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2 Introduction and summary
This thesis consist of four self-contained chapters. The main focus of the thesis is on occupa-
tional mobility, both empirically and theoretically. Chapter 2 introduces a set of new patterns
of occupational mobility, chapter 3 presents a model to match the observed patterns of chapter
2, and chapter 3 provides a more detailed analysis of the occupational mobility patterns from a
group of people with the same education. Chapter 1, which is about the effect of welfare ben-
efits on single mothers’ participation in training, welfare, and the labor market, is not directly
related to the last three chapters.
The second chapter is an empirical paper, which uses administrative panel data on 100%
of the Danish population to document a new set of patterns about occupational mobility. The
population data is used to find each workers’ percentile in the wage distribution within his
occupation. The paper presents two main patterns of occupational mobility. By following a
sample of workers after they graduate from school and calculating their wage percentiles within
their occupation in a given year, a very robust result is that workers’ probability of switching
occupations are U-shaped in their wages. It is the highest and the lowest paid workers who
have the highest probability of switching occupation while the workers in the middle of the
wage distribution have the lowest probability of switching occupation. The second new pattern
of occupational mobility is that conditional on switching occupation, high wage workers have
a higher probability of switching to occupations with higher average wages than the average
wage of the occupation they switched out of. The opposite is true for low wage workers who,
conditional on switching occupation, have higher probability of switching to new occupations
where the average wage is lower than their original occupation.
The second chapter is the background paper of chapter 3, which is coauthored with Philipp
Kircher and Iourii Manovskii. In this paper we present the main new patterns from chapter
2 and develop a general equilibrium model of occupational choice. We show analytically that
the model is consistent with the patterns we find from the data on occupational mobility.
In our theory, workers have different innate abilities and workers and employers learn about
these abilities by observing the output realizations. The model further has scarce employment
opportunities such that workers compete for jobs and it has complementarities in the production
function between workers’ ability and productivity of an occupation, which leaves the more able
workers, in equilibrium, occupying the jobs in the more productive occupations. As agents learn
that they are either too good or too bad for a given profession they switch to a more appropriate
one, which induces the U-shapes. We further show that other predictions from the model on
wage changes and shocks to occupations matches moments in the data and separates our model
from other models of occupational mobility.
The forth chapter is an analysis of the occupational mobility of people who have finished
an apprenticeship as a wall painter. On average close to 70 % of this group of educated painters
are working as painters, 10 % work in other occupations and 20 % are not working. The first
part of this chapter is an analysis of how occupational choices of these painters relate to the
fact that they are educated as painters. Using a discrete dynamic choice model this paper
presents a model of occupational choice that takes into account that most of the educated
painters prefer to work as painters. The second part of this chapter analyzes how the year
of graduation affects long run labor market outcomes for the painting apprentices. Painting
apprentices who graduate when unemployment rate is high are less likely to work in painting
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right after graduation but the majority of workers return to the painting occupations, when
unemployment rate falls. One advantage of the presented theory is that it makes it possible
to know when the worker is not in the occupation he is trained for. It is therefore possible
to perform counterfactual experiments on how workers who graduate during a recession will
react if e.g. the government helps them to a job in their preferred occupation after they
graduate. The model is not estimated but parameters are chosen to let the moments from the
model somewhat fit the data. Using the chosen parameters, the paper shows a counterfactual
experiment of letting the job offer probability in the painting occupation be 100 % during the
first year after graduation. Results from this counterfactual experiment indicates that if there
was 100 % probability of receiving a job offer in painting the first year after graduation, this
will increase the probability of having a job as a painter by 7 percentage points 15 years after
graduation for painters who graduated during high unemployment.
Chapter 2, 3, and 4 are the main chapters of this thesis but chapter 1 on the effect on train-
ing, welfare participation and participation in the labor market of increasing welfare benefit, is
included and important as well. Chapter 1, which is the earliest paper in this thesis is related
to the other chapters in the sense that all chapters build on empirical analyses using the Danish
data however, chapter 1 is unrelated to the other chapters because it does not include anything
on occupational choice. The focus of this chapter is to examine the effect on employment prob-
abilities, welfare participation, and voluntary participation in training programs in Denmark
of a reform from 1987, which increased welfare benefits of single parents by a minimum of 12
percent. Using a difference-in-difference approach to analyze participation in training programs
this paper shows that single mothers on welfare choose a higher participation level in a labor
market training program when their maximum level of attainable benefits increase. The results
on welfare participation and labor market participation show considerable heterogeneity in the
treatment effect for mothers with children of different ages. The mothers with older children
do not show any significant changes in their employment probabilities from having increased
welfare benefits but for mothers with young children the effect on employment probability is
positive. The impact of the reform on welfare participation is indeterminate for mother with
young children, but for mothers with older children the effect is negative, indicating a relatively
higher exit rate out of welfare during the reform period relative to the period before the reform.
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3 Summary in Danish
Denne afhandling best˚ar af fire kapitler. Fokus i denne afhandling er p˚a erhvervsmobilitet, b˚ade
empirisk og teoretisk, men der er ogs˚a et kapitel om enlige mødre p˚a kontanthjælp.
Andet kapitel i denne afhandling er et empirisk papir som bruger administrative reg-
ister data fra 100 % af den danske population til at dokumentere et nyt set af mønstre
vedrørende erhvervsmobilitet. Data fra populationen bruges til at finde hver arbejders percentil
i lønfordelingen inden for deres eget erhverv. Papiret præsenterer to nye mønstre inden for er-
hvervsmobilitet. Ved at følge et sample af individer fra de bliver færdige med deres udannelse
og udregne deres lønpercentiler inden for deres erhverv i et givet a˚r, er et meget robust resultat
fra papiret at arbejdernes sandsynlighed for at skifte erhverv er U-formet i deres lønninger. Det
er de højest- og lavest betalte arbejdere indenfor et erhverv, som har den højeste sandsynlighed
for at skifte erhverv mens arbejderne i midten af lønfordelingen har de laveste sandsynligheder
for at skifte erhverv. Det andet nye mønster inden for erhvervsmobilitet viser, at betinget p˚a
at skifte erhverv, arbejdere med høj løn inden for deres erhverv har højest sandsynlighed for at
skifte til nye erhverv, hvor gennemsnitslønnen er højere end det erhverv de kom fra. Modsat er
det for arbejdere som skifter erhverv fra bunden af lønfordelingen, som har højest sandsynlighed
for at skifte til nye erhverv, hvor gennemsnitslønnen er lavere end det erhverv de kom fra.
Tredje kapitel er skrevet sammen med Philipp Kircher og Iourii Manovskii p˚a baggrund
af resultaterne fra det andet kapitel. I dette kapitel præsenterer vi de nye mønstre om er-
hvervsmobilitet fra kapitel 2 og udvikler en generel ligevægtsmodel for valg af erhverv. Vi viser
analytisk at modellen er i overensstemmelse med de mønstre vi finder fra data om erhvervsmo-
bilitet. I vores teori har alle individer forskellige medfødte evner og arbejdere og arbejdsgivere
lærer om disse evner ved at observere produktionsrealisationer. Modellen har ogs˚a knappe
ansættelsesmuligheder s˚aledes at arbejdere konkurrerer om jobs, og den har komplementaritet
i produktionsfunktionen mellem arbejdernes evner og erhvervets produktivitet, hvilket gør at
arbejdere med højere evner, i ligevægt, besætter de jobs der er i de mere produktive erhverv.
N˚ar arbejderne erfarer at de enten er for gode eller for d˚arlige til et givet erhverv, skifter de
til et mere passende et, hvilket medfører U-formerne. Vi viser endvidere at andre forudsigelser
fra modellen om lønændringer og chok til erhverv ogs˚a passer p˚a momenter i data, og derved
adskiller vores model fra andre modeller om erhvervsmobilitet.
Fjerde kapitel er en analyse af erhvervsmobilitet for folk som har færdiggjort en lærlingeud-
dannelse som malere. I gennemsnit arbejder tæt ved 70 % af denne gruppe uddannede malere
som malere mens 10 % arbejder som noget andet end malere og omkring 20 % er arbejdsløse.
Den første del af dette kapitel er en analyse af, hvordan disse maleres erhvervsvalg relaterer
til, at de er uddannede malere. Ved at bruge en diskret dynamisk valg model, præsenterer
dette kapitel en model vedrørende erhvervsvalg, som tager højde for at de fleste af dem som
er uddannede malere foretrækker at arbejde som malere. Anden del af dette kapitel analyserer
hvordan det a˚r, hvor folk bliver færdige med deres uddannelse, har indflydelse p˚a resultater p˚a
arbejdsmarkedet p˚a lang sigt. Maler lærlinge som bliver færdige n˚ar arbejdsløsheden er høj er
mindre tilbøjelige til at arbejde som malere lige efter de bliver færdige med deres uddannelse,
men hovedparten af dem g˚ar tilbage til at arbejde som malere, n˚ar arbejdsløsheden bliver lavere.
En fordel ved modellen i dette kapitel er, at den gør det muligt at foretage kontra-virkeligheds-
eksperimenter med hvordan arbejdere som bliver færdige n˚ar arbejdsløsheden er høj vil reagere,
hvis fx regeringen sørger for at alle kan have et arbejde første a˚r efter endt uddannelse. Mod-
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ellen er ikke estimeret men parametre er valgt til at lade momenter fra modellen passe rimeligt
p˚a data. Ved at bruge disse valgte parametre ses i kapitel 4 et kontra-virkeligheds-eksperiment,
som lader alle malerlærlinge have 100 % chance for at f˚a et job det første a˚r efter de er færdige
med deres uddannelse. Resultatet fra dette kontra-virkeligheds-eksperiment viser at hvis der
var 100 % chance for at f˚a et job som maler første a˚r efter endt lærlingeuddannelse, ville dette
øge sandsynligheden for at have et job som maler med 7 procentpoint for malere som bliver
færdige under høj arbejdsløshed.
Kapitel 1, som er det først skrevne papir i denne afhandling, undersøger effekterne p˚a ar-
bejdsfrekvensen, sandsynligheden for at modtage kontanthjælp, og frivillig deltagelse i revalid-
eringsprogrammer af en kontanthjælpsreform fra 1987, som øgede kontanthjælpen med mini-
mum 12 % for enlige forældre. Ved at bruge en ”differnce-in-differnce” estimationsprocedure
til at analysere deltagelsen i revalideringsprogrammer viser dette papir at enlige mødre p˚a
kontanthjælp har højere sandsynlighed for at deltage i revalideringsprogrammer, n˚ar kontan-
thjælpssatsen øges. Endvidere ses at arbejdsfrekvensen og sandsynligheden for at modtage
kontanthjælp afhænger af, hvor gamle de enlige mødres børn er. Mødre med ældre børn viser
ingen signifikante ændringer i deres arbejdsfrekvens ved forhøjet kontanthjælpssats, men for
mødre med børn under 7 a˚r øger det arbejdsmarkedsfrekvensen n˚ar kontanthjælpen hæves. Ef-
fekten af reformen p˚a sandsynligheden for at modtage kontanthjælp kan ikke bestemmes for
mødre med yngre børn, men for mødre med ældre børn er effekten negativ, hvilket vidner om
relativt højere sandsynlighed for at skifte væk fra kontanthjælp i tidsperioden under reformen
i forhold til tidsperioden før reformen.
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Welfare Benefits and Participation in Training,
Welfare, and the Labor Market of Single
Mothers ∗
Fane Groes
CAM & University of Copenhagen
July 20, 2009
Abstract
This paper uses a reform from 1987, which increased welfare benefits of single parents
by a minimum of 12 percent, to examine the effect on employment probabilities, welfare
participation, and voluntary participation in training programs in Denmark. Using a
difference-in-difference approach to analyze participation in training programs this paper
shows that single mothers on welfare choose a higher participation level in a labor market
training program when their maximum level of attainable benefits increase. The effects
on both employment probabilities and welfare participation are positive for mothers with
small children and the effect on welfare participation is negative for mothers with children
older than seven years old.
Chapter 1 of PhD thesis
∗I gratefully acknowledge the comments I have received from Martin Browning and Mette Ejrnæs. This
paper has also benefited from helpful comment from participants at the Center for Applied Microeconometrics’
Christmas Workshop and from participants at the COST conference in London.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is an empirical analysis of how welfare benefit recipients in Denmark
react to an increase in their benefits. Using a difference-in-difference methodology I will at-
tempt to estimate the impact on welfare participation, training participation and employment
probabilities of a Danish welfare reform that increased the welfare benefits of single mothers.
The Danish welfare reform happened in 1987 and it increased the real disposable income of
single parents on welfare by a minimum of 12 percent. I will use this to identify what the
impacts of increased welfare benefits are on single mothers’ employment probabilities and their
welfare and training participation rates.
Using single mothers to estimate the impact of the Danish welfare reform follows a large
literature that also has used difference-in-difference methods to isolate impacts of other reforms.
Eissa and Liebman (1996), Blundell, Brewer, and Shephard (2005), and Francesconi and Van
der Klaauw (2004) are some of the studies. Even though this paper also uses single mothers
to identify an impact of a reform change, the reform and the outcome of this analysis are
different than that of the studies mentioned above. I analyze an increase in welfare benefits,
which was given unconditional on any work requirements. Furthermore, the Danish welfare
system around the period of the reform allowed welfare recipients to voluntarily participate
in a training program. This allows me not only to look at how labor supply and welfare
participation are affected by an increase in welfare benefits but it also allows me to analyze
how welfare recipients’ incentives to participate in training are affected by the amount of benefits
they can receive during training.
Denmark is an interesting country to analyze the effect of welfare benefits because it has
one of the highest welfare benefit levels in the world. This means the incentive to work is small
unless a certain earned income is possible. The 1987 reform changed the incentives to work
for an unskilled mother with two children under 6 years old from being able to make, in 2006,
what would be approximately $20 extra per month to loosing about $30 per month if she was
working relative to what she would be able to receive on welfare.
The way out of welfare is to earn more money than the welfare benefits provide and one
way to accomplish this is to build up human capital. Investment in human capital can be done
through work experience or by taking an education. The training program analyzed in this
paper allowed participants to build up their human capital by enrolling in a formal education
or working in a subsidized job while receiving benefits. The increase in welfare benefits gave
the poorest single parents a higher income and my motivation for this paper is to analyze if
the benefit increase lead to any further positive effects, such as investment in human capital
through the training program. In order to understand more about the impact of the reform, I
also include an analysis of the higher welfare benefits’ impact on single mothers’ employment
rates and their welfare participation rates.
There exist a large literature on welfare programs’ effect on employment probabilities and
welfare participation rates however, both the empirical and the theoretical literature on welfare
programs’ effect on human capital accumulation is extremely sparse. In an empirical analysis
Miller and Sanders (1997) find that differences in welfare benefits have no impact on high
school graduation rates. Kesselman (1976) and Moffitt(2003) have theoretical models of welfare
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programs’ effect on training participation however, neither of these models can be fully applied
to analyze the impact of increased benefits on voluntary training participation. The training
program analyzed in this paper has been analyzed by Høgelund and Holm (2006). In a sample
from 1995 they find that the training increased the participants job probabilities in low and
medium paid jobs.
In my analysis I use two samples of welfare participants. The first sample is from 1986,
which is the last full year before the welfare reform, and the individuals in the sample are
followed to 1988, which is the first full year after the welfare reform. To find the effect of the
increase in welfare benefits the estimation strategy is to compare the labor market participation,
welfare participation, and training participation of single mothers to that of single women
without children before and after the reform in 1987. Based on two structural assumptions and
a comparison of the pre-reform and the post-reform outcomes for mothers relative to women
without children it is possible to identify outcome changes, caused by the welfare reform. This
is the two period difference-in-difference (DID) estimation method that I apply in this paper.
One of the assumptions for the model to be identified is the ”common time trend” assumption
and to test for this, I also perform the same DID analysis on a sample of welfare participants
from 1984 who I follow through to 1986.
The most robust result of my analysis is that the increase in welfare benefits increased the
training participation rate of single mothers with children younger than seven years old relative
to that of single women without children. Furthermore, the group of mothers with young
children had a higher probability of staying on welfare but the increase in welfare participation
was not as high as the increase in training participation. The same group of mothers with
children younger than seven also had an increased employment rate after the reform. It is
possible for the mothers to have a positive effect in all three outcome because the outcomes are
not mutually exclusive. However, the positive results on employment rates cannot be explained
by any economic theory that I present in this paper. The increased welfare benefits for mothers
with children older than seven years old did not have a significant effect on either employment
rates or training participation but it decreased the welfare participation rate. This last result
can also not be explained by the theory I present in this paper.
The paper is organized in the following way. First I describe the institutional framework
of the welfare system in Denmark during the 1980’s and then I go into details in describing
the training program that was offered as a part of the welfare system. In section 2.3 I describe
the 1987 welfare reform and in section 3, I explain what other reforms occurred during the
period of my analysis. Section 4 is an overview of some theoretical models of labor supply and
welfare and training participation, which can be used for predicting the expected effects of the
welfare benefit increase. In section 5 I describe the evaluation methodology, a section under
which I explain why I have chosen to condition the sample on receiving welfare benefits in the
year before the reform and I explain the setup of the difference-in-difference estimation method.
Section 6 is a description of the data and section 7 is a presentation of the results. Finally, I
will conclude in section 8.
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2 The Danish Welfare Benefit System
In this introduction to the Danish welfare system from the 1980’s I will first describe how a
person becomes eligible for welfare and what the institutional framework of the welfare system
was. After that I will explain in detail how a person qualified for the training program and
what the program consisted of. Then I will explain the welfare reform that this paper revolves
around and I will illustrate how large the welfare benefit increase was and what the level of
benefits were relative to the lowest and average earned income for different educational groups.
2.1 Institutional Framework of Welfare Benefits
The main reason of receiving welfare benefits is unemployment. In Denmark unemployed in-
dividuals can receive either unemployment insurance (UI) benefits or welfare benefits. This
division between the unemployment support has existed since 1976 where the first act on wel-
fare benefits was passed.
To qualify for UI benefits a recipient must hold a voluntary membership to an unemploy-
ment insurance fund and must do so for at least one year prior to collecting UI benefits. From
1985 to 1991, which is the period analyzed in this paper, a person with an UI fund member-
ship was eligible for UI benefits if she fulfilled what was called the ”26 weeks rule”. The rule
conditioned the right to collect UI benefits on at least 26 weeks of full time employment within
the previous three years. Exceptions were given when the member had finished an education
of minimum 18 months length. In this case the member would receive a lower benefit level and
earn the right to receive full UI benefits after 26 weeks of full time employment. An important
feature of the 26 weeks rule was that the full time employment also includes participation in
labor market programs, such as public salary support for employment in private firms or job
training with employment at the local or regional municipality. (Ingerslev (1992)).
The unemployment insurance benefits were in general higher than the welfare benefits. The
Social Welfare Act of 19871 stated that the total amount of welfare benefits were not allowed
to exceed the maximum amount of unemployment insurance benefits. An exemption from this
was if 90 percent of the welfare recipient’s previous income was higher than the unemployment
insurance benefits.
The people who were unemployed in the 1980’s and who were not eligible for UI benefits
had four different ways of ensuring themselves welfare benefits. The first way was to fulfill the
conditions to receive temporary welfare benefits, the second was to fulfill the conditions in order
to receive permanent welfare benefits, the third way was to fulfill conditions to receive welfare
benefits to cover single expenses, and the last way was to commit to a training program defined
under the Social Welfare Act. In my data it is only possible to determine the difference between
receiving welfare benefits under a training program or not. This means that both permanent,
temporary, and single expenses benefits are categorized the same. Following Thalow and Gamst
(1987) about 60 percent of all single women on welfare received it in the form of temporary
welfare. Another 20 percent received welfare benefits under the training conditions, another
16 percent received welfare benefits to cover single expenses, and the rest (4 percent) received
permanent benefits.
1In Danish this is ”Lov om Social Bistand”
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A person was able to qualify for temporary welfare benefits if she met five core conditions.
The first condition was that the individual must have been subjected to a social occurrence,
which could be the loss of a job, illness, pregnancy, divorce, or other changes that temporarily
prevented the individual from paying her necessary expenses. A core condition was also that
the individual’s expenses could not be covered by other means of public income support ie.
unemployment insurance, student grants, or retirement benefits. Welfare benefits were means-
tested and depended on the family income (except children under the age of 18 years), such that
a third condition was, if the income of a spouse (or the joint income) was above the maximum
attainable benefit level the unemployed individual would no longer be eligible for the welfare
benefits. Furthermore, if the family had large savings that could cover their expenses these
saving had to be exhausted before the unemployed individual was eligible for welfare benefits.
Exceptions were given when the savings were related to housing or education. Finally the fifth
core condition to receive welfare benefits was the requirement that the unemployed individual
and her spouse had exhausted their employment possibilities, meaning that they were not able
to find a suitable job, incapable of working because of illness or caretaking of a child, or because
of participation in a public sponsored schooling program. (See Lov om social bistand 1987).
Welfare benefits to cover single expenses were given mostly to prevent or relieve problems
with children in the household, but could also be given to the welfare recipient. This could be
in the case of handicapped children, medicine or medical treatment for children or the welfare
recipient, or cover travel expenses in order for the child to stay in contact with a parent who
did not live in the household with the child.
In order to receive permanent welfare benefits the recipient had prove it would be impossible
for her to hold a job. Individuals on permanent welfare would most often be transferred to
other types of permanent income support schemes after a while. This could be either disability
benefits or early retirement benefits. In the rest of this paper I will not pay any more attention
to either individuals who received welfare benefits to cover single expenses or to individuals
who received permanent welfare benefits.
The last way to receive welfare benefits was to participate in a training program. The train-
ing program consisted of the choice between any kind of education, internship, apprenticeship,
a stay at an institution, or holding a job with a subsidized salary. A person who participated
in the training program would receive the same amount of welfare benefits as if she was on
temporary benefits, unless she held a job with a subsidized salary in which case she would
receive the minimum wage. The eligibility to participate in the training program was stated
in the Social Welfare Act. A person was eligible for training if this training was a necessary
requirement for the person’s ability to take care of her self or her family as long as there were no
other public schemes/institutions that could help the person.2 In theory this eligible group is
2This is §42 of the Danish Social Welafre Act. In Danish this paragraph goes under the name ”revalidering”
and directly translated into English this word means rehabilitation. These words are not good sustitutes because
the meaning of the English ”rehabilitation” is not the same as the Danish ”revalidering”. Rehabilitation is a
concept that gained popularity in the US and the UK in 1950’s where the purpose was to help war invalids to
get an acceptable life and, if possible, be rehabilitated to work a new job. Rehabilitation included both steps
toward restoring the participant’s health as well as their working prospects.
In Denmark it was argued that rehabilitation should not include treatment of health related issues, because
this was already financed by the state. As a result the semantic meaning of the Danish word “revalidering”,
which is similar to the English word rehabilitation, is different from the notion of rehabilitation in Denmark.
The idea of rehabilitation in Denmark has only focused on work related issues, such as education, vocational
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very large, however in practice, the training program was aimed at six main groups that all had
some form of weak labor force attachment. The main focus groups were single parents, young
people with a low level of education, long time unemployed, persons receiving sickness benefits
and who are unable to return to their prior work, immigrants and refugees, and persons with
problematic social conditions. All these groups will be discussed in some detail in section 2.2
below however, all of them (except the long term unemployed) were able to enter the training
program without experiencing a period of unemployment and all of them were able to receive
welfare benefits until they finished their training program.
Once a person qualified to receive welfare benefits they received a basis amount and another
amount, which depended on their housing expenses and whether or not they had any children.
The welfare benefits were tax free and the total amount of received benefits was reduced dollar
for dollar with the after tax earned income. This means that the welfare benefits were taxed
at a 100 percent marginal tax rate until the after tax earned income exceeded the maximum
welfare benefit amount. At the time around the reform, the enrollment in the welfare program
did not have a time limit and there existed no mandatory work requirements, just as there was
no duty to participate in the training program.
2.2 The training program
The training program analyzed in this paper was a part of the welfare program in the 1980’s.
If a person participated in the training program she would receive the same amount of welfare
benefits as a person who received welfare benefits as a passive recipient. The training partici-
pants could receive benefits for five different types of training. In my data it is not possible to
identify what type of training the participant was enrolled but Valbak and Wamsler (1986) has
a survey, which gives the percentages of participants in each category.
Six percent of the participants in the training program received welfare benefits to be at
what I call an institutional stay. This was a kind of workshop supported by the municipality
where the training participant was evaluated to see if she was fit for work. The second type
of training was enrollment in a formal education. Participants enrolled in a formal education
had by far the largest share of the training participants. In total 71 percent of the training
participants were enrolled in a formal education. This covered 24 percent in education up to
9th grade, 20 percent in vocational training that could be up to 18 months long, and 27 percent
in vocational training that lasted longer time than 18 months. The last three types of training
was internships, apprenticeships, and subsidized wage work, which together consisted of the
last 23 percent of the training participants.
In the Social Welfare Act it was stated that all persons were eligible for training if the
training was a necessary requirement for the person’s ability to take care of her self in the
future. However, certain focus groups were mentioned in the guidelines provided for the case
workers who administered the funding for the training program in the municipalities. Before I
describe the focus groups it is important to state that these guidelines originated in 1983 and
training, and job retraining. This is the reason why I, in this paper, have called the program a labor market
training program rather than a rehabilitation program.
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did not change during the period of the welfare reform analyzed in this paper. Furthermore,
there was no right or duty to participate in the training program for either the focus groups
or the welfare participants not included in the focus groups. Most of the decision was left up
to the case workers in the municipalities and it is therefore important for my further analysis
to emphasize that the case workers did not receive any official change in their guidelines from
1983 to 1988, which is the last year of my analysis.
The guidelines for the training program described six main focus groups. Valbak and
Wamsler (1986) has, in their survey, divided the training participants into five groups dependent
on reason for training. I will refer to some of their enrollment percentages because my data
does not allow me to know what focus group the training participants in my sample fit under.
The only focus group Valbak and Wamsler have not included is immigrants and refugees. This
focus group is self explanatory however, in my analysis I have excluded these individuals in
order to have a more homogenous group of welfare and training participants. The second focus
group was people who received sickness or disability benefits and who could not return to their
previous job. According to Valbak and Wamsler (1986) this group consisted of 29 percent of
the training participants. The third focus group in the guidelines for the training program is
the young people with low level of education. This group consisted of 10 percent of the training
participants in Valbak and Wamsler’s survey. I have also chosen to exclude this group of young
individuals from the survey because if they received welfare benefits they could also be a part
of another training program where they did not receive welfare benefits. The forth focus group
were the people who had been long time unemployed. Valbak and Wamsler do not have this
group as a separate category but together with the fifth focus group, who were the people with
problematic social conditions, they make up 52 percent of the training participants. The sixth
and last group was the single parents who are the ones I will use in my further analysis. This
group consisted of 21 percent of the training participants. In the sample I use in this paper, it
shows that 25 percent of the single mothers who received welfare benefits in 1986 was enrolled
in a training program and for single women without children this number was 17 percent.
2.3 The 1987 welfare reform
On July 1st 1987 there was an increase in the amount paid out to the welfare recipients in
Denmark, which especially benefited parents as can be seen in table 1 below. Both before and
after 1987 the welfare benefits were divided into three sub categories. The first being the basis
support, the second was additional child benefits, and the third was housing support. The
basis support and the child support were both before and after the reform given in somewhat
fixed levels of benefits whereas the housing support could be given to cover rent, water, heat,
electricity etc. and had no fixed level of benefits attached. It was especially the amount of
child support that changed in 1987 because the part of the welfare benefits given to support
any children in the household close to doubled. The increase was such that a single parent with
two children on welfare (and no additional income) would have had a real increase in overall
benefits of about 16 percent, whereas the same single individual without children would have
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had a real increase in benefits of about 4 percent.345
Table 1. Changes in maximum nominal monthly welfare benefits for singles on
July 1st 1987, in Danish Kroner
Prior to After Percent Percent
July 1987 July 1987 increase increase
(nominal) (real)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basis Support:
-singles 2, 319 2, 579 11% 7%
Child Support:
-first child 582 1, 196 105% 98%
-second or above child 582 997 71% 65%
Housing Support:
-non-parents 2, 115 2, 200 4% No change
-parents 3, 076 3, 199 4% No change
Single, one child 5, 977 6, 974 16% 12%
Single, two children 6, 559 7, 872 20% 16%
Single w/o children 4, 434 4, 779 7% 4%
Sources: Lov om Social Bistand 1987, Børnetilskudsloven 1987, Jappe (1987), Bekendtgørelsen om størrelsen
af ydelser efter børnetilskudsloven pr. 1 juli 1987
Both before and after the reform in 1987 the welfare benefits were regulated once a year to
keep up with inflation. To get a feeling of the inflation at the time, the consumer price index
rose 3.7 % in 1986, 4 % in 1987, and 4.5 % in 1988. This means the real value of the increase in
the 1987 reform was as given in column 4. All the welfare benefits were tax free, which means
the welfare benefits should be compared to otherwise possible earned income net of taxes.
In 1987 an unskilled individual’s monthly gross minimum wage was about 9,500 Dkk per
month and the wages of a newly educated grade school teacher was about 13,000 Dkk before
tax. According to Thalow and Gamst (1987) a single mother on welfare with one child in
daycare before the 1987 reform had to earn 9,000 Dkk before taxes in order to have a marginal
tax rate less than 100 percent. This was such that the same single mother with one child in
daycare would receive 50 Dkk extra in after tax income if she worked full time at the minimum
wage for unskilled workers in stead of receiving welfare and she would receive an extra 750
Dkk net income if she worked full time as a newly educated teacher. This is approximately
equivalent to an extra income of $20 dollars for the unskilled and $300 for the newly educated
teacher if the Danish kroner from 1986 is calculated into dollar values in year 2006. The little
3This is only for individuals above 23 years of age.
4The basis amount was reduced for individuals with longer spells than 9 months but this reduction was the
same for indivduals without training.
5This housing support originates from an example after the reform in 1987 of typical housing support for a
single individual without children and is estimated for a single individual with children. The value is reduced
by 4 percent to find the housing support prior to the 1987 reform, which was the increase in CPI. The average
house payments for singles was in 1987 approxiamtely 2,260 dkk per month and approximately 3,250 dkk per
month for single parents. These numbers includes both renting and owning where owning costs about the double
of renting. (See Jappe (1987) and Statistisk Ti˚arsoversigt (1990))
14
extra disposable income was because welfare benefits were means tested and so were additional
housing support and subsidy for daycare, which is described in more detail below.
The three major forms of additional income (or subsidies) for welfare recipients were subsi-
dized housing, subsidized daycare, and other types of child support from the state, which were
not included in the welfare benefits. The additional benefits are an important source of income
for the welfare recipients, especially for the single providers. On average they contribute 20 per-
cent of the total disposable income. The first source of additional income is a housing subsidy
given to all persons who live in rental housing. In 1987 around 70 percent of the single mothers
on welfare received this subsidy, which depended on household income and housing expenses
and on average the welfare recipients received a rent subsidy of 1,200 Dkk per month. The
subsidy was not dependent on receiving welfare such that a person on welfare with the same
disposable income and housing expenses as a working person would receive the same amount of
housing subsidy. However, since the housing subsidy is means tested it is one of the two major
sources of high marginal tax rates facing individuals wishing to work.
The second means tested subsidy was the subsidy for child care. It is not possible from
the data used in this paper to see how much the welfare recipient received in childcare subsidy
but the maximum allowed monthly gross income was 11,250 Dkk in 1987, which was above the
minimum wage for unskilled employees but below the income for a newly educated teacher.
The Ministry of Social Affairs calculated that a single mother earning a minimum wage as
an unskilled worker and who had one child in nursery care and another child in kindergarten
got around a 1,000 Dkk subsidy. This is out of a nursery care payment of 1,115 Dkk and a
kindergarten payment of 938 Dkk in 1987.
The last additional income source, which also only applies to parents are additional types
of child support from the state and the municipality. These additional child benefits demand
special attention since they have changed in levels in the analyzed period and therefore may
cause an identification problem of the effect of increased welfare benefits for single parents.
They will be described in the following section.
3 Other reforms in the 1980’s
During the time period analyzed in this paper, there have been two other major reforms which
potentially can affect the outcomes in my analysis. The first one is the reform in child support
from the state and the municipality and the other one is what in Denmark is referred to as the
”Potato Cure”.
In the 1980’s there existed five different kinds of child supports, where four of them were
given whether or not the single mother received welfare benefits. In English I call these benefits;
child-contribution, child-benefit, family-benefit, a child-check, and a special child-benefit. All
these child benefits are transfer payments and are therefore not calculated as income (to go
toward the means tested welfare benefits) when a person receives social welfare.
The child-check existed up to and including 1986 and was a check paid out to families with
children under the age of 10 and the benefits were 800 DKK per year per child no matter if
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the parents received welfare benefits or not. In 1987 and 1988 the child-check was replaced by
the family-benefit which was a tax free benefit worth 5.000 DKK per child per year, no matter
what the children’s ages were or the income of the family, however only half the amount was
paid out in 1987.
The rules behind the administration of the child-benefit were also changed in 1987, such
that it was no longer dependent on family income and it included children up to 18 years of
age in stead of only up to 16 years before 1987. If a single mother had a higher income than
140.000 Dkk before 1987 then the benefits would gradually be reduced until the women earned
around 200.000 Dkk in which case she would no longer receive child benefits. After 1987 all
parent received the child benefits independent of income. To put the 140.000 into perspective
a skilled worker earning minimum wage would receive what was around 114.000 DKK and the
average income for a single mother who was a public servant was around 159.600 DKK per
year. Not taking account for the means tested child benefits before 1987, a single mother would
receive 443 DKK in child benefits for the first child before 1987. This included both the child
benefits and the special child benefits. After the reform a single mother received 535 DKK for
the first child.
The last kind of child- support is the child-contribution, which is the contribution from the
father to the mother of the child if the child only lives with the mother. This amount was 5.028
DKK in 1986, which also makes it 582 Dkk per child per month and in 1987 this benefit also
increased a little to about 598 DKK per month. This was paid by the father of the child and if
the father did not pay then it was paid by the municipality. The child-support from the father
was also given whether or not the mother received welfare benefits. In total a mother with one
child would receive around 7.200 DKK more each year after 1987 than before and even more if
she earned more than 140.000 before 1987.
The second reform was the ”Potato Cure”. This ”cure” was a tax reform that happened
in 1987 and the main goal was to reduce the Danish population’s incentive to borrow money
and force the house owners to have bigger savings. Summarizing from Christoffersen (1999)
this was done by reducing the tax value of the interest deduction house owners could get, thus
making the relative wealth in houses significantly less. In my empirical analyses I have therefore
included a control variable for whether or not the individuals in the sample are house owners.
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4 Theoretical models of labor supply and welfare and
training participation
The welfare program analyzed in this paper is the largest welfare program in Denmark. Fur-
thermore, the alternatives to the welfare are often not feasible for the welfare participant in the
sense that the welfare recipients do not fulfill the requirements. This could be that the welfare
recipients are not old enough to receive retirement benefits, are not sick enough to receive sick-
ness benefits, or they have not worked enough to be a member of an unemployment insurance
fund.
In this theoretical setup I only consider work as an alternative to welfare and in the next
section I will divide the welfare recipients into two categories. One category with recipients who
only receive passive welfare and another category where recipients receive welfare conditional
on participation in a training program.
There exists a large literature on labor supply issues related to welfare reforms. Friedman
(1962) and Tobin (1965) noted that welfare programs with 100 % marginal tax rate discouraged
work compared to a negative income tax with tax rates less than 100 %. In this section I will
show a model with 100 % marginal tax rate of welfare benefits because this is how the Danish
welfare system looked in the 1980’s. The theory discussed here follows Moffitt (2002). He has,
in his handbook chapter, reviewed some of the theoretical models that combine labor supply
and welfare participation and I will use this as my main reference.
The presented theory is meant to give an idea of the expected sign of the difference-in-
difference estimator, which can be used to comment on the findings in the empirical section.
The link between this theory section and the findings in the empirical results section is not
structural and should this analysis be carried any further this link would be the place to start.
Blundell and MaCurdy (1998) have a discussion of what kind of structural restrictions are
needed for the difference-in-difference estimator to measure a meaningful behavioral parameter
and in section 5.3 I will present these restrictions.
4.1 Labor supply and passive welfare participation
A simple theoretical framework that relates labor supply to welfare participation is a static
model. The individuals in this model have well behaved preferences over consumption (C)
and leisure (L) and have utility function U(C,L). The budget constraint without welfare
benefits is given by N + (1− t)W (T − L) = PC. Here N is exogenous unearned income,
such as government child support, W is hourly wage rate, P is the price of consumption
goods, t is the marginal tax rate on earned income, and T is the total time available in the
interval. If a person receives welfare benefits she receives B = G− (1− t)W (T − L) in welfare,
where G is the maximum amount of attainable welfare benefits. The total amount of received
benefits, B, is reduced dollar for dollar with the after tax earned income (1− t)W (T − L). If
(1− t)W (T − L) > G then B = 0, meaning that the means tested welfare benefits is zero if
earned income net of taxes is above the maximum attainable welfare benefits. If the after tax
earned income is smaller than G, then the total income is G.
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With hours worked defined asH = T−L and the price of consumption goods, P , normalized
to 1, the budget constraint can be rewritten as a piecewise linear budget constraint such that:
Y = G+N if G > (1− t)WH and
Y = N + (1− t)W (T − L) if G < (1− t)WH.
Figure 1 illustrates the budget constraint where the vertical distance AB represents G
before the welfare reform. The horizontal segment BC represents the welfare benefits which
are taxed at a 100 % marginal tax rate and the segment AD is the non-welfare constraint. At
the point C the earned income exceeds the welfare benefits and the slope of the segment CD
is −W (1− t). There is no exogenous unearned income in the illustration because N is set to
zero.
Figure 1: Budget constraint before the reform.
In this model, an individual with well behaved preferences will prefer to work when she
is able to earn an income larger than the maximum welfare benefits. If her potential earned
income is lower than the maximum benefit level she will prefer to receive the full amount of
welfare benefits and not work. This is illustrated in figure 2 where a person who receives the full
amount of welfare benefits has indifference curve 1 and a person who prefers to work without
receiving benefits has indifference curve 2.
In the Danish data there exist individuals who do not receive welfare and have an earned
income less than the maximum attainable welfare benefits thus, a person on the segment AC in
figures. A reason for observing these eligible individuals may be that there exists disutility from
receiving welfare that makes people want to work in stead. Moffitt (1983) has a theoretical
model where he shows how the disutility could arise from stigma of being on welfare. In the
sample used in my analyses I only look at people who received welfare in the year before the
welfare reform thus I do not observe any individuals on the segment AC.
In the data I do observe welfare recipients from 1986 who also earned an income in the same
year and therefore possibly lie on the horizontal segment BC. With well behaved preferences
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Figure 2: Budget constraint with indifference curves.
these individuals do not fit into the predictions presented in figure 2. There are several reasons
why this can be the case and here I will present two of them.
The first reason for observing individuals who both work and receive welfare is that the data
is annual data. In a given observed year this gives the individuals the possibility of convexify
their budget constraints by moving on and off welfare over time periods, which are shorter
than a year. Ignoring discounting, the women in the sample could in this way achieve higher
utility than choosing a fixed amount of hours on the DC segment or zero hours at the point B.
The data does not include dates on time spent on welfare but does provide information about
amount of welfare benefits received. The movement on and off welfare is therefore an option
that cannot be excluded. Blundell and MaCurdy (1998) describes this dynamic model, which
uses a two stage budgeting technique and the labor supply, which is separable between all time
periods.
The second reason why individuals would want to work, when they can receive welfare
benefits, is because of wage growth possibilities related to work experience. Miller and Sanders
(1997) have a theoretical model like this, which also is a dynamic model of labor supply rather
than the static setup presented in figure 1 and 2.
Even though a dynamic model of labor supply can explain the observed data better, the
static model can still be used to look at a change in welfare benefits. Figure 3 illustrates an
increase in maximum attainable welfare benefits in the static model. The maximum attainable
welfare benefits, G, has increased from B to B’. In the model where individuals either receive
the full welfare amount or work without receiving any welfare, the increase in G has the effect
as showed by the arrows in figure 3.
First of all, individuals who received full welfare before the increase continue to receive full
welfare. They are strictly better off after the increase and have no incentives to deviate from
the choice of receiving full welfare. This is illustrated by the arrow that goes from B to B’. The
other arrow illustrates that some of the individuals who worked full time before the reform will
choose to receive welfare after the reform. They will move from the segment DC to the point B’
and be strictly better off.6 In this simple model there is therefore an unambiguously negative
6It should be noted that these individuals are excluded from the sample, since the sample only includes
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Figure 3: Budget constraint after increase in welfare benefits.
effect on labor supply and an equally unambiguously positive effect on welfare participation.
The unambiguous result of increased welfare benefits on labor supply and welfare partic-
ipation does not change if the model allows individuals to both receive welfare benefits and
work. In the two dynamic models mentioned above where work and welfare can be combined,
an increase in welfare benefits also gives that fewer people will be willing to work and more
people will want to receive welfare benefits.
If the individuals in the dynamic models receive full welfare in all periods before the reform
they will continue to do so after the reform and be strictly better off. Among individuals who
convexify their budget constraint there should be some who, after the welfare benefit increase,
get strictly better off by receiving full welfare. These individuals will reduce their labor supply
and stop working. In a model where people work in order to get experience, the labor supply
effect of a welfare increase is also negative. As in the static model, the alternative income to
work is now higher and for some individuals even with their potential wage growth they will not
be able to earn more money than what they are able to receive from welfare after the reform.
These people will make a career out of welfare.
The models presented above give an unambiguously prediction for the empirical section.
This is that the individuals who experienced the welfare increase should reduce their labor
supply and have a higher welfare participation rate after the reform relative to individuals
measured over the same time period who did not receive the increase in welfare benefits.
4.2 Training Participation
There only exist few studies that have analyzed the theoretical effects of welfare programs on
the decision of participating in a training program. To my knowledge, there are no studies
individuals who received welfare before the reform.
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that analyze a setting where the welfare recipients voluntarily can participate in training and
receive the same amount of welfare benefits as if they had been accepting passive welfare. In
this section I will present the studies referred to by Moffitt (2002), which analyze theories about
welfare and training programs and explain why my study differs from these. The three studies
I will refer to are Kesselman (1976), Miller and Sanders (1997), and Moffitt (2003).
I analyze participation in a training program as a human capital investment because a high
percentage of the Danish training participants are enrolled in school. Human capital investment
models are analyzed in a dynamic setting and the static model presented above therefore falls
a little short.
The basic setup in human capital models is that they require an investment of time (i.e.
in education or job training) and then they yield some rate of return in form of higher future
wages. The value to an individual participating in the training program is the present value
of future wages and earnings gained minus the net present value of the cost of time and direct
costs such as tuition fees etc. In this case, It is important to know whether the training program
is voluntary or mandatory to determine when individuals will participate in training or not. No
one will participate in a voluntary training program unless it has a positive net present value.
However, if the training program is mandatory, participants can potentially be made worse
off by participation. As noted by Moffitt (2003) the rate of return to the training program
depends on whether it raises earnings sufficiently to induce the individual to go off welfare.
This is because the marginal tax rate off welfare is lower than it is on welfare, which is the case
in all three studies discussed below as well as in my analysis.
Miller and Sanders (1997) analyze two types of human capital accumulation, which is
educational attainment and labor market experience. They set up a theoretical model for the
joint decision of welfare participation and work but this model does not include a choice of
schooling or training. They analyze educational attainment as a separate empirical analysis
but do not include a theoretical model, which could explain their findings.
Kesselman (1976) analyzed individuals who would be on welfare both before and after a
training period and he found that they had less incentive to participate in training if a welfare
program existed. He looked at a welfare program where individuals on welfare worked at the
same time as they received welfare and for each dollar they made there was a higher marginal
tax rate than for people who did not receive welfare. Individuals could be in the welfare program
up to a certain threshold earning, much like it is the case for the Danish welfare program. The
reason why an individual on welfare both before and after the reform would have less incentive
to participate in the training is because both their opportunity costs and their return to training
is lower on welfare than off welfare. In Kesselman’s analysis people off welfare received their
entire wage, W , and people on welfare paid a marginal tax of their wage such that (1− t)W
was their net of tax wage.
In a two period model, individuals off welfare would have a net present value of training,
which would be PVoff = −W1 + βW2 where W1 is the wage before training, W2 is the wage
after training, and β is a time discount factor. Similarly for individuals on welfare who would
have a net present value of PVon = − (1− t)W1 + β (1− t)W2 = (1− t)PVoff . Individuals on
welfare would therefore have a rate of return to the training, which would be (1− t) of what
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it would be in absence of the program. This means that no individuals should participate in a
voluntary training program if they intend to stay on welfare.
The effect of a training program is the opposite if it can move a person off welfare. The
return at the margin will be higher because the marginal tax rate for work off welfare is lower
than it is on welfare. The net present value for an individual on welfare during the training and
off welfare after the training is PVon = − (1− t)W1 + βW2 > PVoff . Therefore human capital
investment is encouraged relative to what it would be in absence of the program.
Moffitt (2003) built on the model by Kesselman (1976). He also assumes that the oppor-
tunity cost of participating in a training program is in lost earnings rather than in leisure.
However, he sets up a model where the welfare recipients have to undergo training as a condi-
tion for receiving welfare benefits such that the human capital investment becomes a type of
work requirement. This is unlike the Danish welfare program during the 1980’s, where there
was ”no right or duty” for the welfare participants to participate in the training program.
The settings in Kesselman (1976) and Moffitt (2003) are not the same as in my analysis but
the results can be somewhat applied to what I want to analyze. In my analysis it should also
be true that people who received full welfare before the reform would not want to participate
in training after the reform. The marginal tax rate on welfare is 100 % in my analysis and
the opportunity costs of training, according to Kesselman’s setup is therefore zero. If I was
comparing a situation with no welfare to one with a welfare program I could use Kesselman’s
setup. However, I want to analyze the effect of an increase in welfare benefits and not one of
whether there is welfare or not. If I apply Kesselman’s model to my analysis this would affect
individuals who were on the margin of receiving welfare before the reform and received welfare
after the increase. These individuals would have the same outcomes as in Kesselman’s analysis
where the people who could move off welfare after the training would have a higher incentive to
participate in training with the increased welfare than without it. The incentive to take training
for the person who worked before the reform is not a part of my analysis since I only include
individuals who received welfare before the reform thus, who already had zero opportunity cost
of training in Kesselman’s model. These individuals should according to Kesselman (1976) and
Moffitt (2003) not be expected to have higher incentives to participate in training.
My empirical analysis in section 7 show that the single mothers with young children who
received higher welfare benefits also had a relatively high enrollment rate in the training pro-
grams during the period of the welfare increase. The models discussed above do not give this
result however, the models are also very simple. One extension of the models above to repro-
duce my empirical finding could be to let the stigma of being on welfare be positively related to
the amount of welfare benefits received. Then, if the stigma of being in training while receiving
welfare benefits was less than the stigma of passive benefits, an increase in welfare benefits
could make welfare recipients choose more training when welfare benefits increase.
More elaborate dynamic models like the ones in Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Cohen-
Goldner and Eckstein (2006) include more choice variables and the individuals in their models
are allowed to experience a difference in wage growth depending on time spent in the labor
market, education, and their career choice. In dynamic model like these it would be possible
to let welfare recipients be on welfare as a result of a bad shock thus some recipients would not
be on welfare voluntarily. If this is the case then the marginal worker who would have worked
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in the period after the shock is the same type of marginal worker as explained above. If she
would have worked the next period if the welfare increase had not occurred, her opportunity
costs are no longer the lost benefits (which she does not experience) but her wage minus the
benefits she is able to receive. She will be able to lift her self out of welfare after training and
therefore an increase in welfare benefits will increase her incentive to participate in a training
program. By including welfare benefits and training on welfare in a dynamic structural model
like the ones mentioned above it is also possible that this would allow for individuals who work
while they are on welfare to compare their wage profiles as an unskilled worker to a wage profile
as a skilled worker. To become a skilled worker they would have to invest time in education
and this would take time away from a potential wage growth they would have as an unskilled
worker. If the wage growth as an unskilled worker could lead people out of welfare fast and
becoming a skilled worker would take longer time on welfare (training) then the opportunity
cost of training is no longer zero but the potential increase in wage from work experience. This
is a setup very much like Coohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2006) where the opportunity costs
of unemployment and training is accumulation of work experience, which they allow to affect
future wages.
The ways of expanding these dynamic models are merely suggestive. I have in this paper
not set up a formal model of welfare and training participation, which can be applied to my
empirical analysis. As mentioned in the theory introduction, this analysis is primarily empirical.
Should it be carried any further a theoretical model for joint labor market, welfare and training
participation, which could give a structural interpretation to the parameters of an empirical
analysis would be the place to start.
5 Evaluation Methodology
5.1 Identification Strategy
The empirical analysis in this paper aims at estimating the effects of increased welfare benefits
on labor market participation, welfare participation and training participation. To find the
effect of the increase in welfare benefits the estimation strategy is to compare the labor market
participation, welfare participation and training participation of single mothers to that of single
women without children before and after the reform in 1987. This is done by considering single
mothers (who are the ones that receive the increased benefits) as the treatment group and
women without children (who do not receive increased benefits) as the control group. This is
done in order to isolate the effect of the increase in benefits from other policies or economic
shocks that might have occurred in the time period, which have affected both groups similarly.
The difference in time between the change in labor market participation, training partic-
ipation and welfare participation of single mothers to that of single women without children
are the estimates of the 1987 reform. This is the difference-in-difference approach, which com-
pares outcomes of the treated from before the reform in 1986 to outcomes of the treated after
the reform in 1988 and at the same time taking account of the change in outcomes for the
non-treated.
The pre-evaluation year of the reform is chosen as 1986 because this is the last year before
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the reform. The idea is that single women’s decisions in 1986 are not affected by the 1987
reform. The law for the reform was passed in December 1986 and put into effect on July 1st
1987, which means that the welfare recipients in 1986 could potentially have anticipated the
reform and made their choices in a forward looking manner. In my analyses I have not taken
this forward looking behavior into account. I have carried all the analyses out assuming the
law was unanticipated in 1986.
The post-evaluation year of the reform is chosen as 1988 because this is the first full year
after the reform has been put into effect. I have not included observations from 1987 because
the reform occurred in July and it is not clear if 1987 should be included as a pre- or post-reform
year.
There exists a substantial literature that uses the outcomes of single mothers compared to
outcomes of single women without children to estimate effects of tax or benefit reforms. Exam-
ples of these studies are Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Blundell,
Brewer, and Shephard (2005), and Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2004). The reasons I have
chosen outcomes of single mothers compared to outcomes of single women without children
are the same as in the existing literature. The three main reasons why single mothers and
single women without children are popular groups to compare are because of the reforms being
analyzed, problems with joint labor market participation decisions, and data issues.
The analyzed reforms, in the mentioned papers, are all reforms that changed the benefits
or the tax schedule for parents and not for people without children. In a difference-in-difference
estimation this makes it obvious to compare people with children to those without any children.
In the papers, the changes in taxes or benefits are also larger for single parents, which is one of
the reasons for why single parents are used in the DID approach. The second reason why single
parents are used is to avoid problems with joint labor market decisions in the household. Many
of the analyzed benefits or tax credits are given conditional on household incomes, such that
the endogenous income of the spouse (and the change in this income) would also have to be
included in the analysis. To keep the analysis as simple as possible most studies therefore only
look at changes in outcomes of single individuals. One of the main reasons why the outcomes
of single women are more popular to analyze than the outcomes of single men is that there are
more single mothers than single fathers. Single mothers often consist of the largest part of the
reforms’ target groups, which makes it possible to perform the DID with a larger data set.
In the data used in this paper single women consists of 51 percent of the welfare recipients
in 1986 and single men consist of 49 percent. However, of all single women on welfare in
1986, 37 percent of them were single mothers, which makes the treatment group relatively large
compared to the single men where only 3 percent of the single male welfare recipients were
single fathers.
5.2 Selection Problem of training participant
The problem of analyzing the choice of participation in this type of training program is that in
order to be eligible for participation in the training program the majority of individuals must
receive welfare benefits, which in it self is an endogenous decision. To avoid the problem of
individuals selecting into welfare, which is likely to be endogenous to the reform, the sample is
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taken to include individuals who received welfare in 1986. By conditioning on being a welfare
recipient in 1986 and following these individuals to 1988 the selection into welfare is taken
account for but the selection out of welfare is not dealt with.
Ideally I would like to compare those individuals who choose training participation because
of the increase in benefits to those with similar characteristics, who did not receive the increase
in benefits. The complication is that the reason for taking training is not fully known.
The first scenario for participating in training is that the participants in the training pro-
gram choose to receive welfare benefits conditional on training in stead of receiving passive
welfare benefits. The second scenario is that the training participants take training as a substi-
tute for having a job with an earned income. The two reasons for participating in the training
program have different policy implications and this is why I also look at the reforms’ effect on
welfare and participation and employment probabilities.
The increase in benefits could affect the 1986 welfare recipients such that mothers change
their participation in the training program relative to non-parents and there is no change in
exit rates out of total welfare for either group7. If this is the case the total welfare participation
is unaffected by the reform and DID estimator will estimate the effect on training participation
when the total welfare participation as constant. Thus, the women who take training substitute
the passive welfare for the training. However, women with children should have a lower rate
out of welfare, compared to the period before the reform, because their benefits are higher.
This brings about the second possible effect the DID estimator on training can estimate. If the
increase in total welfare is exactly like the increase in training then the single mothers would
have substituted work for training. A last possible scenario is that single mothers and women
without children on welfare have a fixed participation rate in the training program. Because exit
rates out of welfare is not exogenous to the reform an estimation of the training participation
effect could simply just pick up that parents stay longer on welfare after the reform and they
have a fixed rate of the welfare participants in training.
The difference-in-difference estimator does not take the change in welfare participation
into account and the reasons for selecting into training probably include elements of each of the
illustrated cases above. From the data I cannot tell the reason for choosing training but I have
argued earlier that the training program is a voluntary program for the women included in the
sample. When I discuss the results in section 7, I will give my interpretation on how much of
the increase in training could be due to an active selection into training from either welfare or
work and how much can be due to a ”forced” or fixed rate training participation of the welfare
recipients. I will do this by comparing the DID estimator of the training participation with the
DID estimator of the welfare and the labor market participation.
5.3 The Difference-in-Difference Estimator
To assess whether single female welfare recipients adjust their labor supply, welfare participa-
tion, and training participation in response to exogenous changes in welfare benefits I use a
difference-in-difference approach. There exists a large literature on the difference-in-difference
7The total number of welfare recipients is here thought of as the total number of passive welfare recipients
plus the total number of training participants.
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estimation method and applications of this method starting with Ashenfelter (1978) and Heck-
man and Robb (1985). In this paper I follow Abadie (2005) and Blundell et.al. (2005) who
both use ordinary least squares (OLS) to account for time-invariant unobservables that enter
additively in the determination of labor market participation, welfare participation and training
participation. The least squares, based on a linear probability model, is reported for simplicity
of interpretation however, I have also estimated Chamberlain fixed-effects logit model, which
provides estimates that give qualitatively similar results.
The 1987 reform increased the maximum attainable welfare benefits of single mothers rela-
tive to that of women without children. Based on two structural assumptions and a comparison
of the pre-reform and the post-reform outcomes for mothers relative to women without children
it is possible to identify outcome changes, caused by the welfare reform. This is the two period
difference-in-difference (DID) estimation method. In this section I present a simple version of
the DID method where all single mothers have one homogenous treatment effect. In the next
section I expand the DID method in order to allow for the welfare benefits to have differential
impacts on the outcomes of single mothers depending on the number and ages of their children.
Following Abadie (2005) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985) let Y (i, t) be the outcome of
interest for individual i at time period t. The three different estimations methods are set up
similarly such that, in estimation 1, Y (i, t) = 1 for individuals who participate in the labor
market in a given year and Y (i, t) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, in estimation 2, I let Y (i, t) = 1 if
the single women participate in training and in estimation 3, Y (i, t) = 1 if the women receive
welfare benefits. In both estimations Y (i, t) = 0 otherwise.
The pre-reform outcome is observed in 1986, which is classified as t = 0 and post reform
outcome is observed in 1988, which is at t = 1. Between period t = 0 and t = 1 single mothers
in the sample are exposed to treatment, because they receive higher welfare benefits. Letting
D (i, t) = 1 if individual i has been exposed to treatment previous to period t and D (i, t) = 0
otherwise. Individuals with D (i, 1) = 1 are called treated and individuals with D (i, 1) = 0 are
the controls, and since treatment only occurs after period t = 0 then D (i, 0) = 0 for all i.
Having at least one child gives single mothers the right to higher welfare benefits in period
t = 1 such that single mothers are defined as the treated and single women are the controls.
The conventional DID estimator is here derived by a linear probability model8 where out-
come variables are generated by the following process:
Y (i, t) = δ (t) + α ·D (i, t) + η (i) + ν (i, t) (1)
where δ (t) is a time specific component, α is the impact of treatment, η (i) is an unobserved
individual specific component, and ν (i, t) is an unobserved individual transitory shock with
mean zero at both t = 0, 1. Notice that only Y (i, t) and D (i, t) are observed.
A sufficient condition for identifying α is that selection for treatment does not depend on
the unobserved individual-transitory shocks, such that:
8The linear probability model is used for convenience and simplicity of interpretation. In derivation 2 in the
appendix the Chamberlain fixed-effect logit is described and the results from this will be used for sensitivity
analyses.
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P (D (i, 1) = 1|ν (i, t)) = P (D (i, 1) = 1) (2)
for t = 0, 1. By applying equation 2 to equation 1 this gives the the following regression
model9:
Y (i, t) = µ+ τ ·D (i, 1) + δ · t+ α ·D (i, t) + ε (i, t) (3)
where ε (i, t) = η (i)− E [η (i) |D (i, 1)] + ν (i, t) .
Notice that the restriction in equation 2 for t = 0, 1 implies that E [(1, D (i, 1) , t, D (i, t)) · ε (i, t)] =
0 such that all parameters in equation 3 can be estimated by least squares. This also includes
the treatment effect, α, and therefore the difference-in-difference estimator is estimable in a
longitudinal sample by least squares regression of Y (i, 1)− Y (i, 0) on D (i, 1) such that:
α = E [Y (i, 1)− Y (i, 0) |D (i, 1) = 1]− E [Y (i, 1)− Y (i, 0) |D (i, 1) = 0] (4)
which estimates the average effect of treatment on the treated between period t = 0 and
t = 1.
Time invariant covariates and predetermined time variant covariates (age) can be intro-
duced linearly into the DID model in equation 3 by interacting them with time. This is done
by:
Y (i, t) = µ+X (i)′ pi (t) + τ ·D (i, 1) + δ · t+ α ·D (i, t) + ε (i, t) (5)
where X (i) is assumed uncorrelated with ε (i, t).
In this way the regression allows for heterogeneity in the outcome dynamics, such that not
only parenthood can affect the change in outcome between period t = 0 and t = 1, but also other
predetermined variables such as age, level of education, prior welfare experience, labor market
experience, and additional prior income classifications.10 Individuals’ residence is included in
a separate regression because not all municipalities have welfare recipients participating in
training, such that municipalities with perfect prediction of people not in training are dropped
in this regression. Notice that time-varying X’s, which are not predetermined are not included
in the regression because these are likely to be endogenous to the reform.
With repeated observation for the same individual differencing equation 5 with respect to
t gives a useful alternative formulation of the difference in difference estimator, which becomes:
Y (i, 1)− Y (i, 0) = δ +X (i)′ pi + α ·D (i, 1) + ε (i, 1)− ε (i, 0) (6)
where pi = pi (1)− pi (0) and α is still the parameter that captures the treatment effect, i.e.
the effect of mothers’ higher welfare benefits on labor market participation, training participa-
tion and welfare participation.
9See derivation in appendix
10A full description of the covariates is given in section XX.
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Equation 6 is the benchmark estimation that I will expand in the next section in order to
allow for heterogeneity in the treatment effect depending on the number and age of the single
mothers’ children.
Before I go on expanding the DID estimator it is important to emphasize the two threats
to the validity of the α parameter that captures the treatment effect. The threats give the two
following identifying assumptions:
Assumption 1: No compositional changes
This states that composition of the treatment group and control group must not change
between the pre-reform and post-reform periods. This is mainly an issue when cross-sectional
data is used and can cause the estimated treatment effect, α, only to represent a change in the
distribution of (D,X) between t = 0 and t = 1. If it is not the same individuals that make
up each group both in the period before the reform and in the period after the reform then
differencing does not eliminate the averages of the unobserved individual effects, η (i). This
problem is not a major concern in this paper since I use longitudinal data, but it is one of the
reasons why I have chosen not to include women who change parent status between the two
periods.
Assumption 2: Common time effects
This assumption states that in absence of treatment, the average outcomes for the treated
and the controls would have experienced the same variation over time, thus have common
time effects. An example, which could break this assumption, is a contemporaneous shock
that affect the relative outcomes of the treatment and control groups.11 If there exist some
variation in the outcome dynamics between the two groups this can sometimes be explained
by including covariates. However, if the dynamics depend on unobservables, the identification
breaks down. To test the common time effect assumption I have performed the difference-in-
difference estimation on the periods t = −1, 0 and tested whether α is equal to zero. To do this
I have selected a sample from 1984 similarly to the way I selected the 1986 sample. The sample
from 1984 is followed to 1986 and these two years are called t = −1 (for 1984) and t = 0 (for
1986).
As a second sensitivity analysis I also look at heterogeneous treatment effects. This allows
the treatment and control group to vary their responses to the reform differently across a few
observable characteristics. Following Blundell et. al. (2005a) I allow for this by estimating
models that distinguish the single women by age and education, which are two observable char-
acteristics that differ between the treatment and control groups. This allows for the treatment
and control groups to experience different trends within the same age or education group. The
results of this are discussed in section 7.
As a last comment to the DID estimator I should note that the estimated results cannot
be used to simulate policy responses because of selection bias in the sample.
11Two other shocks that did occur in the 1986-1988 time period is a shock for house owners and a change in
the general child benefits as described in section 3. When I write about the results I will comment further on
this.
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5.4 Effects by number of children and by children’s ages
The 1987 welfare reform increased the welfare benefits for parents dependent on the number of
children in the parent(s) had to support. This means that if there is any income effects from
welfare benefits on labor market participation, welfare participation, and training participation
these effects should depend on the number of children. I explore this possibility by including
a linear effect of the number of children in the estimations12. That is, in equation 6 I interact
the treatment status indicator D (i, 1) with the term N (i, 1), which is the number of children
for woman i in period 1. This gives:
Y (i, 1)− Y (i, 0) = δ +X (i)′ pi + β1 ·N (i, 1) ·D (i, 1) + ε (i, 1)− ε (i, 0) (7)
where pi = pi (1)− pi (0) and β1 captures the treatment effect from the number of children.
A further analysis is carried out where I separate the treatment effect from the number of
dependent children into two age intervals. The first is number of preschool children at ages 0-6
and the second is children of ages 7-17. In equation 8, N (i, 1) is split into two variables where
N1 (i, 1) is number of children under 7 and N2 (i, 1) is number of children who are 7 years or
older.
Y (i, 1)− Y (i, 0) = δ +X (i)′ pi + (8)(
β21 ·N1 (i, 1) + β22 ·N2 (i, 1)
) ·D (i, 1) + ε (i, 1)− ε (i, 0)
In equation 8 β21 indicate the treatment effect from the number of children under 7 years
old and β22 is the treatment from number of children who are 7 years or older.
The last estimation is to check whether the estimated treatment effects β21 and β22 in
equation 8 are coming from the number of children or if they have to do with an effect of
having at least one child in the age category. This is done by extending equation 8 to include
two dummy variables for at least one child under 7 and at least one child over 7. This gives
equation 9:
Y (i, 1)− Y (i, 0) = δ +X (i)′ pi + (9)(
β31 ·N1 (i, 1) + β32 ·N2 (i, 1)
) ·D (i, 1) +(
β41 · I
[
N1 (i, 1) > 0
]
+ β42 · I
[
N2 (i, 1) > 0
]) ·D (i, 1)
+ε (i, 1)− ε (i, 0)
12I have also tested for other than effects a linear however none of these other effects were significant and
therefore not included in my analysis.
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where I [N1 (i, 1) > 0] is an indicator function, which is equal to 1 if the number of children
younger than 7 years old is greater than zero. Similarly for I [N2 (i, 1) > 0] which equals 1 if
the number of children who are 7 years or older is greater than zero.
The results from the estimations of equation 7, 8, and 9 are given in section 7.
6 Data
The data used for this study is a 10 percent random sample of the Danish population covering
the period from January 1st 1983 to December 31st 1988. It is administrative register data from
the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA) and the Income Register, which are
both longitudinal databases with annual observation.
The Income Register identify the nominal amount individuals receive in welfare benefits
and includes a separate variable for individuals receiving welfare benefits while participating in
some form of training program. It is not possible to know either the total time period spent
on welfare or the time spent in the training program. Other than information on welfare, the
Income Register also reveals information about earned income in the year and other benefits
such as child support, housing support, pension and sickness benefits.
The Integrated Database for Labor Market Research contains information about age, ed-
ucation, marital status, number of children, residence, labor market history etc. Together the
Income Register and the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research contain more than
200 variables of which I have used approximately 30.
For the difference-in-difference analyses I have conditioned the sample of single women
on receiving welfare benefits at any time during 1986. In order to test for the common time
effect assumption I have also performed similarly difference-in-difference analyses on a sample
conditioned on being on welfare in 1984.
In the 10 percent sample of the Danish population there were 7.561 single women with or
without children who received at least 1 Danish kroner in welfare benefits in 1986. This is 8.9
percent of the single women in the 10 percent sample. For the sample conditioned on receiving
welfare in 1984 there were 8.183 single women, which is 9.8 percent of all the single women in
1984. I have only included women who were in the sample all three years in the two periods,
1984-1986 and 1986-1988. I have not allowed the single women to change marital status between
1986 and 1988 or between 1984 and 1986. This means that I have only included women who
were single in all three years in the analyses, which reduces the sample to 5.583 single women
followed through the 1986-1988 period and 5.932 single women from the 1984-1986 period.
The sample is reduced further because I have excluded all single women under 25 years of
age in 1986. There are two main reasons why women under 23 are excluded from the sample
and one reason why women who are 23 or 24 year old are excluded. The first reason why women
under 23 are excluded from the sample is because the women under 23 who do not have any
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children received a decrease in their welfare benefits in 1987. However, this was only if they did
not participate in a training program. If they participated in the training program they would
receive the same benefits as the women older than 23 years of age. Single mothers younger than
23 also experienced the same increase in benefits as mothers older than 23. The second reason
to exclude women under 23 and the reason why 23 and 24 years old women have been excluded
is that individuals under 25 were a part of a different training program. This other training
program did not give benefits through the welfare system and the women under 25 years of age
would therefore not be expected to have any change in training offered by the welfare program.
I have also excluded people above 55 years of age because this group had a very low training
participation rate and a high retirement rate compared to the rest of the sample. All immigrants
are also excluded from the sample in order to get a more homogenous group. This makes the
sample of single women on welfare in 1986 decrease to 2.660, which is divided into 924 single
women without children and 1.736 single mothers.
The last group of women I have excluded from the sample are the women who changed
status with respect to being a single mother in any of the two time periods. I have furthermore
excluded women who got more or fewer children during the analyzed periods. This is done
to avoid compositional changes between the single mothers and the single women without any
children. This is also a way to try and avoid problems with endogenous fertility decisions and
changing incentives due to change in the number of children. The final sample used in the
analyses is 2.294 single women from 1986 who are followed to 1988 and 2.346 single women
from 1984 who are followed to 1986.
The time-varying covariates used in the estimations are all measured in levels. For the
DID estimator of the 1986-1988 period the covariates are measured either in 1985 or in 1986
or in both years. The same is the case for the estimation of the 1984-1986 period where all the
covariates are from either 1983 or 1984. This is done to avoid that the covariates are affected
by the increase in benefits and thereby potentially becomes endogenous to the reform.
Table A1 and A2 in the appendix presents some summary statistics from 1984 and 1986 of
the single women without children and the single mothers.
Table A2 shows summary statistics for the sample conditioned on receiving welfare in 1986.
The table show that the single mothers in the sample on average have 1.6 child form, which
are divided into 0.57 children who are younger than seven years old and 1.03 children who
are seven years and older. The other observable characteristics for the single women without
children and single mothers mostly show significant differences. Women without children are
on average older, than the single mothers but have almost the same average years of schooling.
Within the group of mothers the difference in age and schooling is bigger than the differences
across motherhood. The mothers with at least one child between zero and six are a lot younger
and longer educated than the mothers with the older children. This is a difference that is both
true for the sample conditioned on receiving welfare in 1986 and for the sample conditioned on
receiving welfare in 1984, which is given in table A1.
The breakup of educational categories dependent on length of education also show simi-
lar trends in education between in two sample period. The percentages of women who have
completed a short, middle and further education are almost exactly the same between the two
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samples. Women without children have on average one or two percentage points higher com-
pletion rate in long further educations. The short and middle length education have the same
percentages of completion. An example of a long further education is a five year university
degree, and a middle long education can be a bachelor’s degree or a school teacher whereas
an example of a short further education is an education such as a nursing degree, which takes
around two and a half years.
The women without children have 39 percent who have not completed 9th grade in 1986.
Among the mothers there are on average 34 percent who have not completed 9th grade however,
the 9th grade non-completion rate is distributed as 23 percent of mothers with children younger
than seven and 39 percent of mothers with children older than seven who has not completed
9th grade. The women without children have a relatively higher completion rate of 12th grade
and a much lower percentage of people who have somewhere between 9th and 11th grade. This
trend in the differences between mothers and non-mothers are also the same for the sample
selected in 1984 even though there are bigger percentages of women with 9th grade in both
categories. At last, mothers on average seem to have a little higher completion rate in a skilled
education such as painter, carpenter or seamstress.
When I estimate the heterogeneous responses in labor market, welfare, and training partic-
ipation I divide the sample in two for both age and education. I use the average age of women
without children, which is 38 years, as the first sample division and under 12th grade as the
second division of the sample.
The second page of the summary statistics show that mothers on average have higher gross
income and receive more welfare benefits both for the sample from 1986 and the sample from
1984. The income and welfare benefits are not included in the difference-in-difference estimation
since I consider them to be highly correlated with the number of children in the household.
I have included whether or not the women were on welfare the year before the sample was
selected and the percentages of women who received welfare benefits in the previous year were
around 73 to 75 percent of the sample for both single women without children and for single
mothers. The average outcome for single mothers covers a spread in welfare dependency where
women with young children had a ten percentage point lower welfare participation rate in 1983
compared to mothers with a least one child between 7 and 17, and for the 1986 sample this
difference was five percent.
The percentages of women in school and who held a job with a wage in the sample year
and the year before the sample are relatively similar between the mother and the non-mothers.
Notice that the variable ”receiving a wage in 1986” is the first year of the dependent variable
in the DID estimation on employment probabilities in the 1986 sample. It is similar for the
sample from 1984.
Ownership shows a little higher percentage of women without children for whom there are
five percent that owns a house relative to three percent among the mothers. I will use the
ownership variable in the DID estimation to control for the effect of the ”Potato Cure”, which
happened in 1987.
The distribution in the take up rate of other benefits than welfare show some significant
differences between mothers and women without children. For sickness benefits the differences
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are more pronounced in the 1986 sample and for retirement benefits the differences are bigger
in 1984. Overall the single mother have a higher percentage who receives sickness benefits
and unemployment support whereas the women without have a higher tendency to receive
retirement benefits. Women without children also seem to live in bigger cities because in 1986,
40 percent of the women without children lived in a city with more than 100.000 inhabitants
where this number for the single mothers 26 percent.
The women’s participation rates in the training program is what I use as the dependent
variable in the DID estimation on training. The training participation rate is very different
between mothers and women without children. In the sample from 1986 there were 17 percent
of women without children who participated in the program and among mothers this was 25
percent. The distribution in the sample in 1984 looks similar where mothers had a training
participation rate of 23 percent and women without children had 16 percent of their welfare
participant who participated in a training program in 1984. Within the group of mothers there
was almost no difference between women with young children and women with older children.
Finally, I would like to comment on the housing and child support. These two types of
supports are not included in the difference-in-difference estimation because child support is
practically proportional to the number of children in the household and housing support is
also dependent on number of children in the household as well as household income. Both the
house and the child support shown in the summary statistics are the two types of government
support, which were given in addition to the welfare benefits. The last eight lines on the third
page of table A1 and A2 describes the patterns in these support schemes.
The percentage of women who received housing support has increased during the periods
of the two estimations. For the 1986 sample, mothers receiving housing support have increased
3 percentage point and women without children have increased 7 and the average amount
of support in the two groups have also increased even though the numbers presented in the
summary statistics are in nominal terms. In real terms the average amount is less and as a
percentage of gross income this has not changed much.13 The sample from 1984 shows similar
trends thus when I compare the two periods in my DID estimation results, the changes in
housing support are not a major concern.
The government child support does need some special attention. As I described in section
3 this support scheme was changed at the same time as the welfare reform and gave almost
double support to the mothers in the sample. Table A1 and A2 show that for all years in both
samples the percentage of mothers who received child support was almost 100 percent. The
differences are in the amount of support that the mothers receive. In table A1 with the sample
from 1984, the child support in 1984 is 8,380 Danish kroner and in 1986 this was 9,553 Danish
kroner. This was an increase in nominal child support of 13 percent, which is less than what
the gross nominal income increased by. The increase in the extra child support in 1987 shows
in the summary statistics for the sample from 1986. The nominal amount of child benefits for
the mothers in 1986 was 8,948 Danish kroner and in 1988 the same mothers received 17,232
Danish kroner. This is almost a doubling of child support which should be held up against an
increase in nominal income (without the child support) of 16 percent.
13Nominal gross income is measured without child support and housing support from the state, but it does
include welfare benefits.
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The change in child support in the 1986 to 1988 period may cause problems in my empirical
analysis because it may affect the relative outcomes of the mother and the women without
children. When I describe the results of the estimations, I will comment further on the effect
of this child support and suggest what kind of bias it can give the estimates.
7 Results
This section includes the results of equations 7, 8, and 9, which are the difference-in-difference
estimations. Three estimations are reported, one for single women’s employment status, another
for their welfare status and a third for their training status. The employment status equals one
for a given year if the women hold a job with a wage at any time throughout the year. Similarly
for the welfare status and training status where welfare equals one if the women receive any
benefits from welfare during the year and the training equals one if the women receive welfare
conditional on training at any time in a given year. The status equals zero in all three categories
if no wage was received for the employment status, if no welfare benefits were received for the
welfare status, and if no benefits conditional on training were received for the training status.
For each of the three outcomes, three types of regressions are performed, each with different
classification of the possible effects from the number of children living with the single mother.
The 1987 reform increased welfare benefits for single mothers proportional to the number of
children in the household between zero and 17 years old. In the first estimation the treatment
indication is a variable for the number of children between zero and 17 in the household. The
second estimation divides the number of children in the household between number of children
who are six years or younger and number of children above six years old. This division is made
to capture the effect of having children who are not yet in school and who requires daycare or
kindergarten if the lone mother is working as opposed to the effect of having children above six
years old who are attending school, at least for a period of the day. The last type of estimation
includes the same division between number of children who are six years and younger and the
number of children who are older than six but at the same time it includes two indicators
of having at least one child who is six or younger or having at least one child who is older
than six. These indicators are included to capture whether the effect on single mothers’ labor
market, welfare, and training participation is affected by the extra amount of welfare benefits
(this is the number of children) or simply an effect of having at least one child. The effect of
at least one child could be stronger than the effect of number of children if the single mother
makes her decision based on having at least one child or not. This could be the case if the
single mother is concerned with the freedom that comes with welfare or training participation.
Finally estimations including fixed effects of municipality residence are performed for all three
ways of reporting the effects of children.
The covariates I described in the data section are also included in the estimations. Age
and year of schooling are included as a third order polynomial and being a recipient of other
kinds of support are included as indicator variables. The covariates also include an indicator
of owning a house, which is included to try and control for the change in taxation of houses
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that also occurred in the same year as the benefit reform. Finally, the covariates also include
an indicator of what size city the women live in.
The crucial structural restriction of the DID estimator is the common trend. This restriction
can be tested when a pre-treatment period exist. Without the treatment, the treated and the
controls should follow a parallel path, which can be tested by applying the DID estimator for
period t = −1 and period t = 0 and testing that α from equation 6 is equal to zero. These
result are presented together with the results from the reform period.
The samples for the DID estimator from period t = −1 to t = 0 is created the same way
as the 1986-1988 sample, just in stead of conditioning on receiving welfare in 1986, the pre-
treatment sample conditions on receiving welfare in 1984 and the DID estimates the changes
from 1984 to 1986.
A summary of the results are given in table 2, 3, and 4 and four of the full estimation
results are presented in table A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, and A8 in the appendix.
7.1 Labor Market Participation14
The overall results from the difference-in-difference estimations of women’s employment status
show a small but insignificant increase in employment for mothers relative to single women
without children. A summary of effect on single mothers’ employment status is presented in
table 2. This includes six different estimations for each period and four of the full estimations
can be found in the appendix table A3 and A4. Comparing the reform period to the period
before the reform the first regression shows a two percentage point increase in the employment
probability per child a mother has. The effect of the number of children in the pre-reform
period is almost exactly zero and in the period of the reform the estimate is significant at
the 10 percent level when I do not control for municipality fixed effects. When I control for
the municipality fixed effects the coefficient becomes insignificant and therefore it cannot be
rejected that there is no effect from the number of children.
The results of dividing the children in the household up between children younger than seven
years old and children between seven and 17 are given in line two and three. The estimates
also show no significant differences between the two periods 1984-1986 and 1986-1988. The size
of the estimates show that mothers with young children seem to have a larger increase in their
employment probability relative to the mothers with older children. However, the standard
errors are really large and it cannot be rejected that the two groups of mothers have the same
change in employment rates.
The results of the last regression, which is equation 9 is reported in the last four lines of table
2. Comparing the two periods 84-86 and 86-88 the mothers with children younger than 7 and the
mothers with older children show opposite patterns. There is a positive effect on employment
probability of the number of young children when I take account of having at least one young
child. This shows because the change in employment probability in number of children younger
14The labor market participation I refer to here is whether or not the women held a job with a paid wage
during a given year. This will be used interchangeably with employment status.
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than seven years is less negative in the 86-88 period than it is in the 84-86 period. In the 84-86
period mothers with young children experience a relative fall in employment probability of 14.7
percent. In the 86-88 period the fall is 6.3 percent but is not significantly different from zero.
The positive effect on employment per child younger than seven is outweighed by a fall in the
employment probability from 21.9 to 13.3 percent of mothers who have at least one young child.
The change in employment probability of mothers with older children relative to the change of
women without children show a fall in the number of children older than seven but an increase
for having at least one child older than seven. However, none of the estimates are significantly
different from zero.
Table 2.The effect of increased welfare benefits on single mothers’ employment
status in the reform period (1986-88) and the pre-reform period (1984-1986).
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 0.001 0.020* -0.002 0.020
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.013 0.037 0.018 0.036
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
Number of children age 7-17 -0.003 0.015 -0.008 0.014
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
3.
Number of children age 0-6 -0.144** -0.084 -0.147** -0.063
(0.062) (0.060) (0.065) (0.063)
Number of children age 7-17 0.014 -0.014 0.004 -0.011
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Dummy for at least 1 child 0-6 0.208** 0.161** 0.219** 0.133*
(0.076) (0.074) (0.079) (0.077)
Dummy for at least 1 child 7-17 -0.037 0.061 -0.027 0.054
(0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
Municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
∗Significant at 10 percent level
∗∗Significant at 5 percent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. All regressions include same explana-
tory variables as given in the appendix
The estimates from equation 7 and 8 of the linear probability model presented above show
similar results in a Chamberlain fixed effect logit estimation. These results are given in table
A9 in the appendix. Here mothers also have a positive increase in employment probability per
child younger than 7 relative to women without children, and for mothers with older children
there is no significant change.15
15I only present results from equation 7 and 8 because the small sample size when conditioning on a change
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The estimates on employment probability of single mothers relative to single women without
children can be affected by the increase in government child support, which occurred the same
time as the reform. The increase in child support was independent of labor market or welfare
status and in the static labor supply model presented in section 4, this child support can be
thought of as unearned income, N . If leisure is a normal good, an increase in unearned income
will give a negative income effect on labor supply. This means that the estimates on the
employment effect of the number of children in the household are a lower bound for the actual
effect of the welfare reform.
I would also like to comment on the covariate, which indicates whether the single women
owns a house or not. Due to the ”Potato Cure” the women who owned a house would have
experienced an income fall in the period of the reform relative to the period before the reform.
This is a fall in unearned income, which according to the static labor supply model should lead
to an increase in employment if leisure is a normal good. Comparing the coefficient on ownership
in the reform period with the coefficient on ownership in the period before the reform shows a
positive effect on employment probability of ownership. Table A3 in the appendix shows that
the coefficient on ownership in the reform period is significantly positive and a little higher
than 9 percent. The same coefficient in the pre-reform period is presented in table A4 and
is 4 percent and is not significantly different from zero. This positive effect on employment
probability of a drop in unearned income supports my argument that an increase in unearned
income from extra child support would have a negative effect on employment. Thus, there is
more reason to think that the estimates on the number of children are a lower bound.
The positive employment effect of number of young children and the insignificant effect of
older children cannot be explained by the labor supply models I presented in section 4. The
results are also not in line with other studies on labor supply effects of welfare programs. Moffitt
(1992) has a survey of the empirical effects of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), which was an American welfare program.16 The AFDC guaranteed a minimum income
much like the Danish welfare program analyzed in this paper. The empirical results of AFDC all
show that the program reduced labor supply and induced greater participation in the program.
For Denmark Toomet (2005) has found that an increase in welfare benefits for young females
reduce their entry rate into employment corresponding to an income elasticity of -0.4.
7.1.1 Heterogeneous responses in employment
In this section I present row (iii) and (iv) from table 2 seperately for women younger and older
than 38 and for women with more or less education than 12th grade.17 The two regressions
presented in table A11 in the appendix show that older women tend to be the ones who
experience the increase in employment probability when they have younger children. However,
these effects from the two years are neither significantly different from each other nor are any
in employment status in the fixed effect logit.
16AFDC is now replace by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). TANF is a welfare program
that has a work requirement and a time limit and is therefore not suited for comparison to the Danish welfare
program from the 1980’s.
17I only present results from equation 7 and 8 because small sample sizes.
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of them significantly different from zero. The younger women show practically no change in
employment probability between the periods.
Table A12 in the appendix presents the results from dividing the sample up into women with
at most 11th grade and women who have 12th grade or higher. This shows that it is the higher
educated women with the young children who experience the higher employment probability
during the period of the reform. This group experienced a five percent (insignificant) increase
in employment probability compared to women without children during the reform period.
Summarizing the overall impact of the welfare benefit reform on the employment proba-
bilities of mothers compared to women without children is not significantly different from the
period before the reform. Mothers who are divided into their childrens’ age categories show no
significant effect when I do not control for having at least one child in the age category. But
the insignificant results show that women with children between zero and six years old have
an increase in their employment probability that is dependent on the number of children they
have. This increase seems to come from older and more educated women who are the ones
that show the increase in employment probability between the two periods. Women with older
children show practically no changes in their employment rates between the period before the
reform and the period of the reform
7.2 Welfare Participation
The results from the difference-in-difference estimations are reported in table 3. If the welfare
participants only have the choice of either welfare or work then the welfare participation should
be a mirror image of the employment rates. However, this is only the case for regression 3,
which comes from equation 9.
A summary of effect of the number of children on the mothers’ welfare participation status
is presented in table 3. As was the case for the DID estimations on the employment status,
this summary table also includes six different estimations for each period and four of the full
estimations can be found in the appendix table A5 and A6. The effect of the increase in benefits
have a negative impact from the overall number of children on mothers’ welfare participation
rate. In regression 1 column (iii) and (iv) the relative change in mothers welfare participation
rate has fallen from 4.8 percent to 2.9 percent.
The relative change in welfare participation from the period before the reform to the period
of the reform is very different for mothers with young children and mothers with older children.
This is seen from regression two, which divides mothers into mothers with young children and
mothers with older children. The effect of the increase in benefit on welfare participation
seems to have positively affected single mothers welfare participation through the number of
their children who are six years old or younger and negatively affected single mothers from the
number of children who are older than seven. However, in the regressions where I divide up the
effect from the number of children even further this shows that the positive effect on welfare
participation of the number of children younger than seven is more an effect of the mother
having at least one child under seven years old in the household. Regression three shows a
decrease in the welfare participation from the number of children younger than seven years old.
In the period before the reform the mothers with young children had a 11.2 percent higher
probability of staying on welfare throughout the period than women without children. In the
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reform period this had fallen to an insignificant 4.3 percent. The change in the effect of having
at least one child younger than seven is positive but insignificant. Mothers with older children
show no significant differences between the two periods but they do have an (insignificant) fall
in their welfare participation. This effect is through having at least one child between seven
and 17 and not through the number of children.
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Table 3. The effect of increased welfare benefits on single mothers’ welfare
status in reform period (1986-88) and pre-reform period (1984-1986).
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 0.052** 0.035** 0.048** 0.029**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.049** 0.080** 0.051** 0.077**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Number of children age 7-17 0.053** 0.021* 0.047** 0.014*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
3.
Number of children age 0-6 0.107** 0.057 0.112** 0.043
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.056)
Number of children age 7-17 0.029 0.033 0.028 0.024
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
Dummy for at least 1 child 0-6 -0.077 0.030 -0.081 0.046
(0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.069)
Dummy for at least 1 child 7-17 0.053 -0.026 0.042 -0.021
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036)
Municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
∗Significant at 10 percent level
∗∗Significant at 5 percent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. All regressions include same explana-
tory variables as given in the appendix
Comparing the welfare participation results in regression 3 from equation 9 to the results of
the employment probability from equation 9 the two regressions show results that are consistent
with each other. In the previous section I described how mothers with young children had an
increase in their employment probabilities during the reform and mothers with older children
did not show any effects that were significantly different from zero. The results of the welfare
participation mirror this result such that the women with young children who had an increase
in employment probability had a decrease in welfare participation at the same time. Neither
of these two results match the theory, which I described in section 4. This also does not match
the literature presented in Moffitt (1992) where the impact of the benefit levels of the AFDC
has a positive effect on enrollment in the program.
The same way as the estimates on employment should illustrate a lower bound the estimates
on welfare participation should represent a higher bound if leisure is a normal good. This
means that the negative effect on welfare participation of the number of children under seven
potentially could be even more negative. However, in this case table A5 and A6, which show
the regressions including covariates does not seem to support the theory that higher income
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makes people more likely to participate in welfare. Again I look at the coefficient on ownership,
which in the 1984-86 period is 0.11 and is significant at the 5 percent level. In the 1986-88
period this coefficient has decreased and is insignificant and around 0.044. All other things
equal, this means that the fall in income experienced by the house owners has caused more of
them to participate in welfare. This does therefore not support the theory that lower income
should give higher labor supply. It is therefore more uncertain whether the increase in the extra
child benefits cause the coefficients on the number of children to be a higher bound.
7.2.1 Heterogeneous responses in welfare participation
The results from the heterogeneous responses in welfare participation caused by age and educa-
tion are presented in table A13 and A14 in the appendix. The absolute change in the estimates
between the two periods are relatively similar for the two age groups. They both show a de-
crease in welfare participation in response to the total number of children. Furthermore, the
effects when the mothers are divided into mothers with young children and mothers with old
children are also the same as when there was no division of the mothers’ age.
Table A14 shows the welfare participation effects when the sample is divided into more or
less educated women. Both samples show that mothers reduce their welfare participation with
the numbers of children who are seven years or older. However, only the women with 12th
grade or higher show the positive effect in welfare participation from the number of children
under seven (when having at least one child under seven is not controlled for). The women
with an education shorter than 12 years and children younger than seven have a fall in their
relative welfare participation from the period before the reform to the period of the reform.
Summarizing the overall impact on welfare participation is highly dependent on which
category the number of children is divided into. Mothers with older children have a fall in their
welfare participation rate, which seems to be driven by the effect of having at least one child
between seven and 17 and not from the number of children. The mothers with children between
zero and six years old show a decrease in their welfare participation from the number of their
children but a positive effect of having at least one child in the age category. The women with
an education, which is shorter than 12 years all have a decrease in their welfare participation
when the reform period is compared to the period before the reform. This is true even when I
do not control for having at least one child in the two different age categories.
7.3 Training Participation
The last outcome I will analyze is the participation in training under the welfare program.
The results on the training participation are to some extent clearer than those of welfare
participation in the sense that they do not change signs depending how I categorize the children.
In table 3 a comparable summary to that of the six regressions on welfare participation is
reported, only in this section it is for training participation. The full estimations are reported
in the appendix table A7 and A8. In table 3 it can be seen that there is a positive effect
on training participation from the number of children a single mother has during the reform
period. The effect is coming from the number of children who are six years old or younger.
Single mothers have about 5 percentage points higher probability of entering training per child
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they have under seven years old compared to the period before the reform. The effect from
the number of children between seven and 17 is also positive but small and not significantly
different from zero. In regression 3 when I control for having at least one child younger or older
than seven, the effect from the number of children between zero and six becomes even stronger.
This is because the change in the coefficient of indicator for having at least one child between
zero and six has decreased from the period before the reform to the reform period. The small
positive (insignificant) effect of the number of children older than seven seems to come from
an effect of just having at least one child older than seven, even though the coefficients are
insignificant.
Table 4. The effect of increased welfare benefits on single mothers’ training
status in reform period (1986-88) and pre-reform period (1984-1986).
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 0.004 0.031** -0.002 0.026**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.014 0.082** 0.006 0.071**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Number of children age 7-17 0.001 0.016 -0.004 0.012
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
3.
Number of children age 0-6 -0.018 0.134** -0.027 0.119**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054)
Number of children age 7-17 0.015 -0.000 0.017 -0.001
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Dummy for at least 1 child 0-6 0.043 -0.070 0.045 -0.064
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.066)
Dummy for at least 1 child 7-17 -0.032 0.034 -0.045 0.028
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
Municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
∗Significant at 10 percent level
∗∗Significant at 5 percent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. All regressions include same explana-
tory variables as given in the appendix
The two first regressions in the linear probability model presented above are also estimated
by the Chamberlain fixed effect logit model. The results of this are given in table A10 in the
appendix. The results show the same overall trend of mothers having an increase in training
per child they have between zero and six years old. Also the mothers with older children show
an increase in training dependent on the number of children older than seven, even though this
effect is not significantly different from zero.
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There should not exist an effect on training participation of the extra child support, if the
training is viewed as a human capital investment. Unearned income, which is provided to the
single mothers whether or not they participate in the welfare program, training program or
have a full time job should not affect the human capital investment. This means that in theory
the coefficients on training should not be biased as an effect of the extra child benefits provided
during the period of the reform. I again compare to coefficient on housing ownership from the
period before the reform to the period of the reform To see if a change in unearned income
affects the training participation. Table A7 and A8 shows that the ownership coefficient is
around 0.05 and not significantly different from zero in both periods analyzed. This supports
the theory of no income effect on training.
A last thing to notice from table A7 and A8 are the coefficients on health and welfare.
The reason for looking specifically at these two coefficients is because both the people receiving
sickness benefits (which is the health variable) and the people who are long time unemployed
(illustrated by the variable of receiving welfare in the year previous the sample period) are
focus groups of the training program. I have argued that no change in administration occurred
during the period of the reform compared to the period before the reform. By comparing the
results for sickness benefits receivers and the long time unemployed from the period before the
reform to the period of the reform I can see how these two other focus groups have changed
their participation rates. These two groups did not experience an increase in their benefits
and they should therefore show no effect of the reform. Comparing the results from these two
groups will give me an indication of whether or not there was any change in the administration
of the focus groups’ entry into the training program.
Overall the coefficients on both the health and welfare do not show any increase in partici-
pation rates of these two other focus groups. By looking at the two periods 86-88 and 84-86 and
comparing the coefficients on health86 to health84 and health8586 to health8384 the coefficients
differ by two or three percentage points. The health84 is positive and significantly different
from zero whereas health86 is not. This indicates that people on sickness benefits take less
training during the reform period compared to the period before the reform. The coefficient
on welfare85 and welfare83 are both around -0.09 and significant. This means that women
who have been unemployed in the years previous to the estimation periods had a fall in their
training participation rates but the fall is the same for both periods. Together the two results
indicate no changes in the administration of the focus groups’ entry into the training program.
In section 5.2 I discussed some potential problems of selection into the training program.
I am especially interested in finding out if the estimations can give some indication of where
the positive effect in training participation comes from. For this purpose I will only compare
women with children between zero and six years old. The second DID estimation of training
shows a significantly positive increase in training from the number of children from the period
before the reform to the period of the reform. In the 1984-86 period the estimate was 0.006
and in the period of the reform this estimate was 0.071. This is an increase in the change of
training participation of mothers relative to non-mothers of 6.5 percentage points. The relative
welfare participation of the same group was 0.051 in the 1984-86 period and 0.077 in 1986-88.
This is an increase in welfare participation of 2.6 percentage points per child between zero and
six. This means that the increase in training was larger than the increase in welfare and the
ratio of training participants to passive welfare participants must have increased. This further
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means that mothers who stayed on welfare during the reform period have a relatively higher
rate of training participation compared to mothers who stayed on welfare before the reform. I
interpret this as the increase in training is at least party due to mothers substituting passive
welfare with training.
Miller and Sanders (1997) is another paper, which analyzes the effect of higher welfare
benefits on human capital investment. They compare the generosity of Aid to Dependent
Families with Children (AFDC) across states in the US and look at the high school completion
rate. They find that the high school completion rates are not significantly affected by the
level of welfare support provided by the different states. This is comparable to my results for
women with older children but not for mothers with young children who increase their training
participation with the higher amount of welfare benefits.
7.3.1 Heterogeneous responses in welfare participation
The results from the heterogeneous responses in training participation caused by age and edu-
cation are presented in table A15 and A16 in the appendix. The results are not heterogeneous
with respect to either age or education. Table A15, which shows the DID estimation divided
into women younger and older than 38, shows the same pattern as the overall results presented
above. The only heterogeneous effect is that older mothers have a relative larger increase in the
training participation during the reform than their younger counterparts. In table A16 there
is no difference in the estimates for mothers with a short education compared to the mothers
with a long education.
Summarizing the overall impact of higher welfare benefits on training shows a positive effect
on training from the number of children between zero and six years old. These is also a positive
effect from having at least one child older than seven but the effect is not significantly different
from zero. There is very little heterogeneity in the training participation response across women
of different age group and across women with different length of education. Finally, there is
some evidence that the effect on training comes from the increase in welfare benefits and not
from mothers being a focus group of the municipality case worker nor because mothers receive
extra child benefits during the period of the reform.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I have estimated the effects of a Danish welfare reform on three outcomes, which
are employment, welfare participation, and participation in a training program. The welfare
reform occurred in 1987 and increased the maximum amount of attainable welfare benefits by
12 percent for mothers with one child and by 16 percent for mothers with two children. Using
longitudinal data from 1983 to 1988 I use a difference-in-difference technique to estimate the
reform’s impact on the outcomes of single mothers. The results show considerable heterogeneity
in the treatment effect for mothers with children of different ages.
The mothers with older children do not show any significant changes in their employment
probabilities or their training participation rates when I compare the period around the reform
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to the period before the reform. The impact of the reform on welfare participation for mothers
with older children is negative, indicating higher exit rates out of welfare during the reform
period relative to the period before the reform. However, this effect is not an income effect
driven by the number of older children but rather an effect of having at least one older child.
The most robust result of my analysis is a positive and significant impact of the reform
on the training participation of mothers dependent on the number of their children between
zero and six years old. The increase in training during the reform period is occurring both
for younger and older mothers as well as for the more and less educated mothers. The result
is also robust to estimating the impact by a fixed effect logit model rather than the linear
probability model, which I have used to interpret the results from. The effects from the number
of young children on their mothers’ employment probability is positive, which is an effect that
is driven by the older and more educated mothers. Finally the impact on welfare participation
from the number of young children a mother has, is highly dependent on how the children are
categorized. When I control for having at least one child between zero and six, the welfare
participation of mothers is decreasing the number of young children during the reform period.
If I do not control for having at least one child in the age category the welfare participation
effect changes sign and becomes negative in the number of young children.
Estimations involving training, which compares single mothers to single women without
children are often subjected to criticism because it is argued that case workers assigning training
will always give priority to the single mothers. In this paper I have argued that the official
guidelines of the training program issued to the case workers did not change during the period
from 1983 to 1988. The guidelines mentioned six focus groups for the training program and
I have showed that the two groups (other than single mothers), which I can identify did not
change their training participation rates when I compare the period of the reform to the period
before the reform. I interpret this as an indication that there has been no change in the
administration of the entry requirements into the training program, which therefore makes my
estimates on training participation more credible.
Another way to make the results more credible is to perform the estimations on a bigger
sample. This way I can get more precise estimates and be able to allow for more heterogeneity
in order to get a better understanding of what is driving the results. The full population of
welfare recipients will soon be available to me and when this happens I expect to be able to
divide the data into more narrowly defined groups. This will for instance allow me to include
immigrants and refugees in my analysis.
In this paper I have primarily been interested in finding the impact of the reform on
mothers’ training participation rates. Analyzing welfare benefits’ effect on training participation
is something that I have not found analyzed in the literature and hopefully my results can shed
some light on the subject. However, a more formal model is required in order to understand
more about the decision to enter training programs and how this decision is affected by the
amount of welfare benefits a participant can receive. Combining the existing theory on human
capital accumulation with a possibility of welfare and training during welfare could be the next
step to understanding more about the training participation decision and perhaps a way to give
a better interpretation to my results.
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APPENDICES
A1 Appendix
Derivation 1: Derivation of equation 3:
Equation 1 is given by:
Y (i, t) = δ (t) + α ·D (i, t) + η (i) + ν (i, t) (1a)
and the sufficient condition is:
P (D (i, 1) = 1|ν (i, t)) = P (D (i, 1) = 1) (2a)
By subtracting and adding E [η (i) |D (i, 1)] in equation 1a:
Y (i, t) = δ (t) + α ·D (i, t) + E [η (i) |D (i, 1)] + {η (i)− E [η (i) |D (i, 1)] + ν (i, t)}
which gives:
Y (i, t) = δ (t) + α ·D (i, t) + E [η (i) |D (i, 1)] + ε (i, t) (3a)
where ε (i, t) = η (i)− E [η (i) |D (i, 1)] + ν (i, t)
Because δ (t) = δ (0) + (δ (1)− δ (0)) t
and E [η (i) |D (i, 1)] = E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 1]+(E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 1]− E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 0])D (i, 1)
Then equation 3a can be rewritten as:
Y (i, t) = δ (0) + (δ (1)− δ (0)) t+ α ·D (i, t) +
E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 1] + (E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 1]− E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 0])D (i, 1) + ε (i, t)
which rearranged look like:
Y (i, t) = δ(0) + E [η(i)|D(i, 1) = 1]
+ (E [η(i)|D(i, 1) = 1]− E [η(i)|D(i, 1) = 0])D(i, 1)
+ (δ(1)− δ(0))t+ α ·D(i, t) + ε(i, t)
(4a)
setting:
µ = δ (0) + E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 1]
τ = E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 1]− E [η (i) |D (i, 1) = 0], and
δ = δ (1)− δ (0)
then equation 4a can be written as:
Y (i, t) = µ+ τ ·D (i, 1) + δ · t+ α ·D (i, t) + ε (i, t)
which is exactly equation 3 that is derived
Derivation 2: The Chamberlain fixed effect logit model
In order to compare the results from this model to the linear probability, I have only
allowed the covariates to enter in levels from the year of the sample periods’ start. These
level are interacting them with time the same way as was the case for the linear probability
model showed in section 5. The idea behind the fixed effect logit is to condition the sample
observations for which Y (i, t) changes, such that:
Y (i, t) = 1
{
X (i, t)′ pi + η (i) + ν (i, t) > 0
}
where X (i, t) is the same list of covarites as in regression 6 and includes an indicator for
being a mother in period t = 1. Then it can be showed that :
P (Y (i, 0) = 0, Y (i, 1) = 1|Y (i, 0) + Y (i, 1) = 1, X (i, 0) , X (i, 1) , η (i))
=
1
1 + exp (X (i, 1)−X (i, 0) pi)
= Λ (∆X (i, 1)pi)
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Table A1: Summary Statistics 1984. Means and standard deviations.
Without children With children
at least 1 at least 1 at least 1
Covariates child child 0-6 child 7-17
Observations in 1984 929 1417 667 1037
Number of children in 1984 1.68 1.82 1.82
(.83) (.87) (.88)
Number of children <7 in 1984 .58 1.23 .32
(.69) (.45) (.55)
Number of children >6 in 1984 1.10 .60 1.50
(.91) (.79) (.73)
Age in 1984 38.99 33.90 30.43 35.68
(9.59) (6.25) (4.50) (5.93)
Years of schooling in 1984 9.25 9.41 9.61 9.20
(3.31) (2.90) (2.87) (2.90)
Under 9th grade .45 .39 .29 .46
(.50) (.49) (.45) (.50)
9th to 11th grade .18 .28 .38 .23
(.38) (.45) (.49) (.42)
12th grade .10 .05 .08 .03
(.31) (.22) (.27) (.17)
Skilled .13 .18 .15 .19
(.34) (.38) (.35) (.39)
Short further education .01 .01 .02 .01
(.12) (.11) (.13) (.11)
Middle further education .06 .06 .06 .05
(.24) (.23) (.23) (.21)
Long further education .05 .03 .04 .03
(.22) (.17) (.19) (.17)
Continued on next page
51
Table A1: Summary Statistics 1984. Means and standard deviations, cont.
Without children With children
at least 1 at least 1 at least 1
Covariates child child 0-6 child 7-17
Gross Income in 1984 64123 76817 75904 76954
(31029) (32678) (32463) (32390)
Welfare benefits in 1984 25200 25889 27973 26018
(18692) (21097) (21823) (20971)
Receiving welfare benefits .75 .73 .66 .76
in 1983 (.44) (.44) (.48) (.43)
Receiving sickness benefits .12 .17 .19 .16
in 1984 (.33) (.37) (.39) (.37)
Receiving sickness benefits .16 .17 .19 .16
in 1983 (.36) (.38) (.39) (.37)
Receiving sickness benefits .06 .08 .08 .08
in 1983 and 1984 (.23) (.27) (.27) (.27)
In school in 1983 .14 .12 .11 .12
(.34) (.33) (.32) (.33)
In school in 1984 .12 .14 .14 .13
(.33) (.34) (.35) (.34)
Receiving unemployment .12 .23 .22 .23
support in 1983 (.33) (.42) (.42) (.42)
Receiving unemployment .16 .27 .26 .26
support in 1984 (.37) (.44) (.44) (.44)
Training participation 1984 .16 .23 .24 .23
(.37) (.42) (.43) (.42)
Ownership .06 .03 .03 .03
(.24) (.17) (.16) (.17)
Continued on next page
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Table A1: Summary Statistics 1984. Means and standard deviations, cont.
Without children With children
at least 1 at least 1 at least 1
Covariates child child 0-6 child 7-17
Receiving retirement .03 .01 .01 .01
benefits in 1983 (.16) (.09) (.08) (.08)
Receiving retirement .10 .02 .00 .03
benefits in 1984 (.30) (.16) (.07) (.16)
Receiving a wage in 1983 .49 .55 .53 .54
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.50)
Receiving a wage in 1984 .47 .57 .54 .56
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.50)
City w/ more than 100.000 .39 .32 .31 .30
(.49) (.47) (.46) (.46)
City b/t 50-100.000 .13 .12 .11 .12
(.33) (.33) (.32) (.32)
City b/t 20-50.000 .26 .28 .29 .28
(.44) (.45) (.46) (.45)
Receiving housing support .39 .78 .78 .81
in 1984
Receiving child benefits .11 .98 .98 .99
in 1984
Receiving housing support .45 .81 .82 .83
in 1986
Receiving child support .00 .99 1.00 .99
in 1986
Amount of housing support 1667 8606 8393 9209
in 1984
Amount of child benefits 434 8380 8221 9188
in 1984
Amount of housing support 2744 10345 10544 10698
in 1986
Amount of child support 36 9554 9991 9960
in 1986
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Table A2: Summary Statistics 1986. Means and standard deviations
Without children With children
at least 1 at least 1 at least 1
Covariates child child 0-6 child 7-17
Observations in 1986 878 1415 670 1026
Number of children in 1986 1.60 1.76 1.73
(.77) (.85) (.81)
Number of children <7 in 1986 .57 1.20 .31
(.68) (.46) (.54)
Number of children >6 in 1986 1.03 .55 1.42
(.84) (.77) (.65)
Age in 1986 38.09 34.00 30.60 35.75
(9.50) (6.17) (4.68) (5.78)
Years of schooling in 1986 9.55 9.52 9.68 9.34
(3.32) (2.95) (2.89) (3.04)
Under 9th grade .39 .34 .23 .39
(.49) (.47) (.42) (.49)
9th to 11th grade .19 .33 .44 .28
(.40) (.47) (.50) (.45)
12th grade .13 .05 .07 .04
(.34) (.22) (.26) (.19)
Skilled .15 .17 .14 .18
(.36) (.37) (.35) (.38)
Short further education .01 .01 .01 .01
(.12) (.11) (.10) (.12)
Middle further education .06 .06 .06 .06
(.24) (.24) (.24) (.24)
Long further education .05 .04 .04 .04
(.23) (.19) (.20) (.19)
Continued on next page
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Table A2: Summary Statistics 1986. Means and Standard Deviations, cont.
Without children With children
at least 1 at least 1 at least 1
Covariates child child 0-6 child 7-17
Gross Income in 1986 75568 88365 85647 89450
(37032) (36804) (34996) (37464)
Welfare benefits in 1986 25684 27041 28349 27735
(21257) (23406) (23923) (23865)
Receiving welfare benefits .73 .74 .71 .76
in 1985 (.44) (.44) (.45) (.43)
Receiving sickness benefits .15 .20 .27 .18
in 1986 (.36) (.40) (.44) (.38)
Receiving sickness benefits .14 .19 .25 .17
in 1985 (.34) (.39) (.43) (.38)
Receiving sickness benefits .07 .10 .15 .09
in 1985 and 1986 (.26) (.31) (.36) (.29)
In school in 1985 .15 .13 .11 .12
(.35) (.33) (.32) (.33)
In school in 1986 .13 .13 .15 .12
(.34) (.34) (.36) (.32)
Receiving unemployment .15 .25 .27 .23
support in 1985 (.36) (.43) (.45) (.42)
Receiving unemployment .15 .22 .23 .22
support in 1986 (.36) (.42) (.42) (.41)
Training participation 1986 .17 .25 .27 .24
(.38) (.43) (.44) (.43)
Ownership .05 .03 .03 .03
(.22) (.17) (.17) (.17)
Continued on next page
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Table A2: Summary Statistics 1986. Means and Standard Deviations, cont.
Without children With children
at least 1 at least 1 at least 1
Covariates child child 0-6 child 7-17
Receiving retirement .03 .01 .00 .01
benefits in 1985 (.16) (.11) (.07) (.11)
Receiving retirement .07 .03 .01 .04
benefits in 1986 (.26) (.17) (.11) (.17)
Receiving a wage in 1985 .54 .58 .57 .59
(.50) (.49) (.50) (.49)
Receiving a wage in 1986 .57 .61 .58 .61
(.50) (.49) (.49) (.49)
City w/ more than 100.000 .40 .26 .28 .28
(.49) (.47) (.45) (.45)
City b/t 50-100.000 .12 .12 .12 .12
(.33) (.33) (.32) (.33)
City b/t 20-50.000 .25 .29 .31 .29
(.43) (.45) (.46) (.45)
Receiving housing support .42 .78 .77 .80
in 1986
Receiving child benefits .09 .99 .98 1.00
in 1986
Receiving housing support .49 .83 .87 .84
in 1988
Receiving child support .01 .99 1.00 .99
in 1988
Amount of housing support 2052 9185 8710 9923
in 1986
Amount of child benefits 374 8948 8952 9761
in 1986
Amount of housing support 3333 11962 12627 12233
in 1988
Amount of child support 52 17232 19007 17924
in 1988
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Table A3: Difference-in-difference estimation of labor market participation in
the years 1986 to 1988, part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nbr of children 0.020*
(0.012)
nbr of children <7 0.037 0.036 -0.063
(0.023) (0.024) (0.063)
nbr of children >6 0.015 0.014 -0.011
(0.014) (0.015) (0.024)
child <7 dummy 0.133*
(0.077)
child >6 dummy 0.054
(0.041)
year of school86 0.004 0.004 -0.006 -0.005
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
year of school862 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
year of school863 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age86 0.129 0.136 0.166* 0.162*
(0.090) (0.090) (0.098) (0.098)
age862 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004* -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
age863 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ownership 0.094* 0.095* 0.092* 0.093*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054)
health85 0.016 0.014 -0.007 -0.005
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042)
health86 -0.196** -0.197** -0.194** -0.193**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)
health8485 -0.051 -0.051 -0.016 -0.016
(0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054)
welfare85 0.014 0.015 0.007 0.007
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
Continued on next page
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Table A3 continued: Difference-in-difference estimation of labor market partic-
ipation in the years 1986 to 1988, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment insurance85 -0.032 -0.032 -0.027 -0.029
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
unemployment insurance86 0.034 0.035 0.026 0.023
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
retirement85 -0.035 -0.036 -0.018 -0.015
(0.097) (0.097) (0.101) (0.101)
retirement86 0.027 0.028 0.019 0.019
(0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062)
in school85 0.060 0.062 0.060 0.063
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
in school86 0.099** 0.098** 0.085* 0.083*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
big municipality 0.003 0.003 0.098 0.025
(0.028) (0.028) (0.506) (0.507)
medium municipality -0.002 -0.002 -0.083 -0.159
(0.036) (0.036) (0.520) (0.521)
small municipality 0.009 0.008 0.613 0.537
(0.029) (0.029) (0.618) (0.619)
municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
constant -1.636 -1.749 -2.162* -2.041
(1.096) (1.105) (1.304) (1.305)
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. Estimates are obtained from a linear
probability model on a sample of single mothers and single women without children. See equation (7), (8), and
(9).
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Table A4: Difference-in-difference estimation of labor market participation in
the years 1984 to 1986, part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nbr of children 0.001
(0.012)
nbr of children <7 0.013 0.018 -0.147**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.065)
nbr of children >6 -0.003 -0.008 0.004
(0.013) (0.014) (0.023)
child <7 dummy 0.219**
(0.079)
child >6 dummy -0.027
(0.041)
year of school84 0.012 0.012 0.029 0.027
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
year of school842 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
year of school843 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age84 0.085 0.092 0.099 0.097
(0.092) (0.093) (0.099) (0.099)
age842 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
age843 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ownership -0.043 -0.043 -0.040 -0.041
(0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053)
health83 -0.038 -0.038 -0.034 -0.034
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
health84 -0.188** -0.188** -0.177** -0.182**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
health8283 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.013
(0.052) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055)
welfare83 0.079** 0.080** 0.082** 0.085**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
Continued on next page
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Table A4 continued: Difference-in-difference estimation of labor market partic-
ipation in the years 1984 to 1986, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment insurance83 0.080** 0.080** 0.093** 0.093**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
unemployment insurance84 -0.035 -0.035 -0.039 -0.036
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036)
retirement83 -0.062 -0.063 -0.061 -0.064
(0.095) (0.095) (0.103) (0.103)
retirement84 0.008 0.009 0.027 0.029
(0.054) (0.054) (0.058) (0.058)
employed83 0.093** 0.094** 0.096** 0.100**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049)
employed84 0.088* 0.088** 0.070 0.067
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
in school83 -0.053 -0.051 -0.059 -0.057
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
in school84 -0.167** -0.166** -0.159** -0.160**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
big municipality -0.036 -0.035 0.060 -1.148**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.511) (0.513)
medium municipality -0.026 -0.026 0.022 -1.181**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.523) (0.524)
small municipality -0.023 -0.023 -0.035 -1.213**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.570) (0.570)
municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
constant -1.101 -1.210 -1.406 -0.189
(1.133) (1.148) (1.321) (1.330)
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.045
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. Estimates are obtained from a linear
probability model on a sample of single mothers and single women without children. See equation (7), (8), and
(9).
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Table A5: Difference-in-difference estimation of Welfare Participation in the
years 1986 to 1988, part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nbr of children 0.035**
(0.011)
nbr of children <7 0.080** 0.077** 0.043
(0.021) (0.022) (0.056)
nbr of children >6 0.021* 0.014* 0.024
(0.012) (0.013) (0.022)
child <7 dummy 0.046
(0.069)
child >6 dummy -0.021
(0.036)
year of school86 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
year of school862 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
year of school863 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age86 -0.042 -0.021 -0.007 -0.007
(0.080) (0.080) (0.087) (0.087)
age862 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
age863 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ownership -0.041 -0.037 -0.044 -0.044
(0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048)
health85 0.070** 0.064* 0.051 0.052
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
health86 0.055** 0.049* 0.047 0.046
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
health8485 -0.020 -0.019 0.000 0.001
(0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049)
Continued on next page
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Table A5 continued: Difference-in-difference estimation of Welfare Participa-
tion in the years 1986 to 1988, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment insurance85 -0.030 -0.031 -0.041 -0.042
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
unemployment insurance86 -0.245** -0.244** -0.234** -0.232**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
retirement85 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.008
(0.085) (0.085) (0.089) (0.089)
retirement86 -0.596** -0.593** -0.575** -0.575**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
employed85 -0.095** -0.093** -0.096** -0.095**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
employed86 -0.176** -0.172** -0.165** -0.165**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
in school85 -0.098** -0.091* -0.106** -0.104**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
in school86 0.096** 0.094* 0.102** 0.100**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
big municipality 0.014 0.013 -0.421 0.002
(0.025) (0.025) (0.449) (0.450)
medium municipality -0.038 -0.037 -0.237 0.186
(0.032) (0.032) (0.461) (0.462)
small municipality 0.045* 0.042* -0.843 -0.428
(0.025) (0.025) (0.549) (0.549)
municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
constant 1.330 1.012 1.233 0.804
(0.975) (0.982) (1.146) (1.161)
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.211 0.211 0.211
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. Estimates are obtained from a linear
probability model on a sample of single mothers and single women without children. See equation (7), (8), and
(9).
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Table A6: Difference-in-difference estimation of Welfare Participation in the
years 1984 to 1986, part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nbr of children 0.052**
(0.010)
nbr of children <7 0.049** 0.051** 0.112**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.055)
nbr of children >6 0.053** 0.047** 0.028
(0.011) (0.012) (0.020)
child <7 dummy -0.081
(0.068)
child >6 dummy 0.042
(0.035)
year of school84 -0.017 -0.017 -0.006 -0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
year of school842 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
year of school843 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age84 0.120 0.118 0.157* 0.154*
(0.079) (0.080) (0.085) (0.085)
age842 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
age843 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ownership -0.113** -0.113** -0.115** -0.115**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
health83 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.043
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
health84 0.094** 0.094** 0.084** 0.086**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
health8283 -0.036 -0.036 -0.043 -0.044
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
Continued on next page
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Table A6: Difference-in-difference estimation of Welfare Participation in the
years 1984 to 1986, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment insurance83 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.044
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)
unemployment insurance84 -0.260** -0.260** -0.278** -0.279**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
retirement83 0.018 0.019 0.034 0.037
(0.081) (0.081) (0.087) (0.087)
retirement84 -0.585** -0.585** -0.583** -0.585**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050)
employed83 -0.023 -0.023 -0.020 -0.020
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
employed84 -0.207** -0.207** -0.205** -0.207**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
in school83 -0.131** -0.132** -0.125** -0.126**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
in school84 0.136** 0.136** 0.133** 0.135**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
big municipality -0.003 -0.003 0.145 0.051
(0.023) (0.023) (0.435) (0.437)
medium municipality 0.039 0.039 0.122 0.023
(0.031) (0.031) (0.445) (0.447)
small municipality 0.031 0.031 0.089 -0.013
(0.025) (0.025) (0.485) (0.486)
municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
constant -0.600 -0.569 -1.216 -1.076
(0.973) (0.987) (1.127) (1.136)
Adjusted R2 0.234 0.233 0.240 0.240
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. Estimates are obtained from a linear
probability model on a sample of single mothers and single women without children. See equation (7), (8), and
(9).
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Table A7: Difference-in-difference estimation of Training Participation in the
years 1986 to 1988, part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nbr of children 0.031**
(0.010)
nbr of children <7 0.082** 0.071** 0.119**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.054)
nbr of children >6 0.016 0.012 -0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.021)
child <7 dummy -0.064
(0.066)
child >6 dummy 0.028
(0.035)
year of school86 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
year of school862 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
year of school863 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age86 -0.160** -0.136* -0.131 -0.131
(0.076) (0.077) (0.084) (0.084)
age862 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
age863 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ownership -0.055 -0.051 -0.053 -0.053
(0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
health85 0.043 0.036 0.027 0.026
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036)
health86 0.038 0.033 0.037 0.038
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
health8485 -0.055 -0.054 -0.050 -0.050
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047)
welfare85 -0.087** -0.082** -0.092** -0.092**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Continued on next page
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Table A7 continued: Difference-in-difference estimation of Training Participa-
tion in the years 1986 to 1988, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment insurance85 -0.034 0.034 0.038 0.038
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
unemployment insurance86 -0.053* -0.052* -0.076** -0.077**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
retirement85 -0.011 -0.013 -0.027 -0.028
(0.082) (0.082) (0.087) (0.087)
retirement86 -0.056 -0.053 -0.037 -0.036
(0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053)
employed85 0.073** 0.076** 0.074** 0.072**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
employed86 -0.065** -0.061** -0.044* -0.044*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
in school85 -0.164** -0.156** -0.158** -0.161**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
in school86 -0.163** -0.165** -0.165** -0.163**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
big municipality 0.024 0.022 0.850** -0.763*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.433) (0.435)
medium municipality 0.025 0.027 1.012** -0.600
(0.031) (0.030) (0.444) (0.447)
small municipality -0.006 -0.010 0.873* -0.728
(0.024) (0.024) (0.530) (0.531)
municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
constant 2.272** 1.907** 0.980 2.602**
(0.935) (0.941) (1.107) (1.120)
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.082 0.067 0.066
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. Estimates are obtained from a linear
probability model on a sample of single mothers and single women without children. See equation (7), (8), and
(9).
66
Table A8: Difference-in-difference estimation of Training Participation in the
years 1984 to 1986, part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nbr of children 0.004
(0.010)
nbr of children <7 0.014 0.006 -0.027
(0.020) (0.020) (0.053)
nbr of children >6 0.001 -0.004 0.017
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019)
child <7 dummy 0.045
(0.065)
child >6 dummy -0.045
(0.033)
year of school84 0.013 0.013 0.023 0.022
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
year of school842 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005* -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
year of school843 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age84 -0.002 0.004 0.029 0.033
(0.076) (0.077) (0.081) (0.081)
age842 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
age843 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ownership -0.042 -0.042 -0.052 -0.052
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
health83 -0.018 -0.018 -0.030 -0.029
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
health84 0.052* 0.052* 0.066** 0.065**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
health8283 -0.076* -0.076* -0.063 -0.063
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
welfare83 -0.091** -0.090** -0.094** -0.093**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Continued on next page
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Table A8: Difference-in-difference estimation of Training Participation in the
years 1984 to 1986, part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment insurance83 0.097** 0.097** 0.101** 0.103**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
unemployment insurance84 -0.093** -0.093** -0.099** -0.099**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
retirement83 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.014
(0.079) (0.079) (0.084) (0.084)
retirement84 -0.027 -0.026 -0.010 -0.008
(0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048)
employed83 0.089** 0.090** 0.102** 0.102**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
employed84 -0.057** -0.056** -0.068** -0.066**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
in school83 -0.053 -0.051 -0.059 -0.057
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
in school84 -0.167** -0.166** -0.159** -0.160**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
big municipality -0.040* -0.040* 0.035 0.041
(0.023) (0.023) (0.416) (0.417)
medium municipality -0.062** -0.062** 0.172 0.182
(0.030) (0.030) (0.425) (0.427)
small municipality -0.042* -0.042* 0.164 0.172
(0.024) (0.024) (0.464) (0.464)
municipality fixed effects no no yes yes
constant 0.330 0.238 -0.168 -0.232
(0.940) (0.953) (1.076) (1.084)
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.055 0.084 0.085
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates. Estimates are obtained from a linear
probability model on a sample of single mothers and single women without children. See equation (7), (8), and
(9).
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Table A9: Employment, fixed effect logit, estimates are evaluated at mean of
explanatory variables
84-86 86-88
(i) (ii)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 -0.016 0.036
(0.021) (0.024)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.016 0.072*
(0.039) (0.039)
Number of children age 7-17 -0.030 0.016
(0.025) (0.029)
Municipality fixed effects no no
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates.
Table A10: Training, fixed effect logit, estimates are evaluated at mean of
explanatory variables
84-86 86-88
(i) (ii)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 0.028 0.089**
(0.131) (0.033)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.106 0.153**
(0.471) (0.059)
Number of children age 7-17 -0.012 0.054
(0.062) (0.037)
Municipality fixed effects no no
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates
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Table A11: Difference-in-difference estimation of employment divided on ages
Younger than 38 years 38 years and older
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 0.003 0.013 -0.012 0.031
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.021 0.017 -0.023 0.122
(0.028) (0.027) (0.094) (0.090)
Number of children age 7-17 -0.005 0.011 -0.011 0.024
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
Municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates.
Table A12: Difference-in-difference estimation of employment divided on edu-
cation
Lower than 12th grade 12th grade and higher
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 -0.004 0.015 0.009 0.022
(0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.033 0.010 -0.002 0.050
(0.033) (0.031) (0.042) (0.043)
Number of children age 7-17 -0.014 0.017 0.013 0.013
(0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027)
Municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates.
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Table A13: Difference-in-difference estimation of welfare divided on ages
Younger than 38 years 38 years and older
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 0.052** 0.040** 0.054** 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.023)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.044** 0.072** 0.121 0.154*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.091) (0.085)
Number of children age 7-17 0.055** 0.025 0.049** -0.002
(0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024)
Municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates.
Table A14: Difference-in-difference estimation of welfare divided on education
Lower than 12th grade 12th grade and higher
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 0.050** 0.017 0.036* 0.034
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.075** 0.060** 0.021 0.110**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038)
Number of children age 7-17 0.043** 0.003 0.042* 0.008
(0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
Municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates.
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Table A15: Difference-in-difference estimation of welfare divided on ages
Younger than 38 years 38 years and older
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 -0.003 0.032** -0.000 0.039**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.001 0.070** -0.039 0.136*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.072) (0.071)
Number of children age 7-17 -0.005 0.014 0.002 0.031
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020)
Municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates.
Table A16: Difference-in-difference estimation of welfare divided on education
Lower than 12th grade 12th grade and higher
84-86 86-88 84-86 86-88
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1.
Number of children age 0-17 0.007 0.023* -0.021 0.015
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021)
2.
Number of children age 0-6 0.012 0.062** -0.005 0.068*
(0.025) (0.026) (0.037) (0.038)
Number of children age 7-17 0.005 0.011 -0.026 -0.002
(0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023)
Municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes
∗Significant at 10 per cent level
∗∗Significant at 5 per cent level
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimates.
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Wages and Occupational Mobility
-patterns in the Danish data∗
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Abstract
Using administrative panel data on 100% of the Danish population we document a new
set of patterns about occupational mobility. The first new pattern of occupational mobil-
ity is that workers’ probability of switching occupations are U-shaped in their wages. It
is the workers with the highest or lowest wages in their occupations who have the highest
probability of leaving the occupation. The second new pattern of occupational mobility is
that, conditional on switching occupation, high wage workers have higher probability of
switching to occupations with higher average wages than the average wage of the occupa-
tion they switched out of. The opposite is true for low wage workers who, conditional on
switching occupation, have higher probability of switching to new occupations where the
average wage is lower than the workers original occupation. The third new pattern about
occupational mobility in Denmark is when the relative average wage of an occupation
rises, the workers from the bottom of the wage distribution within the given occupation
have the highest probability of leaving the occupation. For occupations where the average
wage falls relative to other occupations it is the workers from the top of the wage distri-
bution within the occupation who have the highest probability of leaving the occupation.
These patterns are not implied by existing theories of occupational mobility.
Chapter 2 of PhD thesis
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the correlation between wage and occupational mobility of workers in
Denmark. With the Danish data we reproduce findings from the U.S. about returns to oc-
cupational tenure and declining hazard rates out of an occupation when occupational tenure
increases. We further exploit the fact that we have access to the full population in the Danish
data and show three new patterns of occupational mobility based on a worker’s percentile in
the wage distribution within his occupation. The first new pattern of occupational mobility is
that workers’ probability of switching occupations are U-shaped in their wages. The U-shape
implies that workers at the top and bottom end of the wage distribution within a given occupa-
tion has the highest probability of switching occupation, while the workers in the middle of the
wage distribution have the lowest probability of switching occupation. The second new pat-
tern of occupational mobility is that, conditional on switching occupation, high wage workers
have higher probability of switching to occupations with higher average wages than the average
wage of the occupation they switched out of. The opposite is true for low wage workers who,
conditional on switching occupation, have higher probability of switching to new occupations
where the average wage is lower than the workers original occupation. The last new pattern
about occupational mobility in Denmark is when the relative average wage of an occupation
rises, the workers from the bottom of the wage distribution within the given occupation have
the highest probability of leaving the occupation. For occupations where the average wage falls
relative to other occupations it is the workers from the top of the wage distribution within the
occupation who have the highest probability of leaving the occupation.
The empirical results presented in this paper are part of a bigger project where we model
the decision to change occupation. Our model of occupational mobility and a subset of the
patterns from the data presented in this paper are presented in an accompanying paper (see
Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2009)). That the workers’ probability of switching occupation
are U-shaped in their wages are not implied by any of the existing models of occupational
mobility, which mostly thinks of occupations as a set of horizontally differentiated tasks. In our
accompanying paper, we suggest that it might be productive to think of occupations as forming
vertical hierarchies. The first part of the model we have in mind is a model where workers are
unsure of their abilities but learn about them by observing their output realizations. As a sec-
ond part of the model we have employment opportunities in each occupation, which are scarce
such that it induces competition among workers for them. We also have complementarities in
the production function between worker’s ability and productivity of an occupation and this
induces sorting of workers into occupations according to the workers’ expected ability. Finally,
the model is an equilibrium model of occupational choice including the above mentioned fea-
tures.
In order to show where our new patterns of occupational mobility belongs in the literature
we present a literature review, which is divided into three parts. The first part is a review of
literature related to occupational tenure and wage growth and the second part is a review of
the literature related to occupational mobility and tenure in an occupation. The third section
of the literature review is about how existing models of occupational mobility relate to our new
empirical finding that workers’ probability of switching occupation are U-shaped in their wages.
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The literature review is section 2 of the paper. In section 3 we present in detail the samples we
use from the Danish data and the sample selections we perform. Section 4 gives an overview of
the Danish occupational classifications and typical movements between occupations. In section
5 and in section 6 we present evidence of return to occupational tenure and declining probability
of leaving an occupation with tenure in the occupation. In the last three sections we present
our new patterns of occupational mobility, such that we in section 7 present the U-shapes of
occupational mobility, in section 8 we show the direction of occupational mobility, conditional
on changing occupation, and in section 9 we show what happens to individuals who work in
occupations, which grow or fall in average wages. Finally in section 10 we conclude.
2 Literature review on occupational mobility and the
return to occupation specific human capital
This literature review is divided into three parts. The first part addresses the correlation
between wages and tenure in an occupation. The literature we present focusses on reduced
form estimations and shows that wages within a given occupation increases with tenure in the
occupation. The second part of this literature review is relating the probability of switching
occupations to tenure in the given occupation. We mostly focus on presenting literature of
reduced form estimations motivated by theoretical models, which shows a negative relationship
between occupational tenure and the probability of leaving the occupation. A few structurally
estimated models also produce the same negative relationship between tenure and the transition
probability. The last part of the literature on occupational mobility is to show how existing
models of occupational mobility relate to our new empirical findings.
The reason for the first two parts of this literature review is to show some common findings
in the existing literature that we can show the Danish data matches. The two main finding we
will show are; increasing wages within an occupation and decreasing probability of changing
occupations with occupational tenure. Our new findings that workers’ probability of switching
occupation is U-shaped in their wages are therefore not, merely a fact of a different data set
with different characteristics.
2.1 Literature on occupational tenure and wage growth
In the literature on return to occupation specific human capital it has been shown that tenure
within an occupation generates wage growth, even after controlling for firm and industry tenure.
The literature on the relation between tenure in an occupation and wage growth originated with
Shaw (1984) and Shaw (1987) who argued that investment in occupation specific skills is im-
portant in determining earnings. The first to measure returns to occupation-specific human
capital was Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b). They notice that occupational-specific human
capital is distinct from employer-specific human capital because it is transferable across em-
ployers and thus accumulation of the occupational specific capital cannot be financed by the
employers and should be thought more of as a type of general human capital. In data from
the PSID Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) find that wages on average grow by 12% to 20%
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due to the first 5 years of experience in an occupation and this is the case when controlling for
tenure in the industry and general experience.
Following Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) more analyses have been done on the speci-
ficity of occupational human capital. Using Swedish data Kwon and Meyersson Milgrom (2004)
find that firms prefer to hire workers with relevant occupational experience and they find that
there is no return to firm tenure once tenure in an occupation is accounted for. Hagedorn,
Kambourov, and Manovskii (2004) find substantial returns to occupational tenure in a large
administrative German data set and using data from Canadian Adult Education and Training
Survey, Kambourov, Manovskii, and Plesca (2005) find substantial losses in human capital when
workers switch occupation. Sullivan (2006) supports the finding that human capital is primarily
occupation specific using NLSY data however the results vary with the type of occupation a
person has. Finally using British data, Zangelidis (2004) also finds support that occupational
experience is a major contributor to wage growth whereas the evidence on industry specificity
of wage growth is not supported. Zangelidis (2004) also finds lots of heterogeneity with respect
to what occupations are analyzed. The specificity of occupational wage growth has not been
analyzed using Danish data however, Bagger (2004) finds very low return to firm tenure in
Danish data and high return to general human capital, which includes occupational human
capital.
In conclusion, all the studies show that wages increase with occupational tenure. The ma-
jority of the papers estimate the return to occupational tenure by reduced form approach with
both OLS regression and instrumental variable regression. In section 5 we show that there is
also return to occupational tenure for the Danish sample we use in our analysis.
2.2 Literature on occupational mobility and tenure
The literature on occupational mobility has an unambiguous outcome from the data when
analyzing the correlation between tenure and occupational mobility; the longer tenure a person
has within an occupation the lower probability of separating from that occupation. In this
section we present some literature on occupational mobility. The main focus will be results from
the empirical literature, which links occupational tenure with occupational mobility. However,
we will also review some of the models which have inspired the reduced form findings in the
occupational mobility literature.
One of the earliest models of occupational mobility is Miller (1984) who developed a model
of how young people straight out of their education choose their occupation in an optimal order.
The model’s outcome is that young people should first undertake occupations where success
is rare and if they fail, switch out and try an occupation with the next highest probability of
success. However, as McCall (1991) points out, there are two not very attractive implications
of Miller’s (1984) model. The first implication is that workers would sample all jobs in the
riskiest occupation first before they would switch occupation, because matching is independent
between jobs within an occupation. The second possible unattractive feature is that it is costless
to switch both jobs and occupations. Two articles by McCall (1990) and McCall (1991) try to
address the two shortcomings of Miller’s (1984) model.
Besides Miller (1984) most other models of occupational mobility show declining probability
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of switching out of an occupation (sometimes career) as tenure in the occupation (career)
increases. McCall (1990) derives a theory for occupational matching and shows by estimating
a proportional hazard function that given tenure in a firm, the probability of changing job is
negatively related to tenure in an occupation. Also using young people straight after graduation,
he shows this by comparing two groups of job switchers, those who switched jobs without
switching occupation and those who switched job and occupation. Conditional on having
switched job once, the probability of switching job again is negatively related to the time spent
in the first job and this effect is stronger for those who did not switch occupation in their first
recorded switch. The reason why McCall (1990) does not structurally estimate his model is
because the empirical results of his model ”suggest that a more complex occupation-specific
matching process would be necessary”. This is one place where our empirical results can shed
more light in order to find out what else is important when considering occupational matching
and mobility.
McCall (1990) also sets up a dynamic occupational choice model where information about
the occupational match is revealed with time spent in the occupation and the model includes
training cost or entry cost of switching occupations. He finds that workers only sample the oc-
cupations with the most match uncertainty first (straight after graduation) if the training/entry
costs are low. Finally, McCall (1990) notices that his model does not include employer behav-
ior. He conjectures that in equilibrium where employers (at least partially) would compensate
workers for higher training costs and when workers are identical then they would choose their
initial occupation at random. However, this would not be true if there is heterogeneity among
workers with respect to their comparative advantage.
Building on McCall (1990), Neal (1999), (and an extension from Pavan (2005)), also in-
troduces a model of employer and career choices with match uncertainty. Conceptually Neal
(1999) defines a career as performing the same skill, which is closely related to occupational
category. However in the empirical work, due to measurement error in the NLSY, a career
switch (conditional on switching employer) relies primarily on changes in industry codes.
Neal (1999) builds on McCall’s (1990) result, which predicted that the hazard rate of leaving
a second job should be a decreasing function of tenure on the previous job, if a person did not
change occupation in their first job transition. Neal (1999) develops a model with employer-
and career matches and finds an optimal job search strategy where workers search over career
first and then once they find their career they will search for an employer. This outcome relates
to McCall (1990) in the sense that in McCall (1990) a worker will not change employer within
an occupation if he has learned that the career match is not a good one. Neal (1999) tests his
model empirically and finds no evidence that the model can be rejected.
Pavan (2005) and Sullivan (2006) extends Neal’s (1999) model and estimate their models
structurally. Pavan (2005) gives evidence of career specific matches by showing his model can
reproduce reduced form findings. His model reproduces that conditional on firm tenure the
probability of switching out of a career declines with tenure in the career. The reduced form
analysis is done by a multinomial logit where a worker has three choices; not switching job,
a firm switch but stay in the career, and a career and firm switch. This is all conditional on
being full time in the work force in all years after first time observed as a full time worker.
Pavan (2005) extends Neal’s (1999) model to include firm-specific and career-specific matches
to evolve stochastically over time (rather than being constant as in Neal (1999)).
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In McCall (1990), and Neal (1999) the structural relation between occupational/career
tenure and the probability of separating from a job is negative and they have various ways of
showing that this also is what the data shows. Pavan (2005) extends these results by showing
that the probability of switching out of a career is also negatively related to tenure in the career.
In Miller (1984) there is no clear result of the sign of this relationship.
Borrowing from the literature on firm switching (i.e. Abraham and Farber (1987), Farber
(1998), Parent (2000)), Munch (2006) uses Danish data and a competing risk hazard model to
show the relationship between probability of leaving an occupation and tenure in the occupation.
He finds the probability of exiting a career is declining with tenure in the career however the
probability of exiting an occupation, conditional on the probability of exiting either their firms
or their industries is flat and so does not decline with tenure in an occupation. Munch (2006)
looks at the population (meaning not people coming straight from school) and for people in all
types of jobs. We look at people who we can follow straight from graduation and we look at
people both in the private and public sector.
2.3 Literature on occupational mobility relating to our empirical
findings
In this section we will present some models of occupational mobility and describe how they
relate to our findings that workers’ probabilities of switching occupation are U-shaped in their
wages.
There are three classes of models of occupational mobility we would like to relate to our
empirical findings. The first one, described in, e.g., McCall (1990) and Neal (1999), is based
on match-specific occupational sorting. Occupations are perceived as identical (e.g., not dif-
ferent with respect to skill requirements), but workers find out the quality of their specific
match to an occupation over time. Match-specific sorting occurs when workers realize that
their match-specific shock is bad and abandon the match in favor of (the search for) a better
one. The predictions from this theory are based on selection: Since those workers that are
content with their match stay in their occupation, this theory predicts that the probability
of switching occupation declines with tenure in that occupation, which is consistent with the
data. Moreover, since good matches survive longer, wages and tenure are positively correlated
in the cross-section of workers - an observation that is also consistent with the data. However,
the fundamental selection mechanism in these match-specific sorting models is not consistent
with the data. Virtually any model in which productivities are drawn independently for each
worker-occupation-match rather than representing a permanent trait of either the occupation
or the worker would predict that the probability of switching occupation is negatively related
to wages which indicate match quality. Instead, we find a strong evidence that the probability
of switching occupation is U-shaped in wages: not only is it people with wages lower than
the occupational average, but also those with wages above the average that are more likely to
switch.
A second class of existing models focuses on net mobility, which is explained by fluctuating
demands for services of different occupations. They generally also imply that it is either only
the people on the lower part of wage distribution within an occupation or only in the upper
part of the distribution that tend to switch in response to a change in demand conditions,
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rather than workers on both ends of the spectrum. This is the property of the classic Roy
(1951) model (and its extensions in, e.g., Moscarini (2001)). The models in Kambourov and
Manovskii (2005, 2009a) generically have a similar prediction. They represent a version of the
island economy model of Lucas and Prescott (1974) where islands are interpreted as occupations
and workers accumulate occupation-specific human capital. Human capital is destroyed upon
switching occupations which implies that, if workers with different levels of human capital are
perfectly substitutable in the occupational production function, it is the low human capital,
and hence, low wage, workers that switch first if occupational demand declines. If occupational
demand rises, no one leaves the occupation.
The last model we would like to mention are models of career progressions. Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1997) and Sichernam and Galor (1990) suggest that some occupations form rungs of
a career ladder. Workers spend time on the lower rungs accumulating skills that allow them to
perform effectively at higher rungs. Our setup and these theories share the idea that occupations
may be vertically ranked. However, while their models describe why high wage workers move
to occupations with higher average wages than the occupation they came from, we show that
the occupational mobility goes in both directions; high wage people move to higher paying
occupations and low wage people move to lower paying occupations.
3 Data
We use the administrative Danish register data covering 100% of the population in the years
1980 to 2002. The first part of the data is from the Integrated Database for Labor Market
Research (IDA), which contains annual information on socioeconomic variables (e.g., age, gen-
der, education, etc.) and characteristics of employment (e.g., private sector or government,
occupations, industries, etc.) of the population. Information on wages is extracted from the
Income Registers and consists of the hourly wage in the job held in the last week in November
of each year. Wage information is not available for workers who are not employed in the last
week of November. The wages are deflated to the 1995 wage level using Statistics Denmark’s
consumer price index and trimmed from above and below at the 0.99 and 0.01 percentile for
each year of the selected sample described below.
We use the Danish rather than the U.S. data for two reasons. First, the sample size is much
larger. One of our objectives is to document the patterns of occupational mobility depending
on the position of the individual in the wage distribution within her occupation. A sample
sufficiently large to be representative in each occupation is essential for this purpose. Second,
the administrative data minimizes the amount of measurement error in occupational coding
that plagues the available US data (see Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b)). Nevertheless,
as we show in section 5 and 6 the features of occupational mobility that can be compared
between the U.S. and Denmark are quite similar. This leads us to expect that the patterns of
occupational mobility that we describe using Danish data generalize to, e.g., the U.S.
3.0.1 Sample selection
While the Danish register data dates back to 1980, because information on firm tenure is
available only after 1995 and because of a change in the occupational classification in 1995,
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we study the data spanning the 1995-2002 period (the latter cut-off was dictated by the data
availability at the time we performed the analysis). We use the pre-1995 data in constructing
some of the variables. For example, in 1995 the two occupational classifications used in the
Danish register data are linked to the worker’s job which allows us to construct measures of
occupational tenure. For example, a worker will be considered to have 5 years of occupational
experience in 1996 if he is observed in the same occupation in 1995 and 1996 according to the
new occupational classification and at the same time has the same occupational classification
from 1992 to 1995 according to the old occupational classification.
We only select male workers in order to minimize the impact of the fertility decision on
labor market transitions. To construct experience and tenure variables we need to observe each
individual’s entire labor market history. Thus, our sample includes all individuals completing
their education in or after 1980 if they remain in the sample at least until 1995. The sample
includes graduates from all types of education from 7th grade to a graduate degree conditional
on observing the individual not going back to school for at least three years after graduation
(for people graduating in 2000 we use educational information from 2003). Thus, a worker who
completed high school, worked for three years, then obtained a college degree and went back
to full time work will have two spells in our sample: first, the three years between high school
and college, and second, after graduating from college. If he worked for less than three years
between high school and college, he joins our sample only after graduating from college.
We show our results hold for two different ways of further selecting the sample; one very
restrictive way where we only include full time privately employed workers and another less
restrictive sample where we allow workers to work in both public and private employment and
have spells of non-employment in between. In the most restrictive sample, we truncate the
workers’ labor market histories the first time we observe them in part-time employment, public
employment, and self employment. We allow workers to have a non-employment spell after
their graduation, but we truncate their work spell the first time they are observed with missing
wage data (including non-employment) after they have worked in full time private employment.
The sample with full time privately employed workers consists of 486,612 observations
from 122,000 individuals graduating in the years 1980-2000. The workers do not go back to
school within 3 years after graduation, their spells are truncated according to the description
above, and they have at least 2 consecutive years of full time private employment after 1995.
This sample is a very restrictive sample since most individuals graduating in the early sample
period are not included in the analysis because they experience a spell of non-fulltime private
employment before 1995. Table 1 shows where the people in the restrictive sample come from.
Column 1 in table 1 shows how many graduates there are in each year from 1980 to 2000 and
column 2 shows how many observations between 1995 and 2002 each graduation year give.
Column 3 in table 1 shows how many workers we use in our main sample and how they are
distributed over the sample years from 1995-2001. Notice, this sample only goes to 2001 since
for workers in 2002 we do not know if they change occupation the year after. 1 Since the full
time privately employed workers sample excludes a lot of individuals and observations we have
selected a less restrictive sample where we show the results also hold.
For both samples we always select a sample of graduates from 1980 to 2000 who do not
1the sample presented in table Table 1 includes people from the years where they are not employed, if this
spell of non-employment directly follows their graduation.
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Table 1: Fulltime private work. Main sample by workers graduation year and calendar year in
the sample.
t graduates each year observations in 1995-2001 sample observations in 1995-2001 sample
by graduation year by calendar year
(1) (2) (3)
1980 3350 18027 -
1981 3572 19354 -
1982 4024 21791 -
1983 4213 22249 -
1984 4210 22018 -
1985 4514 23719 -
1986 4941 25118 -
1987 5108 25918 -
1988 5187 25896 -
1989 5246 25950 -
1990 4729 22765 -
1991 5547 25849 -
1992 6417 28946 -
1993 7137 31062 -
1994 7308 30245 -
1995 9183 33314 72682
1996 8807 27647 73781
1997 8517 22912 75038
1998 7990 17641 73559
1999 6536 10325 66529
2000 5866 5866 63882
2001 - - 61141
Total 122402 486612 486612
return to school for at least three years after graduation and whom we observe employed full
time for at least one year in the data from 1995-2002. Their individual working spell for each
educational degree received is truncated the first time we observe them in a new education
(either in school or with a new graduation year). This sample consists of 6.5 million individuals
and table A-1 column 1 shows how many graduated in each year. Column 2 from table A-1
shows how many from each graduation year are in the sample from 1981-2002 and column 3
shows how many there are in the sample from 1995-2002 by graduation year.
The most restrictive sample, which we will refer to as the full time privately employed sample,
is further restricted to never include workers in part time employment (defined as having less
than 20 hours of work per week in either public or private sector). The part time employed
people are excluded from the sample because they do not have reliable hourly wage information
and they do not have any occupational codes, which makes it impossible to calculate tenure
in their occupations. We truncate all spells the first time we observe the individual in part
81
time employment. We further delete spells, which do not have any observations with full time
employment after 1995 because of the part time truncation. Table A-2 column 1, 2, and 3 show
how many people are in full time employment, non-employment, and part time employment
each year. After truncating the workers spells the first time they are in part time employment
table A-2 column 4 and 5 show how many are left in full time employment and non employment.
The third sample restriction is a truncation of all spells the first time they have a missing
occupational data while working full time. We do this to be able to calculate the workers
occupational tenure for all years in the sample. Table A-3 shows the number of non-employment
and full private and public employment with and without missing occupational data each year.
Table A-4 column 4 shows how many of the total observations are truncated because of missing
occupational codes and column 5 shows how many observations we further drop by restricting
the sample to include one year of full time employment between 1995 and 2002. Column
1, 2, and 3 in table A-4 are the number of observations each year left in the overall sample
divided into non-employment, private full time employment, and public full time employment.
Table A-3 shows that it is around 20 percent of the full time private employment observations,
which have missing occupational data and it is also around 20 percent of the full time public
employment spells. However, as table 4 shows these 20 percent forces us to drop 45 percent of
the observations from the time period 1980-2002 by truncating the spells and making sure we
have at least one observation from each spell after 1995.
To create our full time privately employed sample we further restrict the sample to only
include those workers who have two consecutive years of full time private work in the period
1995-2002. This procedure drops 800,000 of the 2.5 million observations of the entire 1981-
2002 period and leaves 965,000 observations in the period 1995-2002. Since we only look at
privately employed people we truncate the workers spells first time they are observed in public
employment. Table A-5 column 3 shows how many from each year we drop because of the
public employment truncation. Column 4 in table A-5 shows how many observations we drop
afterwards in order to only include workers who have two consecutive years of full time private
employment after the public employment truncation. Column 1 and 2 in table A-5 show
how many people are left in non-employment and private employment each year. The above
truncations give a sample of workers who are either in full time private employment or not
working each period. We restrict our main sample to include only those years where people are
full time privately employed. Workers are allowed to enter non-employment after graduation
but once they have entered private employment they are truncated the first time we observe
them entering non-employment after their initial private employment spell. Table A-6 column
3 shows how many observations we truncate with this procedure and column 4 shows how many
we further delete because they do not have two consecutive years in private employment after
the truncation. This leaves a sample of 1.22 million observations in the period 1981-2002 and
730.000 observations from 1995-2002.
The final truncation we do for our main sample is to truncate those spells which have
missing firm codes. The firm codes are available from 1995. Table A-7 column 3 shows how
many observations we truncate each year due to missing firm codes and column 4 shows how
many observations we further drop from the sample due to the restriction of having at least 2
consecutive years of full time private employment without missing firm codes in the period 1995-
2002. Column 1 and 2 in table A-7 show how many of the observations are in non-employment
and in private employment each year. The dataset, which we create the main sample from,
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there are 1.08 million observations from 1981 to 2002 and 630,000 in the period 1995 to 2002.
For our analyses we use only people while they are working and each calendar year, for
each graduation cohort, we drop the workers with the highest and lowest 0.1 percent of real
wages. Furthermore, to create the U-shapes with our main sample we only use the workers
last year to determine what occupation they are in, thus for the U-shape graphs we do not
use the workers’ last year in the sample. Descriptive statistics for the final main sample of all
workers in the years 1995 to 2002 are given in table 2 column 1. Column 2 from table 2 is
descriptive statistics of the sample where we have excluded workers in their final year in the
sample. Column 3 is for the same sample as in column 2 where there is at least 10 workers
in each occupation in each year. Column 4 is for the sample with at least 10 workers in each
occupation, year, and years after graduation category and column 5 is for the sample with at
least 100 workers in each occupation and year. These samples, which includes only full time pri-
vately employed workers, we call our main sample and they will be used in the analysis below. 2
Table A-11 in the appendix show the descriptive statistics of the less restrictive sample. In
this sample we use both full time private and full time public employees. We do not have in-
formation on firms for the public sector employees and we therefore choose to define the entire
public sector as one firm. The workers are allowed to switch in and out of employment but
since we do not have reliable data on part time workers, these workers are treated as if they
were unemployed for the duration of their part time work. This means that while they are
working part time they will not be included in our analyses and they will not generate general
experience or tenure in any occupation, firm, or industry. However, once we observe the worker
in any full time employment, he is part of the sample we use for the analyses again. As men-
tioned during the description of the full time privately employed sample, some workers have
missing occupation or firm codes while they are full time employed. If a worker has missing
occupational data we cannot calculate his his occupational tenure. We therefore exclude the
workers observations while he has missing occupation-codes or missing firm-codes. It is possible
for the worker to re-enter the sample if he is observed switching occupation or firm after his
spell of missing data. When a worker switches occupation, firm, or industry his tenure will be
reset to zero in the new occupation. This means that a worker who is a cook in period t, has
missing occupation in period t+1, is a cook in period t+2, and a truck driver in period t+3,
will be included in the sample in period t and again in period t+3 where his tenure as a truck
driver is 1. As in the sample with full time privately employed workers, a worker is defined as
switching occupation if he works in two different occupations in two consecutive years. For this
least restrictive sample we further allow workers to switch occupation through unemployment,
non-employment or through part time work, if this stage last for no more than one year. This
means that a worker who is a cook in period t, is part time employed in period t+1, and is
a cook in period t+2, is in the sample in period t and t+2, and in period t+2 he has one
more year of experience and occupational tenure than he had in period t. If the worker was a
truck driver in period t+2 he would have an indicator for switching occupation in the period
t. In both cases the worker would be in the sample in period t and he would be in the sample
in period t+2 depending on what he did in period t+3 and t+4 because we do not include
2table 1 shows how many graduate each year from this sample from column 2 in table 2, and how many of
them are in the sample each year.
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people in their last work year. However, if the worker was a cook in period t, part time in
period t+1 and t+2, and a cook again in period t+3, he would not be included in the sample
in period t. Only workers who work in two consecutive years or who at most have one year in
non-employment between two employment spells are included in the sample.
Table 2: Summary statistics for the full time privately employed samples.
Full Without last Over 10 Over 10 Over 100 per
Sample year and per per occupation per
trimmed at occupation year occupation
0.1 pct and year and experience and year
Number of observations 609014 486612 483969 440448 455401
Number of occupations 355 353 236 146 109
Age 31.14 30.92 30.92 30.69 30.84
Occ. tenure 2.91 2.80 2.81 2.80 2.81
Occ. spell number 2.33 2.29 2.28 2.24 2.27
Occ. switchers 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
Empl. tenure 2.77 2.57 2.57 2.54 2.57
Firm switchers 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Occ. and firm switchers 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Occ. but not firm switchers 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11
Ind. tenure 3.87 3.71 3.71 3.67 3.72
Years after graduation 8.05 7.90 7.90 7.74 7.88
Less than 12 years of school 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Apprenticeship education 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71
2 year university 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Bachelor 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Masters degree or above 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Hourly wage in DKK in 1995 175.71 173.84 173.83 172.27 173.15
Married 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35
Union 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Number of children 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.81
Table A-8 shows how the workers in the least restrictive sample are distributed each year
from 1980-2002 on different labor market states and A-9 shows who has missing occupation
and firm data. Column 4 in table A-9 workers who do not either have two consecutive years of
full time employment in the period 1995-2002 or workers who have two years of employment
in the period 1995-2002 separated by at most one year of non-employment or part time work.
From this sample we further define workers as out of the sample if they have missing occupation
codes or missing firm codes and have not been observed with a switch after their missing obser-
vation. Table A-10 column 4 shows how many workers are not in the sample each year due to
only having missing occupation codes, column 5 shows how many have missing firm codes, and
column 6 shows how many have both missing firm and occupation codes. Notice that we only
observe firm data from 1995 thus no one are missing from the sample due to missing firm data
before 1995. Column 7 of table A-10 shows how many observations we completely remove from
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the sample because the worker do not have any valid employment data after 1995. From the
sample of full time workers from column 1 in table A-10 we use those who we can observe what
occupation they are in the year after we use them in the sample and we only selcet observation
in the period 1995 to 2002. This gives a total 1.3 million observations. Table A-11 column 1
shows the summary statistics of these workers. Column 2 in table A-11 shows summary statis-
tics for those workers who are in occupations with at least 10 workers every year and column
3 shows summary statistics for those workers who are in occupations with at least 10 workers
ever year and year after graduation. Column 4 from table A-11 shows summary statistics for
workers who are in occupations with at least 100 workers during the period 1995-2002.
4 Wage Determination and Occupational Classification
The hourly wages from the Danish data are calculated as the sum of total labor market income
and mandatory pension fund payments of the job held in the last week in November in a given
year divided by the total number of hours worked in the job held in November in the given
year. The labor income and the pension contributions are from the tax authorities and are
considered to be highly reliable - see ? for a further description of the Danish wage data. Job
protection is low in Denmark and the wages are compressed, which is partly due to high benefit
levels and partly due to a high degree of unionization where wage bargaining historically has
been centralized. In 2000, 74 % of workers were members of a union and more than 80 % were
covered by a collective agreement. The centralized wage bargaining structure has however, been
decreasing during the 1980’s and the 1990’s and these are described in more detail in ?.
There exists four different wage setting systems in Denmark. The first is a standard-rate
system, where wages of workers are by the industry collective agreements and wages are not
modified at the firm. The standard-rate system covers around 13 % of workers in the private
sector over the period 1995 to 1999. In two of the four wage setting systems, covering around
56 % of the workers, the wage rates set at the industry level are set as a floor and are only paid
to very inexperienced workers. The rest of the workers can negotiate higher wages at the firm
level. The last wage setting system is the firm-level bargaining where the collective bargaining
states that workers wages are negotiated at the plant or firm level. This covers the rest of the
11 % of workers covered by collective agreements.
The Occupational code in the Danish data is based on the DISCO code, which is the Danish
version of the ISCO-88 classification (International Standard Classification of Occupations).
For the main part of our analysis we have chosen the most disaggregate definition of the
occupational classification, which is at the 4-digit level. This aggregation level is chosen partly
to capture all occupational mobility and partly because we look at the wage distributions
within occupations. Some of the occupations at the 4-digit level have significantly different
wage distributions compared to their 3-digit counterparts. At the 1-digit level there are 10
different occupational classification, where one of them is the military. There are 27 major
occupational groups at the 2-digit level and 111 occupational groups at the 3-digit level. For
the 4-digit level of occupations there are 372 possible occupations and in our least exclusive
sample we observe workers in 368 of the occupations. In the appendix section A2 we show the
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occupational classifications and how they are grouped from the first to the forth digit level.
In Denmark it is the employers’ responsibility to collect and report the DISCO codes to
Statistics Denmark. The validity is considered to be high and is used for information on eco-
nomics implications of proposals for the workers and employers of two wage bargaining parties
at the national level; The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and The Confederation
of Danish Employers (DA). Furthermore, Statistics ? assess that the DISCO code is a useful
tool to group workers according to occupations.
One of the reasons for including occupations at the 4-digit level is because the wage dis-
tribution is different for occupations at the 4-digit level than at the 3-digit level. An example
of this is economists who have the 4-digit code 2441 and who, among others, are in the same
3-digit group as sociologist, philosophers, and historians. Since we look at a worker’s place in
the wage distribution within his occupation by aggregating to the 3-digit level we compare the
wages of economists to, for example, historians. The economist in the lowest decile of the wage
distribution of all economist with same number of years after their graduation and in the same
calendar year are not all in the lowest wage decile in their 3-digit occupational group. In the
3-digit occupational group only 28 percent of the workers who are in the lowest decile of the
economists are in the lowest decile of their related 3-digit occupational distribution. Another
67 percent are in the second decile and 5 percent are in the third decile of their 3-digit oc-
cupational classification. The pattern is similar for chemical engineer where 39 percent of the
chemical engineers from the lowest wage decile of chemical engineers are in the lowest decile of
their 3-digit occupational group. For the chemical engineers from the lowest decile another 19
percent are in the second lowest decile, 24 percent are in the third lowest decile, 11 percent are
in the forth lowest decile, 6 percent are in the fifth lowest decile, and 1 percent is in the 7th
lowest decile in their 3-digit occupational group. If we include the public sector workers in the
occupational distribution, the above results become even more significant and we also observe
the same patterns for medical doctors, where 54 percent of the lowest decile from the medical
doctor distribution are in the lowest decile in their related 3-digit distribution.
A second reason for keeping the 4-digit level occupations is that occupational switching at
the 4-digit level, where the occupations are in the same 3-digit level occupational classification,
in some cases are associated with significantly change in occupational specific human capital.
This is true for switches between the occupations mentioned above as well as other occupational
switches, where the 4-digit occupations belong to the same 3-digit occupations. Examples of
such occupations are; plumbers and electricians, bricklayers and carpenters, gardeners and field
crop growers, fire-fighters and prison guards, hair-dressers and undertakers, travel guides and
travel stewards, radio-announcers and circus clowns, and medical assistants and pharmaceutical
assistants.
In appendix A3 we show the occupational switching patterns of full time employees from
the private sectors. We have excluded occupations with less than 500 observations over the
1995-2002 period and we have excluded those occupations the workers enter if the occupation
accounts for less than 2 percent of the overall switchers from the original occupation. Deleting
switches to occupations, which accounts for less than 2 percent of the total switches from the
original occupation leaves 54.000 total switches. This is 67 percent of all switches when we
condition on occupations with at least 500 employees during the period 1995-2002. Appendix
A3 shows that the 4-digit occupational switches associated with significantly different tasks in
their original occupation and their new occupation, which are in the same 3-digit occupational
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groups, are limited. This result speaks in favor of performing our analyzes at a more aggregated
occupational level. We therefore show our main results for different occupational classification
levels. 3
In order to get a better understanding of which occupations people switch between we
have included table A4, A5, A6, and A7. Table A4 through A6 show pairs of occupations
that workers switches between. Table A4 show those occupations where at least 5 percent
of the switchers from the original occupation switches to and where at least 5 percent of
the switchers from the new occupation switches to the original occupation. In the sample
of private sector employees there are 38.000 switches between occupations when we condition
on occupations receiving at least 5 percent of the total switches from an occupation. Out of
these 38.000 occupational switches there are 29.000 switches where workers switches back and
forth between the same two occupations. Examples of occupations that are joined by one such
link are; Department managers in construction and civil engineers, department managers in
wholesales and shop sales persons, supply and distribution managers and buyers, chemist and
chemical engineers, computer system designers and computer assistants, all kinds of engineers to
engineering technicians, accountants and administration managers, accountants to bookkeepers,
electrical engineering technician and electricians, electronic engineering assistant and computer
assistant, cooks and waiters, cooks and truck drivers, carpenters and wood-product machine
operators, welders and tool-makers, blacksmiths and plumbers, dairy product machine operators
and dairy product makers, and building construction laborers and road construction laborers.
The occupational pairs, which have high percentage of workers switching between them are
occupations of similar nature as the pairs of occupations from table A4 indicates. A similar
pattern is the case for occupations which are linked by two occupational switches, even though
occupational switches, which comes back to the original occupation after two other occupa-
tions have larger differences between the occupations than if the link is only through one other
occupation. Table A5 shows what occupations these are. There are 2.597 switches, which are
linked by occupational triple pair. A few examples are that conditional on switching occupa-
tion, 8 percent of the managers in construction switch to civil engineering technicians from
which 11 percent switch to civil engineering where again 5 percent switches back to managers
in construction. Another example is that of the people who switches occupation, 24 percent
of shop and sales persons demonstrator switches to office clerks where 5 percent switches to
freight transport handlers from where another 12 percent switches back to sales persons demon-
strators. A last example is 25 percent of electrical mechanics switches to buildings electricians
where another 10 percent switches to electrical engineering technicians from which 11 percent
switches back to electrical mechanics. The last example illustrate a vast amount of the type of
changes in table A5. As other examples, many engineering technicians switches between types
of engineering technicians and engineers as well as computer programmers switches between
different types of computer programming analyst, computer designer, and computer assistant.
Table A6 in the appendix is like table A4 and A5, only in table A6 we allow three occu-
pational changes before the occupational switch comes back to the original occupation. This
accounts for 2.577 switches where the occupations are three-way linked occupational groups.
One example of occupations, which maps back to the original occupation after 4 occupational
3Note also that the 4-digit occupations that ends with the number 9, are the occupations which are not
elsewhere classified. We perform robustness analyzes where these occupations are excluded.
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switches (with more than 5 percent of switchers from an occupation) are; Department managers
in wholesales, commercial sales representatives, office clerks, and shop sales persons. Another
example is computer programmers, electronics engineers, electronics engineering technicians,
and computer assistants. A third example which creates a loop in occupational switches is
carpenters, cabinet makers, wood production machine operators, and transport laborers.
Finally, there are occupational switches, which are not represented by the switches between
occupations that loop back to the same occupation. Table A7 shows what occupations workers
switches between, where their switch does does bring them back to their original occupation
after 3 switches or less. These type of switches we classify as one-way switches and there
are 5.648 of them in the sample. Examples of these type of occupational switches, which
do not loop back around are: sales department managers to sales representatives, mechanical
engineers to sales representatives, primary education teachers to handicrafts workers in wood
related materials, computer assistants to office clerks, buyers to office clerks, production clerk
to sales representative, metal molder to tool-maker, and meat- and fish processing operator to
manufacturing laborer.
The one way occupational switches from table A7 represents mostly workers who switches
between more different occupation than in table A4 to A6. This gives us an indication that
vertical occupational switches are the most likely switches that occur, and when we observe
switches between occupation that do not go both ways these switches are more likely to be
horizontal switches.
5 Returns to Occupational Tenure
In this section we show that the return to occupational tenure is higher than the return to firm
or industry tenure, when controlling for other explanatory factors.
5.1 Econometric Model for Wage Regression
We show the return to occupational tenure for our two samples following the approach by
Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) who show that there exist return to occupational tenure in
the U.S. data. The returns to tenure can be measured from the linear estimation model:
lnwijmnt =β0Emp Tenijt + β1OJijt + β2OCC Tenimt + β3OCC Spell nbimt
+ β4Ind Tenint + β5Work Expit + θijmnt
(1)
where wijmnt is the real hourly wage of person i working in period t with employer j in
occupation m and industry n. Emp Tenijt, OCC Tenimt, and Ind Ten are tenure with an
employer, an occupation, and the industry and all three terms are included linearly, squared,
and cubed for occupation and industry tenure. The term OCC Spell nbimt are dummy variables
indicating occupational what spell the individual is in. We are able to include the spell number
because we follow individuals from the time they graduate from school. Work Expit denotes
overall work experience and is also included with a linear, square, and cubed term. OJijt is a
dummy variable, which equals one if in the worker is past his his year at a firm. Other covariates
in the regression model are a dummy variable if the workers in member of a union, number of
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children of the worker, a dummy variable if the worker is married, lagged unemployment rate in
county of residence, year dummies, dummies for 1-digit occupations, and dummies for 1-digit
industries.
Following the literature on measuring return to tenure we use an estimation model by
Altonji and Shakotko (1987). The estimates on tenure are likely to be biased from unobserved
individual and match heterogeneity. This is because workers with a better employer match
would be expected to have higher employer tenure and receive higher wages. Also, a worker
in a good match is more likely to receive higher wages and accumulate more tenure in that
occupation. This will bias the estimate on tenure from the OLS regression upward.
The OLS can be biased because the error component can be decomposed as:
θijmnt = µi + λij + ξim + υin + εit (2)
where µi is a fixed individual specific error component, λij is a fixed job match-specific error
component, ξim is a fixed occupation match-specific error component, υin is a fixed industry
match-specific error component, and εit is a time-varying person specific error term in the wage,
which affects wages of all employees.
To deal with this problem we follow the literature started by Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
and used by Parent (2000) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) and use an instrumental
variable procedure. This is done by instrumenting the three types of tenure, general experience,
and OJ with deviations from their sample means. If Ximt is occupational tenure of individual i
who is working in occupation m in period t, then Xim denotes the sample mean of tenure period
individual i worked in occupation m and the instrumental variable is X˜imt = Ximt −Xim. The
squared and cubed terms are similarly
(
X˜imt
)2
= (Ximt)
2 −
(
X2im
)
and
(
X˜imt
)3
= (Ximt)
3 −(
X3im
)
.
Furthermore, since the analysis is done by panel data we also follow the literature and
estimate the instrumented model using generalized least squares (here called IV-GLS). We
show results for regression 1 by OLS, Random effects GLS, IV-OLS, and IV-GLS.
5.2 Wage Regression Results
The first estimates from the wage regression are from the sample of full time privately employed
workers. Table 3 below shows the returns to 2, 5, and 8 years of occupational tenure, industry
tenure, and firm tenure estimated by OLS and IV-GLS of model 1. The returns are somewhat
lower than they are for the U.S. reported in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b), who have 20
percent return for 5 years of occupational tenure estimated by OLS and 12 % return to tenure
estimated by IV-GLS on a random sample of the US population. Also Sullivan (2006) has
high returns for young people after they graduate from school. The coefficients of the three
tenure variables and general experience from model 1 of the OLS and IV-GLS (and the GLS
and IV-OLS) are reported in the appendix, table A-12 .
Table 3 shows that for the sample of full time privately employed workers, there are higher
returns to occupational tenure than there are to industry or firm tenure in both the OLS and
the IV random effects estimation. This matches the findings in both Kambourov and Manovskii
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Table 3: Returns to 2, 5, and 8 years of tenure, private worker sample
2 years 5 years 8 years
OLS
Occupation 0.048 0.079 0.074
(0.0015) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry 0.009 0.005 -0.014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Employer 0.014 0.013 -0.015
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
IV GLS
Occupation 0.043 0.086 0.108
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Industry 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Employer -0.023 -0.051 -0.067
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
(2009b) and Sullivan (2006) who found the same patterns respectively for the U.S. and the U.K.
Both their samples were also privately employed workers and in Sullivan (2006) the workers
are also observed since they leave school. However, there is a problem in our dataset with
firm tenure because we only observe firms from 1995. In table 4 we show the returns on a
subsample of people who graduated after 1994 and who did not have more than 3 years of
general experience by the time they graduated.
Table 4 shows that for the smaller sample of graduates after 1994 the results are qualita-
tively similar but the return to firm tenure, as expected is relatively higher than in the sample
of graduates from 1980 to 2000. The coefficients of the four estimations on the smaller sample
is presented in the appendix, table A-13.
As a robustness analysis we show in the appendix table A-15 that if we include full time
public sector workers and allow the workers to have spells of unemployment, non-employment,
and part time work the results on the returns to tenure becomes smaller. Table A-14 shows
the coefficients for the four regressions, OLS, GLS, IV-OLS, and IV-GLS for our larger sample
including public sector employees and table A-15 shows the returns to 2, 5, and 8 years of
tenure when including public sector employees.
6 Occupational mobility and tenure - duration
Our aim when analyzing the tenure and occupational mobility relationship is to analyze the sign
of this relationship. Furthermore, we are also interested in reproducing some of the facts from
the literature in order to understand whether the Danish data shows similar characteristics in
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Table 4: Returns to 2, 5, and 8 years of tenure, private worker sample
2 years 5 years 8 years
OLS
Occupation 0.0917 0.151 0.230
(0.009) (0.008) (0.022)
Industry -0.019 -0.014 0.020
(0.011) (0.009) (0.023)
Employer 0.051 0.059 -0.013
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
IV GLS
Occupation 0.066 0.077 0.112
(0.010) (0.012) (0.022)
Industry -0.026 -0.012 -0.007
(0.011) (0.010) (0.022)
Employer 0.005 -0.006 -0.041
(0.013) (0.018) (0.012)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
term of the relationship between tenure and occupational mobility as is found in the U.S. data.
6.1 Econometric model of occupational mobility and tenure
With the duration models we want to show the correlation between tenure in an occupation
and probability of separating from the given occupation. This section draws on literature from
Wooldridge (2002), Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Jenkins (2005), and Chen and Manatunga
(2007).
The observed transition times from one occupation to another are grouped in years and it
is assumed that the hazard within the yearly interval is constant. This means the duration in
an occupation is measured as an interval and we have to take account of this by estimating a
discrete-time hazard function. The probability of transition at discrete time tj of a person i,
given survival up to time tj, is defined as the discrete-time hazard function, where the hazard
hij is given as:
λ(t) = Pr [T = t|T ≥ t] (3)
In the first part of the duration analysis we specify a proportional hazard model (Cox
(1972)), which is given by
λ(t;x) = exp(β′x)λ0(t) (4)
where λ0(t) is an unspecified baseline hazard function and β is a vector of regression
coefficients associated with x and together exp (β′x) serves as a scaling function. Because
the survival is discrete we use a proportional odds model (Cox (1972)). The proportional odds
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model assumes that the relative odds of making a transition in year t, given survival up to the
end of the previous year is summarized by the expression:
λt(x)
1− λt(x) =
[
λt(x0)
1− λt(x0)
]
exp(β′(x− x0)) (5)
where λt (x) is the discrete time hazard rate for year t and λt (x0) is the discrete time
hazard rate where x0 is some arbitrary known baseline covariate value (most often this is taken
where x0 = 0). By taking logs on both sides of equation it follows that:
logit[λt(x)] = log
[
λt(x)
1− λt(x)
]
= αt + β
′(x− x0) (6)
where αt = log it [λt (x0)].
The hazard of switching occupation in period t can alternatively be written as:
λt (x) =
1
1 + exp (−αj − β′ (x− x0)) (7)
which has a proportional odds interpretation of its derivatives.
In our analysis we set the baseline hazard to be piece-wise constant and we do this by
defining αj = γ1D1 + γ2D2 + ... + γJDJ , where DJ is a binary variable equal to 1 if t = l and
equal to zero otherwise. When estimating the model we will not include an intercept in the
hazard of switching occupation β.
Occupational spells that do not end within the eight years of the sample period are treated
as right censored. These spells all have occupational transition equal to zero for all periods of
the spell and their contribution to the likelihood function is the probability of having worked
in the same occupation for at least the observed number of years.
The literature on occupational and career mobility often tries to separate between an
occupational transition, which happens at the same time as a firm transition, or at the same
time as an industry transition. To address this issue we have also estimated a multinomial logit
model, which can be seen as a proportional odds model in a competing risk framework.
Rather than having two states (observed switching occupation or not) as above in the logit
regression, we allow for five states in our multinomial logit model. The hazard of transiting
into state k in this model is now defined as:
λk,t (x) =
exp (−αk,t − β′k (x− x0))
1 + exp (−αk,t − β′k (x− x0))
(8)
where k takes on the values (0) no observed transition, (1) transition into new occupation
within same firm and industry, (2) transition into new occupation and new firm, but stay in
the same industry, (4) transition into a new occupation and a new industry, but staying at the
same firm, and (5) transition into new occupation, new firm, and new industry.
6.2 Duration Results
Figure 1(a) shows the pointwise estimates of the hazard rate form model 7 at the mean of the
fulltime privately working sample and table A-16 column 1 in the appendix shows the coefficients
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from the regression. Figure 1(a) shows the probability of switching occupation decreases over
the first 15 years of occupational tenure. The decrease in probability of switching occupation
is largest in the first 4 years whereafter it flattens out. A second feature of the data is shown
in table 1(b), where the hazard rate out of an occupation is given for different occupational
spell number. Figure 1(b) shows that the probability of leaving an occupation is lowest if it is
the first occupation the worker has ever been in and the probability of switching occupation
is higher for the second and third occupation the worker is in. This means that conditional
on switching occupation, the probability of switching again is higher than if the workers never
switches occupation.
(a) Probability of switching occupation
by occupational tenure
(b) Probability of switching occupation
by occupational spell number and occu-
pational tenure
Figure 1: Hazard rate out of occupations by occupational tenure, over all and by occupational
spell number.
If there is return to occupational tenure then we should expect a negative duration depen-
dence like the one we observe. However, in the literature it has been argued that the negative
duration dependence should be with respect to career changes (both occupation and industry
change) and not purely with respect to occupation. I test this by estimating model 8, which is
a multinomial logit. The point estimates are given in table A-17 and the predicted hazard rates
at the mean of the sample are shown in figure 2. For table A-17 the reference category is to
stay in the occupation. Column 1 gives point estimates of switching only occupation, column 2
is switching occupation and firm, column 3 is switching occupation and industry, and column
4 is switching occupation, firm, and industry.
Figure 2 shows that the hazard rate of occupational switches occurring alone, with firm-
switches, and with firm and industry switches all exhibits a declining hazard. The highest
probability of switching occupation is occurring for people switching occupation but not firm
or industry. These have around 14 % probability of switching occupation after 1 year of work
compared to firm and occupation switches, which happens with 7 % and occupation, firm, and
industry switches, which happens for 2 % of the sample with 1 year of occupational tenure. All
three types of occupational switches fall with tenure in the occupation.
The probability of switching occupation alone falls more in the first couple of years than
the probability of switching firm and occupation, or firm, industry, and occupation. This
can be taken as a sign that the workers try out more occupations than occupation-firm pairs.
93
Figure 2: Hazard rate out of occupations by occupational tenure, over all and by occupational
spell number.
This is opposite the occupation, firm, and industry switching, which only falls very little with
occupational tenure. Together with statistics from our chapter on U-shapes in the data we get
the picture that workers are mobile in the beginning of their occupational spell (and from the
U-shapes we get that the most mobile are the ones at the ends of the wage distributions). In
Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2009) we argue that people learn about their ability and sort
them self according to their expected ability in different occupations. This sorting it not as
prevalent in firm choices, and is non-existing in industry choices.
In the appendix we show in figure A-1 and A-2 similar to figure 1 and 2, only for our
larger sample where we include public employees and allow people to return to the sample
after spells of non-employment and part-time work. Table A-16 column 2 shows the coefficient
from the regression behind figure 1(a) and table A-18 in the appendix shows the regression
coefficients behind figure 2. As was the case for the return to occupational tenure, figure 1(a)
shows, that the decrease in hazard rate with occupational tenure is also slightly lower for the
first few years of tenure than for the sample of full time private employees. The workers’
probability of changing occupation decreases from 25 % one year after graduation to 12 % five
years after graduation. Figure 1(b) shows that the difference in effect on switching occupations
from different occupational spells is also smaller for the sample including all workers, than it is
for the sample including only full time private employees. Finally figure 2 shows that it is still
occupational switching alone, which has the highest hazard, followed by firm and occupational
switching. Switching occupation, firm, and industry is again for this larger sample changing
very little over the years of occupational tenure 4.
7 U-shapes in occupational mobility
The previous two sections of our data analysis have shown that workers in Denmark behave
similarly to workers, especially from the US, who have been analyzed in the existing litera-
ture. The workers have wage return to occupational tenure and their occupational mobility
decreases with longer tenure and with more general experience. In this section we combine
4We should keep in mind that in this sample we artificially lower the firm transition rates because we classify
all public sector employment as working for the same firm.
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the occupational mobility of workers with their wages. We show that doing this produces a
wage-occupational mobility relationship, which is U-shaped.
Our results that the probability of switching occupation is U-shaped in workers wages are
presented in two parts. The first part is an aggregation of all occupations to show how a worker’s
wage within his occupation relates to his probability of switching out of that occupation. The
second part shows that most occupations separately exhibits U-shapes in the probability of
switching occupation. We will show the results for both of our two samples, the full time
privately employed workers, and the sample allowing for public employees and spells of non-
employment and part-time work.
Figure 3(a) is a non-parametric plot (from a kernel smoothed local linear regression with
bandwidth 5) of the probability of switching out of an occupation as a function of a worker’s
position in the wage distribution in that occupation in a given year. The probability of switching
occupation is clearly U-shaped in wages. It is the workers with the highest or lowest wages in
their occupations who have the highest probability of leaving the occupation. The workers in
the middle wage deciles have the lowest probability of switching occupations.
(a) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion and year
(b) wage distribution of wage residuals
Figure 3: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile in
the wage distribution.
Figure 3(a) is based on raw wage data. Figure 3(b) indicates that we also observe a U-
shaped pattern of occupational mobility in the position of the worker in the distribution of
residual wages in his occupation in a given year. We generate residual wages by estimating a
standard wage regression
lnwijt = Xijtβ + ijt, (9)
where wijt is real hourly wage of an individual i working in occupation j in period t. The
explanatory variables in X include dummies for calendar years, third degree polynomials in
general experience, occupational tenure, industry tenure, a second degree polynomial in firm
tenure, number of occupational spells, education, marital status, union membership, and re-
gional dummies. These wage regressions are estimated separately for each occupation.5
5Figure A-3 in Appendix A10 shows that excluding the regressors firm and industry tenure or excluding
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The U-shapes further hold if we look at wage percentiles within occupation, year, and
years after graduation. Figure 4(a) plots the probability of switching occupation as a function
of worker’s position in the wage distribution of workers in the same occupation, calendar year,
and years after graduation. Figure 4(b) separately graphs occupational mobility for 1, 2, 4,
and 6 years after graduation. The figure shows U-shapes in occupational mobility for all years
after graduation and shows that the level of mobility decreases with years after graduation for
almost all percentiles of the within occupation, calendar year, and years since graduation wage
distribution. In the appendix figure A-7 we show the U-shapes for 1, 2, 4, and 6 years after
graduation for 2.5 % and 10 % bandwidths.
(a) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion, year, and years after graduation
(b) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion, year, and years after graduation for different
years after graduation
Figure 4: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile in
the wage distribution within occupation, year, and years after graduation.
The same way we showed the hazard rates for combinations of switching occupation and
firm we also show the U-shapes for occupation and firm switchers in figure A-8 in the appendix.
Figure A-8 shows that the U-shapes are not as pronounced when we look at firm and occupa-
tional switchers as when we only look at occupational switchers. However, when percentiles
are generated from the residuals and when percentiles are found within occupations, calendar
year, and years after graduation, the U-shapes are the most pronounced, which are the graphs,
where we control for the most.
Above we show there exists U-shapes in the probability of switching occupation for the
sample of full time privately employed workers. The same U-shapes exist for our sample allowing
for public employment and spells of non-employment and part time work. Figure 5 shows, for
the larger sample including public sector workers, that also here do the highest and lowest
people in the wage distribution have the highest probability of switching occupation, while
the workers in the middle of the wage distribution have the lowest occupational switching
dummies for the occupational spell number in the wage regression does not change the qualitative result of the
U-shape in occupational mobility. In the Appendix Figures A-4 to A-7 we show that the U-shapes hold for
bandwidths which are half and double of what we use in Figures 3 and 4.
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probability. Figure 5(a) shows there exist U-shapes when we look at workers percentile in their
raw wage distribution within occupation and year, and figure 5(b) shows that there also exist
U-shapes when we look at percentiles in the residual wage distribution from model 9.
(a) wage distribution of raw wages within oc-
cupation and year
(b) Risidual wage distribution within occu-
pation and year
Figure 5: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile in
the wage distribution or residual wage distribution.
In the appendix we have included several different robustness checks of the U-shapes for
the larger sample, which includes public sector employees. Figure A-9 in the appendix shows, in
column 1, variations of the U-shapes for workers switching both occupation and firm or workers
switching occupation but not firm. Column 2 shows the same U-shapes for occupations groups
to a three digit level. The graphs in figure A-9 shows that workers at the three digit level
occupations have an overall lower probability of switching three digit occupations, than they
had in their four digit level occupations. Besides this obvious feature, there are no qualitative
differences in the U-shapes between the three and four digit level occupations when we create
percentile within occupation and year. Figure A-10 shows a similar picture when we create
percentiles from the wage residuals. In figure A-10 the results from the smaller private sample
appears again in the larger sample including public sector employees. The U-shapes are more
pronounced for occupation and firm switchers when we create residual distributions rather than
percentiles from the raw wage distribution. The figures A-11, A-12, and A-13 in the appendix
show the U-shapes when we create percentiles within occupation, calendar year, and years after
graduation. Column 1 in the three graphs shows the probability of switching 4-digit occupation
and column 2 shows the probability of switching 3-digit level occupation. Figure A-11 shows
that creating percentiles within occupation, year, and years after graduation creates almost
the same U-shapes as in figure A-9 and figure A-10. Figure A-12 and A-13 in the appendix
show the probability of switching occupation, switching occupation and firm, or switching oc-
cupation but not firm for different years after graduation. Unlike the hazard rate out of an
occupation as a function of tenure, workers from the larger sample have smaller differences in
the probability of switching occupation in the U-shapes when we look at the first 6 years after
graduation. For the first 6 years after graduation the probability of switching occupation is
falling very little as shown in the top line in figure A-12. However, if we look at the probability
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of switching occupation over the first 15 years after graduation in figure A-13 the trend is clear;
occupational mobility is falling for all parts of the wage distribution with years after graduation.
There is a possibility of errors in occupational coding. People at the extremes of occupa-
tional wage distribution seem more likely to be miscoded in a given year and it may not be
surprising to see them switch in the following year. The fact that we see U-shapes for people
many years after graduation is comforting in this respect. Moreover, as figure A-14 in the
appendix shows there is persistence in wages. People with high (low) wages in their occupation
in a given year also have higher probability of switching occupation two years after their wages
in the end of the wage distribution is observed. This is both true in figure 14(a) for workers
who stay in the same occupation in the two periods prior to a possible switch and also true if
we allow people to change occupation before the year in which we look at the probability of
switching occupation as shown in figure 14(b).
An additional informative statistic is the percentage of occupation-year pairs that exhibit
U-shapes. Computing these statistics requires enough workers in each occupation in each
year to accurately predict a probability of changing occupation in different parts of the wage
distribution of that occupation. Thus, we restrict the sample to occupations that include at
least 100 workers in a given year and we divide the wage distribution of each occupation into
quintiles. We define U-shapes in each occupation-year pair in two ways. First, we count an
occupation in a given year as having a U-shape if the quintile with the highest probability of
changing occupation is either quintile 1 or quintile 5. Second, we count an occupation in a given
year as having a U-shape if, in addition, the quintile with the lowest probability of changing
occupation is in the interior, i.e., quintile 2, 3, or 4. There are 598 occupation-year observations
with at least 100 workers in the sample of full time privately employed workers. 95 Percent of
workers in these 598 occupation-year pairs are in occupations that have a maximum probability
of switching occupation in one of the extreme quintiles when the quintiles are based on raw
wages. When the quintiles are defined on the wage residuals, 98% of workers are in occupations
which exhibit U-shapes according to this definition. In addition, 66% of the these occupations
have a global minimum in the interior of the distribution of raw wages and 77% of the these
occupations have a global minimum in the interior of the distribution of wage residuals.
A different way of examining whether individuals occupations exhibits U-shapes is to
keep the percentiles within occupation and year and use these percentiles as a continues
explanatory variable in a probit regression where the dependent variable is probability of
switching occupation. We run the Probit regression separately for each occupation with at
least 100 workers in it and include the percentiles as a 2nd degree polynomial, such that
Pr(switch) = Φ [α + β ∗ perc+ γ ∗ perc2]. From each regression we check the sign and sig-
nificance of the β coefficient and the sign and significance of β + 2 ∗ γ. We want the derivative
of the 2nd order polynomial to be falling at the beginning (where perc = 0) and, since the
derivative is β + 2 ∗ γ ∗ perc, we check whether the β coefficient is negative and significant. We
also want the curve to be increasing at the high end (where perc = 1), and we therefore also
check the sign and significance of β + 2 ∗ γ. There are 1.26 million workers when we calculate
percentiles from the residual wage distribution and of these 78 % are in occupations, where
both β and β + 2 ∗ γ have the correct sign and are significantly different from zero. When we
create percentile in the raw wage distribution within each occupation and year, there are 77 %
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of workers in occupation that exhibit U-shapes. For occupations at the 3-digit level there are
86 % of workers from both the residual distribution and the raw wage distribution who are in
occupations that show U-shapes. It is primarily the larger occupation that show the U-shapes
therefore if we increase the number in an occupation to be 1000 before we include it, there are
77 and 84 % of workers in occupations at the 4-digit level which exhibit significant U-shapes.
If we only count occupations with the correct sign and do not condition on the coefficient being
significantly different from zero there are 85 and 91 % of workers in occupations with at least
100 workers that have U-shapes at the four digit level. For occupation with at least 1000 work-
ers these percentages increase to 91 and 94 % of workers who are in occupations that exhibit
U-shapes.
8 Direction of occupational mobility
In this section we document another prominent feature of the data: conditional on changing
occupation, workers with higher (lower) relative wage within their occupation tend to switch to
occupations with higher (lower) average wages. We first find the average wage of the occupations
in a given year in order to determine the ranking between occupations. Similarly to our analysis
of probability of occupational switching, we rank occupations based on their raw wages or
residual wages adjusted for worker characteristics. To obtain the ranking based on raw wages,
we find the average real wage of all full time private sector workers in a given occupation in a
given year when we look at private sector employees. For private and public sector employees
we generate ranking on occupations based on both public and private sector workers in the
given occupation.6 To obtain the ranking based on residual wages, we use our two different
selected samples to run similar wage regressions as in equation 9 for each occupation where we
include time dummies in the regression (without the intercept). We interpret the coefficients
on these time dummies as the average occupational wage in a given year, adjusted for human
capital accumulation of workers in the occupation as well as other worker characteristics such
as education, regional dummies, and marital status. For this wage regression we include only
occupations which have more than 100 observations in total over the 8 year period 1995-2002.
Figure 6(a) plots the probability of switching to an occupation with a higher or lower
average wage as a function of the worker’s position in the wage distribution of the occupation
he or she is leaving. The sample on which the figure is based consists of all workers from the
private sector sample who switched occupation in a given year and occupations are ranked based
on the raw average wages. Figure 6(b) presents corresponding evidence when occupations are
ranked based on residual wages and the direction of occupational mobility is plotted against
the percentile in the distribution of residual wages within an occupation the worker is switching
from. The evidence contained in these figures suggest that, conditional on switching occupation,
the higher wage a person had in his occupation before the switch the higher is the probability
that the worker will switch to an occupation with a higher average wage. Similarly, the lower
wage a worker has in his occupation the higher is the probability that he will switch to an
6Note that both these samples are bigger than our selected samples, which only consists of workers who
graduated after 1980. In the fulltime private employee sample the workers who never worked in the public
sector, worked part time, etc. The results are, however, robust to only looking at the average wages in our
selected sample.
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(a) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion and year. Average wage in occupation from
population.
(b) wage distribution of wage residuals. Average
wage in occupation from time constants in wage re-
gression
Figure 6: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility, conditional on switching
occupation.
occupation with a lower average wage than in the occupation he switches from.
Figure 7(a) illustrates that similar results hold if we further condition the private sector
workers on their position in the distribution of wages in their occupation in a given year and
among other workers with the same number of years since graduation. This figure is compa-
rable to figure 6(a) in that occupational average wages are calculated from raw wages of the
population in the occupation in a given year. Finally, Figure 7(b) shows that the direction of
occupational mobility is similar for individuals who graduated 1, 2, 4, or 6 years prior.
The direction of occupational mobility is a very robust feature of the data. In our large sam-
ple, which includes the public sector workers and allow people to have spells of non-employment
and part time work, we find the same pattern in the direction of occupational mobility as we
did in the smaller sample, only including public sector workers. Conditional on changing oc-
cupation, the high wage workers have high probability of switching to new occupations, which
have higher average wage than the occupation they originate from. The opposite is true for low
wage workers who have a high probability of switching to occupations with lower average wages
than the occupation they switch out of. In the appendix we show graphs for the direction
of occupational mobility from the sample of both public and private sector workers. Figure
6(a) shows the direction of occupational mobility when workers’ wage percentiles are calculated
from within occupation and year. In column 1 the occupations are from the 4-digit level and in
column 2 the occupations are from the 3-digit level. The first row represents all occupational
switchers, the second row are occupation and firm switchers, and the third row are occupations
switchers who did not switch firm. The six graphs in figure 6(a) show that the patterns of
directional mobility are true for both the 3 and 4 digit occupations as well as for occupation
switchers and occupation and firm switchers.
Figure A-16 shows that the patterns are the same when we use workers percentiles in the
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(a) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion, year, and year after graduation. Average wage
in occupation from population.
(b) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion, year, and year after graduation for individual
years after graduation. Average wage in occupation
from population.
Figure 7: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility, conditional on switching
occupation.
residual wage distribution and at the same time calculate the average wages of their occupations
from the time dummies in the wage regressions, which run separately for each occupation.
Again the direction of occupational mobility is robust to looking at occupations at the 4-
digit level as shown in column 1 and to the 3-digit occupations as shown in column 1. The
direction of occupational mobility is also robust to calculating workers wage percentile within
their occupation, calendar year, and years after graduation as figure A-17 shows. Figure A-18
shows the probability of moving to occupations with higher average wage than the average wage
of the occupation the worker was in before his switch. As figure A-18 shows the probability of
moving to higher paying occupations, conditional on switching occupation, are close to the same
for 1, 2, 4, and 6 years after graduation. Figure A-19 shows similar probabilities of switching to
higher paying occupations for workers with 1, 5, 10, and 15 years after graduation, conditional
on switching occupation and conditional on being in the same original wage percentile calculated
within the worker’s occupation, year, and year after graduation.
9 Occupational mobility in occupations changing rank
In section 7 we show that workers’ probability of switching occupation is U-shaped in their wages
and in section 8 we show that we can rank occupations by calculating the population average
wages in each occupation. We calculate the average wage of all occupations separately for each
year in our sample period 1995 to 2002, which means that we end up with eight different averages
per occupation. This section examines what happens to workers’ occupational mobility when
they are in occupations, which have high fluctuations in the average wages. More specifically,
we want to see if workers’ probabilities of switching occupations still are U-shaped in their
wages when they are in occupations that have slow growing average wages or when they are
101
in occupations with the high growing average wages. In the model of occupational mobility in
Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2009) each occupation has a specific productivity that can be
mapped into workers’ wages. When the average wage of an occupation falls relative to other
occupations this can therefore be a signal of falling relative productivity of the given occupation.
From the data we find that lower paid workers tend to leave their occupation when the relative
average wage of the given occupation rises. In the other end of the wage distribution, higher
paid workers are more likely to leave their occupation when the relative average wage of the
given occupation declines.
We calculate the average growth rates of the occupations in two different ways. The first
way is from the raw data where we calculate the occupational average wages each year from the
population and find the growth rates between the year to year average wages. Alternatively,
we find the average wage of an occupation in a given year by using our selected sample to run
a wage regression for each occupation where we include time dummies in the regression. We
use the coefficients on the time dummies in the regression as the average residual occupational
wage in a given year and calculate growth rate of the yearly residuals. We calculate the growth
rates by the percent increase between two consecutive years from 1995 to 2002 of all individual
occupations. We use coefficients on time dummies from the wage regression in order to find
occupations’ growth rates after correcting for changes in compositional effects from year to year
in the occupation and across occupations. An example of the correction is if an occupation’s
average wage grows purely due to the people in it accumulating more tenure or if they become
higher educated, this will be controlled for by the wage regression and should therefore not
affect the ranking of the occupation from one year to another.
(a) wage distribution of raw wages within oc-
cupation and year. Growth rates of average
wage in occupation from population.
(b) wage distribution of wages residuals.
Growth rates of average wage in occupation
from time constants in wage regression.
Figure 8: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility of the private worker sample
for occupations growing at different rates.
Figure 8(a) plots three groups of occupations, separated by the growth rates in raw average
wages between years t and t + 1 for our sample of full time privately employed workers. The
first group consists of the 10 percent of occupations with the lowest growth rates, the second
group is the 10 percent of occupations with the highest growth rates, and the third group is
the occupations with growth rates in average occupational wages in the middle 80 percent.
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For the three different occupational groups we plot the probabilities of switching occupation as
function of the workers’ position in wage distribution in their occupation in year t. Figures 8(a)
and 8(b) show that workers in the lowest growing occupations between t and t+ 1 have higher
probability of leaving their occupation between t and t+1 if they are from the upper end of the
occupational wage distribution in year t. Workers in the fast growing occupations have higher
probability of changing occupation if they are in the low end of the wage distribution in their
occupation. Workers in occupation, which grows faster than the slowest 10 percent but slower
than the fastest 10 percent, have a probability of changing occupation that is U-shaped in their
wage percentile.7
The above results are from the sample of privately employed workers who never worked in
the public sector or worked part time. The results for the sample of both public and private
sector workers look similar to the results from the private sector workers. The growth rates
in average occupational wages are found by only including the wages of workers who stay in
a given occupation between two years. Figure 9 shows the occupational mobility of people in
the larger sample. Figure 9(a) shows the mobility pattern for workers in the 5 % lowest and
5 % highest growing occupations when average wage is calculated from population raw wages.
Figure 9(b) shows the mobility pattern when the occupation growth is taken from the time
coefficient of the wage regression. Both Figure 9(a) and 9(b) show that in the occupations
growing the 5 % slowest, high wage workers have higher probability of leaving the occupation
than low wage workers. For the highest 5 % of growing occupations the picture is reverse, here
it is the lowest wage workers who have higher probability of leaving the occupation. Figure
9(a) and 9(b) further show that workers in the low and high growing occupations have higher
mobility than in the average growing occupation. The average worker mobility of the highest
and lowest growing occupations decrease when we look at the 10 % highest and lowest growing
occupations rather than the extreme 5 %. Figure 9(c) and 9(d) show the workers’ probabilities
of changing occupations when they are in the highest or lowest 10 % growing occupations. In
figure 9(c) the occupational growth rates are calculated from the average wage of stayers in the
occupations and in figure 9(d) the growth rates are from the time dummies in a wage regression
done separately for each occupation. When a worker is in an occupation that is among the 10
% slowest growing occupations his probability of switching occupation is still highest if he is
among the highest paid or the highest wage residual workers. The opposite is again true for
the highest growing occupations where it is the workers at the bottom of the wage distribution
who have the highest probability of switching occupation.
Comparing figures 9(a) and 9(b) to figures 9(c) and 9(d) it is noticeable that the level
of occupational mobility falls when we include more occupations in the extreme occupation-
growing categories. Furthermore, when more occupations are included in the top and bottom
growing occupations the pattern of high wage people leaving low growing occupation and low
wage people leaving high growing occupations becomes less clear and the workers tend to behave
a little more like the previous studied U-shapes. To further illustrate this point figure A-20 in
the appendix shows mobility patterns of workers from the highest 15 % growing occupations
and the lowest 15 % growing occupations. For workers in these 15 % extreme occupations the
mobility patterns are almost showing the original U-shapes.
7The results are robust to calculating average wage change of the occupation only from workers who stay in
the occupation between t and t+ 1.
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(a) wage distribution of raw wages within
occupation and year. Average wage in occu-
pation from population.
(b) wage distribution of wages residuals.
Growth rates of average wage in occupation
from time constants in wage regression.
(c) wage distribution of raw wages within
occupation and year. Average wage in occu-
pation from population.
(d) wage distribution of wages residuals.
Growth rates of average wage in occupation
from time constants in wage regression.
Figure 9: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility of the public and private
worker sample for occupations growing at different rates.
The two last robustness checks of workers mobilities in fast or slow growing occupations
are presented in figures A-21 and A-22 in the appendix. In figure A-21 we find workers’ wage
percentiles within their occupation, year, and year after graduation and keep the population
average occupational wages of stayers between two consecutive years in the occupation. Figure
A-21 shows the same patterns as figure 9; when we include more occupations in the extreme
growing occupations the workers in the extreme occupations get closer to having their probabil-
ity of switching occupation being U-shaped in their wages. In the top graph in figure A-21 with
the 5 % extreme occupation the patterns of low wage people leaving high growing occupations
and high wage people leaving low growing occupations are very clear. In the bottom graph in
figure A-21 where we include top and bottom 15 % of the growing occupations the workers’
probability of switching occupation is U-shaped in their wages. The last figure in the appendix,
figure A-22, shows the occupational mobility for workers who are in different years after their
graduation and who are in the middle 80 % of the occupations, or in the lowest 10 % growing
occupations, or in the fast 10 % growing occupations. The top graph in figure A-22 shows
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that workers of the middle 80 % occupations have U-shapes in their probability of switching
occupation, independent of their years after graduation. The middle graph and the bottom
graph in figure A-22 show the lowest 10 % growing occupations and the highest 10 % of grow-
ing occupations by groups of different years after graduation. Workers are divided into three
groups according to their years after graduation where the first group includes workers who
are 1 to 3 years after graduation, the second group is workers in 4 to 6 years after graduation,
and the last group is workers 7 to 10 years after graduation. The middle graph shows that for
all years after graduation, the high wage workers have higher probability of leaving the occu-
pations, which are among the 10 % slowest growing. The bottom graph shows that low wage
workers who are between 1 and 3 years after graduation do not have a higher probability of
leaving the high growing occupations. However, for workers later than 3 years after graduation
the patterns from the overall sample arises again. Low wage workers have higher probability of
leaving occupations with fast growing average wages relative to the high wage workers in the
same occupations.
10 Conclusion
In this paper we present three new patterns of occupational mobility. The first new pattern
of occupational mobility is that workers’ probability of switching occupations are U-shaped in
their wages. We follow a set of workers after they graduate from school and calculate their wage
percentiles within their occupation in a given year - or we use their residual wage percentile.
We find that workers who are high in the wage distribution and workers who are in the bottom
of the wage distribution have the highest probability of switching occupations whereas workers
in the middle of the wage distribution have the lowest probability of switching occupations.
The second new pattern of occupational mobility is that, conditional on switching occu-
pation, high wage workers have a higher probability of switching to occupations with higher
average wages than the average wage of the occupation they switched out of. The opposite is
true for low wage workers who, conditional on switching occupation, have higher probability of
switching to new occupations where the average wage is lower than their original occupation.
We rank occupations by including workers from the entire population and not just people who
we follow since they graduated from school, which we use as our sample. Each occupation
is ranked by the population-workers’ average wages in the given occupation and we use this
ranking to find that, conditional on switching occupation, high wage workers move to higher
average wage occupations and low wage workers move to lower average wage occupations.
The third pattern we find is that when the average wage of an occupation changes this
relates to different mobility patterns of workers in the given occupation than for the occupation
that does not have a movement in average wages. For occupations where the average wage
of the occupation increases relative to other occupations, workers at the bottom of the wage
distribution in that given occupation have the highest probability of leaving the occupation. In
occupations that have relative falling average wages it is the workers from the top of the wage
distribution who have the highest probability of leaving the occupation.
We show our results hold for two different samples of workers whom we follow after they
graduate from school. The first sample is workers who always only worked full time in the private
sector and the second sample includes both public and private sector workers who are allowed
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to have spells on non-employment and part time work. We also show that our two samples have
similar characteristics as the sample from the U.S. in terms of return to occupational tenure
and declining probability of switching occupation with tenure in an occupation.
Our results cannot be explained by existing models of occupational mobility and therefore,
in Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2009) we develop a model which is consistent with the new
patterns of occupational mobility that we find.
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APPENDICES
A1 Appendix Sample Summary Statistics
Table A-1: Initial sample selection. Includes men who graduates in 1980-2000 who do not
return to school for at least 3 years and who works at least one year full time during the period
1995-2002
people in the sample by year of graduation
grad. year graduates each year sample 1980-2002 sample 1995-2002
(1) (2) (3)
1980 22748 558543 200993
1981 22692 534923 201779
1982 23683 531651 210407
1983 23803 500995 208462
1984 22708 453096 199295
1985 22505 427633 199096
1986 23612 427822 211892
1987 24720 415338 219108
1988 23302 371728 210396
1989 23925 346348 210899
1990 22083 292160 192488
1991 24282 287488 206742
1992 24694 267261 213051
1993 23974 235447 211473
1994 22728 194274 194274
1995 23210 180390 180390
1996 22398 151908 151908
1997 22526 127596 127596
1998 23609 106029 106029
1999 19965 68415 68415
2000 21113 42226 42226
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Table A-2: Sample 2 selection -excluding part time workers and truncating spells first time part
time work is observed. Conditional on observing least 1 year of full time work in 1995-2002.
Before part time truncation After part time truncation
t full time non-employment part time full time non-employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1981 15892 4983 1873 11626 2940
1982 35979 9313 3154 25742 5467
1983 57960 13073 4275 41317 7431
1984 82959 13790 5730 58947 7733
1985 108086 13256 6915 76944 7258
1986 130726 15610 7395 93527 8519
1987 152989 18938 8665 110816 10306
1988 171988 27026 10160 126659 14660
1989 194910 29278 12153 144510 16011
1990 212719 36176 15675 160115 20341
1991 231833 41854 16922 175277 23886
1992 254320 47852 16499 192226 27943
1993 277707 53333 16275 210511 32291
1994 309902 48306 17903 237463 29487
1995 343342 43680 16901 265566 25987
1996 363182 44619 18516 277924 27687
1997 383951 44192 18751 291233 27286
1998 402322 44145 20120 303621 26971
1999 417667 47764 21515 314103 28715
2000 432477 48746 22064 322373 28776
2001 448168 50539 22082 331889 29056
2002 436029 56190 19957 315543 31045
Total 5465108 752663 303500 4087932 439796
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Table A-3: Sample selection 3. Showing all full time private and public observations with
missing occupational codes.
t non-employment private private, no occ-code public public, no occ-code
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1981 294 7188 849 3367 222
1982 5467 16794 1558 6911 479
1983 7431 27391 2563 10475 888
1984 7733 40442 3782 13647 1076
1985 7258 53495 5523 16676 1250
1986 8519 65454 6941 19735 1397
1987 10306 78254 731 23704 1548
1988 14660 88670 8676 27611 1702
1989 16011 103181 8206 31082 2041
1990 20341 115164 10368 32757 1826
1991 23886 128810 8997 35756 1714
1992 27943 140444 10719 38703 2360
1993 32291 132520 14209 58687 5095
1994 29487 152005 17369 63155 4934
1995 25987 133989 56022 50129 25426
1996 27687 160221 38338 57333 22032
1997 27286 172806 35605 62333 20489
1998 26971 179837 37234 65357 21193
1999 28715 184317 39374 76583 13829
2000 28776 176512 53138 74888 17835
2001 29056 178667 56174 78511 18537
2002 31045 167699 54261 76607 16976
total 439796 2503860 477216 924007 182849
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Table A-4: Sample selection 3. Excluding full time observations with no occupational codes
and truncating spells first time missing occupation is observed. Conditional on observing least
1 year of full time work in 1995-2002.
t non-employment private public occ.-truncation no fulltime obs in 1995-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1981 1291 4946 2264 1554 4511
1982 2340 11393 4703 3683 9090
1983 3048 18725 7026 6575 13374
1984 2840 27396 9077 10056 17311
1985 2118 36253 11126 14483 20222
1986 2265 44557 12971 19224 23029
1987 2698 53002 15253 23781 26388
1988 4553 60541 17500 28556 30169
1989 4915 69445 19396 33242 33523
1990 6491 78427 20670 38618 36250
1991 8286 85822 22209 43607 39239
1992 10260 94039 24037 49566 42267
1993 12351 91194 37720 57909 43628
1994 10708 104268 39972 65246 46756
1995 10088 115555 44030 117478 4402
1996 10140 118442 44260 130090 2679
1997 9197 122605 45253 139460 2004
1998 8557 125723 47351 147460 1501
1999 9028 126806 50902 154741 1341
2000 8422 115043 50617 176091 976
2001 7602 113623 53094 186042 584
2002 8013 98129 49537 190909 0
total 145211 1715934 628968 1638371 399244
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Table A-5: Sample selection 4. Excluding full time observations from the public sector and
truncating spells first time work in public sector is observed. Conditional on observing least 2
consecutive years of full time private work in 1995-2002.
Public employment truncation
t non-employment private public truncation 2 consecutive private
fulltime obs in 1995-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1981 688 333 502 622
1982 1215 7741 1186 1171
1983 1572 12824 2057 1499
1984 1270 18857 2879 1743
1985 802 24938 3685 1999
1986 880 30719 4378 2260
1987 1146 36882 5179 2527
1988 2208 42730 6036 2719
1989 2198 49537 6998 2771
1990 3004 56030 7778 2906
1991 3686 61684 8540 2925
1992 4762 67644 9432 2881
1993 6194 73776 11863 1324
1994 4223 84105 12888 935
1995 4035 93422 13744 566
1996 3395 104271 14513 231
1997 3461 108016 15262 142
1998 3336 110999 15887 79
1999 3939 111370 16460 34
2000 3385 101379 14805 5
2001 2777 100225 14464 7
2002 3511 87537 13822 2
Total 61687 1388016 202358 29348
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Table A-6: Sample selection 5. Excluding observations not in full time private employment after
the workers have been observed in an initial spell of full time private employment. Conditional
on observing least 2 consecutive years of full time private work in 1995-2002.
Truncation after initial spell in private full time work
t non-employment private non-private truncation 2 consecutive private
fulltime obs in 1995-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1981 444 2581 0 993
1982 669 6182 227 1878
1983 687 10514 701 2494
1984 461 15405 1118 3143
1985 239 20234 1441 3826
1986 222 25094 1807 4476
1987 277 30295 2319 5137
1988 469 35777 3451 5241
1989 521 41305 4314 5595
1990 707 47062 5568 5697
1991 962 52195 7055 5158
1992 1353 57922 8854 4277
1993 1949 64299 10987 2735
1994 1706 72424 12085 2113
1995 1576 81445 13361 1075
1996 1331 91728 14349 258
1997 1043 95247 14985 202
1998 809 98194 15105 227
1999 748 99149 15269 143
2000 417 90503 13840 4
2001 4 89704 13283 11
2002 0 78167 12880 1
Total 16594 1205426 172999 54684
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Table A-7: Sample selection 6. Truncating observations with missing firm codes.
Missing firm code truncation
t non-employment private firm-code truncation 2 consecutive private
fulltime obs in 1995-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1981 417 2420 0 188
1982 627 5808 0 416
1983 656 9877 0 668
1984 431 14509 0 926
1985 222 19047 0 1204
1986 201 23577 0 1538
1987 251 28421 0 1900
1988 435 33542 0 2269
1989 484 38703 0 2639
1990 652 44034 0 3083
1991 871 48797 0 3489
1992 1230 54045 0 4000
1993 1780 59908 0 4560
1994 1546 67303 0 5281
1995 1408 75355 609 168
1996 1209 82577 9151 122
1997 968 83847 11400 75
1998 730 85139 13051 83
1999 677 82971 16174 75
2000 384 74415 16087 34
2001 3 72468 17234 3
2002 0 6144 16726 1
Total 15182 1068203 105913 32722
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Table A-8: Sample selection 1 for least restrictive sample, part 1.
t Full time employment part time non-employment
(1) (2) (3)
1981 12,333 1,502 2,990
1982 28,439 2,467 5,716
1983 45,551 3,287 7,963
1984 65,234 4,417 7,783
1985 84,443 5,202 6,554
1986 102,211 5,531 7,089
1987 121,035 6,403 8,405
1988 135,933 7,483 13,576
1989 155,653 9,046 14,210
1990 169,516 11,424 17,955
1991 187,784 12,150 21,188
1992 203,818 11,508 24,313
1993 217,363 10,916 27,026
1994 241,336 12,402 21,717
1995 207,329 10,511 18,838
1996 252,277 10,583 15,490
1997 276,412 10,259 13,713
1998 296,602 10,682 12,326
1999 312,557 11,306 13,622
2000 302,132 11,589 12,835
2001 309,319 10,955 12,665
2002 289,494 10,956 17,740
total 4,016,771 190,579 303,714
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Table A-9: Sample selection 1 for least restrictive sample, part 2.
t missing missing missing no fulltime obs
occ. firm occ. and firm in 1995-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1981 1,223 0 0 356
1982 2,389 0 0 691
1983 4,090 0 0 1,077
1984 5,651 0 0 1,328
1985 7,742 0 0 1,890
1986 9,361 0 0 2,627
1987 9,570 0 0 3,449
1988 11,018 0 0 3,780
1989 10,580 0 0 4,319
1990 12,424 0 0 4,564
1991 10,179 0 0 5,303
1992 12,386 0 0 5,673
1993 17,786 0 0 5,696
1994 19,310 0 0 5,550
1995 62,890 12,232 4,652 5,673
1996 41,128 13,565 2,908 5,390
1997 34,233 15,904 2,645 5,887
1998 36,071 10,581 1,969 6,569
1999 29,223 13,286 1,457 7,371
2000 47,843 12,811 2,210 8,812
2001 48,029 12,086 2,454 10,252
2002 56,254 11,563 2,723 11,839
total 489,380 102,028 21,018 108,096
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Table A-10: Sample selection 2 for least restrictive sample. Excluding observations with no
information on occupation or firm tenure
Full time part time non missing missing missing no fulltime obs
t employment -employment occ firm occ and firm in 1995-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1981 9,544 1,044 2,372 825 0 0 5,139
1982 21,628 1,606 4,150 2,029 0 0 10,950
1983 34,435 2,071 5,579 3,612 0 0 17,005
1984 48,590 2,779 5,225 5,352 0 0 23,218
1985 62,580 3,233 4,110 7,358 0 0 29,238
1986 75,573 3,275 4,308 9,251 0 0 35,078
1987 88,676 3,798 4,800 10,959 0 0 41,231
1988 99,796 4,404 7,975 12,669 0 0 47,851
1989 113,270 5,321 8,023 13,701 0 0 54,208
1990 124,163 6,711 10,320 15,182 0 0 60,745
1991 136,221 7,123 12,265 14,858 0 0 66,821
1992 148,968 6,757 14,482 15,116 0 0 73,140
1993 161,528 6,212 16,251 16,551 0 0 79,223
1994 177,918 7,488 12,961 17,220 0 0 85,482
1995 181,187 6,431 11,419 26,443 3,297 1,867 91,486
1996 197,686 5,984 8,819 25,085 5,030 2,670 96,072
1997 207,218 6,000 8,358 24,616 8,580 4,383 99,899
1998 215,670 6,321 7,792 24,748 11,194 6,162 102,913
1999 220,382 6,853 8,743 24,653 15,347 8,020 104,824
2000 209,363 6,863 8,097 41,709 15,399 11,818 104,983
2001 210,880 5,753 7,263 46,565 16,102 15,481 103,716
2002 189,268 5,243 9,244 57,603 17,312 19,630 102,269
total 2,934,544 111,270 182,556 416,105 92,261 70,031 1,435,491
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Table A-11: Summary statistics of least restrictive sample. For workers in full time employment
in 1995-2001.
Full Over 10 Over 10 Over 100
Sample per per occupation, per
occupation year, occupation
and year and experience and year
Number of observations 1294468 1292932 1229339 1291602
Number of occupations 368 324 242 295
Occupational tenure 4.53 4.54 4.57 4.54
Occupational switchers 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19
Firm tenure 2.78 2.78 2.77 2.78
Firm switchers 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Industry tenure 3.78 3.78 3.79 2.80
Years after graduation 9.56 9.56 9.54 9.56
Less than 12 years of school 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Apprenticeship education 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55
2 year university 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Bachelor 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Masters degree or above 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Hourly wage in DKK in 1995 172.65 172.66 172.29 172.68
Married 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Union 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
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A2 Appendix Occupational Classification
A2.1 1, 2, 3, and 4-digit Occupational Classification
MAJOR GROUP 1
LEGISLATORS, SENIOR OFFICIALS AND MANAGERS
11 LEGISLATORS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS
111 LEGISLATORS
1110 Legislators
114 SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SPECIAL-INTEREST ORGANISATIONS
1141 Senior officials of political-party organisations
1142 Senior officials of employers’, workers’ and other economic-interest
organisations
1143 Senior officials of humanitarian and other special-interest organisa-
tions
12 CORPORATE MANAGERS (This group is intended to include per-
sons who - as directors, chief executives or department managers - manage
enterprises or organisations, or departments, requiring a total of three or
more managers.)
121 DIRECTORS AND CHIEF EXECUTIVES
1210 Directors and chief executives
122 PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT MANAGERS
1221 Production and operations department managers in agriculture,
hunting, forestry and fishing
1222 Production and operations department managers in manufacturing
1223 Production and operations department managers in construction
1224 Production and operations department managers in wholesale and
retail trade
1225 Production and operations department managers in restaurants and
hotels
1226 Production and operations department managers in transport, stor-
age and communications
1227 Production and operations department managers in business services
1228 Production and operations department managers in personal care,
cleaning and related services
1229 Production and operations department managers not elsewhere clas-
sified
123 OTHER DEPARTMENT MANAGERS
1231 Finance and administration department managers
1232 Personnel and industrial relations department managers
1233 Sales and marketing department managers
1234 Advertising and public relations department managers
1235 Supply and distribution department managers
1236 Computing services department managers
1237 Research and development department managers
1239 Other department managers not elsewhere classified
13 GENERAL MANAGERS (This group is intended to include persons
who manage enterprises, or in some cases organisations, on their own
behalf, or on behalf of the proprietor, with some non-managerial help
and the assistance of no more than one other manager who should also
be classified in this sub- major group as, in most cases, the tasks will
be broader than those of a specialised manager in a larger enterpriseor
organisation. Non-managerial staff should be classified according to their
specific tasks.
131 GENERAL MANAGERS
1311 General managers in agriculture, hunting, forestry/ and fishing
1312 General managers in manufacturing
1313 General managers in construction
1314 General managers in wholesale and retail trade
1315 General managers of restaurants and hotels
1316 General managers in transport, storage and communications
1317 General managers of business services
1318 General managers in personal care, cleaning and related services
1319 General managers not elsewhere classified
MAJOR GROUP 2
PROFESSIONALS
21 PHYSICAL, MATHEMATICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS
211 PHYSICISTS, CHEMISTS AND RELATED PROFESSIONALS
2111 Physicists and astronomers
2112 Meteorologists
2113 Chemists
2114 Geologists and geophysicists
212 MATHEMATICIANS, STATISTICIANS AND RELATED PROFES-
SIONALS
2121 Mathematicians and related professionals
2122 Statisticians
213 COMPUTING PROFESSIONALS
2131 Computer systems designers and analysts
2132 Computer programmers
2139 Computing professionals not elsewhere classified
214 ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS AND RELATED PROFESSIONALS
2141 Architects, town and traffic planners
2142 Civil engineers
2143 Electrical engineers
2144 Electronics and telecommunications engineers
2145 Mechanical engineers
2146 Chemical engineers
2147 Mining engineers, metallurgists and related professionals
2148 Cartographers and surveyors
2149 Architects, engineers and related professionals not elsewhere classi-
fied
22 LIFE SCIENCE AND HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
221 LIFE SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS
2211 Biologists, botanists, zoologists and related professionals
2212 Pharmacologists, pathologists and related professionals
2213 Agronomists and related professionals
222 HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (except nursing)
2221 Medical doctors
2222 Dentists
2223 Veterinarians
2224 Pharmacists
2229 Health professionals (except nursing) not elsewhere classified
223 NURSING AND MIDWIFERY PROFESSIONALS
2230 Nursing and midwifery professionals
23 TEACHING PROFESSIONALS
231 COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION TEACHING
PROFESSIONALS
2310 College, university and higher education teaching professionals
232 SECONDARY EDUCATION TEACHING PROFESSIONALS
2320 Secondary education teaching professionals
233 PRIMARY AND PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION TEACHING PRO-
FESSIONALS
2331 Primary education teaching professionals
234 SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHING PROFESSIONALS
2340 Special education teaching professionals
235 OTHER TEACHING PROFESSIONALS
2351 Education methods specialists
2352 School inspectors
2359 Other teaching professionals not elsewhere classified
24 OTHER PROFESSIONALS
241 BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS
2411 Accountants
2412 Personnel and careers professionals
2419 Business professionals not elsewhere classified
242 LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
2421 Lawyers
2422 Judges
2429 Legal professionals not elsewhere classified
243 ARCHIVISTS, LIBRARIANS AND RELATED INFORMATION
PROFESSIONALS
2431 Archivists and curators
2432 Librarians and related information professionals
244 SOCIAL SCIENCE AND RELATED PROFESSIONALS
2441 Economists
2442 Sociologists, anthropologists and related professionals
2443 Philosophers, historians and political scientists
2444 Philologists, translators and interpreters
2445 Psychologists
2446 Social work professionals
245 WRITERS AND CREATIVE OR PERFORMING ARTISTS
2451 Authors, journalists and other writers
2452 Sculptors, painters and related artists
2453 Composers, musicians and singers
2454 Choreographers and dancers
2455 Film, stage and related actors and directors
246 RELIGIOUS PROFESSIONALS
2460 Religious professionals
2470: working with administration of legislation in the public sector
MAJOR GROUP 3
TECHNICIANS AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
31 PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCE ASSOCIATE PROFES-
SIONALS
311 PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCE TECHNICIANS
3111 Chemical and physical science technicians
3112 Civil engineering technicians
3113 Electrical engineering technicians
3114 Electronics and telecommunications engineering technicians
3115 Mechanical engineering technicians
3116 Chemical engineering technicians
3117 Mining and metallurgical technicians
3118 Draughtspersons
3119 Physical and engineering science technicians not elsewhere classified
312 COMPUTER ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
120
3121 Computer assistants
3122 Computer equipment operators
3123 Industrial robot controllers
313 OPTICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT OPERATORS
3131 Photographers and image and sound recording equipment operators
3132 Broadcasting and telecommunications equipment operators
3133 Medical equipment operators
3139 Optical and electronic equipment operators not elsewhere classified
314 SHIP AND AIRCRAFT CONTROLLERS AND TECHNICIANS
3141 Ships’ engineers
3142 Ships’ deck officers and pilots
3143 Aircraft pilots and related associate professionals
3144 Air traffic controllers
3145 Air traffic safety technicians
315 SAFETY AND QUALITY INSPECTORS
3151 Building and fire inspectors 3152 Safety, health and quality inspec-
tors
32 LIFE SCIENCE AND HEALTH ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
321 LIFE SCIENCE TECHNICIANS AND RELATED ASSOCIATE PRO-
FESSIONALS
3211 Life science technicians
3212 Agronomy and forestry technicians
3213 Farming and forestry advisers
322 MODERN HEALTH ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS (except nurs-
ing)
3221 Medical assistants
3222 Sanitarians
3223 Dieticians and nutritionists
3224 Optometrists and opticians
3225 Dental assistants
3226 Physiotherapists and related associate professionals
3227 Veterinary assistants
3228 Pharmaceutical assistants
3229 Modern health associate professionals (except nursing) not elsewhere
classified
323 NURSING AND MIDWIFERY ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
3231 Nursing associate professionals
33 TEACHING ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
331 PRIMARY EDUCATION TEACHING ASSOCIATE PROFESSION-
ALS
3310 Primary education teaching associate professionals
332 PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION TEACHING ASSOCIATE PROFES-
SIONALS
3320 Pre-primary education teaching associate professionals
333 SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHING ASSOCIATE PROFESSION-
ALS
3330 Special education teaching associate professionals
334 OTHER TEACHING ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
3340 Other teaching associate professionals
34 OTHER ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
341 FINANCE AND SALES ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
3411 Securities and finance dealers and brokers
3412 Insurance representatives
3413 Estate agents
3414 Travel consultants and organizers
3415 Technical and commercial sales representatives
3416 Buyers
3417 Appraisers, valuers and auctioneers
3419 Finance and sales associate professionals not elsewhere classified
342 BUSINESS SERVICES AGENTS AND TRADE BROKERS
3421 Trade brokers
3422 Clearing and forwarding agents
3423 Employment agents and labor contractors
3429 Business services agents and trade brokers not elsewhere classified
343 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
3431 Administrative secretaries and related associate professionals
3432 Legal and related business associate professionals
3433 Bookkeepers
3434 Statistical, mathematical and related associate professionals
3439 Administrative associate professionals not elsewhere classified
344 CUSTOMS, TAX AND RELATED GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATE
PROFESSIONALS
3441 Customs and border inspectors
3442 Government tax and excise officials
3443 Government social benefits officials
3444 Government licensing officials
3449 Customs, tax and related government associate professionals not
elsewhere classified
345 POLICE INSPECTORS AND DETECTIVES
3450 Police inspectors and detectives
346 SOCIAL WORK ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
3460 Social work associate professionals
347 ARTISTIC, ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS ASSOCIATE PRO-
FESSIONALS
3471 Decorators and commercial designers
3472 Radio, television and other announcers
3473 Street, night-club and related musicians, singers and dancers
3474 Clowns, magicians, acrobats and related associate professionals
3475 Athletes, sportspersons and related associate professionals
348 RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
3480 Religious associate professionals
MAJOR GROUP 4
CLERKS
41 OFFICE CLERKS
411 SECRETARIES AND KEYBOARD-OPERATING CLERKS
4111 Stenographers and typists
4112 Word-processor and related operators
4113 Data entry operators
4114 Calculating-machine operators
4115 Secretaries
412 NUMERICAL CLERKS
4121 Accounting and bookkeeping clerks
4122 Statistical and finance clerks
413 MATERIAL-RECORDING AND TRANSPORT CLERKS
4131 Stock clerks
4132 Production clerks
4133 Transport clerks
414 LIBRARY, MAIL AND RELATED CLERKS
4141 Library and filing clerks
4142 Mail carriers and sorting clerks
4143 Coding, proof-reading and related clerks
419 OTHER OFFICE CLERKS
4190 Other office clerks
42 CUSTOMER SERVICES CLERKS
421 CASHIERS, TELLERS AND RELATED CLERKS
4211 Cashiers and ticket clerks
4212 Tellers and other counter clerks
4213 Bookmakers and croupiers
4214 Pawnbrokers and money-lenders
4215 Debt-collectors and related workers
422 CLIENT INFORMATION CLERKS
4221 Travel agency and related clerks
4222 Receptionists and information clerks
4223 Telephone switchboard operators
MAJOR GROUP 5
SERVICE WORKERS AND SHOP AND MARKET SALES WORKERS
51 PERSONAL AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKERS
511 TRAVEL ATTENDANTS AND RELATED WORKERS
5111 Travel attendants and travel stewards
5112 Transport conductors
5113 Travel guides
512 HOUSEKEEPING AND RESTAURANT SERVICES WORKERS
5121 Housekeepers and related workers
5122 Cooks
5123 Waiters, waitresses and bartenders
513 PERSONAL CARE AND RELATED WORKERS
5131 Child-care workers
5132 Institution-based personal care workers
5133 Home-based personal care workers
5139 Personal care and related workers not elsewhere classified
514 OTHER PERSONAL SERVICES WORKERS
5141 Hairdressers, barbers, beauticians and related workers
5142 Companions and valets
5143 Undertakers and embalmers
5149 Other personal services workers not elsewhere classified
515 ASTROLOGERS, FORTUNE-TELLERS AND RELATED WORK-
ERS
5151 Astrologers and related workers
5152 Fortune-tellers, palmists and related workers
516 PROTECTIVE SERVICES WORKERS
5161 Fire-fighters
5162 Police officers
5163 Prison guards
5169 Protective services workers not elsewhere classified
52 MODELS, SALESPERSONS AND DEMONSTRATORS
521 FASHION AND OTHER MODELS
5210 Fashion and other models
522 SHOP SALESPERSONS AND DEMONSTRATORS
5220 Shop salespersons and demonstrators
523 STALL AND MARKET SALESPERSONS
5230 Stall and market salespersons
MAJOR GROUP 6
SKILLED AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERY WORKERS
61 MARKET-ORIENTED SKILLED AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERY
WORKERS
611 MARKET GARDENERS AND CROP GROWERS
6111 Field crop and vegetable growers
6112 Tree and shrub crop growers
612 MARKET-ORIENTED ANIMAL PRODUCERS AND RELATED
WORKERS
6121 Dairy and livestock producers
6122 Poultry producers
6129 Market-oriented animal producers and related workers not elsewhere
classified
613 MARKET-ORIENTED CROP AND ANIMAL PRODUCERS
6130 Market-oriented crop and animal producers
614 FORESTRY AND RELATED WORKERS
6141 Forestry workers and loggers
6142 Charcoal burners and related workers
615 FISHERY WORKERS, HUNTERS AND TRAPPERS
6151 Aquatic-life cultivation workers
121
6152 Inland and coastal waters fishery workers
6153 Deep-sea fishery workers
6154 Hunters and trappers
MAJOR GROUP 7
CRAFT AND RELATED TRADES WORKERS
71 EXTRACTION AND BUILDING TRADES WORKERS
711 MINERS, SHOTFIRERS, STONE CUTTERS AND CARVERS
7111 Miners and quarry workers
7112 Shotfirers and blasters
7113 Stone splitters, cutters and carvers
712 BUILDING FRAME AND RELATED TRADES WORKERS
7121 Builders, traditional materials
7122 Bricklayers and stonemasons
7123 Concrete placers, concrete finishers and related workers
7124 Carpenters and joiners
7129 Building frame and related trades workers not elsewhere classified
713 BUILDING FINISHERS AND RELATED TRADES WORKERS
7131 Roofers
7132 Floor layers and tile setters
7133 Plasterers
7134 Insulation workers
7135 Glaziers
7136 Plumbers and pipe fitters
7137 Building and related electricians
7139: buildingswork elsewhere
714 PAINTERS, BUILDING STRUCTURE CLEANERS AND RELATED
TRADES WORKERS
7141 Painters and related workers
7142 Varnishers and related painters
7143 Building structure cleaners
72 METAL, MACHINERY AND RELATED TRADES WORKERS
721 METAL MOULDERS, WELDERS, SHEET-METAL WORKERS,
STRUCTURAL- METAL PREPARERS, ANDRELATED TRADES
WORKERS
7211 Metal moulders and coremakers
7212 Welders and flamecutters
7213 Sheet metal workers
7214 Structural-metal preparers and erectors
7215 Riggers and cable splicers
7216 Underwater workers
722 BLACKSMITHS, TOOL-MAKERS AND RELATED TRADES
WORKERS
7221 Blacksmiths, hammer-smiths and forging-press workers
7222 Tool-makers and related workers
7223 Machine-tool setters and setter-operators
7224 Metal wheel-grinders, polishers and tool sharpeners
723 MACHINERY MECHANICS AND FITTERS
7231 Motor vehicle mechanics and fitters
7232 Aircraft engine mechanics and fitters
7233 Agricultural- or industrial-machinery mechanics and fitters
724 ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT MECHANICS
AND FITTERS
7241 Electrical mechanics and fitters
7242 Electronics fitters
7243 Electronics mechanics and servicers
7244 Telegraph and telephone installers and servicers
7245 Electrical line installers, repairers and cable jointers
73 PRECISION, HANDICRAFT, PRINTING AND RELATED TRADES
WORKERS
731 PRECISION WORKERS IN METAL AND RELATED MATERIALS
7311 Precision-instrument makers and repairers
7312 Musical instrument makers and tuners
7313 Jewellery and precious-metal workers
732 POTTERS, GLASS-MAKERS AND RELATED TRADES WORK-
ERS
7321 Abrasive wheel formers, potters and related workers
7322 Glass makers, cutters, grinders and finishers
7323 Glass engravers and etchers
7324 Glass, ceramics and related decorative painters
733 HANDICRAFT WORKERS IN WOOD,TEXTILE, LEATHER AND
RELATED MATERIALS
7331 Handicraft workers in wood and related materials
7332 Handicraft workers in textile, leather and related materials
734 PRINTING AND RELATED TRADES WORKERS
7341 Compositors, typesetters and related workers
7342 Stereotypers and electrotypers
7343 Printing engravers and etchers
7344 Photographic and related workers
7345 Bookbinders and related workers
7346 Silk-screen, block and textile printers
74 OTHER CRAFT AND RELATED TRADES WORKERS
741 FOOD PROCESSING AND RELATED TRADES WORKERS
7411 Butchers, fishmongers and related food preparers
7412 Bakers, pastry-cooks and confectionery makers
7413 Dairy-products makers
7414 Fruit, vegetable and related preservers
7415 Food and beverage tasters and graders
7416 Tobacco preparers and tobacco products makers
742 WOOD TREATERS, CABINET-MAKERS AND RELATED TRADES
WORKERS
7421 Wood treaters
7422 Cabinet makers and related workers
7423 Woodworking machine setters and setter-operators
7424 Basketry weavers, brush makers and related workers
743 TEXTILE, GARMENT AND RELATED TRADES WORKERS
7431 Fibre preparers
7432 Weavers, knitters and related workers
7433 Tailors, dressmakers and hatters
7434 Furriers and related workers
7435 Textile, leather and related pattern-makers and cutters
7436 Sewers, embroiderers and related workers
7437 Upholsterers and related workers
744 PELT, LEATHER AND SHOEMAKING TRADES WORKERS
7441 Pelt dressers, tanners and fellmongers
7442 Shoe-makers and related workers
MAJOR GROUP 8
PLANT AND MACHINE OPERATORS AND ASSEMBLERS
81 STATIONARY-PLANT AND RELATED OPERATORS
811 MINING- AND MINERAL-PROCESSING-PLANT OPERATORS
8111 Mining-plant operators
8112 Mineral-ore- and stone-processing-plant operators
8113 Well drillers and borers and related workers
812 METAL-PROCESSING-PLANT OPERATORS
8121 Ore and metal furnace operators
8122 Metal melters, casters and rolling-mill operators
8123 Metal-heat-treating-plant operators
8124 Metal drawers and extruders
813 GLASS, CERAMICS AND RELATED PLANT OPERATORS
8131 Glass and ceramics kiln and related machine operators
8139 Glass, ceramics and related plant operators not elsewhere classified
814 WOOD-PROCESSING- AND PAPERMAKING-PLANT OPERA-
TORS
8141 Wood-processing-plant operators
8142 Paper-pulp plant operators
8143 Papermaking-plant operators
815 CHEMICAL-PROCESSING-PLANT OPERATORS
8151 Crushing-, grinding- and chemical-mixing-machinery operators
8152 Chemical-heat-treating-plant operators
8153 Chemical-filtering- and separating-equipment operators
8154 Chemical-still and reactor operators (except petroleum and natural
gas)
8155 Petroleum- and natural-gas-refining-plant operators
8159 Chemical-processing-plant operators not elsewhere classified
816 POWER-PRODUCTION AND RELATED PLANT OPERATORS
8161 Power-production plant operators
8162 Steam-engine and boiler operators
8163 Incinerator, water-treatment and related plant operators
817 AUTOMATED-ASSEMBLY-LINE AND INDUSTRIAL-ROBOT OP-
ERATORS
82 MACHINE OPERATORS AND ASSEMBLERS
821 METAL- AND MINERAL-PRODUCTS MACHINE OPERATORS
8211 Machine-tool operators
8212 Cement and other mineral products machine operators
822 CHEMICAL-PRODUCTS MACHINE OPERATORS
8221 Pharmaceutical- and toiletry-products machine operators
8222 Ammunition- and explosive-products machine operators
8223 Metal finishing-, plating- and coating-machine operators
8224 Photographic-products machine operators
8229 Chemical-products machine operators not elsewhere classified
823 RUBBER- AND PLASTIC-PRODUCTS MACHINE OPERATORS
8231 Rubber-products machine operators
8232 Plastic-products machine operators
824 WOOD-PRODUCTS MACHINE OPERATORS
8240 Wood-products machine operators
825 PRINTING-, BINDING- AND PAPER-PRODUCTS MACHINE OP-
ERATORS
8251 Printing-machine operators
8252 Bookbinding-machine operators
8253 Paper-products machine operators
826 TEXTILE-, FUR- AND LEATHER-PRODUCTS MACHINE OPER-
ATORS
8261 Fibre-preparing-, spinning- and winding-machine operators
8262 Weaving- and knitting-machine operators
8263 Sewing-machine operators
8264 Bleaching-, dyeing- and cleaning-machine operators
8265 Fur and leather-preparing-machine operators
8266 Shoemaking- and related machine operators
8269 Textile-, fur- and leather-products machine operators not elsewhere
classified
827 FOOD AND RELATED PRODUCTS MACHINE OPERATORS
8271 Meat- and fish-processing-machine operators
8272 Dairy-products machine operators
8273 Grain- and spice-milling-machine operators
8274 Baked-goods, cereal and chocolate-products machine operators
8275 Fruit-, vegetable- and nut-processing-machine operators
8276 Sugar production machine operators
8277 Tea-, coffee-, and cocoa-processing-machine operators
8278 Brewers, wine and other beverage machine operators
8279 Tobacco production machine operators
828 ASSEMBLERS
8281 Mechanical-machinery assemblers
8282 Electrical-equipment assemblers
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8283 Electronic-equipment assemblers
8284 Metal-, rubber- and plastic-products assemblers
8285 Wood and related products assemblers
8286 Paperboard, textile and related products assemblers
8287: Assembly line and assembler elsewhere
829 OTHER MACHINE OPERATORS AND ASSEMBLERS
8290 Other machine operators and assemblers
83 DRIVERS AND MOBILE-PLANT OPERATORS
831 LOCOMOTIVE-ENGINE DRIVERS AND RELATED WORKERS
8311 Locomotive-engine drivers
8312 Railway brakers, signallers and shunters
832 MOTOR-VEHICLE DRIVERS
8321 Motor-cycle drivers
8322 Car, taxi and van drivers
8323 Bus and tram drivers
8324 Heavy-truck and lorry drivers
833 AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER MOBILE-PLANT OPERATORS
8331 Motorized farm and forestry plant operators
8332 Earth-moving- and related plant operators
8333 Crane, hoist and related plant operators
8334 Lifting-truck operators
834 SHIPS’ DECK CREWS AND RELATED WORKERS
8340 Ships’ deck crews and related workers
MAJOR GROUP 9
ELEMENTARY OCCUPATIONS
91 SALES AND SERVICES ELEMENTARY OCCUPATIONS
911 STREET VENDORS AND RELATED WORKERS
9113 Door-to-door and telephone salespersons
912 SHOE CLEANING AND OTHER STREET SERVICES ELEMEN-
TARY OCCUPATIONS
9120 Shoe cleaning and other street services elementary occupations
913 DOMESTIC AND RELATED HELPERS, CLEANERS AND LAUN-
DERERS
9131 Domestic helpers and cleaners
9132 Helpers and cleaners in offices, hotels and other establishments
9133 Hand-launderers and pressers
914 BUILDING CARETAKERS, WINDOW AND RELATED CLEANERS
9141 Building caretakers
9142 Vehicle, window and related cleaners
915 MESSENGERS, PORTERS, DOORKEEPERS AND RELATED
WORKERS
9151 Messengers, package and luggage porters and deliverers
9152 Doorkeepers, watchpersons and related workers
9153 Vending-machine money collectors, meter readers and related work-
ers
916 GARBAGE COLLECTORS AND RELATED LABOURERS
9161 Garbage collectors
9162 Sweepers and related labourers
92 AGRICULTURAL, FISHERY AND RELATED LABOURERS
921 AGRICULTURAL, FISHERY AND RELATED LABOURERS
9211 Farm-hands and labourers
9212 Forestry labourers
9213 Fishery, hunting and trapping labourers
93 LABOURERS IN MINING, CONSTRUCTION, MANUFACTURING
AND TRANSPORT
931 MINING AND CONSTRUCTION LABOURERS
9311 Mining and quarrying labourers
9312 Construction and maintenance labourers: roads, dams and similar
constructions
9313 Building construction labourers
932 MANUFACTURING LABOURERS
933 TRANSPORT LABOURERS AND FREIGHT HANDLERS
MAJOR GROUP 0
ARMED FORCES
01 ARMED FORCES
011 ARMED FORCES
0110 Armed forces
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A3 Most Common Occupational Switches For Private
Sector Employees
From To Nb. Switch Pct
Occ. Occ. switch total switch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1210 1222 5 240 0,021
1210 1224 11 240 0,046
1210 1229 6 240 0,025
1210 1231 16 240 0,067
1210 1233 11 240 0,046
1210 1239 12 240 0,050
1210 1317 9 240 0,038
1210 2145 5 240 0,021
1210 2411 11 240 0,046
1210 3112 5 240 0,021
1210 3115 9 240 0,038
1210 3415 23 240 0,096
1210 3419 6 240 0,025
1210 5220 9 240 0,038
1210 7124 7 240 0,029
1210 7223 5 240 0,021
1222 1210 17 448 0,038
1222 1239 22 448 0,049
1222 1312 29 448 0,065
1222 2145 17 448 0,038
1222 2149 17 448 0,038
1222 3115 25 448 0,056
1222 3119 21 448 0,047
1222 3415 10 448 0,022
1222 3439 10 448 0,022
1222 4132 10 448 0,022
1222 7124 13 448 0,029
1222 7222 14 448 0,031
1222 7223 30 448 0,067
1222 7231 19 448 0,042
1222 7423 11 448 0,025
1222 8240 11 448 0,025
1223 1222 6 76 0,079
1223 1233 2 76 0,026
1223 1235 2 76 0,026
1223 1239 3 76 0,039
1223 1313 10 76 0,132
1223 2142 11 76 0,145
1223 2149 5 76 0,066
1223 3112 6 76 0,079
1223 3439 2 76 0,026
1223 7124 5 76 0,066
1223 7137 2 76 0,026
1223 7241 3 76 0,039
1224 1210 37 479 0,077
1224 1233 13 479 0,027
1224 1239 22 479 0,046
1224 1314 112 479 0,234
1224 3415 62 479 0,129
1224 3416 12 479 0,025
1224 3419 17 479 0,035
1224 4190 27 479 0,056
1224 5220 89 479 0,186
1229 1210 8 117 0,068
1229 1222 3 117 0,026
1229 1233 8 117 0,068
1229 1234 3 117 0,026
1229 1237 7 117 0,060
1229 1319 8 117 0,068
1229 2131 3 117 0,026
1229 2142 4 117 0,034
1229 3112 4 117 0,034
1229 3115 3 117 0,026
1229 3415 4 117 0,034
1229 3419 3 117 0,026
1229 4115 3 117 0,026
1229 7423 5 117 0,043
1231 1210 24 279 0,086
1231 1222 6 279 0,022
1231 1239 13 279 0,047
1231 2144 8 279 0,029
1231 2411 43 279 0,154
1231 2419 11 279 0,039
1231 2441 11 279 0,039
1231 3415 20 279 0,072
1231 3419 30 279 0,108
1231 3433 36 279 0,129
1231 4190 11 279 0,039
1233 1210 28 316 0,089
1233 1224 14 316 0,044
1233 1234 11 316 0,035
1233 1239 11 316 0,035
1233 3415 109 316 0,345
1233 3419 33 316 0,104
1233 5220 7 316 0,022
1234 1210 5 92 0,054
1234 1233 5 92 0,054
1234 1237 3 92 0,033
1234 1317 3 92 0,033
1234 2224 2 92 0,022
1234 2419 5 92 0,054
1234 2441 2 92 0,022
1234 2451 2 92 0,022
1234 3121 5 92 0,054
1234 3415 15 92 0,163
1234 3419 17 92 0,185
1234 3429 5 92 0,054
1234 3439 3 92 0,033
1234 4131 2 92 0,022
1235 1210 4 139 0,029
1235 1222 3 139 0,022
1235 1224 6 139 0,043
1235 1239 9 139 0,065
1235 2131 3 139 0,022
1235 2145 3 139 0,022
1235 2149 3 139 0,022
1235 3115 3 139 0,022
1235 3415 18 139 0,129
1235 3416 11 139 0,079
1235 3419 8 139 0,058
1235 3422 3 139 0,022
1235 3439 3 139 0,022
1235 4131 5 139 0,036
1235 4132 6 139 0,043
1235 4190 3 139 0,022
1235 5220 5 139 0,036
1235 7223 3 139 0,022
1235 7411 7 139 0,050
1235 9330 4 139 0,029
1237 1222 6 82 0,073
1237 1239 6 82 0,073
1237 2113 2 82 0,024
1237 2139 3 82 0,037
1237 2144 6 82 0,073
1237 2146 2 82 0,024
1237 2149 8 82 0,098
1237 2213 2 82 0,024
1237 2419 5 82 0,061
1237 3111 3 82 0,037
1237 3115 4 82 0,049
1237 3121 2 82 0,024
1237 3152 6 82 0,073
1239 1210 16 633 0,025
1239 1222 18 633 0,028
1239 1224 30 633 0,047
1239 1314 14 633 0,022
1239 2149 13 633 0,021
1239 3115 20 633 0,032
1239 3415 36 633 0,057
1239 3419 15 633 0,024
1239 4190 28 633 0,044
1239 5220 50 633 0,079
1239 7231 16 633 0,025
1314 1224 38 669 0,057
1314 1239 25 669 0,037
1314 3114 15 669 0,022
1314 3415 64 669 0,096
1314 4190 20 669 0,030
1314 5220 74 669 0,111
1314 7124 14 669 0,021
1314 7137 21 669 0,031
1314 7223 28 669 0,042
1314 7231 37 669 0,055
1314 7233 16 669 0,024
1314 7411 20 669 0,030
1314 8211 14 669 0,021
1314 8271 26 669 0,039
2113 1237 5 125 0,040
2113 1239 5 125 0,040
2113 2111 3 125 0,024
2113 2139 3 125 0,024
2113 2142 5 125 0,040
2113 2145 8 125 0,064
2113 2146 19 125 0,152
2113 2149 13 125 0,104
2113 2211 9 125 0,072
2113 2213 4 125 0,032
2113 2224 8 125 0,064
2113 2419 4 125 0,032
2113 3111 4 125 0,032
2113 3114 3 125 0,024
2131 2132 61 641 0,095
2131 2139 145 641 0,226
2131 2144 28 641 0,044
2131 2419 23 641 0,036
2131 3114 13 641 0,020
2131 3121 101 641 0,158
2131 3122 32 641 0,050
2131 3415 33 641 0,051
2131 3419 31 641 0,048
2131 4190 21 641 0,033
2132 2131 51 322 0,158
2132 2139 49 322 0,152
2132 2144 20 322 0,062
2132 2149 10 322 0,031
2132 3114 11 322 0,034
2132 3121 78 322 0,242
2132 3122 7 322 0,022
2132 3419 8 322 0,025
2132 4190 20 322 0,062
2139 2131 120 755 0,159
2139 2132 64 755 0,085
2139 2144 37 755 0,049
2139 2149 16 755 0,021
2139 2419 18 755 0,024
2139 3114 34 755 0,045
2139 3121 130 755 0,172
2139 3122 23 755 0,030
2139 3415 30 755 0,040
2139 3419 26 755 0,034
2139 4190 30 755 0,040
2139 7243 21 755 0,028
2141 1210 15 146 0,103
2141 1317 8 146 0,055
2141 2142 21 146 0,144
2141 2149 11 146 0,075
2141 2213 3 146 0,021
2141 2310 4 146 0,027
2141 3112 23 146 0,158
2141 3118 7 146 0,048
2141 3415 3 146 0,021
2141 3471 4 146 0,027
2141 7124 6 146 0,041
2142 1223 21 401 0,052
2142 1239 13 401 0,032
2142 2141 31 401 0,077
2142 2143 16 401 0,040
2142 2145 24 401 0,060
2142 2149 84 401 0,209
2142 3112 54 401 0,135
2142 3115 9 401 0,022
2142 3415 21 401 0,052
2142 7124 11 401 0,027
2143 1239 5 233 0,021
2143 2142 13 233 0,056
2143 2144 14 233 0,060
2143 2145 22 233 0,094
2143 2149 40 233 0,172
2143 3113 12 233 0,052
2143 3114 14 233 0,060
2143 3115 7 233 0,030
2143 3119 10 233 0,043
2143 3415 18 233 0,077
2143 7137 17 233 0,073
2143 7241 5 233 0,021
2144 2131 19 252 0,075
2144 2132 12 252 0,048
2144 2139 33 252 0,131
2144 2143 12 252 0,048
2144 2145 13 252 0,052
2144 2149 24 252 0,095
2144 3114 33 252 0,131
2144 3119 7 252 0,028
2144 3121 15 252 0,060
2144 3415 7 252 0,028
124
2144 7137 6 252 0,024
2144 7243 11 252 0,044
2145 1222 20 718 0,028
2145 1239 22 718 0,031
2145 2139 16 718 0,022
2145 2142 17 718 0,024
2145 2143 34 718 0,047
2145 2144 31 718 0,043
2145 2146 19 718 0,026
2145 2149 152 718 0,212
2145 2419 34 718 0,047
2145 3113 16 718 0,022
2145 3115 78 718 0,109
2145 3119 30 718 0,042
2145 3415 40 718 0,056
2145 7223 18 718 0,025
2146 1222 3 142 0,021
2146 1239 8 142 0,056
2146 2113 10 142 0,070
2146 2143 6 142 0,042
2146 2144 3 142 0,021
2146 2145 11 142 0,077
2146 2149 28 142 0,197
2146 2224 6 142 0,042
2146 2419 4 142 0,028
2146 3114 3 142 0,021
2146 3115 4 142 0,028
2146 3116 3 142 0,021
2146 3119 5 142 0,035
2146 3121 3 142 0,021
2146 3152 5 142 0,035
2146 3211 3 142 0,021
2146 3415 6 142 0,042
2149 1222 47 964 0,049
2149 1239 34 964 0,035
2149 2139 26 964 0,027
2149 2142 103 964 0,107
2149 2143 31 964 0,032
2149 2144 84 964 0,087
2149 2145 118 964 0,122
2149 2146 34 964 0,035
2149 3114 32 964 0,033
2149 3115 47 964 0,049
2149 3415 35 964 0,036
2224 1210 4 73 0,055
2224 1222 3 73 0,041
2224 1237 7 73 0,096
2224 1239 3 73 0,041
2224 2139 3 73 0,041
2224 2146 11 73 0,151
2224 2149 4 73 0,055
2224 2211 4 73 0,055
2224 2221 3 73 0,041
2224 2229 6 73 0,082
2224 2419 6 73 0,082
2224 3152 2 73 0,027
2224 3415 7 73 0,096
2331 3114 7 231 0,030
2331 3115 5 231 0,022
2331 3415 9 231 0,039
2331 4190 14 231 0,061
2331 5220 11 231 0,048
2331 7124 8 231 0,035
2331 7136 7 231 0,030
2331 7137 5 231 0,022
2331 7213 8 231 0,035
2331 7222 5 231 0,022
2331 7223 6 231 0,026
2331 7231 34 231 0,147
2331 7233 7 231 0,030
2331 7243 9 231 0,039
2411 1210 28 663 0,042
2411 1231 104 663 0,157
2411 1239 14 663 0,021
2411 2419 33 663 0,050
2411 3419 84 663 0,127
2411 3433 150 663 0,226
2411 3439 16 663 0,024
2411 4121 51 663 0,077
2411 4190 52 663 0,078
2419 1210 11 430 0,026
2419 1233 9 430 0,021
2419 1239 12 430 0,028
2419 2131 20 430 0,047
2419 2139 34 430 0,079
2419 2146 14 430 0,033
2419 2149 11 430 0,026
2419 2411 21 430 0,049
2419 2441 12 430 0,028
2419 3121 10 430 0,023
2419 3415 45 430 0,105
2419 3419 44 430 0,102
2419 3429 9 430 0,021
2419 3433 10 430 0,023
2421 1210 2 22 0,091
2421 1317 1 22 0,045
2421 2310 1 22 0,045
2421 2411 3 22 0,136
2421 2419 1 22 0,045
2421 2429 7 22 0,318
2421 3121 1 22 0,045
2421 3419 1 22 0,045
2421 4115 1 22 0,045
2421 4190 1 22 0,045
2421 4212 1 22 0,045
2421 5162 1 22 0,045
2421 9330 1 22 0,045
2451 1239 5 105 0,048
2451 1317 4 105 0,038
2451 2131 3 105 0,029
2451 2139 4 105 0,038
2451 2419 5 105 0,048
2451 2442 3 105 0,029
2451 2443 9 105 0,086
2451 3121 3 105 0,029
2451 3131 16 105 0,152
2451 3415 3 105 0,029
2451 3419 4 105 0,038
2451 3429 6 105 0,057
2451 3471 5 105 0,048
2451 4115 5 105 0,048
3111 2113 6 138 0,043
3111 2146 3 138 0,022
3111 2149 4 138 0,029
3111 3114 5 138 0,036
3111 3116 5 138 0,036
3111 3119 10 138 0,072
3111 3152 6 138 0,043
3111 3211 30 138 0,217
3111 3415 5 138 0,036
3111 4190 23 138 0,167
3112 1222 12 564 0,021
3112 1223 23 564 0,041
3112 2141 41 564 0,073
3112 2142 63 564 0,112
3112 2149 22 564 0,039
3112 3115 47 564 0,083
3112 3118 37 564 0,066
3112 3119 33 564 0,059
3112 3415 32 564 0,057
3112 7124 44 564 0,078
3112 7136 24 564 0,043
3113 2139 11 463 0,024
3113 2143 24 463 0,052
3113 2144 13 463 0,028
3113 2145 15 463 0,032
3113 2149 19 463 0,041
3113 3114 58 463 0,125
3113 3115 33 463 0,071
3113 3119 18 463 0,039
3113 3415 21 463 0,045
3113 7137 68 463 0,147
3113 7223 12 463 0,026
3113 7241 52 463 0,112
3113 7243 17 463 0,037
3114 2131 31 1218 0,025
3114 2139 59 1218 0,048
3114 2144 105 1218 0,086
3114 2145 27 1218 0,022
3114 2149 49 1218 0,040
3114 3113 65 1218 0,053
3114 3115 34 1218 0,028
3114 3119 52 1218 0,043
3114 3121 86 1218 0,071
3114 3122 37 1218 0,030
3114 3415 46 1218 0,038
3114 7137 39 1218 0,032
3114 7241 39 1218 0,032
3114 7242 78 1218 0,064
3114 7243 131 1218 0,108
3115 1222 54 1431 0,038
3115 1239 33 1431 0,023
3115 2145 129 1431 0,090
3115 2149 56 1431 0,039
3115 3112 45 1431 0,031
3115 3113 51 1431 0,036
3115 3114 42 1431 0,029
3115 3118 101 1431 0,071
3115 3119 143 1431 0,100
3115 3415 121 1431 0,085
3115 4132 29 1431 0,020
3115 7222 31 1431 0,022
3115 7223 54 1431 0,038
3115 7233 41 1431 0,029
3116 1239 2 88 0,023
3116 2146 4 88 0,045
3116 2149 4 88 0,045
3116 3111 5 88 0,057
3116 3114 4 88 0,045
3116 3115 7 88 0,080
3116 3118 3 88 0,034
3116 3119 7 88 0,080
3116 3211 6 88 0,068
3116 3415 4 88 0,045
3116 7136 9 88 0,102
3116 7137 3 88 0,034
3116 7223 2 88 0,023
3116 8141 3 88 0,034
3116 8159 2 88 0,023
3118 2145 14 356 0,039
3118 2149 9 356 0,025
3118 3112 41 356 0,115
3118 3114 10 356 0,028
3118 3115 81 356 0,228
3118 3119 44 356 0,124
3118 3415 15 356 0,042
3119 1222 42 1148 0,037
3119 2145 35 1148 0,030
3119 2149 39 1148 0,034
3119 3112 44 1148 0,038
3119 3113 33 1148 0,029
3119 3114 59 1148 0,051
3119 3115 141 1148 0,123
3119 3118 50 1148 0,044
3119 3121 23 1148 0,020
3119 3415 58 1148 0,051
3119 4132 27 1148 0,024
3119 7223 32 1148 0,028
3119 7243 31 1148 0,027
3121 2131 158 1057 0,149
3121 2132 86 1057 0,081
3121 2139 199 1057 0,188
3121 3114 60 1057 0,057
3121 3122 63 1057 0,060
3121 3415 40 1057 0,038
3121 3419 38 1057 0,036
3121 4190 111 1057 0,105
3121 7243 25 1057 0,024
3122 1312 8 397 0,020
3122 2131 59 397 0,149
3122 2132 14 397 0,035
3122 2139 35 397 0,088
3122 3114 28 397 0,071
3122 3121 92 397 0,232
3122 3415 14 397 0,035
3122 4190 26 397 0,065
3122 7243 17 397 0,043
3141 2145 2 68 0,029
3141 3113 2 68 0,029
3141 3115 22 68 0,324
3141 3142 2 68 0,029
3141 3415 5 68 0,074
3141 7212 2 68 0,029
3141 7222 3 68 0,044
3141 7231 2 68 0,029
3141 7233 8 68 0,118
3141 7243 2 68 0,029
3141 8253 2 68 0,029
3141 8340 3 68 0,044
3142 1223 1 37 0,027
3142 2444 1 37 0,027
3142 2452 1 37 0,027
3142 3121 2 37 0,054
3142 3122 1 37 0,027
3142 3141 5 37 0,135
3142 3152 1 37 0,027
3142 3415 1 37 0,027
3142 3439 8 37 0,216
3142 4115 1 37 0,027
3142 4133 2 37 0,054
3142 4190 1 37 0,027
3142 6130 1 37 0,027
3142 6152 2 37 0,054
3142 7214 1 37 0,027
3142 7222 1 37 0,027
3142 8113 2 37 0,054
3142 8271 1 37 0,027
3142 8278 1 37 0,027
3142 8334 1 37 0,027
3142 8340 1 37 0,027
3142 9330 1 37 0,027
3152 1222 7 205 0,034
3152 1239 9 205 0,044
125
3152 2145 6 205 0,029
3152 2146 7 205 0,034
3152 2149 12 205 0,059
3152 3114 10 205 0,049
3152 3115 20 205 0,098
3152 3119 13 205 0,063
3152 3121 5 205 0,024
3152 4190 6 205 0,029
3152 7124 5 205 0,024
3152 7223 11 205 0,054
3152 7231 6 205 0,029
3211 1239 6 108 0,056
3211 3111 22 108 0,204
3211 3116 6 108 0,056
3211 3119 13 108 0,120
3211 3415 3 108 0,028
3211 4190 15 108 0,139
3211 8159 7 108 0,065
3224 1210 1 23 0,043
3224 1224 3 23 0,130
3224 1239 16 23 0,696
3224 3415 2 23 0,087
3224 9151 1 23 0,043
3415 1224 92 3223 0,029
3415 1233 151 3223 0,047
3415 3115 93 3223 0,029
3415 3416 71 3223 0,022
3415 3419 360 3223 0,112
3415 4131 100 3223 0,031
3415 4132 75 3223 0,023
3415 4190 326 3223 0,101
3415 5220 385 3223 0,119
3416 1235 33 450 0,073
3416 2419 13 450 0,029
3416 3115 23 450 0,051
3416 3415 65 450 0,144
3416 3419 28 450 0,062
3416 3422 10 450 0,022
3416 3439 10 450 0,022
3416 4131 13 450 0,029
3416 4132 35 450 0,078
3416 4190 53 450 0,118
3416 5220 26 450 0,058
3419 1231 58 1680 0,035
3419 1233 47 1680 0,028
3419 1234 37 1680 0,022
3419 2131 54 1680 0,032
3419 2139 58 1680 0,035
3419 2411 117 1680 0,070
3419 2419 63 1680 0,038
3419 3121 58 1680 0,035
3419 3415 395 1680 0,235
3419 3429 60 1680 0,036
3419 3433 68 1680 0,040
3419 4115 39 1680 0,023
3419 4190 45 1680 0,027
3419 5220 60 1680 0,036
3422 3415 61 398 0,153
3422 3416 16 398 0,040
3422 3429 18 398 0,045
3422 4115 13 398 0,033
3422 4131 8 398 0,020
3422 4132 13 398 0,033
3422 4133 40 398 0,101
3422 4190 115 398 0,289
3422 9330 13 398 0,033
3429 1233 7 213 0,033
3429 2419 7 213 0,033
3429 3114 5 213 0,023
3429 3415 38 213 0,178
3429 3416 6 213 0,028
3429 3419 40 213 0,188
3429 3422 13 213 0,061
3429 4190 10 213 0,047
3429 7137 6 213 0,028
3431 1239 7 188 0,037
3431 2411 4 188 0,021
3431 3115 4 188 0,021
3431 3415 23 188 0,122
3431 3416 4 188 0,021
3431 3419 20 188 0,106
3431 3433 8 188 0,043
3431 3439 9 188 0,048
3431 4115 11 188 0,059
3431 4132 4 188 0,021
3431 4133 4 188 0,021
3431 4190 16 188 0,085
3431 5220 4 188 0,021
3433 1231 42 393 0,107
3433 1239 9 393 0,023
3433 2139 8 393 0,020
3433 2411 108 393 0,275
3433 2419 9 393 0,023
3433 3121 11 393 0,028
3433 3415 11 393 0,028
3433 3419 46 393 0,117
3433 3439 14 393 0,036
3433 4121 21 393 0,053
3433 4122 8 393 0,020
3433 4190 29 393 0,074
3439 1222 13 642 0,020
3439 1224 17 642 0,026
3439 1239 21 642 0,033
3439 3115 13 642 0,020
3439 3119 14 642 0,022
3439 3415 62 642 0,097
3439 3416 21 642 0,033
3439 3419 45 642 0,070
3439 3433 21 642 0,033
3439 4190 39 642 0,061
3439 5220 21 642 0,033
3471 1312 2 77 0,026
3471 1317 5 77 0,065
3471 2141 5 77 0,065
3471 2149 2 77 0,026
3471 2451 4 77 0,052
3471 2452 7 77 0,091
3471 3114 2 77 0,026
3471 3118 3 77 0,039
3471 3119 2 77 0,026
3471 3121 2 77 0,026
3471 3415 6 77 0,078
3471 3429 2 77 0,026
3471 3439 2 77 0,026
3471 4190 4 77 0,052
3471 5220 5 77 0,065
3471 7124 2 77 0,026
3471 7341 5 77 0,065
3471 8251 3 77 0,039
4115 3415 53 563 0,094
4115 3416 20 563 0,036
4115 3419 42 563 0,075
4115 3422 13 563 0,023
4115 3433 17 563 0,030
4115 3439 14 563 0,025
4115 4132 19 563 0,034
4115 4190 103 563 0,183
4115 5220 20 563 0,036
4121 1231 13 265 0,049
4121 2411 45 265 0,170
4121 3121 6 265 0,023
4121 3419 15 265 0,057
4121 3433 42 265 0,158
4121 3439 7 265 0,026
4121 4115 7 265 0,026
4121 4122 7 265 0,026
4121 4190 51 265 0,192
4131 3415 153 923 0,166
4131 3419 21 923 0,023
4131 4132 43 923 0,047
4131 4190 107 923 0,116
4131 5220 156 923 0,169
4131 9320 19 923 0,021
4131 9330 96 923 0,104
4132 1222 20 589 0,034
4132 3115 21 589 0,036
4132 3119 24 589 0,041
4132 3415 108 589 0,183
4132 3416 40 589 0,068
4132 3419 28 589 0,048
4132 4131 23 589 0,039
4132 4190 80 589 0,136
4132 5220 36 589 0,061
4132 7231 15 589 0,025
4133 3415 11 146 0,075
4133 3416 6 146 0,041
4133 3421 3 146 0,021
4133 3422 49 146 0,336
4133 3429 5 146 0,034
4133 3439 4 146 0,027
4133 4115 4 146 0,027
4133 4190 18 146 0,123
4133 5220 5 146 0,034
4133 7231 4 146 0,027
4133 8324 5 146 0,034
4190 3121 171 4901 0,035
4190 3415 776 4901 0,158
4190 3416 112 4901 0,023
4190 3422 165 4901 0,034
4190 4115 155 4901 0,032
4190 4131 132 4901 0,027
4190 4132 172 4901 0,035
4190 5220 1369 4901 0,279
4190 9330 261 4901 0,053
5122 1314 10 286 0,035
5122 3415 20 286 0,070
5122 3439 6 286 0,021
5122 5123 39 286 0,136
5122 5220 13 286 0,045
5122 8271 13 286 0,045
5122 8278 24 286 0,084
5122 8324 45 286 0,157
5122 9132 13 286 0,045
5122 9320 6 286 0,021
5123 4115 2 79 0,025
5123 4190 3 79 0,038
5123 5122 20 79 0,253
5123 5169 2 79 0,025
5123 5220 6 79 0,076
5123 7124 4 79 0,051
5123 7141 2 79 0,025
5123 7212 2 79 0,025
5123 7214 2 79 0,025
5123 7222 3 79 0,038
5123 8271 2 79 0,025
5123 8284 2 79 0,025
5123 9320 2 79 0,025
5220 1224 249 4020 0,062
5220 1239 123 4020 0,031
5220 1314 179 4020 0,045
5220 3415 871 4020 0,217
5220 4131 132 4020 0,033
5220 4190 982 4020 0,244
5220 9330 183 4020 0,046
6130 3415 18 879 0,020
6130 7124 70 879 0,080
6130 7212 25 879 0,028
6130 7214 18 879 0,020
6130 7221 37 879 0,042
6130 7222 21 879 0,024
6130 7223 34 879 0,039
6130 7231 59 879 0,067
6130 7233 82 879 0,093
6130 7241 18 879 0,020
6130 8240 22 879 0,025
6130 8271 49 879 0,056
6130 8324 21 879 0,024
6130 9312 23 879 0,026
6130 9320 18 879 0,020
7122 2142 8 184 0,043
7122 2149 12 184 0,065
7122 3112 17 184 0,092
7122 3415 6 184 0,033
7122 6130 8 184 0,043
7122 7124 15 184 0,082
7122 8232 5 184 0,027
7122 9132 4 184 0,022
7122 9211 5 184 0,027
7122 9312 6 184 0,033
7122 9313 12 184 0,065
7122 9320 5 184 0,027
7122 9330 4 184 0,022
7124 3112 91 2759 0,033
7124 6130 58 2759 0,021
7124 7132 61 2759 0,022
7124 7135 101 2759 0,037
7124 7139 57 2759 0,021
7124 7422 219 2759 0,079
7124 7423 423 2759 0,153
7124 8240 358 2759 0,130
7124 8285 85 2759 0,031
7124 9313 58 2759 0,021
7124 9320 122 2759 0,044
7124 9330 63 2759 0,023
7129 3112 4 135 0,030
7129 3415 3 135 0,022
7129 5220 5 135 0,037
7129 6130 3 135 0,022
7129 7124 27 135 0,200
7129 7214 5 135 0,037
7129 7221 9 135 0,067
7129 7222 23 135 0,170
7129 7223 3 135 0,022
7129 7231 4 135 0,030
7129 7422 3 135 0,022
7129 8271 3 135 0,022
7129 9313 5 135 0,037
7129 9320 3 135 0,022
7135 1239 2 90 0,022
7135 1312 3 90 0,033
7135 7124 53 90 0,589
7135 7231 3 90 0,033
7135 8240 2 90 0,022
126
7135 9132 2 90 0,022
7135 9312 2 90 0,022
7135 9330 3 90 0,033
7136 3112 54 1143 0,047
7136 3115 62 1143 0,054
7136 3415 25 1143 0,022
7136 7143 56 1143 0,049
7136 7212 84 1143 0,073
7136 7213 37 1143 0,032
7136 7214 47 1143 0,041
7136 7221 83 1143 0,073
7136 7222 46 1143 0,040
7136 7223 34 1143 0,030
7136 7233 132 1143 0,115
7137 2143 29 1325 0,022
7137 3113 132 1325 0,100
7137 3114 68 1325 0,051
7137 3415 44 1325 0,033
7137 7233 109 1325 0,082
7137 7241 318 1325 0,240
7137 7243 63 1325 0,048
7139 7124 44 152 0,289
7139 7129 4 152 0,026
7139 7136 13 152 0,086
7139 7137 4 152 0,026
7139 7213 4 152 0,026
7139 7221 6 152 0,039
7139 7222 7 152 0,046
7139 7223 9 152 0,059
7139 7231 10 152 0,066
7139 7233 4 152 0,026
7139 9313 4 152 0,026
7141 7142 124 431 0,288
7141 7242 99 431 0,230
7141 9320 20 431 0,046
7141 9330 11 431 0,026
7142 3415 4 151 0,026
7142 7141 79 151 0,523
7142 7231 4 151 0,026
7142 7242 19 151 0,126
7142 8271 4 151 0,026
7211 7136 11 190 0,058
7211 7212 15 190 0,079
7211 7213 6 190 0,032
7211 7214 7 190 0,037
7211 7221 6 190 0,032
7211 7222 35 190 0,184
7211 7223 28 190 0,147
7211 7231 7 190 0,037
7211 7233 16 190 0,084
7211 8123 16 190 0,084
7211 8211 4 190 0,021
7212 7136 91 1878 0,048
7212 7213 130 1878 0,069
7212 7214 122 1878 0,065
7212 7221 141 1878 0,075
7212 7222 639 1878 0,340
7212 7223 187 1878 0,100
7212 7231 114 1878 0,061
7212 7233 119 1878 0,063
7212 8211 40 1878 0,021
7213 7136 38 1143 0,033
7213 7212 138 1143 0,121
7213 7214 75 1143 0,066
7213 7221 84 1143 0,073
7213 7222 219 1143 0,192
7213 7223 86 1143 0,075
7213 7231 150 1143 0,131
7213 7233 69 1143 0,060
7213 8211 24 1143 0,021
7214 7136 44 1384 0,032
7214 7212 152 1384 0,110
7214 7213 79 1384 0,057
7214 7221 106 1384 0,077
7214 7222 442 1384 0,319
7214 7223 145 1384 0,105
7214 7231 51 1384 0,037
7214 7233 78 1384 0,056
7221 6130 38 1671 0,023
7221 7136 133 1671 0,080
7221 7212 152 1671 0,091
7221 7213 106 1671 0,063
7221 7214 141 1671 0,084
7221 7222 348 1671 0,208
7221 7223 137 1671 0,082
7221 7231 69 1671 0,041
7221 7233 174 1671 0,104
7222 7212 712 3892 0,183
7222 7213 312 3892 0,080
7222 7214 485 3892 0,125
7222 7221 382 3892 0,098
7222 7223 466 3892 0,120
7222 7233 404 3892 0,104
7222 8211 103 3892 0,026
7223 3115 74 3488 0,021
7223 7212 196 3488 0,056
7223 7213 97 3488 0,028
7223 7214 144 3488 0,041
7223 7221 142 3488 0,041
7223 7222 370 3488 0,106
7223 7231 101 3488 0,029
7223 7233 676 3488 0,194
7223 8211 363 3488 0,104
7223 8232 72 3488 0,021
7231 3415 74 3180 0,023
7231 5220 64 3180 0,020
7231 6130 66 3180 0,021
7231 7212 113 3180 0,036
7231 7213 160 3180 0,050
7231 7221 74 3180 0,023
7231 7223 84 3180 0,026
7231 7233 840 3180 0,264
7231 8211 94 3180 0,030
7231 8284 84 3180 0,026
7231 8324 151 3180 0,047
7231 9330 76 3180 0,024
7233 7136 102 2950 0,035
7233 7137 82 2950 0,028
7233 7212 74 2950 0,025
7233 7221 109 2950 0,037
7233 7222 343 2950 0,116
7233 7223 600 2950 0,203
7233 7231 604 2950 0,205
7233 7241 179 2950 0,061
7241 3113 76 1174 0,065
7241 3114 44 1174 0,037
7241 3415 35 1174 0,030
7241 7137 301 1174 0,256
7241 7231 43 1174 0,037
7241 7233 197 1174 0,168
7241 7242 57 1174 0,049
7241 7243 65 1174 0,055
7242 3114 117 701 0,167
7242 3119 20 701 0,029
7242 3121 18 701 0,026
7242 7137 24 701 0,034
7242 7233 20 701 0,029
7242 7241 51 701 0,073
7242 7243 279 701 0,398
7243 2139 26 1164 0,022
7243 2144 30 1164 0,026
7243 3113 42 1164 0,036
7243 3114 186 1164 0,160
7243 3119 28 1164 0,024
7243 3121 52 1164 0,045
7243 3122 28 1164 0,024
7243 3415 35 1164 0,030
7243 7137 38 1164 0,033
7243 7233 32 1164 0,027
7243 7241 81 1164 0,070
7243 7242 261 1164 0,224
7311 3115 6 157 0,038
7311 7222 10 157 0,064
7311 7223 50 157 0,318
7311 7233 18 157 0,115
7311 7242 4 157 0,025
7311 7243 6 157 0,038
7311 8211 11 157 0,070
7311 8232 6 157 0,038
7341 1222 9 246 0,037
7341 2452 9 246 0,037
7341 3415 6 246 0,024
7341 3471 7 246 0,028
7341 4190 9 246 0,037
7341 7343 35 246 0,142
7341 7346 5 246 0,020
7341 8251 102 246 0,415
7411 1314 24 802 0,030
7411 3415 18 802 0,022
7411 5220 43 802 0,054
7411 8271 498 802 0,621
7411 9330 18 802 0,022
7412 1314 12 348 0,034
7412 3415 7 348 0,020
7412 5220 10 348 0,029
7412 8211 7 348 0,020
7412 8271 102 348 0,293
7412 8274 32 348 0,092
7412 9313 7 348 0,020
7412 9320 13 348 0,037
7412 9330 8 348 0,023
7413 1222 6 209 0,029
7413 1239 23 209 0,110
7413 3119 6 209 0,029
7413 8159 7 209 0,033
7413 8271 7 209 0,033
7413 8272 96 209 0,459
7422 1222 9 272 0,033
7422 7124 133 272 0,489
7422 7423 27 272 0,099
7422 8240 19 272 0,070
7422 8285 7 272 0,026
7422 9320 7 272 0,026
7423 1222 24 656 0,037
7423 7124 260 656 0,396
7423 7422 40 656 0,061
7423 8240 134 656 0,204
7423 9320 16 656 0,024
8123 5220 3 117 0,026
8123 7124 5 117 0,043
8123 7211 16 117 0,137
8123 7222 16 117 0,137
8123 7223 8 117 0,068
8123 7231 4 117 0,034
8123 7233 4 117 0,034
8123 8212 3 117 0,026
8123 8271 4 117 0,034
8123 8284 3 117 0,026
8123 9312 4 117 0,034
8123 9320 3 117 0,026
8159 3119 23 187 0,123
8159 3211 5 187 0,027
8159 4131 4 187 0,021
8159 6130 4 187 0,021
8159 7124 6 187 0,032
8159 7137 5 187 0,027
8159 7221 4 187 0,021
8159 7223 16 187 0,086
8159 7231 9 187 0,048
8159 7412 4 187 0,021
8159 8290 6 187 0,032
8159 9313 5 187 0,027
8159 9320 5 187 0,027
8159 9330 6 187 0,032
8211 7212 36 1248 0,029
8211 7213 29 1248 0,023
8211 7222 115 1248 0,092
8211 7223 409 1248 0,328
8211 7231 74 1248 0,059
8211 7233 51 1248 0,041
8211 8284 25 1248 0,020
8211 9320 26 1248 0,021
8212 3115 2 73 0,027
8212 6130 5 73 0,068
8212 7124 6 73 0,082
8212 7136 2 73 0,027
8212 7214 2 73 0,027
8212 7221 3 73 0,041
8212 7222 5 73 0,068
8212 7223 2 73 0,027
8212 7231 4 73 0,055
8212 8159 2 73 0,027
8212 8240 2 73 0,027
8212 8271 2 73 0,027
8212 8285 3 73 0,041
8212 9312 4 73 0,055
8212 9313 4 73 0,055
8212 9320 3 73 0,041
8231 1239 1 43 0,023
8231 4132 1 43 0,023
8231 5220 1 43 0,023
8231 7136 1 43 0,023
8231 7143 1 43 0,023
8231 7212 1 43 0,023
8231 7213 1 43 0,023
8231 7221 2 43 0,047
8231 7223 3 43 0,070
8231 7224 1 43 0,023
8231 7231 2 43 0,047
8231 7233 3 43 0,070
8231 7243 1 43 0,023
8231 7245 1 43 0,023
8231 7341 1 43 0,023
8231 7437 1 43 0,023
8231 8211 1 43 0,023
8231 8221 1 43 0,023
8231 8232 4 43 0,093
8231 8240 1 43 0,023
8231 8251 2 43 0,047
8231 8252 1 43 0,023
8231 8271 4 43 0,093
8231 9142 1 43 0,023
8231 9312 2 43 0,047
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8231 9320 3 43 0,070
8231 9330 1 43 0,023
8232 5220 12 445 0,027
8232 7124 19 445 0,043
8232 7213 9 445 0,020
8232 7221 9 445 0,020
8232 7222 23 445 0,052
8232 7223 79 445 0,178
8232 7231 29 445 0,065
8232 7233 19 445 0,043
8232 7241 19 445 0,043
8232 8211 10 445 0,022
8232 8271 9 445 0,020
8232 8284 11 445 0,025
8232 8290 13 445 0,029
8232 9320 13 445 0,029
8232 9330 9 445 0,020
8240 7124 668 1402 0,476
8240 7422 50 1402 0,036
8240 7423 238 1402 0,170
8240 9320 95 1402 0,068
8251 3119 4 146 0,027
8251 3122 3 146 0,021
8251 3439 3 146 0,021
8251 3471 3 146 0,021
8251 7223 3 146 0,021
8251 7341 75 146 0,514
8251 7343 15 146 0,103
8251 8252 5 146 0,034
8253 1222 2 93 0,022
8253 1314 3 93 0,032
8253 4131 2 93 0,022
8253 5220 2 93 0,022
8253 7124 3 93 0,032
8253 7137 2 93 0,022
8253 7223 7 93 0,075
8253 7231 8 93 0,086
8253 7233 6 93 0,065
8253 7341 2 93 0,022
8253 8123 2 93 0,022
8253 8211 5 93 0,054
8253 8232 3 93 0,032
8253 8251 2 93 0,022
8253 8271 3 93 0,032
8253 8287 2 93 0,022
8253 8290 2 93 0,022
8253 8334 4 93 0,043
8253 9330 5 93 0,054
8271 5220 37 1650 0,022
8271 6130 43 1650 0,026
8271 7411 449 1650 0,272
8271 7412 218 1650 0,132
8271 8272 102 1650 0,062
8271 8324 49 1650 0,030
8271 9320 86 1650 0,052
8271 9330 45 1650 0,027
8272 1239 17 233 0,073
8272 3119 5 233 0,021
8272 6130 10 233 0,043
8272 7231 6 233 0,026
8272 7233 6 233 0,026
8272 7413 36 233 0,155
8272 8159 7 233 0,030
8272 8271 23 233 0,099
8272 8278 6 233 0,026
8272 8290 5 233 0,021
8272 9320 22 233 0,094
8274 1222 3 82 0,037
8274 4190 2 82 0,024
8274 5220 4 82 0,049
8274 7124 3 82 0,037
8274 7223 2 82 0,024
8274 7233 4 82 0,049
8274 7412 6 82 0,073
8274 8211 2 82 0,024
8274 8232 3 82 0,037
8274 8253 2 82 0,024
8274 8271 14 82 0,171
8274 8272 4 82 0,049
8274 8334 2 82 0,024
8274 9312 2 82 0,024
8274 9320 7 82 0,085
8278 3121 2 57 0,035
8278 3439 2 57 0,035
8278 5122 7 57 0,123
8278 7223 7 57 0,123
8278 7231 2 57 0,035
8278 8159 3 57 0,053
8278 8271 3 57 0,053
8278 8290 2 57 0,035
8278 8322 2 57 0,035
8278 8324 7 57 0,123
8278 8334 2 57 0,035
8281 7222 13 152 0,086
8281 7223 31 152 0,204
8281 7231 8 152 0,053
8281 7233 17 152 0,112
8281 8211 11 152 0,072
8281 8283 7 152 0,046
8281 8290 4 152 0,026
8281 9320 8 152 0,053
8283 3114 7 143 0,049
8283 4190 3 143 0,021
8283 7124 3 143 0,021
8283 7137 3 143 0,021
8283 7222 3 143 0,021
8283 7223 4 143 0,028
8283 7231 3 143 0,021
8283 7233 3 143 0,021
8283 7241 8 143 0,056
8283 7242 5 143 0,035
8283 7243 31 143 0,217
8283 7311 3 143 0,021
8283 8232 8 143 0,056
8283 8281 9 143 0,063
8283 8284 3 143 0,021
8283 8290 3 143 0,021
8283 9320 7 143 0,049
8283 9330 5 143 0,035
8284 6130 14 432 0,032
8284 7124 15 432 0,035
8284 7222 18 432 0,042
8284 7223 36 432 0,083
8284 7231 67 432 0,155
8284 7233 19 432 0,044
8284 8211 16 432 0,037
8284 8232 12 432 0,028
8284 8271 17 432 0,039
8284 8290 10 432 0,023
8284 9320 22 432 0,051
8284 9330 15 432 0,035
8285 6130 5 206 0,024
8285 7124 72 206 0,350
8285 7231 5 206 0,024
8285 7422 7 206 0,034
8285 7423 18 206 0,087
8285 8240 17 206 0,083
8285 8271 7 206 0,034
8285 9320 10 206 0,049
8287 6130 4 153 0,026
8287 7124 7 153 0,046
8287 7221 5 153 0,033
8287 7222 13 153 0,085
8287 7223 10 153 0,065
8287 7231 16 153 0,105
8287 7233 5 153 0,033
8287 7241 6 153 0,039
8287 7243 5 153 0,033
8287 8211 5 153 0,033
8287 8271 4 153 0,026
8287 9330 6 153 0,039
8290 3114 9 428 0,021
8290 4190 11 428 0,026
8290 5220 11 428 0,026
8290 7124 27 428 0,063
8290 7222 15 428 0,035
8290 7223 36 428 0,084
8290 7231 16 428 0,037
8290 7233 11 428 0,026
8290 7243 10 428 0,023
8290 8211 15 428 0,035
8290 8232 12 428 0,028
8290 8271 30 428 0,070
8290 8284 15 428 0,035
8290 9320 20 428 0,047
8290 9330 14 428 0,033
8322 3415 18 209 0,086
8322 4190 21 209 0,100
8322 5220 20 209 0,096
8322 7124 7 209 0,033
8322 7136 5 209 0,024
8322 7223 5 209 0,024
8322 7231 18 209 0,086
8322 8324 25 209 0,120
8322 9330 14 209 0,067
8324 3415 52 445 0,117
8324 5122 27 445 0,061
8324 5220 13 445 0,029
8324 6130 15 445 0,034
8324 7124 16 445 0,036
8324 7221 9 445 0,020
8324 7231 77 445 0,173
8324 8271 11 445 0,025
8324 8322 18 445 0,040
8324 8334 9 445 0,020
8324 9320 16 445 0,036
8324 9330 30 445 0,067
8332 1313 2 86 0,023
8332 3416 2 86 0,023
8332 6130 5 86 0,058
8332 7124 2 86 0,023
8332 7213 2 86 0,023
8332 7221 2 86 0,023
8332 7222 4 86 0,047
8332 7223 3 86 0,035
8332 7231 7 86 0,081
8332 7233 3 86 0,035
8332 8251 3 86 0,035
8332 8271 2 86 0,023
8332 8272 3 86 0,035
8332 8324 4 86 0,047
8332 9211 2 86 0,023
8332 9312 16 86 0,186
8332 9313 4 86 0,047
8332 9320 2 86 0,023
8334 3415 12 347 0,035
8334 4115 7 347 0,020
8334 4131 11 347 0,032
8334 4190 17 347 0,049
8334 5220 15 347 0,043
8334 6130 13 347 0,037
8334 7124 16 347 0,046
8334 7223 9 347 0,026
8334 7231 17 347 0,049
8334 7233 8 347 0,023
8334 8271 9 347 0,026
8334 8290 10 347 0,029
8334 8324 18 347 0,052
8334 9320 12 347 0,035
8334 9330 54 347 0,156
9113 3119 4 158 0,025
9113 3415 54 158 0,342
9113 3419 12 158 0,076
9113 4131 4 158 0,025
9113 4132 4 158 0,025
9113 4190 33 158 0,209
9113 5220 11 158 0,070
9113 9330 6 158 0,038
9132 3415 10 395 0,025
9132 3439 23 395 0,058
9132 4190 22 395 0,056
9132 5122 11 395 0,028
9132 5220 25 395 0,063
9132 7124 19 395 0,048
9132 7136 17 395 0,043
9132 7137 14 395 0,035
9132 7222 8 395 0,020
9132 7223 9 395 0,023
9132 7231 22 395 0,056
9132 8232 8 395 0,020
9132 8271 22 395 0,056
9132 9320 12 395 0,030
9132 9330 14 395 0,035
9211 6112 20 108 0,185
9211 6130 7 108 0,065
9211 6141 3 108 0,028
9211 8271 6 108 0,056
9211 8284 3 108 0,028
9211 8324 5 108 0,046
9211 8332 4 108 0,037
9211 9312 8 108 0,074
9211 9313 4 108 0,037
9211 9320 3 108 0,028
9211 9330 3 108 0,028
9312 6130 12 409 0,029
9312 7122 10 409 0,024
9312 7124 20 409 0,049
9312 7136 14 409 0,034
9312 7222 16 409 0,039
9312 7223 13 409 0,032
9312 7231 31 409 0,076
9312 7233 11 409 0,027
9312 8324 9 409 0,022
9312 8332 29 409 0,071
9312 9211 10 409 0,024
9312 9313 84 409 0,205
9312 9330 9 409 0,022
9313 6130 11 437 0,025
9313 7122 18 437 0,041
9313 7124 53 437 0,121
9313 7136 23 437 0,053
9313 7212 11 437 0,025
9313 7221 11 437 0,025
128
9313 7222 17 437 0,039
9313 7223 13 437 0,030
9313 7231 24 437 0,055
9313 7233 13 437 0,030
9313 9312 56 437 0,128
9313 9320 16 437 0,037
9320 4190 26 967 0,027
9320 5220 35 967 0,036
9320 7124 117 967 0,121
9320 7222 31 967 0,032
9320 7223 42 967 0,043
9320 7231 29 967 0,030
9320 7233 27 967 0,028
9320 8211 21 967 0,022
9320 8240 27 967 0,028
9320 8271 46 967 0,048
9320 8284 26 967 0,027
9320 8290 20 967 0,021
9320 8334 24 967 0,025
9320 9330 55 967 0,057
9330 3415 69 1273 0,054
9330 4131 70 1273 0,055
9330 4190 165 1273 0,130
9330 5220 152 1273 0,119
9330 7124 47 1273 0,037
9330 7231 49 1273 0,038
9330 8271 29 1273 0,023
9330 8324 29 1273 0,023
9330 8334 53 1273 0,042
9330 9320 64 1273 0,050
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A4 Linked Occupations by More than 5 Percent of Switch-
ers from both Occupations, For Private Sector Em-
ployees
Occ. 1 Pct from Occ. 2 Pct from
occ1 to occ2 to
occ2 occ1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1210 0,067 1231 0,086
1223 0,145 2142 0,052
1224 0,234 1314 0,057
1224 0,186 5220 0,062
1231 0,086 1210 0,067
1231 0,154 2411 0,157
1231 0,129 3433 0,107
1235 0,079 3416 0,073
1314 0,057 1224 0,234
2113 0,152 2146 0,070
2131 0,095 2132 0,158
2131 0,226 2139 0,159
2131 0,158 3121 0,149
2132 0,158 2131 0,095
2132 0,152 2139 0,085
2132 0,242 3121 0,081
2139 0,159 2131 0,226
2139 0,085 2132 0,152
2139 0,172 3121 0,188
2141 0,144 2142 0,077
2141 0,158 3112 0,073
2142 0,052 1223 0,145
2142 0,077 2141 0,144
2142 0,209 2149 0,107
2142 0,135 3112 0,112
2143 0,052 3113 0,052
2144 0,095 2149 0,087
2144 0,131 3114 0,086
2145 0,212 2149 0,122
2145 0,109 3115 0,090
2146 0,070 2113 0,152
2149 0,107 2142 0,209
2149 0,087 2144 0,095
2149 0,122 2145 0,212
2411 0,157 1231 0,154
2411 0,127 3419 0,070
2411 0,226 3433 0,275
2411 0,077 4121 0,170
3111 0,217 3211 0,204
3112 0,073 2141 0,158
3112 0,112 2142 0,135
3112 0,066 3118 0,115
3113 0,052 2143 0,052
3113 0,125 3114 0,053
3113 0,147 7137 0,100
3113 0,112 7241 0,065
3114 0,086 2144 0,131
3114 0,053 3113 0,125
3114 0,071 3121 0,057
3114 0,064 7242 0,167
3114 0,108 7243 0,160
3115 0,090 2145 0,109
3115 0,071 3118 0,228
3115 0,100 3119 0,123
3116 0,068 3211 0,056
3118 0,115 3112 0,066
3118 0,228 3115 0,071
3119 0,123 3115 0,100
3121 0,149 2131 0,158
3121 0,081 2132 0,242
3121 0,188 2139 0,172
3121 0,057 3114 0,071
3121 0,060 3122 0,232
3122 0,232 3121 0,060
3211 0,204 3111 0,217
3211 0,056 3116 0,068
3415 0,112 3419 0,235
3415 0,101 4190 0,158
3415 0,119 5220 0,217
3416 0,073 1235 0,079
3416 0,078 4132 0,068
3419 0,070 2411 0,127
3419 0,235 3415 0,112
3422 0,101 4133 0,336
3433 0,107 1231 0,129
3433 0,275 2411 0,226
3433 0,053 4121 0,158
4121 0,170 2411 0,077
4121 0,158 3433 0,053
4131 0,104 9330 0,055
4132 0,068 3416 0,078
4133 0,336 3422 0,101
4190 0,158 3415 0,101
4190 0,279 5220 0,244
4190 0,053 9330 0,130
5122 0,136 5123 0,253
5122 0,084 8278 0,123
5122 0,157 8324 0,061
5123 0,253 5122 0,136
5220 0,062 1224 0,186
5220 0,217 3415 0,119
5220 0,244 4190 0,279
7124 0,079 7422 0,489
7124 0,153 7423 0,396
7124 0,130 8240 0,476
7136 0,073 7221 0,080
7137 0,100 3113 0,147
7137 0,240 7241 0,256
7141 0,288 7142 0,523
7142 0,523 7141 0,288
7211 0,084 8123 0,137
7212 0,069 7213 0,121
7212 0,065 7214 0,110
7212 0,075 7221 0,091
7212 0,340 7222 0,183
7212 0,100 7223 0,056
7213 0,121 7212 0,069
7213 0,066 7214 0,057
7213 0,073 7221 0,063
7213 0,192 7222 0,080
7213 0,131 7231 0,050
7214 0,110 7212 0,065
7214 0,057 7213 0,066
7214 0,077 7221 0,084
7214 0,319 7222 0,125
7221 0,080 7136 0,073
7221 0,091 7212 0,075
7221 0,063 7213 0,073
7221 0,084 7214 0,077
7221 0,208 7222 0,098
7222 0,183 7212 0,340
7222 0,080 7213 0,192
7222 0,125 7214 0,319
7222 0,098 7221 0,208
7222 0,120 7223 0,106
7222 0,104 7233 0,116
7223 0,056 7212 0,100
7223 0,106 7222 0,120
7223 0,194 7233 0,203
7223 0,104 8211 0,328
7231 0,050 7213 0,131
7231 0,264 7233 0,205
7233 0,116 7222 0,104
7233 0,203 7223 0,194
7233 0,205 7231 0,264
7233 0,061 7241 0,168
7241 0,065 3113 0,112
7241 0,256 7137 0,240
7241 0,168 7233 0,061
7241 0,055 7243 0,070
7242 0,167 3114 0,064
7242 0,398 7243 0,224
7243 0,160 3114 0,108
7243 0,070 7241 0,055
7243 0,224 7242 0,398
7341 0,415 8251 0,514
7411 0,621 8271 0,272
7412 0,293 8271 0,132
7412 0,092 8274 0,073
7413 0,459 8272 0,155
7422 0,489 7124 0,079
7422 0,099 7423 0,061
7423 0,396 7124 0,153
7423 0,061 7422 0,099
7423 0,204 8240 0,170
8123 0,137 7211 0,084
8211 0,328 7223 0,104
8240 0,476 7124 0,130
8240 0,170 7423 0,204
8251 0,514 7341 0,415
8271 0,272 7411 0,621
8271 0,132 7412 0,293
8271 0,062 8272 0,099
8272 0,155 7413 0,459
8272 0,099 8271 0,062
8274 0,073 7412 0,092
8278 0,123 5122 0,084
8324 0,061 5122 0,157
8332 0,186 9312 0,071
9312 0,071 8332 0,186
9312 0,205 9313 0,128
9313 0,128 9312 0,205
9320 0,057 9330 0,050
9330 0,055 4131 0,104
9330 0,130 4190 0,053
9330 0,050 9320 0,057
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A5 Linked Occupations with 2 Links by More than 5
Percent of Switchers from both Occupations, For
Private Sector Employees
Occ. 1 Pct from Occ. 2 Pct from Occ. 3 Pct from
occ1 to occ2 to occ3 to
occ2 occ3 occ1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1223 0,066 2149 0,107 2142 0,052
1223 0,079 3112 0,112 2142 0,052
1224 0,234 1314 0,111 5220 0,062
1224 0,129 3415 0,119 5220 0,062
1224 0,056 4190 0,279 5220 0,062
1231 0,154 2411 0,226 3433 0,107
1231 0,108 3419 0,070 2411 0,157
1231 0,129 3433 0,275 2411 0,157
1314 0,111 5220 0,062 1224 0,234
2113 0,064 2224 0,151 2146 0,070
2131 0,095 2132 0,152 2139 0,159
2131 0,095 2132 0,062 2144 0,075
2131 0,095 2132 0,242 3121 0,149
2131 0,226 2139 0,085 2132 0,158
2131 0,226 2139 0,172 3121 0,149
2131 0,158 3121 0,081 2132 0,158
2131 0,158 3121 0,188 2139 0,159
2131 0,158 3121 0,060 3122 0,149
2132 0,158 2131 0,226 2139 0,085
2132 0,158 2131 0,158 3121 0,081
2132 0,152 2139 0,159 2131 0,095
2132 0,152 2139 0,172 3121 0,081
2132 0,062 2144 0,075 2131 0,095
2132 0,062 2144 0,131 2139 0,085
2132 0,062 2144 0,060 3121 0,081
2132 0,242 3121 0,149 2131 0,095
2132 0,242 3121 0,188 2139 0,085
2139 0,159 2131 0,095 2132 0,152
2139 0,159 2131 0,158 3121 0,188
2139 0,085 2132 0,158 2131 0,226
2139 0,085 2132 0,062 2144 0,131
2139 0,085 2132 0,242 3121 0,188
2139 0,172 3121 0,149 2131 0,226
2139 0,172 3121 0,081 2132 0,152
2139 0,172 3121 0,060 3122 0,088
2141 0,144 2142 0,135 3112 0,073
2141 0,075 2149 0,107 2142 0,077
2141 0,158 3112 0,112 2142 0,077
2142 0,052 1223 0,066 2149 0,107
2142 0,052 1223 0,079 3112 0,112
2142 0,077 2141 0,075 2149 0,107
2142 0,077 2141 0,158 3112 0,112
2142 0,060 2145 0,212 2149 0,107
2142 0,135 3112 0,073 2141 0,144
2143 0,060 3114 0,053 3113 0,052
2143 0,073 7137 0,100 3113 0,052
2144 0,075 2131 0,095 2132 0,062
2144 0,131 2139 0,085 2132 0,062
2144 0,052 2145 0,212 2149 0,087
2144 0,060 3121 0,081 2132 0,062
2144 0,060 3121 0,057 3114 0,086
2145 0,212 2149 0,107 2142 0,060
2145 0,212 2149 0,087 2144 0,052
2146 0,070 2113 0,064 2224 0,151
2149 0,107 2142 0,052 1223 0,066
2149 0,107 2142 0,077 2141 0,075
2149 0,107 2142 0,060 2145 0,212
2149 0,087 2144 0,052 2145 0,212
2224 0,151 2146 0,070 2113 0,064
2411 0,157 1231 0,108 3419 0,070
2411 0,157 1231 0,129 3433 0,275
2411 0,226 3433 0,107 1231 0,154
2411 0,226 3433 0,117 3419 0,070
2411 0,226 3433 0,053 4121 0,170
2411 0,077 4121 0,057 3419 0,070
2411 0,077 4121 0,158 3433 0,275
3111 0,217 3211 0,056 3116 0,057
3112 0,073 2141 0,144 2142 0,135
3112 0,112 2142 0,052 1223 0,079
3112 0,112 2142 0,077 2141 0,158
3112 0,083 3115 0,071 3118 0,115
3113 0,052 2143 0,060 3114 0,053
3113 0,052 2143 0,073 7137 0,100
3113 0,147 7137 0,051 3114 0,053
3113 0,147 7137 0,240 7241 0,065
3113 0,112 7241 0,256 7137 0,100
3114 0,086 2144 0,060 3121 0,057
3114 0,053 3113 0,052 2143 0,060
3114 0,053 3113 0,147 7137 0,051
3114 0,071 3121 0,060 3122 0,071
3114 0,064 7242 0,398 7243 0,160
3114 0,108 7243 0,224 7242 0,167
3115 0,071 3118 0,115 3112 0,083
3115 0,071 3118 0,124 3119 0,123
3116 0,057 3111 0,217 3211 0,056
3118 0,115 3112 0,083 3115 0,071
3118 0,124 3119 0,123 3115 0,071
3119 0,123 3115 0,071 3118 0,124
3121 0,149 2131 0,095 2132 0,242
3121 0,149 2131 0,226 2139 0,172
3121 0,081 2132 0,158 2131 0,158
3121 0,081 2132 0,152 2139 0,172
3121 0,081 2132 0,062 2144 0,060
3121 0,188 2139 0,159 2131 0,158
3121 0,188 2139 0,085 2132 0,242
3121 0,057 3114 0,086 2144 0,060
3121 0,060 3122 0,149 2131 0,158
3121 0,060 3122 0,088 2139 0,172
3121 0,060 3122 0,071 3114 0,071
3122 0,149 2131 0,158 3121 0,060
3122 0,088 2139 0,172 3121 0,060
3122 0,071 3114 0,071 3121 0,060
3211 0,056 3116 0,057 3111 0,217
3415 0,101 4190 0,279 5220 0,217
3415 0,101 4190 0,053 9330 0,054
3415 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,129
3415 0,119 5220 0,244 4190 0,158
3419 0,070 2411 0,157 1231 0,108
3419 0,070 2411 0,226 3433 0,117
3419 0,070 2411 0,077 4121 0,057
3433 0,107 1231 0,154 2411 0,226
3433 0,275 2411 0,157 1231 0,129
3433 0,275 2411 0,077 4121 0,158
3433 0,117 3419 0,070 2411 0,226
3433 0,053 4121 0,170 2411 0,226
4121 0,170 2411 0,226 3433 0,053
4121 0,057 3419 0,070 2411 0,077
4121 0,158 3433 0,275 2411 0,077
4131 0,116 4190 0,053 9330 0,055
4190 0,158 3415 0,119 5220 0,244
4190 0,279 5220 0,062 1224 0,056
4190 0,279 5220 0,217 3415 0,101
4190 0,053 9330 0,054 3415 0,101
4190 0,053 9330 0,055 4131 0,116
4190 0,053 9330 0,119 5220 0,244
5122 0,084 8278 0,123 8324 0,061
5220 0,062 1224 0,234 1314 0,111
5220 0,062 1224 0,129 3415 0,119
5220 0,062 1224 0,056 4190 0,279
5220 0,217 3415 0,101 4190 0,279
5220 0,244 4190 0,158 3415 0,119
5220 0,244 4190 0,053 9330 0,119
7124 0,079 7422 0,099 7423 0,396
7124 0,079 7422 0,070 8240 0,476
7124 0,153 7423 0,061 7422 0,489
7124 0,153 7423 0,204 8240 0,476
7124 0,130 8240 0,170 7423 0,396
7124 0,130 8240 0,068 9320 0,121
7136 0,073 7212 0,075 7221 0,080
7137 0,100 3113 0,052 2143 0,073
7137 0,100 3113 0,112 7241 0,256
7137 0,051 3114 0,053 3113 0,147
7137 0,082 7233 0,061 7241 0,256
7137 0,240 7241 0,065 3113 0,147
7212 0,069 7213 0,066 7214 0,110
7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,091
7212 0,069 7213 0,192 7222 0,183
7212 0,069 7213 0,075 7223 0,056
7212 0,065 7214 0,057 7213 0,121
7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,091
7212 0,065 7214 0,319 7222 0,183
7212 0,065 7214 0,105 7223 0,056
7212 0,075 7221 0,080 7136 0,073
7212 0,075 7221 0,063 7213 0,121
7212 0,075 7221 0,084 7214 0,110
131
7212 0,075 7221 0,208 7222 0,183
7212 0,075 7221 0,082 7223 0,056
7212 0,340 7222 0,080 7213 0,121
7212 0,340 7222 0,125 7214 0,110
7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,091
7212 0,340 7222 0,120 7223 0,056
7212 0,100 7223 0,106 7222 0,183
7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,121
7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,183
7212 0,063 7233 0,203 7223 0,056
7213 0,121 7212 0,065 7214 0,057
7213 0,121 7212 0,075 7221 0,063
7213 0,121 7212 0,340 7222 0,080
7213 0,121 7212 0,061 7231 0,050
7213 0,066 7214 0,110 7212 0,069
7213 0,066 7214 0,077 7221 0,063
7213 0,066 7214 0,319 7222 0,080
7213 0,073 7221 0,091 7212 0,069
7213 0,073 7221 0,084 7214 0,057
7213 0,073 7221 0,208 7222 0,080
7213 0,192 7222 0,183 7212 0,069
7213 0,192 7222 0,125 7214 0,057
7213 0,192 7222 0,098 7221 0,063
7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,069
7213 0,075 7223 0,106 7222 0,080
7213 0,060 7233 0,116 7222 0,080
7213 0,060 7233 0,205 7231 0,050
7214 0,110 7212 0,069 7213 0,066
7214 0,110 7212 0,075 7221 0,084
7214 0,110 7212 0,340 7222 0,125
7214 0,057 7213 0,121 7212 0,065
7214 0,057 7213 0,073 7221 0,084
7214 0,057 7213 0,192 7222 0,125
7214 0,077 7221 0,091 7212 0,065
7214 0,077 7221 0,063 7213 0,066
7214 0,077 7221 0,208 7222 0,125
7214 0,319 7222 0,183 7212 0,065
7214 0,319 7222 0,080 7213 0,066
7214 0,319 7222 0,098 7221 0,084
7214 0,105 7223 0,056 7212 0,065
7214 0,105 7223 0,106 7222 0,125
7214 0,056 7233 0,116 7222 0,125
7221 0,080 7136 0,073 7212 0,075
7221 0,091 7212 0,069 7213 0,073
7221 0,091 7212 0,065 7214 0,077
7221 0,091 7212 0,340 7222 0,098
7221 0,063 7213 0,121 7212 0,075
7221 0,063 7213 0,066 7214 0,077
7221 0,063 7213 0,192 7222 0,098
7221 0,084 7214 0,110 7212 0,075
7221 0,084 7214 0,057 7213 0,073
7221 0,084 7214 0,319 7222 0,098
7221 0,208 7222 0,183 7212 0,075
7221 0,208 7222 0,080 7213 0,073
7221 0,208 7222 0,125 7214 0,077
7221 0,082 7223 0,056 7212 0,075
7221 0,082 7223 0,106 7222 0,098
7221 0,104 7233 0,116 7222 0,098
7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,192
7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,319
7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,208
7222 0,183 7212 0,100 7223 0,106
7222 0,183 7212 0,063 7233 0,116
7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,340
7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,319
7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,208
7222 0,080 7213 0,075 7223 0,106
7222 0,080 7213 0,060 7233 0,116
7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,340
7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,192
7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,208
7222 0,125 7214 0,105 7223 0,106
7222 0,125 7214 0,056 7233 0,116
7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,340
7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,192
7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,319
7222 0,098 7221 0,082 7223 0,106
7222 0,098 7221 0,104 7233 0,116
7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,340
7222 0,120 7223 0,194 7233 0,116
7222 0,120 7223 0,104 8211 0,092
7222 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,106
7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,075
7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,105
7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,082
7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,120
7223 0,056 7212 0,063 7233 0,203
7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,100
7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,075
7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,105
7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,082
7223 0,106 7222 0,104 7233 0,203
7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,120
7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,120
7231 0,050 7213 0,121 7212 0,061
7231 0,050 7213 0,060 7233 0,205
7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,063
7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,060
7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,056
7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,104
7233 0,116 7222 0,120 7223 0,194
7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,063
7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,104
7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,060
7233 0,061 7241 0,256 7137 0,082
7241 0,065 3113 0,147 7137 0,240
7241 0,256 7137 0,100 3113 0,112
7241 0,256 7137 0,082 7233 0,061
7241 0,055 7243 0,224 7242 0,073
7242 0,167 3114 0,108 7243 0,224
7242 0,073 7241 0,055 7243 0,224
7242 0,398 7243 0,160 3114 0,064
7243 0,160 3114 0,064 7242 0,398
7243 0,224 7242 0,167 3114 0,108
7243 0,224 7242 0,073 7241 0,055
7412 0,092 8274 0,171 8271 0,132
7422 0,489 7124 0,153 7423 0,061
7422 0,099 7423 0,396 7124 0,079
7422 0,070 8240 0,476 7124 0,079
7422 0,070 8240 0,170 7423 0,061
7423 0,396 7124 0,079 7422 0,099
7423 0,396 7124 0,130 8240 0,170
7423 0,061 7422 0,489 7124 0,153
7423 0,061 7422 0,070 8240 0,170
7423 0,204 8240 0,476 7124 0,153
8211 0,092 7222 0,120 7223 0,104
8240 0,476 7124 0,079 7422 0,070
8240 0,476 7124 0,153 7423 0,204
8240 0,170 7423 0,396 7124 0,130
8240 0,170 7423 0,061 7422 0,070
8240 0,068 9320 0,121 7124 0,130
8271 0,132 7412 0,092 8274 0,171
8274 0,171 8271 0,132 7412 0,092
8278 0,123 8324 0,061 5122 0,084
8324 0,061 5122 0,084 8278 0,123
9320 0,121 7124 0,130 8240 0,068
9330 0,054 3415 0,101 4190 0,053
9330 0,055 4131 0,116 4190 0,053
9330 0,119 5220 0,244 4190 0,053
132
A6 Linked Occupations with 3 Links by More than 5
Percent of Switchers from both Occupations, For
Private Sector Employees
Occ. 1 Pct from Occ. 2 Pct from Occ. 3 Pct from Occ. 4 Pct from
occ1 to occ2 to occ3 to occ4 to
occ2 occ3 occ4 occ1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1210 0,050 1239 0,079 5220 0,062 1224 0,077
1210 0,096 3415 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,077
1223 0,079 3112 0,073 2141 0,144 2142 0,052
1224 0,077 1210 0,050 1239 0,079 5220 0,062
1224 0,077 1210 0,096 3415 0,119 5220 0,062
1224 0,234 1314 0,096 3415 0,119 5220 0,062
1224 0,129 3415 0,101 4190 0,279 5220 0,062
1224 0,056 4190 0,158 3415 0,119 5220 0,062
1224 0,056 4190 0,053 9330 0,119 5220 0,062
1231 0,154 2411 0,077 4121 0,158 3433 0,107
1231 0,072 3415 0,112 3419 0,070 2411 0,157
1231 0,108 3419 0,070 2411 0,226 3433 0,107
1231 0,129 3433 0,117 3419 0,070 2411 0,157
1231 0,129 3433 0,053 4121 0,170 2411 0,157
1239 0,079 5220 0,062 1224 0,077 1210 0,050
1314 0,096 3415 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,234
2131 0,095 2132 0,152 2139 0,172 3121 0,149
2131 0,095 2132 0,062 2144 0,131 2139 0,159
2131 0,095 2132 0,062 2144 0,060 3121 0,149
2131 0,095 2132 0,242 3121 0,188 2139 0,159
2131 0,095 2132 0,242 3121 0,060 3122 0,149
2131 0,226 2139 0,085 2132 0,062 2144 0,075
2131 0,226 2139 0,085 2132 0,242 3121 0,149
2131 0,226 2139 0,172 3121 0,081 2132 0,158
2131 0,226 2139 0,172 3121 0,060 3122 0,149
2131 0,158 3121 0,081 2132 0,152 2139 0,159
2131 0,158 3121 0,081 2132 0,062 2144 0,075
2131 0,158 3121 0,188 2139 0,085 2132 0,158
2131 0,158 3121 0,057 3114 0,086 2144 0,075
2131 0,158 3121 0,060 3122 0,088 2139 0,159
2132 0,158 2131 0,226 2139 0,172 3121 0,081
2132 0,158 2131 0,158 3121 0,188 2139 0,085
2132 0,152 2139 0,159 2131 0,158 3121 0,081
2132 0,152 2139 0,172 3121 0,149 2131 0,095
2132 0,062 2144 0,075 2131 0,226 2139 0,085
2132 0,062 2144 0,075 2131 0,158 3121 0,081
2132 0,062 2144 0,131 2139 0,159 2131 0,095
2132 0,062 2144 0,131 2139 0,172 3121 0,081
2132 0,062 2144 0,131 3114 0,071 3121 0,081
2132 0,062 2144 0,060 3121 0,149 2131 0,095
2132 0,062 2144 0,060 3121 0,188 2139 0,085
2132 0,242 3121 0,149 2131 0,226 2139 0,085
2132 0,242 3121 0,188 2139 0,159 2131 0,095
2132 0,242 3121 0,060 3122 0,149 2131 0,095
2132 0,242 3121 0,060 3122 0,088 2139 0,085
2139 0,159 2131 0,095 2132 0,062 2144 0,131
2139 0,159 2131 0,095 2132 0,242 3121 0,188
2139 0,159 2131 0,158 3121 0,081 2132 0,152
2139 0,159 2131 0,158 3121 0,060 3122 0,088
2139 0,085 2132 0,158 2131 0,158 3121 0,188
2139 0,085 2132 0,062 2144 0,075 2131 0,226
2139 0,085 2132 0,062 2144 0,060 3121 0,188
2139 0,085 2132 0,242 3121 0,149 2131 0,226
2139 0,085 2132 0,242 3121 0,060 3122 0,088
2139 0,172 3121 0,149 2131 0,095 2132 0,152
2139 0,172 3121 0,081 2132 0,158 2131 0,226
2139 0,172 3121 0,081 2132 0,062 2144 0,131
2139 0,172 3121 0,057 3114 0,086 2144 0,131
2139 0,172 3121 0,060 3122 0,149 2131 0,226
2141 0,144 2142 0,052 1223 0,079 3112 0,073
2141 0,075 2149 0,107 2142 0,135 3112 0,073
2142 0,052 1223 0,079 3112 0,073 2141 0,144
2142 0,135 3112 0,073 2141 0,075 2149 0,107
2143 0,060 2144 0,131 3114 0,053 3113 0,052
2143 0,073 7137 0,051 3114 0,053 3113 0,052
2143 0,073 7137 0,240 7241 0,065 3113 0,052
2144 0,075 2131 0,226 2139 0,085 2132 0,062
2144 0,075 2131 0,158 3121 0,081 2132 0,062
2144 0,075 2131 0,158 3121 0,057 3114 0,086
2144 0,131 2139 0,159 2131 0,095 2132 0,062
2144 0,131 2139 0,172 3121 0,081 2132 0,062
2144 0,131 2139 0,172 3121 0,057 3114 0,086
2144 0,131 3114 0,053 3113 0,052 2143 0,060
2144 0,131 3114 0,071 3121 0,081 2132 0,062
2144 0,060 3121 0,149 2131 0,095 2132 0,062
2144 0,060 3121 0,188 2139 0,085 2132 0,062
2144 0,060 3121 0,060 3122 0,071 3114 0,086
2149 0,107 2142 0,135 3112 0,073 2141 0,075
133
2411 0,157 1231 0,072 3415 0,112 3419 0,070
2411 0,157 1231 0,129 3433 0,117 3419 0,070
2411 0,157 1231 0,129 3433 0,053 4121 0,170
2411 0,226 3433 0,107 1231 0,108 3419 0,070
2411 0,226 3433 0,053 4121 0,057 3419 0,070
2411 0,077 4121 0,158 3433 0,107 1231 0,154
2411 0,077 4121 0,158 3433 0,117 3419 0,070
2411 0,078 4190 0,158 3415 0,112 3419 0,070
3112 0,073 2141 0,144 2142 0,052 1223 0,079
3112 0,073 2141 0,075 2149 0,107 2142 0,135
3112 0,059 3119 0,123 3115 0,071 3118 0,115
3113 0,052 2143 0,060 2144 0,131 3114 0,053
3113 0,052 2143 0,073 7137 0,051 3114 0,053
3113 0,052 2143 0,073 7137 0,240 7241 0,065
3113 0,125 3114 0,064 7242 0,073 7241 0,065
3113 0,125 3114 0,108 7243 0,070 7241 0,065
3113 0,071 3115 0,100 3119 0,051 3114 0,053
3113 0,147 7137 0,082 7233 0,061 7241 0,065
3113 0,112 7241 0,256 7137 0,051 3114 0,053
3113 0,112 7241 0,055 7243 0,160 3114 0,053
3114 0,086 2144 0,075 2131 0,158 3121 0,057
3114 0,086 2144 0,131 2139 0,172 3121 0,057
3114 0,086 2144 0,060 3121 0,060 3122 0,071
3114 0,053 3113 0,052 2143 0,060 2144 0,131
3114 0,053 3113 0,052 2143 0,073 7137 0,051
3114 0,053 3113 0,071 3115 0,100 3119 0,051
3114 0,053 3113 0,112 7241 0,256 7137 0,051
3114 0,053 3113 0,112 7241 0,055 7243 0,160
3114 0,071 3121 0,081 2132 0,062 2144 0,131
3114 0,064 7242 0,073 7241 0,065 3113 0,125
3114 0,064 7242 0,073 7241 0,256 7137 0,051
3114 0,064 7242 0,073 7241 0,055 7243 0,160
3114 0,108 7243 0,070 7241 0,065 3113 0,125
3114 0,108 7243 0,070 7241 0,256 7137 0,051
3115 0,071 3118 0,115 3112 0,059 3119 0,123
3115 0,100 3119 0,051 3114 0,053 3113 0,071
3118 0,115 3112 0,059 3119 0,123 3115 0,071
3119 0,051 3114 0,053 3113 0,071 3115 0,100
3119 0,123 3115 0,071 3118 0,115 3112 0,059
3121 0,149 2131 0,095 2132 0,152 2139 0,172
3121 0,149 2131 0,095 2132 0,062 2144 0,060
3121 0,149 2131 0,226 2139 0,085 2132 0,242
3121 0,081 2132 0,158 2131 0,226 2139 0,172
3121 0,081 2132 0,152 2139 0,159 2131 0,158
3121 0,081 2132 0,062 2144 0,075 2131 0,158
3121 0,081 2132 0,062 2144 0,131 2139 0,172
3121 0,081 2132 0,062 2144 0,131 3114 0,071
3121 0,188 2139 0,159 2131 0,095 2132 0,242
3121 0,188 2139 0,085 2132 0,158 2131 0,158
3121 0,188 2139 0,085 2132 0,062 2144 0,060
3121 0,057 3114 0,086 2144 0,075 2131 0,158
3121 0,057 3114 0,086 2144 0,131 2139 0,172
3121 0,060 3122 0,149 2131 0,095 2132 0,242
3121 0,060 3122 0,149 2131 0,226 2139 0,172
3121 0,060 3122 0,088 2139 0,159 2131 0,158
3121 0,060 3122 0,088 2139 0,085 2132 0,242
3121 0,060 3122 0,071 3114 0,086 2144 0,060
3122 0,149 2131 0,095 2132 0,242 3121 0,060
3122 0,149 2131 0,226 2139 0,172 3121 0,060
3122 0,088 2139 0,159 2131 0,158 3121 0,060
3122 0,088 2139 0,085 2132 0,242 3121 0,060
3122 0,071 3114 0,086 2144 0,060 3121 0,060
3415 0,112 3419 0,070 2411 0,157 1231 0,072
3415 0,112 3419 0,070 2411 0,078 4190 0,158
3415 0,101 4190 0,279 5220 0,062 1224 0,129
3415 0,101 4190 0,053 9330 0,055 4131 0,166
3415 0,101 4190 0,053 9330 0,119 5220 0,217
3415 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,077 1210 0,096
3415 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,234 1314 0,096
3415 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,056 4190 0,158
3415 0,119 5220 0,244 4190 0,053 9330 0,054
3419 0,070 2411 0,157 1231 0,072 3415 0,112
3419 0,070 2411 0,157 1231 0,129 3433 0,117
3419 0,070 2411 0,226 3433 0,107 1231 0,108
3419 0,070 2411 0,226 3433 0,053 4121 0,057
3419 0,070 2411 0,077 4121 0,158 3433 0,117
3419 0,070 2411 0,078 4190 0,158 3415 0,112
3433 0,107 1231 0,154 2411 0,077 4121 0,158
3433 0,107 1231 0,108 3419 0,070 2411 0,226
3433 0,117 3419 0,070 2411 0,157 1231 0,129
3433 0,117 3419 0,070 2411 0,077 4121 0,158
3433 0,053 4121 0,170 2411 0,157 1231 0,129
3433 0,053 4121 0,057 3419 0,070 2411 0,226
4121 0,170 2411 0,157 1231 0,129 3433 0,053
4121 0,057 3419 0,070 2411 0,226 3433 0,053
4121 0,158 3433 0,107 1231 0,154 2411 0,077
4121 0,158 3433 0,117 3419 0,070 2411 0,077
4131 0,166 3415 0,101 4190 0,053 9330 0,055
4131 0,169 5220 0,244 4190 0,053 9330 0,055
4190 0,158 3415 0,112 3419 0,070 2411 0,078
4190 0,158 3415 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,056
4190 0,279 5220 0,062 1224 0,129 3415 0,101
134
4190 0,053 9330 0,054 3415 0,119 5220 0,244
4190 0,053 9330 0,055 4131 0,166 3415 0,101
4190 0,053 9330 0,055 4131 0,169 5220 0,244
4190 0,053 9330 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,056
4190 0,053 9330 0,119 5220 0,217 3415 0,101
5220 0,062 1224 0,077 1210 0,050 1239 0,079
5220 0,062 1224 0,077 1210 0,096 3415 0,119
5220 0,062 1224 0,234 1314 0,096 3415 0,119
5220 0,062 1224 0,129 3415 0,101 4190 0,279
5220 0,062 1224 0,056 4190 0,158 3415 0,119
5220 0,062 1224 0,056 4190 0,053 9330 0,119
5220 0,217 3415 0,101 4190 0,053 9330 0,119
5220 0,244 4190 0,053 9330 0,054 3415 0,119
5220 0,244 4190 0,053 9330 0,055 4131 0,169
7124 0,079 7422 0,099 7423 0,204 8240 0,476
7124 0,079 7422 0,070 8240 0,170 7423 0,396
7124 0,079 7422 0,070 8240 0,068 9320 0,121
7124 0,153 7423 0,061 7422 0,070 8240 0,476
7124 0,153 7423 0,204 8240 0,068 9320 0,121
7124 0,130 8240 0,170 7423 0,061 7422 0,489
7136 0,073 7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,080
7136 0,073 7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,080
7136 0,073 7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,080
7136 0,115 7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,080
7137 0,051 3114 0,053 3113 0,052 2143 0,073
7137 0,051 3114 0,053 3113 0,112 7241 0,256
7137 0,051 3114 0,064 7242 0,073 7241 0,256
7137 0,051 3114 0,108 7243 0,070 7241 0,256
7137 0,082 7233 0,061 7241 0,065 3113 0,147
7137 0,240 7241 0,065 3113 0,052 2143 0,073
7212 0,069 7213 0,066 7214 0,077 7221 0,091
7212 0,069 7213 0,066 7214 0,319 7222 0,183
7212 0,069 7213 0,066 7214 0,105 7223 0,056
7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,080 7136 0,073
7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,084 7214 0,110
7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,208 7222 0,183
7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,082 7223 0,056
7212 0,069 7213 0,192 7222 0,125 7214 0,110
7212 0,069 7213 0,192 7222 0,098 7221 0,091
7212 0,069 7213 0,192 7222 0,120 7223 0,056
7212 0,069 7213 0,075 7223 0,106 7222 0,183
7212 0,069 7213 0,060 7233 0,116 7222 0,183
7212 0,069 7213 0,060 7233 0,203 7223 0,056
7212 0,065 7214 0,057 7213 0,073 7221 0,091
7212 0,065 7214 0,057 7213 0,192 7222 0,183
7212 0,065 7214 0,057 7213 0,075 7223 0,056
7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,080 7136 0,073
7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,063 7213 0,121
7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,208 7222 0,183
7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,082 7223 0,056
7212 0,065 7214 0,319 7222 0,080 7213 0,121
7212 0,065 7214 0,319 7222 0,098 7221 0,091
7212 0,065 7214 0,319 7222 0,120 7223 0,056
7212 0,065 7214 0,105 7223 0,106 7222 0,183
7212 0,065 7214 0,056 7233 0,116 7222 0,183
7212 0,065 7214 0,056 7233 0,203 7223 0,056
7212 0,075 7221 0,063 7213 0,066 7214 0,110
7212 0,075 7221 0,063 7213 0,192 7222 0,183
7212 0,075 7221 0,063 7213 0,075 7223 0,056
7212 0,075 7221 0,084 7214 0,057 7213 0,121
7212 0,075 7221 0,084 7214 0,319 7222 0,183
7212 0,075 7221 0,084 7214 0,105 7223 0,056
7212 0,075 7221 0,208 7222 0,080 7213 0,121
7212 0,075 7221 0,208 7222 0,125 7214 0,110
7212 0,075 7221 0,208 7222 0,120 7223 0,056
7212 0,075 7221 0,082 7223 0,106 7222 0,183
7212 0,075 7221 0,104 7233 0,116 7222 0,183
7212 0,075 7221 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,056
7212 0,340 7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,110
7212 0,340 7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,091
7212 0,340 7222 0,080 7213 0,075 7223 0,056
7212 0,340 7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,121
7212 0,340 7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,091
7212 0,340 7222 0,125 7214 0,105 7223 0,056
7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,080 7136 0,073
7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,121
7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,110
7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,082 7223 0,056
7212 0,340 7222 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,056
7212 0,100 7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,121
7212 0,100 7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,110
7212 0,100 7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,091
7212 0,100 7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,183
7212 0,100 7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,183
7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,066 7214 0,110
7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,073 7221 0,091
7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,192 7222 0,183
7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,075 7223 0,056
7212 0,061 7231 0,264 7233 0,116 7222 0,183
7212 0,061 7231 0,264 7233 0,203 7223 0,056
7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,121
7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,110
135
7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,091
7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,120 7223 0,056
7212 0,063 7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,183
7212 0,063 7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,121
7213 0,121 7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,063
7213 0,121 7212 0,065 7214 0,319 7222 0,080
7213 0,121 7212 0,075 7221 0,084 7214 0,057
7213 0,121 7212 0,075 7221 0,208 7222 0,080
7213 0,121 7212 0,340 7222 0,125 7214 0,057
7213 0,121 7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,063
7213 0,121 7212 0,100 7223 0,106 7222 0,080
7213 0,121 7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,080
7213 0,121 7212 0,063 7233 0,205 7231 0,050
7213 0,066 7214 0,110 7212 0,075 7221 0,063
7213 0,066 7214 0,110 7212 0,340 7222 0,080
7213 0,066 7214 0,110 7212 0,061 7231 0,050
7213 0,066 7214 0,077 7221 0,091 7212 0,069
7213 0,066 7214 0,077 7221 0,208 7222 0,080
7213 0,066 7214 0,319 7222 0,183 7212 0,069
7213 0,066 7214 0,319 7222 0,098 7221 0,063
7213 0,066 7214 0,105 7223 0,056 7212 0,069
7213 0,066 7214 0,105 7223 0,106 7222 0,080
7213 0,066 7214 0,056 7233 0,116 7222 0,080
7213 0,066 7214 0,056 7233 0,205 7231 0,050
7213 0,073 7221 0,080 7136 0,073 7212 0,069
7213 0,073 7221 0,091 7212 0,065 7214 0,057
7213 0,073 7221 0,091 7212 0,340 7222 0,080
7213 0,073 7221 0,091 7212 0,061 7231 0,050
7213 0,073 7221 0,084 7214 0,110 7212 0,069
7213 0,073 7221 0,084 7214 0,319 7222 0,080
7213 0,073 7221 0,208 7222 0,183 7212 0,069
7213 0,073 7221 0,208 7222 0,125 7214 0,057
7213 0,073 7221 0,082 7223 0,056 7212 0,069
7213 0,073 7221 0,082 7223 0,106 7222 0,080
7213 0,073 7221 0,104 7233 0,116 7222 0,080
7213 0,073 7221 0,104 7233 0,205 7231 0,050
7213 0,192 7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,057
7213 0,192 7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,063
7213 0,192 7222 0,183 7212 0,061 7231 0,050
7213 0,192 7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,069
7213 0,192 7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,063
7213 0,192 7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,069
7213 0,192 7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,057
7213 0,192 7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,069
7213 0,192 7222 0,104 7233 0,205 7231 0,050
7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,057
7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,063
7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,080
7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,061 7231 0,050
7213 0,075 7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,069
7213 0,075 7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,057
7213 0,075 7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,063
7213 0,075 7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,080
7213 0,075 7223 0,194 7233 0,205 7231 0,050
7213 0,075 7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,080
7213 0,075 7223 0,104 8211 0,059 7231 0,050
7213 0,131 7231 0,264 7233 0,116 7222 0,080
7213 0,060 7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,069
7213 0,060 7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,057
7213 0,060 7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,063
7213 0,060 7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,069
7213 0,060 7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,080
7214 0,110 7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,084
7214 0,110 7212 0,069 7213 0,192 7222 0,125
7214 0,110 7212 0,075 7221 0,063 7213 0,066
7214 0,110 7212 0,075 7221 0,208 7222 0,125
7214 0,110 7212 0,340 7222 0,080 7213 0,066
7214 0,110 7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,084
7214 0,110 7212 0,100 7223 0,106 7222 0,125
7214 0,110 7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,066
7214 0,110 7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,125
7214 0,057 7213 0,121 7212 0,075 7221 0,084
7214 0,057 7213 0,121 7212 0,340 7222 0,125
7214 0,057 7213 0,073 7221 0,091 7212 0,065
7214 0,057 7213 0,073 7221 0,208 7222 0,125
7214 0,057 7213 0,192 7222 0,183 7212 0,065
7214 0,057 7213 0,192 7222 0,098 7221 0,084
7214 0,057 7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,065
7214 0,057 7213 0,075 7223 0,106 7222 0,125
7214 0,057 7213 0,060 7233 0,116 7222 0,125
7214 0,077 7221 0,080 7136 0,073 7212 0,065
7214 0,077 7221 0,091 7212 0,069 7213 0,066
7214 0,077 7221 0,091 7212 0,340 7222 0,125
7214 0,077 7221 0,063 7213 0,121 7212 0,065
7214 0,077 7221 0,063 7213 0,192 7222 0,125
7214 0,077 7221 0,208 7222 0,183 7212 0,065
7214 0,077 7221 0,208 7222 0,080 7213 0,066
7214 0,077 7221 0,082 7223 0,056 7212 0,065
7214 0,077 7221 0,082 7223 0,106 7222 0,125
7214 0,077 7221 0,104 7233 0,116 7222 0,125
7214 0,319 7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,066
7214 0,319 7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,084
136
7214 0,319 7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,065
7214 0,319 7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,084
7214 0,319 7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,065
7214 0,319 7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,066
7214 0,319 7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,065
7214 0,105 7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,066
7214 0,105 7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,084
7214 0,105 7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,125
7214 0,105 7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,065
7214 0,105 7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,066
7214 0,105 7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,084
7214 0,105 7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,125
7214 0,105 7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,125
7214 0,056 7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,065
7214 0,056 7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,066
7214 0,056 7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,084
7214 0,056 7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,065
7214 0,056 7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,125
7214 0,056 7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,066
7221 0,080 7136 0,073 7212 0,069 7213 0,073
7221 0,080 7136 0,073 7212 0,065 7214 0,077
7221 0,080 7136 0,073 7212 0,340 7222 0,098
7221 0,080 7136 0,115 7233 0,116 7222 0,098
7221 0,091 7212 0,069 7213 0,066 7214 0,077
7221 0,091 7212 0,069 7213 0,192 7222 0,098
7221 0,091 7212 0,065 7214 0,057 7213 0,073
7221 0,091 7212 0,065 7214 0,319 7222 0,098
7221 0,091 7212 0,340 7222 0,080 7213 0,073
7221 0,091 7212 0,340 7222 0,125 7214 0,077
7221 0,091 7212 0,100 7223 0,106 7222 0,098
7221 0,091 7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,073
7221 0,091 7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,098
7221 0,063 7213 0,121 7212 0,065 7214 0,077
7221 0,063 7213 0,121 7212 0,340 7222 0,098
7221 0,063 7213 0,066 7214 0,110 7212 0,075
7221 0,063 7213 0,066 7214 0,319 7222 0,098
7221 0,063 7213 0,192 7222 0,183 7212 0,075
7221 0,063 7213 0,192 7222 0,125 7214 0,077
7221 0,063 7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,075
7221 0,063 7213 0,075 7223 0,106 7222 0,098
7221 0,063 7213 0,060 7233 0,116 7222 0,098
7221 0,084 7214 0,110 7212 0,069 7213 0,073
7221 0,084 7214 0,110 7212 0,340 7222 0,098
7221 0,084 7214 0,057 7213 0,121 7212 0,075
7221 0,084 7214 0,057 7213 0,192 7222 0,098
7221 0,084 7214 0,319 7222 0,183 7212 0,075
7221 0,084 7214 0,319 7222 0,080 7213 0,073
7221 0,084 7214 0,105 7223 0,056 7212 0,075
7221 0,084 7214 0,105 7223 0,106 7222 0,098
7221 0,084 7214 0,056 7233 0,116 7222 0,098
7221 0,208 7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,073
7221 0,208 7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,077
7221 0,208 7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,075
7221 0,208 7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,077
7221 0,208 7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,075
7221 0,208 7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,073
7221 0,208 7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,075
7221 0,082 7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,073
7221 0,082 7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,077
7221 0,082 7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,098
7221 0,082 7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,075
7221 0,082 7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,073
7221 0,082 7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,077
7221 0,082 7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,098
7221 0,082 7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,098
7221 0,104 7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,075
7221 0,104 7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,073
7221 0,104 7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,077
7221 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,075
7221 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,098
7221 0,104 7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,073
7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,066 7214 0,319
7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,208
7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,075 7223 0,106
7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,060 7233 0,116
7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,057 7213 0,192
7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,208
7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,105 7223 0,106
7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,056 7233 0,116
7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,063 7213 0,192
7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,084 7214 0,319
7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,082 7223 0,106
7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,104 7233 0,116
7222 0,183 7212 0,100 7223 0,194 7233 0,116
7222 0,183 7212 0,100 7223 0,104 8211 0,092
7222 0,183 7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,192
7222 0,183 7212 0,061 7231 0,264 7233 0,116
7222 0,183 7212 0,063 7233 0,203 7223 0,106
7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,065 7214 0,319
7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,075 7221 0,208
7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,100 7223 0,106
7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,063 7233 0,116
137
7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,110 7212 0,340
7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,077 7221 0,208
7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,105 7223 0,106
7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,056 7233 0,116
7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,091 7212 0,340
7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,084 7214 0,319
7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,082 7223 0,106
7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,104 7233 0,116
7222 0,080 7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,340
7222 0,080 7213 0,075 7223 0,194 7233 0,116
7222 0,080 7213 0,075 7223 0,104 8211 0,092
7222 0,080 7213 0,131 7231 0,264 7233 0,116
7222 0,080 7213 0,060 7233 0,203 7223 0,106
7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,069 7213 0,192
7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,075 7221 0,208
7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,100 7223 0,106
7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,063 7233 0,116
7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,121 7212 0,340
7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,073 7221 0,208
7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,075 7223 0,106
7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,060 7233 0,116
7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,091 7212 0,340
7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,063 7213 0,192
7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,082 7223 0,106
7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,104 7233 0,116
7222 0,125 7214 0,105 7223 0,056 7212 0,340
7222 0,125 7214 0,105 7223 0,194 7233 0,116
7222 0,125 7214 0,105 7223 0,104 8211 0,092
7222 0,125 7214 0,056 7233 0,203 7223 0,106
7222 0,098 7221 0,080 7136 0,073 7212 0,340
7222 0,098 7221 0,080 7136 0,115 7233 0,116
7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,069 7213 0,192
7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,065 7214 0,319
7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,100 7223 0,106
7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,063 7233 0,116
7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,121 7212 0,340
7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,066 7214 0,319
7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,075 7223 0,106
7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,060 7233 0,116
7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,110 7212 0,340
7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,057 7213 0,192
7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,105 7223 0,106
7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,056 7233 0,116
7222 0,098 7221 0,082 7223 0,056 7212 0,340
7222 0,098 7221 0,082 7223 0,194 7233 0,116
7222 0,098 7221 0,082 7223 0,104 8211 0,092
7222 0,098 7221 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,106
7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,192
7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,319
7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,208
7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,063 7233 0,116
7222 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,340
7222 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,104 8211 0,092
7222 0,104 7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,192
7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,066 7214 0,105
7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,073 7221 0,082
7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,192 7222 0,120
7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,060 7233 0,203
7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,057 7213 0,075
7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,077 7221 0,082
7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,319 7222 0,120
7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,056 7233 0,203
7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,063 7213 0,075
7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,084 7214 0,105
7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,208 7222 0,120
7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,104 7233 0,203
7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,080 7213 0,075
7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,125 7214 0,105
7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,098 7221 0,082
7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,104 7233 0,203
7223 0,056 7212 0,061 7231 0,050 7213 0,075
7223 0,056 7212 0,061 7231 0,264 7233 0,203
7223 0,056 7212 0,063 7233 0,116 7222 0,120
7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,075
7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,105
7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,082
7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,063 7233 0,203
7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,100
7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,105
7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,082
7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,060 7233 0,203
7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,100
7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,075
7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,082
7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,056 7233 0,203
7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,100
7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,075
7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,105
7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,104 7233 0,203
7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,100
7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,075
7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,105
138
7223 0,194 7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,082
7223 0,194 7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,075
7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,183 7212 0,100
7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,080 7213 0,075
7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,125 7214 0,105
7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,098 7221 0,082
7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,104 7233 0,203
7223 0,104 8211 0,059 7231 0,050 7213 0,075
7223 0,104 8211 0,059 7231 0,264 7233 0,203
7231 0,050 7213 0,121 7212 0,063 7233 0,205
7231 0,050 7213 0,066 7214 0,110 7212 0,061
7231 0,050 7213 0,066 7214 0,056 7233 0,205
7231 0,050 7213 0,073 7221 0,091 7212 0,061
7231 0,050 7213 0,073 7221 0,104 7233 0,205
7231 0,050 7213 0,192 7222 0,183 7212 0,061
7231 0,050 7213 0,192 7222 0,104 7233 0,205
7231 0,050 7213 0,075 7223 0,056 7212 0,061
7231 0,050 7213 0,075 7223 0,194 7233 0,205
7231 0,050 7213 0,075 7223 0,104 8211 0,059
7231 0,264 7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,061
7231 0,264 7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,131
7231 0,264 7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,061
7231 0,264 7233 0,203 7223 0,104 8211 0,059
7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,069 7213 0,060
7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,065 7214 0,056
7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,075 7221 0,104
7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,100 7223 0,194
7233 0,116 7222 0,183 7212 0,061 7231 0,264
7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,121 7212 0,063
7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,066 7214 0,056
7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,073 7221 0,104
7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,075 7223 0,194
7233 0,116 7222 0,080 7213 0,131 7231 0,264
7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,110 7212 0,063
7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,057 7213 0,060
7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,077 7221 0,104
7233 0,116 7222 0,125 7214 0,105 7223 0,194
7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,080 7136 0,115
7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,091 7212 0,063
7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,063 7213 0,060
7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,084 7214 0,056
7233 0,116 7222 0,098 7221 0,082 7223 0,194
7233 0,116 7222 0,120 7223 0,056 7212 0,063
7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,069 7213 0,060
7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,065 7214 0,056
7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,075 7221 0,104
7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,340 7222 0,104
7233 0,203 7223 0,056 7212 0,061 7231 0,264
7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,183 7212 0,063
7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,080 7213 0,060
7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,125 7214 0,056
7233 0,203 7223 0,106 7222 0,098 7221 0,104
7233 0,203 7223 0,104 8211 0,092 7222 0,104
7233 0,203 7223 0,104 8211 0,059 7231 0,264
7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,121 7212 0,063
7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,066 7214 0,056
7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,073 7221 0,104
7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,192 7222 0,104
7233 0,205 7231 0,050 7213 0,075 7223 0,194
7233 0,061 7241 0,065 3113 0,147 7137 0,082
7241 0,065 3113 0,052 2143 0,073 7137 0,240
7241 0,065 3113 0,125 3114 0,064 7242 0,073
7241 0,065 3113 0,125 3114 0,108 7243 0,070
7241 0,065 3113 0,147 7137 0,082 7233 0,061
7241 0,256 7137 0,051 3114 0,053 3113 0,112
7241 0,256 7137 0,051 3114 0,064 7242 0,073
7241 0,256 7137 0,051 3114 0,108 7243 0,070
7241 0,055 7243 0,160 3114 0,053 3113 0,112
7241 0,055 7243 0,160 3114 0,064 7242 0,073
7242 0,073 7241 0,065 3113 0,125 3114 0,064
7242 0,073 7241 0,256 7137 0,051 3114 0,064
7242 0,073 7241 0,055 7243 0,160 3114 0,064
7243 0,160 3114 0,053 3113 0,112 7241 0,055
7243 0,160 3114 0,064 7242 0,073 7241 0,055
7243 0,070 7241 0,065 3113 0,125 3114 0,108
7243 0,070 7241 0,256 7137 0,051 3114 0,108
7422 0,489 7124 0,130 8240 0,170 7423 0,061
7422 0,099 7423 0,204 8240 0,476 7124 0,079
7422 0,070 8240 0,476 7124 0,153 7423 0,061
7422 0,070 8240 0,170 7423 0,396 7124 0,079
7422 0,070 8240 0,068 9320 0,121 7124 0,079
7423 0,396 7124 0,079 7422 0,070 8240 0,170
7423 0,061 7422 0,489 7124 0,130 8240 0,170
7423 0,061 7422 0,070 8240 0,476 7124 0,153
7423 0,204 8240 0,476 7124 0,079 7422 0,099
7423 0,204 8240 0,068 9320 0,121 7124 0,153
8211 0,092 7222 0,183 7212 0,100 7223 0,104
8211 0,092 7222 0,080 7213 0,075 7223 0,104
8211 0,092 7222 0,125 7214 0,105 7223 0,104
8211 0,092 7222 0,098 7221 0,082 7223 0,104
8211 0,092 7222 0,104 7233 0,203 7223 0,104
8211 0,059 7231 0,050 7213 0,075 7223 0,104
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8211 0,059 7231 0,264 7233 0,203 7223 0,104
8240 0,476 7124 0,079 7422 0,099 7423 0,204
8240 0,476 7124 0,153 7423 0,061 7422 0,070
8240 0,170 7423 0,396 7124 0,079 7422 0,070
8240 0,170 7423 0,061 7422 0,489 7124 0,130
8240 0,068 9320 0,121 7124 0,079 7422 0,070
8240 0,068 9320 0,121 7124 0,153 7423 0,204
9320 0,121 7124 0,079 7422 0,070 8240 0,068
9320 0,121 7124 0,153 7423 0,204 8240 0,068
9330 0,054 3415 0,119 5220 0,244 4190 0,053
9330 0,055 4131 0,166 3415 0,101 4190 0,053
9330 0,055 4131 0,169 5220 0,244 4190 0,053
9330 0,119 5220 0,062 1224 0,056 4190 0,053
9330 0,119 5220 0,217 3415 0,101 4190 0,053
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A7 One-way Linked Occupations by More than 5 Per-
cent of Switchers from Original Occupations, For
Private Sector Employees
Occ 1 Occ 2 Pct from occ1 to occ2
(1) (3) (2)
1222 1312 0,065
1222 3115 0,056
1222 7223 0,067
1223 1222 0,079
1223 1313 0,132
1223 7124 0,066
1229 1210 0,068
1229 1233 0,068
1229 1237 0,060
1229 1319 0,068
1233 1210 0,089
1233 3415 0,345
1233 3419 0,104
1234 1210 0,054
1234 1233 0,054
1234 2419 0,054
1234 3121 0,054
1234 3415 0,163
1234 3419 0,185
1234 3429 0,054
1235 1239 0,065
1235 3415 0,129
1235 3419 0,058
1235 7411 0,050
1237 1222 0,073
1237 1239 0,073
1237 2144 0,073
1237 2149 0,098
1237 2419 0,061
1237 3152 0,073
1239 3415 0,057
1314 7231 0,055
2113 2145 0,064
2113 2149 0,104
2113 2211 0,072
2131 3415 0,051
2132 4190 0,062
2141 1210 0,103
2141 1317 0,055
2142 3415 0,052
2143 2142 0,056
2143 2145 0,094
2143 2149 0,172
2143 3415 0,077
2145 3415 0,056
2146 1239 0,056
2146 2145 0,077
2146 2149 0,197
2224 1210 0,055
2224 1237 0,096
2224 2149 0,055
2224 2211 0,055
2224 2229 0,082
2224 2419 0,082
2224 3415 0,096
2331 4190 0,061
2331 7231 0,147
2419 2139 0,079
2419 3415 0,105
2419 3419 0,102
2421 1210 0,091
2421 2411 0,136
2421 2429 0,318
2451 2443 0,086
2451 3131 0,152
2451 3429 0,057
3111 3119 0,072
3111 4190 0,167
3112 3415 0,057
3112 7124 0,078
3115 3415 0,085
3116 3115 0,080
3116 3119 0,080
3116 7136 0,102
3119 3415 0,051
3121 4190 0,105
3122 4190 0,065
3141 3115 0,324
3141 3415 0,074
3141 7233 0,118
3142 3121 0,054
3142 3141 0,135
3142 3439 0,216
3142 4133 0,054
3142 6152 0,054
3142 8113 0,054
3152 2149 0,059
3152 3115 0,098
3152 3119 0,063
3152 7223 0,054
3211 1239 0,056
3211 3119 0,120
3211 4190 0,139
3211 8159 0,065
3224 1224 0,130
3224 1239 0,696
3224 3415 0,087
3416 3115 0,051
3416 3415 0,144
3416 3419 0,062
3416 4190 0,118
3416 5220 0,058
3422 3415 0,153
3422 4190 0,289
3429 3415 0,178
3429 3419 0,188
3429 3422 0,061
3431 3415 0,122
3431 3419 0,106
3431 4115 0,059
3431 4190 0,085
3433 4190 0,074
3439 3415 0,097
3439 3419 0,070
3439 4190 0,061
3471 1317 0,065
3471 2141 0,065
3471 2451 0,052
3471 2452 0,091
3471 3415 0,078
3471 4190 0,052
3471 5220 0,065
3471 7341 0,065
4115 3415 0,094
4115 3419 0,075
4115 4190 0,183
4121 4190 0,192
4132 3415 0,183
4132 4190 0,136
4132 5220 0,061
4133 3415 0,075
4133 4190 0,123
5122 3415 0,070
5123 5220 0,076
5123 7124 0,051
6130 7124 0,080
6130 7231 0,067
6130 7233 0,093
6130 8271 0,056
7122 2149 0,065
7122 3112 0,092
7122 7124 0,082
7122 9313 0,065
7129 7124 0,200
7129 7221 0,067
7129 7222 0,170
7135 7124 0,589
7136 3115 0,054
7139 7124 0,289
7139 7136 0,086
7139 7223 0,059
7139 7231 0,066
7141 7242 0,230
7142 7242 0,126
7211 7136 0,058
7211 7212 0,079
7211 7222 0,184
7211 7223 0,147
7211 7233 0,084
7311 7222 0,064
7311 7223 0,318
7311 7233 0,115
7311 8211 0,070
7341 7343 0,142
7411 5220 0,054
7413 1239 0,110
8123 7222 0,137
8123 7223 0,068
8159 3119 0,123
8159 7223 0,086
8212 6130 0,068
8212 7124 0,082
8212 7222 0,068
8212 7231 0,055
8212 9312 0,055
8212 9313 0,055
8231 7223 0,070
8231 7233 0,070
8231 8232 0,093
8231 8271 0,093
8231 9320 0,070
8232 7222 0,052
8232 7223 0,178
8232 7231 0,065
8251 7343 0,103
8253 7223 0,075
8253 7231 0,086
8253 7233 0,065
8253 8211 0,054
8253 9330 0,054
8271 9320 0,052
8272 1239 0,073
8272 9320 0,094
8274 9320 0,085
8278 7223 0,123
8278 8159 0,053
8278 8271 0,053
8281 7222 0,086
8281 7223 0,204
8281 7231 0,053
8281 7233 0,112
8281 8211 0,072
8281 9320 0,053
8283 7241 0,056
8283 7243 0,217
8283 8232 0,056
8283 8281 0,063
8284 7223 0,083
8284 7231 0,155
8284 9320 0,051
8285 7124 0,350
8285 7423 0,087
8285 8240 0,083
8287 7222 0,085
8287 7223 0,065
8287 7231 0,105
8290 7124 0,063
8290 7223 0,084
8290 8271 0,070
8322 3415 0,086
8322 4190 0,100
8322 5220 0,096
8322 7231 0,086
8322 8324 0,120
8322 9330 0,067
8324 3415 0,117
8324 7231 0,173
8324 9330 0,067
8332 6130 0,058
8332 7231 0,081
8334 8324 0,052
8334 9330 0,156
9113 3415 0,342
9113 3419 0,076
9113 4190 0,209
9113 5220 0,070
9132 3439 0,058
141
9132 4190 0,056
9132 5220 0,063
9132 7231 0,056
9132 8271 0,056
9211 6112 0,185
9211 6130 0,065
9211 8271 0,056
9211 9312 0,074
9312 7231 0,076
9313 7124 0,121
9313 7136 0,053
9313 7231 0,055
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A8 Appendix on Wage Regressions
Table A-12: Wage regressions for fulltime privately employed workers
OLS GLS/RE IV-OLS IV-GLS/RE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
occ. ten. 0.0309*** 0.0154*** -0.0016 0.0246***
(29.22) (20.30) (-0.622) (20.24)
occ. ten. sq -0.0036*** -0.0014*** 0.0037*** -0.0017***
(-20.78) (-11.62) -7.410 (-10.39)
occ. ten. cub 0.0001*** 0.0000*** -0.0002*** 0.0000***
(13.63) -5.595 (-9.151) -5.105
ind. ten. 0.0078*** 0.0066*** -0.0130*** 0.0012
-6.133 -7.665 (-4.714) -1.152
ind. ten. sq -0.0017*** -0.0013*** 0.0024*** -0.0002
(-7.325) (-8.553) -4.792 (-0.901)
ind. ten. cub 0.0001*** 0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0000
-5.413 -6.304 (-5.335) (-0.148)
firm ten. 0.0100*** 0.0062*** -0.0315*** -0.0124***
-4.966 -5.022 (-5.548) (-6.385)
firm ten. sq -0.0015*** -0.0013*** 0.0026*** 0.0005**
(-6.032) (-9.032) -3.927 -2.155
gen. exp. 0.0276*** 0.0357*** 0.0430*** 0.0231***
(22.90) (39.47) (13.99) (16.01)
gen. exp. sq -0.0013*** -0.0020*** -0.0057*** -0.0015***
(-7.735) (-16.35) (-11.43) (-9.592)
gen. exp. cub 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0000***
-5.014 (10.54) (11.01) -7.477
Constant 5.3416*** 5.2180*** 5.6013*** 5.3875***
(741.8) (701.3) (505.6) (600.2)
Occ. Spell dummies yes yes yes yes
5 education dummies yes yes yes yes
OJ yes yes yes yes
Number of children yes yes yes yes
Marriage and Union dummies yes yes yes yes
County unemployment rate yes yes yes yes
Time and regional dummies yes yes yes yes
1 digit ind. and occ. dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 426164 426164 426164 426164
R-squared 0.439 . 0.427 .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and t statistics in parentheses
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Table A-13: Wage regressions for fulltime privately employed workers, who graduated from
1994-1999 and had at most 3 years of general experience at time of graduation
OLS GLS/RE IV-OLS IV-GLS/RE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
occ. ten. 0.0644*** 0.0505*** 0.0635*** 0.0542***
-7.477 -7.671 -4.775 -6.547
occ. ten. sq -0.0109*** -0.0097*** -0.0159*** -0.0124***
(-4.012) (-4.737) (-4.196) (-5.408)
occ. ten. cub 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0013*** 0.0009***
-3.275 -3.833 -4.041 -4.645
ind. ten. -0.0153 -0.0024 0.0032 -0.0250**
(-1.501) (-0.308) (0.166) (-2.403)
ind. ten. sq 0.0030 0.0003 -0.0012 0.0071**
(0.966) (0.111) (-0.201) -2.288
ind. ten. cub -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005*
(-0.351) (0.412) (0.291) (-1.900)
firm ten. 0.0345*** 0.0275*** 0.0096 0.0055
-5.137 -5.321 (0.571) (0.666)
firm ten. sq -0.0045*** -0.0038*** -0.0015 -0.0013
(-5.265) (-5.689) (-0.763) (-1.352)
gen. exp. 0.0402*** 0.0379*** 0.0188*** 0.0422***
-9.953 (11.45) -3.498 (11.95)
gen. exp. sq -0.0028*** -0.0005 0.0083*** 0.0006
(-2.818) (-0.639) -4.999 (0.753)
gen. exp. cub 0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0008*** -0.0002***
(0.835) (-2.161) (-6.496) (-4.083)
Constant 4.9924*** 4.9504*** 5.0002*** 0.0000
(333.5) (349.8) (195.2) ()
Occ. Spell dummies yes yes yes yes
5 education dummies yes yes yes yes
OJ yes yes yes yes
Number of children yes yes yes yes
Union dummy yes yes yes yes
Marriage dummy yes yes yes yes
County unemployment rate yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
1 digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes
1 digit occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 57584 57584 57584 57584
R-squared 0.562 . 0.558 .
Number of pnr 15172 15172
R-squared overall 0.558 0.552
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and t statistics in parentheses
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Table A-14: Wage regressions for fulltime public and private employees allowing for spells of
non-employment and part-time work
OLS GLS IV-OLS IV-GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
occ. ten. 0.0180*** 0.0056*** -0.0078*** 0.0056***
(42.33) (18.58) (-7.595) (13.72)
occ. ten. sq -0.0019*** -0.0005*** 0.0028*** -0.0003***
(-33.32) (-12.20) (15.74) (-6.161)
occ. ten. cub 0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0001*** 0.0000**
(22.11) -6.776 (-16.62) -2.472
ind. ten. 0.0049*** 0.0032*** 0.0069*** -0.0014***
-8.150 -7.993 -7.654 (-3.016)
ind. ten. sq -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0008*** 0.0000
(-5.929) (-9.214) (-6.309) (0.613)
ind. ten. cub 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000
-9.194 -9.687 -7.348 (0.446)
firm ten. -0.0023** 0.0045*** -0.0583*** -0.0184***
(-2.025) -6.673 (-17.87) (-18.22)
firm ten. sq -0.0009*** -0.0010*** 0.0046*** 0.0014***
(-6.894) (-13.00) (13.28) (12.30)
gen. exp. 0.0332*** 0.0356*** 0.0293*** 0.0359***
(69.10) (92.53) (38.49) (69.28)
gen. exp. sq -0.0016*** -0.0015*** -0.0024*** -0.0017***
(-30.11) (-39.21) (-32.98) (-37.49)
gen. exp. cub 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000***
(18.58) (20.75) (26.85) (22.42)
Constant 5.3325*** 5.0052*** 5.1812*** 5.0364***
(978.8) (935.5) (696.5) (897.9)
Occ. Spell dummies yes yes yes yes
5 education dummies yes yes yes yes
OJ yes yes yes yes
Number of children yes yes yes yes
Union dummy yes yes yes yes
Marriage dummy yes yes yes yes
County unemployment rate yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
1 digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes
1 digit occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1266782 1266782 1266782 1266782
R-squared 0.419 . 0.402 .
Number of pnr 310127 310127
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and t statistics in parentheses
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Table A-15: Returns to 2, 5, and 8 years of tenure, public and private worker sample
2 years 5 years 8 years
OLS
Occupation 0.029 0.048 0.045
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry 0.008 0.015 0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employer -0.008 -0.035 -0.078
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
IV GLS
Occupation 0.010 0.021 0.027
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Industry -0.003 -0.005 -0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employer -0.031 -0.058 -0.060
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
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A9 Appendix on Hazard rates
Table A-16: Returns to 2, 5, and 8 years of tenure, public and private worker sample
Private public and private
Column 1 Column 2
occ.ten.1 -2,520 -
(-1.60) -
occ.ten.2 -2,820 -
(-1.79) -
occ.ten.3 -3,019 1,623
(-1.92) (17,140)
occ.ten.4 -3,215 1,444
(-2.04) (15,250)
occ.ten.5 -3,294 1,323
(-2.09) (13,970)
occ.ten.6 -3,395 1,079
(-2.16) (11,380)
occ.ten.7 -3,416 1,000
(-2.17) (10,530)
ind.ten. -0,478 -0,341
( -25.94) (-44,030)
ind.ten.sq 0,076 0,041
(19.90) (30,440)
ind.ten.cub -0,004 -0,002
(-17.35) (-24,750)
firm.ten. -0,490 -0,336
(-30.15) (-39,750)
firm.ten.sq 0,056 0,037
(23.58) (31,880)
gen.exp. 0,625 0,283
(43.14) (57,280)
gen.exp.sq -0,078 -0,025
(-33.69) (-42,650)
gen.exp.cub 0,003 0,001
(27.72) (33,940)
occ. ten. 8-21 dummies other yes yes
other explanatory variables yes yes
total obs. 404800 1266756
log likelihood -178720,66 -559774,41
z statistics in parentheses
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(a) Probability of switching occupation
by occupational tenure
(b) Probability of switching occupation
by occupational spell number and occu-
pational tenure
Figure A-1: Hazard rate out of occupations by occupational tenure, over all and by occupational
spell number for large sample including public sector workers and allowing for spells of non-
employment and part-time work.
Figure A-2: Hazard rate out of occupations by occupational tenure, over all and by occupational
spell number for large sample including public sector workers and allowing for spells of non-
employment and part-time work.
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Table A-17: Multinomial Logit for fulltime private sample
Occ. occ. and firm Occ. and ind. Occ., firm, and ind.
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
occ.ten.1 -2,183 -4,111 -4,411 -1,675
(-20,080) (-13,850) (-10,230) (-13,420)
occ.ten.2 -2,531 -4,329 -4,569 -1,897
(-22,960) (-14,400) (-10,400) (-14,810)
occ.ten.3 -2,770 -4,484 -4,647 -2,026
(-25,010) (-14,850) (-10,540) (-15,660)
occ.ten.4 -2,981 -4,651 -4,943 -2,175
(-26,670) (-15,280) (-11,090) (-16,590)
occ.ten.5 -3,057 -4,819 -4,931 -2,230
(-27,160) (-15,720) (-10,970) (-16,840)
occ.ten.6 -3,165 -4,789 -5,091 -2,358
(-28,010) (-15,590) (-11,230) (-17,600)
occ.ten.7 -3,179 -5,009 -5,164 -2,313
(-28,150) (-16,210) (-11,430) (-17,290)
occ.ten.8 -3,176 -5,016 -5,042 -2,394
(-27,990) (-16,090) (-11,150) (-17,580)
occ.ten.9 -3,170 -4,975 -4,904 -2,395
(-27,850) (-15,880) (-10,830) (-17,360)
occ.ten.10 -3,091 -4,984 -4,999 -2,379
(-27,120) (-15,760) (-10,970) (-17,000)
occ.ten.11 -3,034 -4,776 -5,061 -2,211
(-26,530) (-15,120) (-11,030) (-15,790)
occ.ten.12 -3,071 -4,798 -5,146 -2,204
(-26,630) (-15,010) (-11,060) (-15,460)
occ.ten.13 -3,139 -5,068 -5,068 -2,501
(-26,810) (-15,320) (-10,800) (-16,490)
occ.ten.14 -3,194 -5,117 -5,307 -2,386
(-26,450) (-14,910) (-10,750) (-15,040)
occ.ten.15 -35,506 -35,419 -32,576 2,913
(-0,000) (-0,000) (-0,000) (1,860)
ind.ten. -0,430 0,110 -1,047 -0,682
(-19,460) (1,950) (-9,560) (-19,270)
ind.ten.sq 0,073 0,001 0,123 0,091
(16,020) (0,110) (4,470) (11,660)
ind.ten.cub -0,004 -0,001 -0,005 -0,004
(-14,470) (-1,280) (-2,840) (-8,710)
firm.ten. -0,463 -1,054 -0,091 -0,369
(-23,600) (-21,270) (-1,010) (-12,090)
firm.ten.sq 0,055 0,105 0,030 0,041
(19,440) (13,670) (2,240) (8,950)
gen.exp. 0,680 0,524 0,693 0,541
(38,660) (11,930) (9,240) (21,560)
gen.exp.sq -0,082 -0,072 -0,080 -0,074
(-29,380) (-10,010) (-6,680) (-17,570)
gen.exp.cub 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
(24,070) (8,410) (5,330) (14,170)
other explanatory variables yes yes yes yes
total obs. 404800
log likelihood -245066,19
z statistics in parentheses
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Table A-18: Multinomial Logit for fulltime private and public sample
Occ. occ. and firm Occ. and ind. Occ, firm, and ind
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
occ.ten.3 1,456 1,291 14,788 0,699
(13,500) (3,090) (46,920) (3,170)
occ.ten.4 1,279 1,183 14,720 0,585
(11,870) (2,830) (45,930) (2,650)
occ.ten.5 1,169 1,061 14,520 0,501
(10,850) (2,540) (44,800) (2,270)
occ.ten.6 0,898 0,942 14,353 0,386
(8,330) (2,250) (43,690) (1,750)
occ.ten.7 0,844 0,751 14,347 0,350
(7,820) (1,790) (43,150) (1,580)
occ.ten.8 0,749 0,733 14,050 0,266
(6,930) (1,750) (41,260) (1,200)
occ.ten.9 0,649 0,551 14,230 0,265
(5,990) (1,310) (41,920) (1,190)
occ.ten.10 0,628 0,531 14,137 0,169
(5,780) (1,260) (40,950) (0,760)
ind.ten. -0,318 0,193 -0,695 -0,520
(-36,040) (6,820) (-9,790) (-31,080)
ind.ten.sq 0,039 -0,015 0,076 0,056
(25,920) (-2,980) (4,600) (17,440)
ind.ten.cub -0,002 0,000 -0,003 -0,002
(-21,480) (0,310) (-3,240) (-12,380)
firm.ten. -0,207 -1,041 -0,165 -0,381
(-20,980) (-34,760) (-2,690) (-22,280)
firm.ten.sq 0,026 0,095 0,026 0,033
(19,590) (21,200) (2,970) (13,180)
gen.exp. 0,226 0,208 0,323 0,205
(34,960) (10,880) (8,710) (20,100)
gen.exp.sq -0,019 -0,023 -0,027 -0,024
(-26,820) (-10,890) (-6,440) (-20,070)
gen.exp.cub 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
(21,360) (10,220) (5,070) (17,130)
education yes yes yes yes
number of children yes yes yes yes
union,marriage yes yes yes yes
county unempl.rate yes yes yes yes
time dummies yes yes yes yes
1 digit industry dummies yes yes yes yes
1 digit occupation dummies yes yes yes yes
regional dummies yes yes yes yes
total obs. 1266783
log likelihood -733982,97
z statistics in parentheses
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A10 Appendix on U-shapes in Occupational Mobility
(a) residual distribution from wage regression not including
firm and industry tenure
(b) residual distribution from wage regression not includ-
ing occupational spell number
Figure A-3: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in residual distributions from different wage regressions.
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Figure A-4: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in the wage distribution within occupation and year for half and double bandwidth.
Figure A-5: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in the wage residuals for half and double bandwidth.
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Figure A-6: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in the wage within occupation, year, and years after graduation for half and double bandwidth.
Figure A-7: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in the wage within occupation, year, and 1, 2, 4, and 6 years after graduation for half and
double bandwidth.
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(a) wage distribution of raw wages within oc-
cupation and year
(b) wage distribution of wages residual
(c) wage distribution of raw wages within oc-
cupation, year, and year after graduation
(d) wage distribution of raw wages within
occupation, year, and year after graduation
for 1, 2, 4, and 6 years after graduation
Figure A-8: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation AND firm by worker’s
percentile in the wage distribution.
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Figure A-9: Probability of switching occupation, occupation and firm, and occupation but not
firm. Percentiles of wage distribution within occupation and year.
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Figure A-10: Probability of switching occupation, occupation and firm, and occupation but not
firm. Percentiles of residual wage distribution.
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Figure A-11: Probability of switching occupation, occupation and firm, and occupation but not
firm. Percentiles of wage distribution within occupation, year and year after graduation.
157
Figure A-12: Probability of switching occupation, occupation and firm, and occupation but
not firm. Percentiles of wage distribution within occupation, year and 1, 2, 4 and 6 years after
graduation.
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Figure A-13: Probability of switching occupation, occupation and firm, and occupation but not
firm. Percentiles of wage distribution within occupation, year and 1, 5, 10, and 15 years after
graduation.
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(a) Probability of switching occupation between
year t and t+1 for workers in the same occupa-
tion in year t-1 and t depending on wage percentile
in their occupation t and t-1
(b) Probability of switching occupation between
year t and t+1 for workers in the any occupation
in year t-1 and t depending on wage percentile in
their occupation t and t-1
Figure A-14: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation between year t and
t+1 by worker’s percentile in the wage within occupation and year in period t-1 and t.
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A11 Appendix: Direction of Occupational Mobility, Con-
dition on Changing Occupation
Figure A-15: Probability of switching to occupations with higher or lower average wage condi-
tional on switching occupation. Percentiles of wage distribution within occupation and year.
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Figure A-16: Probability of switching to occupations with higher or lower average wage condi-
tional on switching occupation. Percentiles of residual wage distribution.
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Figure A-17: Probability of switching to occupations with higher or lower average wage con-
ditional on switching occupation. Percentiles of wage distribution within occupation, year and
year after graduation.
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Figure A-18: Probability of switching to occupations with higher average wage conditional on
switching occupation. Percentiles of wage distribution within occupation, year and 1, 2, 4 and
6 years after graduation.
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Figure A-19: Probability of switching to occupations with higher average wage conditional on
switching occupation. Percentiles of wage distribution within occupation, year and 1, 5, 10,
and 15 years after graduation.
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A12 Appendix of mobility in response to occupations
changing rank
Figure A-20: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility of the public and private
worker sample for occupations growing at different rates.
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Figure A-21: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility of the public and private
worker sample for occupations growing at different rates. Percentiles in wage distribution are
calculation within occupation, year, and years after graduation.
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Figure A-22: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility of the public and private
worker sample for occupations growing at different rates. Percentiles in wage distribution are
calculation within occupation, year, and years after graduation. Plots of different groups of
years after graduation.
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Abstract
Using administrative panel data on 100% of the Danish population we document a new
set of facts characterizing the patterns of occupational mobility. We find that a worker’s
probability of switching occupation is U-shaped in his position in the wage distribution
in his occupation. It is the workers with the highest or lowest wages in their occupations
who have the highest probability of leaving the occupation. Workers with higher (lower)
relative wage within their occupation tend to switch to occupations with higher (lower)
average wages. Higher (lower) paid workers within their occupation tend to leave it when
relative productivity of that occupation declines (rises).
These facts are not implied by existing theories of occupational mobility that mostly
treat occupations as horizontally differentiated sets of tasks. We suggest that it might be
productive to think of occupations as forming vertical hierarchies. Workers who are unsure
of their abilities learn about them by observing their output realizations. Employment
opportunities in each occupation are scarce, inducing competition among workers for them.
Complementarities in the production function between worker’s ability and productivity
of an occupation induce sorting of workers into occupations according to their expected
ability. We present an equilibrium model of occupational choice with these features and
show analytically that it is consistent with patterns of mobility described above.
Chapter 3 of PhD thesis
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1 Introduction
When a worker switches detailed occupational categories (technician, engineer, manager) he or
she moves to an observationally different technology often requiring a different set of tasks to
be performed. The fraction of workers switching occupations is remarkably large. Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008) document that close to 20% of workers in the U.S. switch occupations in
a given year. Moreover, these gross flows are much larger than the net flows that are needed to
account for the changing sizes of occupations. What is it that induces workers to undertake all
these occupational changes? We provide new evidence on the patterns of occupational mobility
and suggest that the standard theories of occupational mobility are not consistent with these
facts. We then proceed to develop a new theory of occupational mobility.
There are two commonly used classes of models of occupational mobility. The first one, de-
scribed in, e.g., McCall (1990) and Neal (1999), is based on match-specific occupational sorting.
Occupations are perceived as identical (e.g., not different with respect to skill requirements),
but workers find out the quality of their specific match to an occupation over time. Match-
specific sorting occurs when workers realize that their match-specific shock is bad and abandon
the match in favor of (the search for) a better one. The predictions from this theory are based
on selection: Since those workers that are content with their match stay in their occupation,
this theory predicts that the probability of switching occupation declines with tenure in that
occupation, which is consistent with the data. Moreover, since good matches survive longer,
wages and tenure are positively correlated in the cross-section of workers - an observation that
is also consistent with the data.
A closer look at the data that we take in this paper, however, reveals that the fundamental
selection mechanism in these match-specific sorting models is not consistent with the data. Vir-
tually any model in which productivities are drawn independently for each worker-occupation-
match rather than representing a permanent trait of either the occupation or the worker would
predict that the probability of switching occupation is negatively related to wages which indicate
match quality. Instead, we find a strong evidence that the probability of switching occupation
is U-shaped in wages: not only is it people with wages lower than the occupational average,
but also those with wages above the average that are more likely to switch.
The second class of existing models focuses on net mobility, which is explained by fluctu-
ating demands for services of different occupations. They generally also imply that it is either
only the people on the lower part of the wage distribution within an occupation or only in the
upper part of the distribution that tend to switch in response to a change in demand condi-
tions, rather than workers on both ends of the spectrum. This is the property of the classic Roy
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(1951) model (and its extensions in, e.g., Moscarini (2001)). The models in Kambourov and
Manovskii (2005, 2009a) generically have a similar prediction. They represent a version of the
island economy model of Lucas and Prescott (1974) where islands are interpreted as occupa-
tions and workers accumulate occupation-specific human capital. Human capital is destroyed
upon switching occupations which implies that, if workers with different levels of human capital
are perfectly substitutable in the occupational production function, it is the low human capital,
and hence, low wage, workers that switch first if occupational demand declines. If occupational
demand rises, no one leaves the occupation.
We will show below that in the data most occupations exhibit U-shapes in mobility. On
top of this, however, when an occupation experience an increase in demand, workers in the
lower part of the wage distribution of that occupation tend to leave it. None of the existing
theories are consistent with this pattern. The data further implies that occupational switching
is non-random. A worker who is in the upper tail of the wage distribution in some occupation
and decides to switch to another occupation, on average moves to an occupation with higher
mean earnings. A worker who is in the lower tail of the wage distribution in some occupation
and decides to switch to another occupation, on average moves to an occupation with lower
mean earnings.1 Once again, existing models do not generate such patterns. The reason is
that the literature has treated occupations as horizontally differentiated sets of tasks. We
think, however, that it might be productive to think of occupations as also forming vertical
hierarchies.
In our theory, workers have different innate abilities. Workers and employers learn about
these abilities by observing the output realizations. In difference to, e.g., Johnson (1978), Miller
(1984), Papageorgiou (2007), and Eeckhout and Weng (2009) the speed of learning is indepen-
dent of the occupation the individual is working in, which allows us to consider more than two
occupations without loosing tractability.2 This turns out to be important to understand the
U-shapes in the switching pattern. Employment opportunities in each occupation are scarce
- for example because other factor inputs to production are fixed or exhibit increasing costs
when more employment is created.
With scarce employment opportunities workers compete for jobs. With complementarities
1Nevertheless, a worker who leaves an occupation from the top of its wage distribution on average experiences
a decline of his wage growth upon a switch, while a switcher from the bottom of the occupational distribution
experience an increase in wage growth.
2Closest in spirit are Papageorgiou (2007) and Eeckhout and Weng (2009) who have a sorting model. Both
consider two occupations. In Papageorgiou (2007) news is asymmetric in the sense that a higher probability
of being good in one sector implies a higher probability of being bad in the the other sector. In Eeckhout and
Weng (2009), similar to our paper, news is symmetric in the sense that positive news about the ability in one
sector also means a higher productivity in the other sector.
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in the production function between workers’ ability and productivity of an occupation, the more
able workers will in equilibrium occupy the jobs in more productive occupations. As agents
learn that they are either too good or too bad for a given profession they switch to a more
appropriate one, which induces the U-shapes. Those workers that are talented move to more
productive occupations, while those that are less talented switch to less productive occupations.
Even those workers that switch to lower productivities benefit relative to staying. If they would
attempt to stay they would block a better suited worker from the job. In a competitive labor
market this opportunity cost translates directly into low wages for the inappropriate worker.
In fact that wage is below the wage in a less productive profession for which the opportunity
costs are not that high.3 A similar logic applies with free entry when jobs in more productive
occupations have higher capital costs: With complementarities in production only workers with
high ability will be willing to pay the cost of creating a job in a highly productive occupation.
Extensions of this idea that allow for changing occupational productivities reveal that
occupations with rising productivity indeed expand their high-ability workforce while shedding
lower-ability workers in order to match the skill of their workforce to the productivity of the
jobs. Similarly, occupations with declining productivity increase their low-ability workforce
and loose the high-ability workers to better occupations. These insights obtain with fixed
production factors as well as when entry is not fully elastic. In another extension we take into
account that even in our vertically differentiated view of occupations a switch requires a new set
of skills which induces costs to occupational switching (see e.g. Shaw (1984, 1987); Kambourov
and Manovskii (2009b)). For example, engineers that move up to manage small groups need
to adjust their human resource skills, while those that move down to become technicians need
to adjust their applied skills. We extend our analysis to allow for occupation-specific human
capital accumulation and retraining costs and show that U-shapes still arise. Since our findings
challenge the importance of selection for wage growth because both bad and good workers leave
occupations, human capital is the obvious remainder that can account for the positive relation
between wages and occupational tenure.4
This theory of occupational mobility is related to the setup in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and
Parent (2005), which also features learning that is independent of occupational choice. Their
main focus is not the switching patterns directly, but on an econometric instrumental variable
approach that allows for a consistent determination of the parameters of a wage equation in
the presence of such learning. Despite differences in focus and functional form, our analysis can
be applied to their model, as we do in the discussion section. Conversely, adaptation of their
3The wage offer might in fact become negative, which we might interpret as firing.
4Our theory does generate returns to general experience as workers are able to sort better after learning.
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econometric technique will allow consistent estimation of the parameters also in our model.
As a word of caution, we do not think that the simple vertical sorting mechanism that
we propose accounts for the full extent of occupational mobility. Both vertical and horizontal
moves arise in the labor market, i.e. some occupations are considered better than others while
some are just different. And among those that can be ranked the ranking might change over
time. Therefore it is likely that match-specific components and the volatility of productivities
of occupations or of the demands for their services are responsible for a nontrivial share of
mobility. We do think, however, that the mechanism we emphasize should be an important
part of any comprehensive theory of occupational mobility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the set of
new facts that characterize occupational mobility. In Section 3 we present the model that is
consistent with the facts we document. Section 4 presents relevant extensions to our theory
and Section 5 discusses it’s contributions vis a vis the existing literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 The U-shapes of occupational mobility: Evidence
2.1 Data
We use the administrative Danish register data covering 100% of the population in the years
1980 to 2002. The first part of the data is from the Integrated Database for Labor Market
Research (IDA), which contains annual information on socioeconomic variables (e.g., age, gen-
der, education, etc.) and characteristics of employment (e.g., private sector or government,
occupations, industries, etc.) of the population. Information on wages is extracted from the
Income Registers and consists of the hourly wage in the job held in the last week in November
of each year. Wage information is not available for workers who are not employed in the last
week of November. The wages are deflated to the 1995 wage level using Statistics Denmark’s
consumer price index and trimmed from above and below at the 0.995 and 0.005 percentile for
each year of the selected sample described below.
We use the Danish rather that the U.S. data for two reasons. First, the sample size is much
larger. One of our objectives is to document the patterns of occupational mobility depending
on the position of the individual in the wage distribution within her occupation. A sample
sufficiently large to be representative in each occupation is essential for this purpose. Second,
the administrative data minimizes the amount of measurement error in occupational coding
that plagues the available US data (see Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b)). Nevertheless, we
find that the features of occupational mobility that can be compared between the U.S. and
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Denmark are quite similar (see Groes (2009)). This leads us to expect that the patterns of
occupational mobility that we describe using Danish data generalizes to, e.g., the U.S.
2.1.1 Sample selection
While the Danish register data dates back to 1980, because information on firm tenure is
available only after 1995 and because of a change in the occupational classification in 1995,
we study the data spanning the 1995-2002 period (the latter cut-off was dictated by the data
availability at the time we performed the analysis). We use the pre-1995 data in constructing
some of the variables. For example, in 1995 the two occupational classifications used in the
Danish register data are linked to the worker’s job which allows us to construct measures of
occupational tenure. For example, a worker will be considered to have 5 years of occupational
experience in 1996 if he is observed in the same occupation in 1995 and 1996 according to the
new occupational classification and at the same time has the same occupational classification
from 1992 to 1995 according to the old occupational classification.
We only select male workers in order to minimize the impact of the fertility decision on labor
market transitions. Due to data limitations the sample is restricted to full time workers in the
private sector. In the period 1995 to 1998 we do not observe the workplace of public employees
and, to be able to use tenure information, we choose to include only the privately employed
(rather than further restricting the time dimension of the data). The part-time workers are
excluded because they do not have as dependable wage information. The sample is restricted
to employees because we do not observe earnings for the self employed.
To construct experience and tenure variables we need to observe each individual’s entire
labor market history. Thus, our sample includes all individuals completing their education in
or after 1980 if they remain in the sample at least until 1995. The sample includes graduates
from all types of education from 7th grade to a graduate degree conditional on observing the
individual not going back to school for at least three years after graduation. Thus, a worker
who completed high school, worked for three years, then obtained a college degree and went
back to full time work will have two spells in our sample: first, the three years between high
school and college, and second, after graduating from college. If he worked for less than three
years between high school and college, he joins our sample only after graduating from college.
We truncate the workers’ labor market histories the first time we observe them in part-time
employment, public employment, self employment, or at the first observation with missing wage
data.
Finally, since we study occupational mobility between consecutive years, the sample only
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includes workers with valid occupation data in the year after we use them in the analysis5 (e.g.,
we use information from 2002 for this purpose).
Descriptive statistics of our sample are provided in the Table 1. Column 1 is the sample
described above. Column 2 is for the sample where there is at least 10 workers in each occupation
in each year. Column 3 is for the sample with at least 10 workers in each occupation, year,
and years after graduation category and column 4 is for the sample with at least 100 workers
in each occupation and year. These samples will be used in the analyses below.
Table 1: Summary statistics for the overall sample and subsamples
Full sample Over 10 per Over 10 per Over 100 per
occupation occupation, occupation
and year year, and and year
experience
Number of observations 404800 402136 368520 375367
Number of occupations 353 229 143 105
Age 29.67 29.66 29.49 29.57
Occupational tenure 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.44
Occupational spell number 1.69 1.69 1.67 1.68
Occupational switchers 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
Employer tenure 2.36 2.36 2.33 2.35
Industry tenure 3.38 3.38 3.35 3.38
Years after graduation 6.49 6.49 6.40 6.48
Less than 12 years of school 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Apprenticeship education 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70
2 year university 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Bachelor 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08
Masters degree or above 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
Hourly wage in DKK in 1995 170.16 170.13 168.75 169.49
Married 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Union 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Number of children 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.71
2.2 U-shapes in the probability of occupational switching
In this section we present evidence of U-shapes in the probability of occupational switching.
Figure 1(a) is a non-parametric plot (from a kernel smoothed local linear regression with band-
5In Groes (2009) we show that all results hold for a larger sample including both private and public sector
workers who are allowed spells of non-employment and part time work. Furthermore, we allow workers to switch
occupation through non-employment and part time work.
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width 5) of the probability of switching out of an occupation as a function of a worker’s position
in the wage distribution in that occupation in a given year. The probability of switching occu-
pation is clearly U-shaped in wages. It is the workers with the highest or lowest wages in their
occupations who have the highest probability of leaving the occupation. The workers in the
middle wage deciles have the lowest probability of switching occupations.
(a) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion and year
(b) wage distribution of wage residuals
Figure 1: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile in
the wage distribution.
Figure 1(a) is based on raw wage data. Figure 1(b) indicates that we also observe a U-
shaped pattern of occupational mobility in the position of the worker in the distribution of
residual wages in his occupation in a given year. We generate residual wages by estimating a
standard wage regression
lnwijt = Xijtβ + ijt, (1)
where wijt is real hourly wage of an individual i working in occupation j in period t. The
explanatory variables in X include dummies for calendar years, third degree polynomials in
general experience, occupational tenure, industry tenure, a second degree polynomial in firm
tenure, number of occupational spells, education, marital status, union membership, and re-
gional dummies. These wage regressions are estimated separately for each occupation.6
The U-shapes further hold if we look at wage percentiles within occupation, year, and
years after graduation. Figure 2(a) plots the probability of switching occupation as a function
6Figure A-1 in Appendix A2 shows that excluding the regressors firm and industry tenure or excluding
dummies for the occupational spell number in the wage regression does not change the qualitative result of the
U-shape in occupational mobility. In the Appendix Figures A-2 to A-5 we show that the U-shapes hold for
bandwidths which are half and double of what we use in Figures 1 and 2.
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of worker’s position in the wage distribution of workers in the same occupation, calendar year,
and years after graduation. Figure 2(b) separately graphs occupational mobility for 1, 2, 4,
and 6 years after graduation. The figure shows U-shapes in occupational mobility for all years
after graduation and shows that the level of mobility decreases with years after graduation for
almost all percentiles of the within occupation, calendar year, and years since graduation wage
distribution.
(a) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion, year, and years after graduation
(b) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion, year, and years after graduation for different
years after graduation
Figure 2: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile in
the wage distribution within occupation, year, and years after graduation.
An additional informative statistic is the percentage of occupation-year pairs that exhibit
U-shapes. Computing this statistics requires enough workers in each occupation in each year to
accurately predict a probability of changing occupation in different parts of the wage distribu-
tion of that occupation. Thus, we restrict the sample to occupations that include at least 100
workers in a given year and we divide the wage distribution of each occupation into quintiles.
We define U-shapes in each occupation-year pair in two ways. First, we count an occupation
in a given year as having a U-shape if the quintile with the highest probability of changing
occupation is either quintile 1 or quintile 5. Second, we count an occupation in a given year as
having a U-shape if, in addition, the quintile with the lowest probability of changing occupation
is in the interior, i.e., quintile 2, 3, or 4. There are 598 occupation-year observations with at
least 100 workers. 95 Percent of these have maximum probability of switching occupation in
one of the extreme quintiles when the quintiles are based on raw wages. When the quintiles
are defined on the wage residuals, 98% of occupations exhibit U-shapes according to this def-
inition. In addition, 66% of the these occupations have a global minimum in the interior of
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the distribution of raw wages and 77% of the these occupations have a global minimum in the
interior of the distribution of wage residuals7.
2.3 U-shapes in the direction of occupational switching
In this section we document another prominent feature of the data: conditional on changing
occupation, workers with higher (lower) relative wage within their occupation tend to switch to
occupations with higher (lower) average wages. We first find the average wage of the occupations
in a given year in order to determine the ranking between occupations. Similarly to our analysis
of probability of occupational switching, we rank occupations based on their raw wages or
residual wages adjusted for worker characteristics. To obtain the ranking based on raw wages,
we find the average real wage of all full time private sector workers in a given occupation in a
given year.8 To obtain the ranking based on residual wages, we use our selected sample to run
a similar wage regression as in Equation 1 for each occupation where we include time dummies
in the regression (without the intercept). We interpret the coefficients on these time dummies
as the average occupational wage in a given year, adjusted for human capital accumulation of
workers in the occupation as well as other worker characteristics such as education, regional
dummies, and marital status. For this wage regression we include only occupations which have
more than 100 observations in total over the 8 year period 1995-2002.
Figure 3(a) plots the probability of switching to an occupation with a higher or lower
average wage as a function of the worker’s position in the wage distribution of the occupation
he or she is leaving. The sample on which the figure is based consists of all workers who switched
occupation in a given year and occupations are ranked based on the raw average wages. Figure
3(b) presents corresponding evidence when occupations are ranked based on residual wages and
the direction of occupational mobility is plotted against the percentile in the distribution of
residual wages within an occupation the worker is switching from. The evidence contained in
these figures suggest that, conditional on switching occupation, the higher wage a person had in
his occupation before the switch the higher is the probability that the worker will switch to an
occupation with a higher average wage. Similarly, the lower wage a worker has in his occupation
the higher is the probability that he will switch to an occupation with a lower average wage
than in the occupation he switches from.
Figure 4(a) illustrates that similar results hold if we further condition on workers position
7In Groes (2009) we show that this way of measuring U-shapes is robust to letting the wage percentiles be
a 2nd order polynomial in each occupation and testing for the significance of the polynomials.
8Note that this is a bigger sample than our selected sample, which only consists of workers who graduated
after 1980 and who never worked in the public sector, worked part time, etc. The results are, however, robust
to only looking at the average wages in our selected sample.
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(a) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion and year. Average wage in occupation from
population.
(b) wage distribution of wage residuals. Average
wage in occupation from time constants in wage re-
gression
Figure 3: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility, conditional on switching
occupation.
in the distribution of wages in his occupation in a given year and among people with the same
number of years since graduation. This figure is comparable to figure 3(a) in that occupational
average wages are calculated from raw wages of the population in the occupation in a given year.
Finally, Figure 4(b) shows that the direction of occupational mobility is similar for individuals
who graduated 1, 2, 4, or 6 years prior.
2.4 Summary
To summarize the evidence presented so far, the probability of switching out of most occupations
is U-shaped in the position of the worker in the wage distribution of that occupation. Workers
with high wages relative to their occupational average switch to occupations with higher average
wages. Workers with low wages relative to their occupational average switch to occupations
with lower average wages.
As mentioned in the Introduction, these patterns are not implied by the existing theories
of occupational mobility. Hence, in what follows we develop an alternative theory that is
consistent with these features of the data. We confront additional implications of our theory
with the data as we derive them.
179
(a) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion, year, and year after graduation. Average wage
in occupation from population.
(b) wage distribution of raw wages within occupa-
tion, year, and year after graduation for individual
years after graduation. Average wage in occupation
from population.
Figure 4: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility, conditional on switching
occupation.
3 The U-shapes of occupational mobility: Theory
The economy is set in a discrete-time infinite horizon setting, where workers choose employment
in different occupations over time.
Workers: Each period a measure α of workers enters the labor market. The index for an
individual worker will be i throughout. Each worker is in the labor force for T periods. Workers
are risk-neutral and discount the future by factor β. Each worker has an ability level ai that is
drawn from a normal distribution with mean µa and variance σa. The amount of output that
a worker can produce depends on his ability. In particular, he produces
Xi = ai + εi (2)
in a given period, where εi is a normally distributed noise term with mean zero and variance
σε. Workers don’t know their precise ability, but observe the output they produce, even if they
choose home production. We assume that the worker observes a first draw after finishing school,
i.e. before the first time in the labor market, so that not all workers are identical when entering
the labor force.9
While we think that not only ability but also occupation-specific human capital accumu-
lation is an essential feature that leads to wage growth and that limits occupational switching,
9The signal after school could have a different variance than the output realization - this would only com-
plicate the notation slightly without altering the qualitative results.
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we first abstract from this to highlight the main insights of vertical occupational sorting in the
simplest setting possible. We briefly return to this point in Section 4.
Occupations: There are a finite number of occupations, indexed by k ∈ {0, 1, ..., K}, in
which workers can be employed. In each occupation the number of job opportunities is fixed
to some measure γk that is constant over time. One can think of a limited measure γk of
entrepreneurs who know how to implement the specific technology k, and each needs exactly
one workers to operate the technology. The limited number of jobs in an occupation allows
entrepreneurs to earn rents. We discuss entry of entrepreneurs in Section 4.
Each unit of the good (or service) that is produced sells in the market at some exogenously
given price Pk. We refer to the price of output also as the productivity of the occupation, and
rank occupations in order of increasing productivity such that PK > ... > Pk > ... > P0 = 0.
We interpret the lowest occupation as home production, which means that it is available to
everybody.10 An entrepreneur of type k who employs worker i thus obtains revenues
Rki = PkXi.
This revenue function is supermodular, i.e. entrepreneurs in more productive occupations gain
more from employing a more able worker than entrepreneurs in less productive occupations.11
Wages: We consider a competitive economy without matching frictions. The only frictions
are information frictions in the sense that workers’ abilities are not known. We assume that
firms compete by posting output-contingent wages w(X). An entrepreneur in occupation k who
employs worker i has then an expected profit
Πk = E(PkXi − wk(Xi))
If an entrepreneur in occupation k can ensure himself some expected profit Πk in any period
by employing some specific worker i, he can simply offer wage contract
wk(X) = PkX − Πk (3)
10Availability to everybody means that γ0 > αT. The home production option guarantees that workers who
have negative ability can still obtain a non-negative payoff. Our assumption that output is also observed in
home production implies that there is no differential in the speed of learning.
11We note here that it is trivial to account not only for price differences but also for differences in the
productivity of output generation across occupations because we can reinterpret Pk as the combination of
selling price and the firms contribution to output. For example, an equivalent interpretation of our setup is
that prices in all occupations are identical, but workers in occupation k product Pkai units of output. In this
interpretation jobs in more productive occupations can be viewed as higher up in a hierarchy that produces a
homogeneous good (i.e. one manager may be equally important to production as several of his subordinates).
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to any arbitrary worker. Worker i is still willing to work at this firm because his expected wage
is unchanged, and any other worker who accepts the job does not make the firm worse off.
Therefore, such a “selling-the-shop” wage schedule has the effect that the firm does not need
to know the type of the worker, but just needs to know how much profit it wants to secure
to itself. It then adjusts the worker’s wages according to (3) through performance-dependent
boni/penalties in order to achieve this profit. We can therefore reinterpret the model as the
workers offering a payoff Πk to the entrepreneurs in occupation k for the right to work there
and retain the surplus that is created.
For workers only the expected wage that they can earn in a given occupation matters. If
firms obtain expected profits Πk with the wage schedule in (3) and a worker holds a belief
about his own ability with a mean of Ai in this period, then his expected wage when working
in occupation k is
wk(Ai) = PkAi − Πk. (4)
Without any costs to switching occupations it is clear that workers will choose the occupation
that offers the highest expected wage. (We discuss switching costs together with specific human
capital in the extensions.) Therefore, if workers switch occupations this happens because the
expected wage in the alternative occupation is higher than the expected wage that they can
obtain in their old occupation given the new information about their ability. While this sounds
like voluntary quits by the worker, one may easily think of this as layoffs: If a worker realizes
that he is worse than expected, the expected wage that he obtains after leaving profit Πk to
the entrepreneur might be very low in the current occupation. Such a wage offer might be
interpreted as firing.
We have taken the stance that firms offer output contingent contracts so that workers
self-select in the appropriate occupations even if the firm has no information about the prior
work history (and the revealed signals). If the firm does observe the prior work history and
has symmetric information relative to the worker, it can equally well offer a fixed wage based
on the expected ability. This would correspond to the expected wage in (4). While we take a
stance favoring the former, the prediction of U-shapes is robust to this assumption. We show
U-shapes both in realized wages as well as in the expected wages that arise if the firm bears
the risk of employment.
To formalize the optimal choice by the workers, let Ik(A,Π) be the following indicator
function: Ik(A,Π) = 1 if the expected wage according to (4) in occupation k is higher than in
any other occupation, and Ik(A,Π) = 0 otherwise. Clearly this indicator depends on the vector
Π = (Π1,Π2, ...,ΠK) of profits that have to be left to the firms.
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Updating: Neither workers nor entrepreneurs are sure about a worker’s true ability. Each
worker observes his output Xi and updates his beliefs according to Bayes’ law. We are agnostic
about whether firms learn as well, i.e. whether they observe the output history of a worker or
not. The driving force in this model is the workers belief about his mean ability Ai in a given
period. Of interest in solving the model is
1. how a worker updates his belief about his individual mean ability. This determines how
individuals change occupations.
2. how beliefs about the mean ability are distributed across the population. This determines
the equilibrium profits Πk and the associated wage offers according to (4).
For the first point, it is convenient to use the concept of precision, which is the inverse of the
variance. Let φa = 1/σa and φε = 1/σε, and define φt = φa+ tφε as the cumulative precision. A
worker’s initial belief about his mean ability before any output realization is A0i = µa. Consider
a worker who has prior Ati in any period t ∈ {0, 1, .., T} of his life and observes output realization
Xi. Standard results on updating of normal distributions establish that his posterior mean A
t+1
i
is the precision-weighted average of his prior mean and the observation
At+1i =
φt
φt+1
Ati +
φε
φt+1
Xi. (5)
The weight on the prior increases the more observations have already been observed in the past,
i.e. the higher is t. Correspondingly, the weight on the most recent observation decreases with
years in the labor market. Workers become more convinced over time of their ability. Since
workers draw once before entering the labor market, A1i is the prior at the beginning of the
first period of work. So the worker’s posterior belief about his exact ability ai is a normal with
mean At+1i and a variance of 1/φt+1.
For agents with prior At the realization of output and the resulting posterior mean At+1
is still random. We denote the distribution of this posterior by Gt(A
t+1|At) and its density by
gt(.|.). One can show that this posterior is normally distributed with mean At and precision
φtφt+1/φ.
12 It is not important that the update is normally distributed. The following quali-
tative properties suffice for the results we want to show: gt(.|A) is single-peaked and symmetric
12Conditional on knowing the true ability a of a worker, the output X is distributed normally with mean
a and precision φ, i.e. X ∼ N(a, φ). Yet the ability is not known. Rather, the individual only knows his
expected ability A while his true ability is a draw a ∼ N(A, φt). Integrating out the uncertainty over his ability
implies that output is distributed X ∼ N(A, φφt/φt+1). We are not interested in the output per se, but in
the update A′ = (φεX + φtA)/φt+1 that is a function of output. This linear combination implies that that the
posterior distribution Gt(A′|A) is a normal with mean A and precision φtφt+1/φε, i.e. A′ ∼ N(A, φtφt+1/φε)
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around its peak at A, and shifting the mean A simply shifts the entire distribution about the
posterior horizontally in the sense that gt(A
′|A) = gt(A′ + δ|A+ δ) for any δ. We call this last
property lateral adjustment.
For the second point, note that at any point in time there is a measure α of workers
that have been in the labor force for t ∈ {1, ..., T} periods. Call the measure of workers in
cohort t that have a belief regarding their mean ability weakly below A by F t(A), which is
a non-normalized normal distribution.13 We call the sum of this measure over the cohorts
F (A) =
∑T
t=1 F
t(A). Note that this distribution is independent of the choices of the agents
because workers learn about their type in any eventuality. This simplifies the specification of
an equilibrium substantially.14 For simplicity we will assume that there are enough workers
with positive levels of ability to fill all the jobs.15
Equilibrium: We are considering a standard stationary competitive equilibrium in this
matching market between occupations and workers. Stationary means that the entrepreneurs’
profits (Π1,Π2, ...,ΠK) and the associated wage offers according to (3) are constant over time.
Equilibrium implies that the workers’ decisions equate demand and supply, where Πk can be
interpreted as the price workers have to pay to take over a job in occupation k.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a vector of profits Π = (Π0, ...,ΠK) with Π0 = 0 such that
markets clear, i.e. for all k > 0 ∫
Ik(A,Π)dF = γk.
As is standard in competitive equilibrium theory, one can interpret the market profits Π
as optimal decisions by the entrepreneurs. Decreasing the demanded profit (i.e. increasing
the wage) is not optimal because already all entrepreneurs employ a worker. Increasing the
demanded profit (i.e. decreasing the wage) does not attract any worker, because workers expect
13Non-normalized means that the mass under the density does not necessarily add up to one. In our case id
adds up to F t(∞) = α since the size of cohort t is α. Let F˜t be the probability that any given worker has a
belief about his mean ability below A in period t. Then F t = αF˜t. At the beginning of period t the workers
have observed t output observations. The only relevant information for the worker is the average X¯ of these
output realizations. Conditional on a this is distributed normally with mean a and precision tφε. Since a is not
known, an agent with prior µa faces realizations of X¯ that are normal with mean µa and precision tφεφa/φt.
Since the update is At = (tφεX¯ + φaµa)/φt, F˜ t is normal mean µa and precision φtφa/(tφε).
14Other work such as Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997) and Papageorgiou (2007) focuses on differential speed of
learning, which substantially complicates the analysis and limits the analysis in these papers to two occupations
only. Moreover, these papers do not consider the implications for the U-shapes of switching behavior on which
our analysis is centered.
15The precise condition for this is αT − F (0) > ∑Kk=1 γk. Otherwise entrepreneurs in the less productive
occupations do not fill their positions and thus these low occupations will not be observed.
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to be able to work at the market wages. The indicator function Ik(A,Π) ensures that workers
indeed take optimal decisions when determining market clearing.
3.1 Analysis of Sorting
The tractability of the model arises from the fact that every period workers can reoptimize and
therefore their life-time optimal decision is also the decision that maximizes the payoffs in each
period. Since the distribution of mean abilities remains constant, we can solve most aspects with
the standard tools for the analysis of static matching models. We provide these results first.
Then we turn to problem that workers face over time as their individual uncertainty induces
agents to switch occupations as they transit to the stationary economy. These individual
uncertainty yields high gross mobility of workers between occupations, even though the net
mobility is by assumption zero in steady-state. Since gross mobility dwarfs net mobility in
magnitude, this seems to be an important starting point. We will introduce reasons for net
mobility in the extension section.
3.1.1 Preliminaries
The model can be easily be solved. In a given period, a worker’s decision only depends on
his prior A about his mean ability. The revenue function R = PA is super-modular, i.e.
∂2R/(∂P∂A) > 0. A result from the matching literature going back to Becker (1973) is that
under supermodularity entrepreneurs in more productive occupations match with workers with
higher mean ability in equilibrium. This is easy to see in our setup. Firms with higher produc-
tivity clearly make higher profits. A worker will choose occupation k ≥ 1 over occupation k− 1
only if the expected wage according to (4) is higher in the former, i.e.
PkA− Πk ≥ Pk−1A− Πk−1.
This is equivalent to
A ≥ Πk − Πk−1
Pk − Pk−1 := Bk, (6)
where Bk is the mean ability at which a worker is exactly indifferent between the two occu-
pations. This shows that workers with a higher belief about their mean ability choose higher
occupations. since these workers can always mimic the choices of workers with lower beliefs,
they have to earn higher wages than those. And since they choose better occupations, better
occupations can be identified by the fact that they pay on average higher wages.
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Since we assumed that there are enough workers with positive mean ability, all but the
home production occupation will obtain strictly positive profits in equilibrium. To fulfill market
clearing, it has to hold for all k > 0 that
F (Bk+1)− F (Bk) = γk, (7)
where BK+1 =∞. Moreover, (6) implies B1 = Π1/P1 and the measure of employed workers has
to equal the overall demand for workers, which determines Π1.
16 Then (6) and (7) can be used
successively for higher k to determine the profits for all higher occupations. This constructively
gives existence and exact levels for the profits in all occupations.
3.1.2 Occupational mobility conditional on expected ability
An important part of the previous analysis is that it gives the levels Bk that determine at which
belief a worker switches to a different occupation.
Consider a worker who has worked for t > 1 years and had a prior of A ∈ [Bk, Bk+1) in his
t′th year of work. That is, he chose occupation k in the last period he worked. He will switch to
a higher occupation between t and t+1 if his posterior At+1 > Bk+1. We denote the probability
of such an upward switch out of occupation k by s+k (t, A
t). Conditioning on At is identical to
conditioning on the expected wage w¯ in (4) because of the one-to-one mapping between the two.
The switching probability is given by
s+k (t, A
t) = 1−Gt(Bk+1|At).
Similarly, if At+1 < Bk then the worker will switch to a lower occupation with a lower mean
wage. We denote the probability of such a downward switch out of occupation k by s−k (t, A
t)
and have
s−k (t, A
t) = Gt(Bk|At).
The total switching probability is then sk(t, A) = s
−
k (t, A) + s
+
k (t, A). The domain of these
functions is [Bk, Bk+1) because only with these priors would a worker choose occupation k.
In the following we will adopt the following convention, where our properties always refer
to the second argument and not to the cohort indicator. Fix the cohort indicator t, then
Definition 2 (U-shapes) A function f(t, .) is U-shaped if it has local maxima at the bound-
aries of its domain and one of these is a global maximum.
16The condition is αT − F (B0) =
∑K
k=1 γk.
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Definition 3 (Strict U-shapes) A function f(t, .) is strictly U-shaped if it is U-shaped and
its negative −f(t, .) is strictly quasi-concave.
U-shapes capture the qualitative feature that switching probabilities increase toward each of
the ends of the domain, i.e. in the context of s(t, .) switching becomes more likely for workers
with low and high expected wages (abilities). Strict U-shapes additionally ensure that the
switching probability increases monotonically from its interior minimum toward the extremes
of the domain.
We will first consider the overall switching probability of a worker with prior A ∈ [Bk, Bk+1)
in his t′th year of his work life
sk(t, A) = Gt(Bk|A) + 1−Gt(Bk+1|A).
We consider interior occupations k ∈ {1, ..., K−1} that are not at the extreme end of the spec-
trum. Since the distribution gt(A
′|A) is symmetric and quasi-concave, the switching probability
is lowest when the prior A is at the midpoint between Bk and Bk+1 and increases the more the
prior moves toward either side of the interval. Figure 5 illustrates this. The solid curve is the
distribution of the posterior mean of an agent with prior Bk :=
Bk+Bk+1
2
. For this worker it is
least likely that his posterior lies outside the boundaries Bk and Bk+1. The dotted curve to the
right is the distribution of the posterior mean for a worker starting with a prior above Bk. It
is more likely that his posterior lies above Bk+1 compared to the solid curve, and this increase
in the upper tail outweighs the decrease in the lower tail below Bk.
Proposition 4 In each interior occupation k and for each cohort t, the switching probability
sk(t, A) is strictly U-shaped in A.
Proof. Let δk = (Bk+1 −Bk) /2 be half of the distance of interval [Bk, Bk+1), and recall that
Bk = Bk + δk. Any other belief A can be written in terms of the distance δ from Bk. Then
sk(t, Bk)− sk(t, Bk + δ) = Gt(Bk|Bk)−G(Bk|Bk + δ) +Gt(Bk+1|Bk + δ)−Gt(Bk+1|Bk)
= Gt(−δk|0)−G(−δk − δ|0) +Gt(δk − δ|0)−Gt(δk|0)
=
∫ δ
0
[gt(−δk − ε|0)− gt(δk − ε|0)] dε, (8)
where the second equality follows from lateral adjustment. Clearly this distance is zero when
δ = 0. Symmetry around zero and single-peakedness imply that the integrand in (8) is strictly
negative for any ε > 0. Therefore, this interval is strictly negative for δ > 0. When δ < 0
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Figure 5: Illustration of the proof of Propositions 4 and 5.
the integrand of (8) is positive for all relevant ε but the range is negative, and so the integral
becomes negative. The proposition obtains because integral (8) decreases in the absolute value
|δ|.
For the extreme occupations of home production k = 0 and of k = K the negative −s(t, .)
is also quasi-concave, but the minimum is at the extreme of the domain, in the case of home
production workers at the top are most likely to switch while in the case of the highest occupa-
tion workers at the bottom are most likely to switch.17 The U-shapes are likely to persist when
we condition on belief A but not on cohort t, yet theoretically there are cases where this does
not hold. The reason is that at the same expected ability older workers have more precision
and switch less. If young workers are mainly in the middle of the interval of mean abilities
associated with a given occupation, while old workers are more at one side, this composition
effect between cohorts can lead workers with interior abilities to switch more than those with
abilities that are a bit more to the side. It is possible to construct examples where this happens
in some occupation.
Next, we describe the direction of switching. Consider some occupation k ∈ {1, ..., K}.
Intuitively, workers with high ability within this occupation and associated high average wages
are the ones that are most likely to have output realization that tell them that they are ap-
propriate for better occupations. In Figure 5 this is visible because the tail of the distribution
that exceeds the upper bound increases as the distribution is shifted to the right. Workers
with low belief about their mean ability are more likely to find out that they are not good
17Proposition 5 provides a more general formal proof for this.
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enough and should move to a less productive occupation. As we mentioned before, such a
switch might manifest itself through firing if the employer learns the same as the worker, or as
a quit due to the fact that the wage in absence of high performance is not good enough in the
current occupation. The following proposition captures this intuition about switching behavior.
It characterizes the probability for upward and downward switches conditional on switching.
If the switching probability sk(t, A) > 0, then the conditional probability of switching up is
s+k (t, A)/sk(t, A), and similar for downward switches.
Proposition 5 Consider workers of experience t in interior occupation k that switch. The
higher ability workers are more likely to switch up and the lower ability workers are more likely
to switch down: s+k (t, A)/sk(t, A) is increasing and s
−
k (t, A)/sk(t, A) is decreasing in A.
Proof. We can write s+k (t, A) = 1−Gt(Bk+1|A) = 1−Gt(Bk+1−A|0), where the second equality
follows from lateral adjustment. This is clearly increasing in A. A similar argument establishes
that s−k (t, A) is decreasing in A. This immediately implies that s
−
k (t, A)/(s
−
k (t, A) + s
+
k (t, A))
is increasing, while 1 minus this term is decreasing.
The analysis so far considered occupational switching conditional on the prior At, which is
equivalent to condition on the expected wage wk(A
t) in (4). This is the easiest benchmark to
establish in this environment.
3.1.3 Occupational mobility conditional on the realized wage
If the firm is not completely symmetrically informed about the worker’s ability, it is optimal
to induce self-selection by the worker by offering the output-contingent wages wk(Xi) in (3)
via boni or penalties for good and bad performance. Performance pay serves therefore a se-
lection mechanism to attract people with the desired skills rather than an incentive device.
An econometrician might not be able to elicit the belief At or the associated expected wage.
Rather, he only observes the realized wage wk(Xi) that already includes performance boni or
penalties. In analogy to our earlier definition about switching probabilities, we will denote the
switching probabilities of a worker of cohort t who earned a wage w in the period t of his work
life as Sk(t, w). Similarly, S
+
k (t, w) denotes the probability of upward switches and S
−
k (t, w) the
probability of downward switches. The domain of these functions is the entire real line since
realized wages can take any value. We will establish the following two results.
Proposition 6 In each interior occupation k and for each cohort t, the switching probability
Sk(t, w) is U-shaped in w.
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Proof. See Appendix A1.1.
Figure 6 illustrates the logic behind the result. Given the wage w, we can back out from
(3) the output realization X(w) which is positively related with the wage. A worker with prior
A will switch if his posterior mean exceeds the upper bound Bk+1. For given output X(w)
those workers with A > Aw = (Bk+1 − (1 − α)X(w))/α switch upward, where α = φt/φt+1
is the weight in updating according to (5). Since the prior A is below Bk+1 for workers who
chose occupation k, no worker switches up if X (w) below Bk+1. By a similar logic, for X(w)
above Bk no worker switches down, so that the switching probability is minimal in the interior.
The range of prior means A for which the workers switch upward becomes larger as the wage
increases, and for high enough wages even the lowest type with prior Bk would switch upward
and the switching probability becomes one. Similarly, when wages are low enough all workers
will switch down and again the switching probability has a local (and global) maximum of
one.18
Weak U-shapes arise even if we do not condition on cohort identifier t, i.e. we only condition
on the wage a person received in a given period in an occupation. Clearly for some intermediate
wages the switching probability is less than one, while for very low and for very high wages any
worker that chose occupation k is induced to switch.
Bk
Bk+1Bk
Aw =
Bk+1−(1−α)X(w)
α
Mean of
Ability
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output X(w)
Figure 6: Illustration of the proof of Propositions 6 and 7.
As in Section 3.1.2 we again obtain the following directions for switching similar to those
in the data.
Proposition 7 In interior occupation k, among workers of experience t that switch the higher
wage workers are more likely to switch up and lower wage workers are more likely to switch
down. That is, S+k (t, w)/Sk(t, w) is increasing in w and S
−
k (t, w)/Sk(t, w) is decreasing in w.
18The reason why the switching probability might not be strictly U-shaped has to do with an inference effect.
Consider a wage w at which all workers with prior mean above Aw switch upward. At a higher wage w′ the
range of priors at which workers will switch extends, i.e. Aw′ is lower than Aw. While this extends the region
[Aw, Bk+1) in which workers switch and decreases the region [Bk, Aw′) where workers stay, it also changes the
likelihood that a given worker at this wage is from the first interval relative to the second. It is possible that
higher wages mean that the lower interval is more likely, which can lead to non-monotonicities.
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Proof. Conditional on switching means that output X(w) = (w − Πk)/Pk is either below Bk,
in which the case the worker switches downward for sure. Or X(w) is above Bk+1, in which
case the move is upward because the belief about mean ability has improved.
3.1.4 Wage changes associated with occupational switching: Theory
The model has the immediate feature that cohorts with more years in the labor market receive
on average higher wages. This is an immediate effect of learning, which allows workers to sort
themselves into more appropriate occupations.
As a secondary result of our analysis we also obtain predictions about the behavior of
wages of workers of the same cohort who switch occupations relative to those who stay in an
occupation.
Corollary 8 Consider workers who work in occupation k after t years of labor market expe-
rience, and consider the wage in year t + 1. The average wage for those workers who stay in
occupation k is strictly higher than for those who switch down to an occupation lower than k,
and is strictly lower than for those who switch up to an occupation higher than k.
The result follows immediately because wages are linear in expected ability and these
expected abilities are strictly ranked: workers who switch up do so because their expectation
about their ability went up above Bk+1 while workers who stayed have an expectation about
mean ability in [Bk, Bk+1] and workers who switched down have expectations about their mean
ability below Bk.
When workers switch from occupation k to occupation k′, we can compare the wage relative
to stayers in k as in the preceding corollary. Alternatively, we can compare the wages of the
switchers to those who stayed in occupation k′, i.e. the stayers in the occupation into which the
switchers moved. The model has a tendency towards lower wages for workers who switch up
relative to the incumbents of the occupation they move to, while switchers to lower occupations
tend to do better than the incumbents. This is easy to show for adjacent occupations that are
not too large.19
Proposition 9 Consider workers with the same labor market experience and occupations that
are not too large. Workers that switch from occupation k up into occupation k′ = k + 1 earn
on average less than those that were already in k′ and stayed there. Worker that witch from
19An important part of the proof is the concavity in the relative range, which leads to differentials in the slope
of the distribution of updates in the relevant range. Concavity is only a sufficient condition and not necessary,
but significantly simplifies the argument.
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occupation k down into occupation k′ = k−1 earn on average more than those that were already
in k′ and stayed there.
Proof. Consider workers with t years of labor market experience that chose occupation k and
those that chose occupation k′. In year t+1 we compare their wages, conditional on choosing k′.
All workers that we compare have some belief At in Bk−1, Bk in year t. We are only interested
in workers that have a belief in the same range in t + 1. The distribution of the update is
concave in the relevant region if Bk+1 − Bk−1 is not too large since normal distributions are
concave around their mean.20 The range Bk+1 − Bk−1 is small when the occupations are not
too large.
The workers update At+1 is distributed symmetrically around At. If k′ > k, the density of
the update at each point in [Bk, Bk+1] is higher (because of symmetry and single-peakedness)
and has a larger derivative (because of concavity) for any stayer than for any switcher. It then
follows directly that the conditional distribution of the update, conditional on At ∈ [Bk, Bk+1],
for stayers first order stochastically dominates the distribution for switchers. The implication
for expected wages follows immediately. For k′ < k the density is still higher but the derivative
is lower, which directly implies that the distribution for switchers first order stochastically
dominates the distribution for stayers.
Finally, we should note that for stayers there is no particular channel for wage gains from
one period to the next in this simple environment (we discuss human capital later). Nevertheless
overall wages grow due to better assignment of workers over time. There is scope for wage gains
for both types of switchers in this model: Workers who switch down do so because they had a
particularly bad wage this period and are likely to do better next period, and additionally switch
to a more suitable occupation. It can be shown that these workers always exhibit wage gains.21
Workers who switch to higher occupations did so because they had a particularly productive
20In particular we require Bk+1 −Bk−1 <
√
φt+1/(φ + φt).
21Consider a worker with wage w in occupation k and associate output X(w) = (w + Πk)/Pk. He switches
downward only if A ≥ Bk but X(w) < Bk, and thus X(w) < A. If he stayed in occupation k, then his expected
wage according to (4) after switching is PkA′ −Πk where A′ = αA+ (1− α)X(w) and α = φt/φt+1. We have
PkA
′ −Πk > w
⇔ PkαA+ Pk(1− α)X(w)−Πk > w
⇔ αA > αX(w), (9)
which we showed to be true. Moreover, a worker only switches if this improves his expected wage relative to
staying in the previous occupation, and therefore E−(w′|w) > PkA′ − Πk > w. This proves that a downward
move is on average associated with an improvement of the wage. The logic does not apply to upward shifts,
because in this case X(w) > A. Therefore inequality (9) is no longer true and the wage would on average go
down relative to the previous period if the worker remained in k. Whether the reallocation improves the wage
enough relative to this wage decrease depends on the exact difference Pk+1 − Pk.
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year. While their productivity is likely to be not as high next period (mean reversion towards
the prior), the gain due to a better suited occupation can outweigh this effect and lead to gains
in expected wages.
3.1.5 Wage changes associated with occupational switching: Evidence
Closer investigation of the data supports these conclusions about wage dynamics. Workers who
switched to higher ranking occupations from period t to t + 1 have higher wages, in their new
occupation in period t+1, than workers who stayed in the same original occupation from period
t to t + 1. The opposite is true for workers who switched to lower ranking occupation from
period t to t + 1 who have lower wages in their new occupation in period t + 1 than the wage
in period t + 1 of workers who stayed in the same original occupation from period t to t + 1.
This is the ordering of corollary 8.
In order to see the patterns from corollary 8 in the data we compare wage in period t + 1
of workers who stay in the same occupation from period t to t + 1 to workers who switch
occupation up or down from period t to t+ 1. For workers who were in the same occupation, k,
in period t we find the ratio of wages in period t+ 1 of workers who switched to higher ranking
occupations over workers who stayed in occupation k and the ratio of wages in period t+ 1 of
workers who switched to lower ranking occupations over workers who stayed in occupation k.
This gives K ratios of wages from period t + 1 for up-switchers over stayers and K ratios of
wages from period t+ 1 for down-switchers over stayers. We take the weighted average of these
ratios according to the number of workers in each occupation who switched either up or down.
Figure 7(a) shows the weighted average of these ratios.
The ratio of up-switchers over stayers are above 1, which indicates that the wages in period
t+1 of workers who switch up from t to t+1 is higher than the wage of workers who stayed in the
switchers original occupation from period t to t+1. In a similar way the ratio of down-switchers
over stayers is below 1 indicating that workers who switched to lower ranking occupations have
lower wages after the switch than workers who stayed in the same original occupation.
Figure 7(b) shows that the ranking in corollary 8 also is valid when we condition on general
labor market experience. The ratios in figure 7(b) is found for each group of workers from
the same original occupation and with same number of years after graduation. This gives
K∗maximum years in sample number of ratios of up-switchers over stayers and down-switchers
over stayers. We again take the weighted average of the ratios according the number of switchers
in each group. The weighted average is presented in figure 7(b) and shows that corollary 8 also
holds in the data when we conditional on general labor market experience.
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(a) Ratio of real wages in year t+1 for work-
ers who switch occupation over workers stay
conditional on originating from the same oc-
cupation in period t.
(b) Ratio of real wages in year t+1 for work-
ers who switch occupation over workers stay
conditional on originating from the same oc-
cupation in period t and conditional on the
same years of general experience.
Figure 7: Weighted average of ratios of real wages in year t+1 for workers who switch occupation
over workers stay in the same original occupation from year t and t+ 1.
Figure 7 shows what happens to workers who switch from occupation k to occupation k′
relative to stayers in occupation k. Alternatively, figure Figure 8 shows what happens to the
wages of switchers relative to those who stayed in occupation k′. This is the evidence from the
data of proposition 9. In figure 8(a) we construct the weighted average of ratios of wages in
period t+1 from switchers over stayers conditional on being in the same occupation, k′, in year
t+1. From figure 8(a) it is clear that workers who switched to higher ranking occupations have
lower wages after the switch than the stayers in the occupation into which the up-switchers
moved and that the opposite is true for workers who switched to lower ranking occupations.
The ranking from proposition 9 is also true in the data when we condition on years of
general labor market experience. Figure 8(b) shows the weighted average of ratios when we
further condition on the same years of labor market experience. The ratio of workers who
switched to higher ranking occupations over the stayers from their new occupation is less than
1, meaning the up-switchers on average have lower wages than the workers who stayed in
the occupation they switch into. For workers who switched to lower ranking occupations the
opposite is true.
4 Extensions
In this section we discuss three extensions. First, we introduce changes to the productivity
of occupations. Second, we allow for entry of firms. Third, we allow for human capital and
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(a) Ratio of real wages in year t+1 for work-
ers who switch occupation over workers stay
conditional on being in the same occupation
in period t+ 1.
(b) Ratio of real wages in year t+1 for work-
ers who switch occupation over workers stay
conditional on being in the same occupation
in period t + 1 and conditional on the same
years of general experience.
Figure 8: Weighted average of ratios of real wages in year t+1 for workers who switch occupation
over workers stay in the same original occupation from year t and t+ 1.
switching costs (but leave productivities constant).
4.1 Changing Occupational Productivities
We denote calendar time by τ and index occupations by a name r ∈ {0, 1, ..., K} rather than
their rank in terms of productivity, with r = 0 still being home production. We continue to
assume that prices P τr > 0 are a (realization of a possibly stochastic) function of calendar time
for all occupations r > 0. We assume still that the measure of entrepreneurs in an occupation
remains constant. Let rτ (k) be the name of the occupation that has a productivity that is higher
than that in k other occupations. Since workers optimal occupational choice still coincides with
the choices that maximizes their utility in the current period and since the distribution F of
beliefs remains stationary, we can solve the model period by period as outlined in the previous
section. In each period we can assign prices Pk = P
τ
rτ (k)
and solve for the period equilibrium
profits and cutoffs via the same equations (6) and (7) from the previous section. This delivers
the boundaries Bk for this period. The lower and upper boundaries for the beliefs of workers in
occupation rτ (k) in this period are then B
τ
rτ (k) = Bk and B
τ
rτ (k) = Bk+1. We assume strict ranks
of occupations in all periods and denote by Γτr the measure of all jobs that have weakly lower
output prices (i.e. do not belong to more productive occupations) than the jobs in occupation
r in period τ. We call Γτr the position of occupation r in the distribution of productivities.
When the positions for all occupations remain constant between two consecutive periods,
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the switching behavior of workers sr(t, A) is exactly as outlined in the previous section.
22 When
the position of a specific occupation r stays constant for two periods, i.e. Γτr = Γ
τ+1
r , it is easy
to show that still the cutoffs that determine who stays in the occupation remain constant, i.e.
Bτr = B
τ+1
r and B
τ
r = B
τ+1
r , and so the switching behavior of workers in occupation r remains
unchanged. Moreover, in this case it follows directly from lateral adjustment in updating and
symmetry that workers with the highest and lowest belief have equal switching probabilities.
This changes when the relative rankings change.
Proposition 10 When an occupation improves its position, Γτ+1r > Γ
τ
r , the workers with the
lowest prior mean in occupation r are more likely to switch then than their counterparts with
the highest priors, and the ability of the workforce improves in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance relative to the previous period. For a declining occupations with Γτ+1r < Γ
τ
r the
opposite is the case.
Proof. We will consider the case Γτ+1r > Γ
τ
r ; the other case follows by analogous arguments.
In period τ the workers with the highest belief in occupation r have belief B
τ
r and those with
the lowest belief have Bτr . The shift in the position implies that B
τ+1
r > B
τ
r and B
τ+1
r > B
τ
r .
Workers stay in occupation r if their posterior belief is in [Bτ+1r , B
τ+1
r ). Since this interval is
closer to B
τ
r than to B
τ
r the likelihood that the update falls in this interval is higher for the
high worker types. The fact that the mean abilities of the workers that choose occupation r get
higher in the sense that Bτ+1r > B
τ
r and B
τ+1
r > B
τ
r implies first order stochastic dominance of
the ability distribution.
Changes in the position of an occupation have direct consequences for the wages that are
paid. Clearly, since the workforce becomes better the improvement is associated with rising
wages. Also we obtain predictions for the wages of stayers, i.e. of those workers that do
not change occupations. The conditions in the following propositions are fulfilled for example
when two occupations of equal size switch productivities while the productivities of all other
occupations stay the same, but also hold under other reasons for changes in position induced
by shifts of multiple occupations.
Proposition 11 If the position of an occupation increases sufficiently in the sense that Γτ+1r ≥
Γτr + γr, then workers that stay in this rising occupation all earned wages above the occupation
average in period τ. For a sufficient decline Γτ+1r ≤ Γτr − γr workers that stay in this declining
occupation earned wages below the occupation average.
22The function Sr(t, w) is constant only if also the prices remain constant for both periods.
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Proof. The rising occupation attracts workers with mean ability in [Bτr , B
τ
r) in τ. The condition
Γτ+1r ≥ Γτr + γr implies that the lower bound in the next period is higher than the upper bound
in τ, i.e. Bτ+1r ≥ Bτr . Since the average wage w¯τr (Bτr) according to (3) of the worker with the
highest belief A = B
τ
r is above the occupation average in period τ , workers that earn below
average wages earn a wage below w¯τr (B
τ
r). They therefore have output observations X that are
below B
τ
r . Therefore no worker with below average wages improves his posterior above B
τ
r , and
therefore none of them improves his posterior into the range [Bτ+1r , B
τ+1
r ). In contrast, some of
the workers with above average wages improve their posteriors into [Bτ+1r , B
τ+1
r ) and are suited
for the rising occupation. A similar argument applies to the declining occupation.
The result is driven by the fact that only those workers stay whose posterior improves
in line with the increase in occupational importance and who, thus, remain suitable for this
occupation. Only workers with above average wages fulfill this criterion. Even if we relax
Γτ+1r ≥ Γτr + γr a bit such that high ability workers remain even after an output realization
below their expected average, the statement still remains true because these retained workers
still earn more than the occupational average. If we relax this condition further some workers
with high prior will stay even when they earn wages below the occupational average because
their posterior is still sufficiently above initial period’s lower bound Bτr . In general, the more
Γτ+1r improves over Γ
τ
r , the higher the lower bound of wages of the workers who still remain in
the occupation. Similarly for a declining occupation: The more the position Γτ+1r drops below
Γτr , the lower the higher bound on wages of the workers who still remain in the occupation.
4.1.1 Mobility in response to shocks: Evidence
Consistent with the theory, in the data we find that lower paid workers in a given occupation
tend to leave it when occupational productivity rises, while higher paid workers in a given
occupation are more likely to leave it when productivity of the occupation declines. We examine
this in the data by studying occupations with different growth rates of the average wage. The
average wage of an occupation is found in the same two ways as in section 2.3. First, we find
the average wage of the full time private sector workers in a given occupation in a given year.
Alternatively, we find the average wage of an occupation in a given year by using our selected
sample to run a wage regression for each occupation where we include time dummies in the
regression. We use use the coefficients on the time dummies in the regression as the average
residual occupational wage in a given year.
Next, for each of these two notions of the average wage, we calculate the percent increase
between each two consecutive years between 1995 and 2002. Figure 9(a) plots three groups of
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(a) wage distribution of raw wages within oc-
cupation and year. Growth rates of average
wage in occupation from population.
(b) wage distribution of wages residuals.
Growth rates of average wage in occupation
from time constants in wage regression.
Figure 9: Non-parametric plot of direction of occupational mobility, conditional on switching
occupation.
occupations, separated by the growth rates in raw average wages between years t and t+1. The
first group consists of the 10 percent of occupations with the lowest growth rates, the second
group is the 10 percent of occupations with the highest growth rates, and the third group is
the occupations with growth rates in average occupational wages in the middle 80 percent.
For the three different occupational groups we plot the probabilities of switching occupation
as function of the workers’ position in wage distribution in their occupation in year t. Figures
9(a) and 9(b) show that workers in the lowest growing occupations between t and t + 1 have
higher probability of leaving their occupation between t and t+ 1 if the are from the upper end
of the occupational wage distribution in year t. Workers in the fast growing occupations have
higher probability of changing occupation if they are in the low end of the wage distribution in
their occupation. Workers in occupation, which grows faster than the slowest 10 percent but
slower than the fastest 10 percent, have a probability of changing occupation that is U-shaped
in their in their wage percentile.23
4.2 Free Entry into Occupations
In the previous section we have taken the number of jobs per occupation as fixed. Here we briefly
outline that the model extends to an economy in which jobs can be created at some opportunity
cost. Clearly entry costs have to differ between occupations to sustain several occupations with
different productivities (since otherwise only the most productive occupations will operate).
23The results is robust to calculating average wage change of the occupation only from workers who stay in
the occupation between t and t+ 1.
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Assume that the per-period cost to create and maintain a job in occupation k (or r if we
adopt the notation from the previous subsection) is given by Ck(γk) = ck + c(γk), except for
home production sector k = 0 where entry costs C0(γ0) = 0. That is, there is a fixed cost ck
independent of the number of other entrepreneurs who create jobs, and a component c(γk) that
depends on the overall number of entrants into the occupation.
If we assume that c(γk) = 0, then we have perfectly elastic supply of jobs. This corresponds
to a model in which workers can simply rent jobs at cost ck. Occupations with lower productivity
have to have lower costs as otherwise no worker would rent the machine. In such a world the
gross per-period profits Πk have to equal the per-period cost ck. The model is particularly
simple to solve because firms profits are exogenously tied to the entry costs.
The drawback of having only fixed costs ck is the response of the market when productivities
change over time. Among the occupations that hire workers, those with lower productivity
have to have lower fixed costs because otherwise they would not be competitive and would
not hire any workers. As long as the rank of occupations does not change the analysis is
straightforward. Yet if an occupation changes rank with the next higher occupation, then it
has higher productivity and lower costs and the other occupation completely disappears. There
are various reasons why we don’t expect this to occur: Prices might change in response to output
changes or costs might change in response to the number of jobs in the occupation. The second
might reflect the fact that resources into production become scarce when more entrepreneurs
produce. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as cost heterogeneity among entrepreneurs and
c(γk) reflects the costs of the marginal entrant: The more entrepreneurs enter the less able the
marginal one is.24 We integrate this idea into the model by assuming that c(.) is increasing
and convex. If prices are always high enough to cover the fixed cost, then Inada conditions on
the second component ensure that even with changing productivities no occupation completely
vanishes, but the level of operation might substantially vary.2526
An equilibrium is now a tuple Π = (Π0, ...,ΠK) of profits and a tuple γ = (γ0, ...γK) of
24In the interpretation all infra-marginal entrants will generate profits larger than their costs. Only the
marginal entrant will be exactly indifferent to entering.
25In particular, it is easy to verify that the following conditions ensure employment in all occupations k > 0 in
all periods. Assume that c′(0) = 0 and there is some constant ψ > 0 and employment level e = [αT −F (ψ)]/K
such that limγ→ε c′(γ) =∞. This ensures that no occupation employs more than e workers. Moreover, let P > 0
be the lowest price that can ever arise in any occupation (apart from home production). Then ψP > maxk ck
ensures that it is optimal to have at least some employment in each occupation at each point in time because
the worker with ability ψ never gets employed and therefore could be hired for free.
26Another alternative formulation that ensures the operation of all occupations is that prices are changing
while entry costs remain constant, i.e. Pk(γk) is dependent on the level of employment and Ck is fixed. Together
with some Inada conditions still all occupation remain active, but the requirement that Πk = Ck implies that
the equilibrium ordering of the productivities Pk(γk) of occupations cannot change.
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entry levels such that all conditions in Equilibrium Definition 1 are satisfied and additionally
it holds that Πk = C(γk) for all k > 0. All results regarding switching behavior from Section 3
apply, only that now the cutoffs Bk are determined in a way that incorporates optimal entry.
It is easy to solve for these cutoffs by considering the following set of equations in analogy to
(6) and (7)
C(γk)− C(γk−1)
Pk − Pk−1 = Bk, (10)
F (Bk)− F (Bk−1) = γk, (11)
for all k > 0.
Equation system (10) and (11) allows us to determine the size of each occupation in each
period even in the case when productivities are changing as in the previous Subsection 4.1. We
can now define an improving occupation in the sense of Proposition 10 as one that improves
its position at both the high and the low end, i.e. Γτ+1r > Γ
τ
r and Γ
τ+1
r − γτ+1r > Γτr − γτr .27
A sufficient increase in the sense of Proposition 11 still means Γτ+1r ≥ Γτr + γτr . With these
extended definitions the propositions remain valid. If on the other hand an occupation with
increasing productivity expands so much in size that the measure of jobs with strictly lower
productivities Γr − γr actually decreases, it starts to employ not only more high ability but
also more low ability workers. When we consider a smooth increase in the productivity of
occupation m and hold the other productivities fixed, it is easy to see that the expansion of the
workforce is continuous but the position switches upward when it overtakes another profession,
at which point indeed both upper and lower position Γr and Γr − γr increase jointly and the
ability of the work force improves substantially in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
4.3 Human Capital and Switching Costs
Here we briefly introduce human capital and switching costs in the basic environment of Section
4.1. Whenever a worker wants to switch into occupation k he has to pay cost κk. This captures
application effort, retraining costs and time the worker is not on the job. A worker who is
t years of experience in the labor market has human capital H(t). Moreover, a worker who
has already worked ι consecutive years in occupation k has human capital hk(ι) in the next
period. We normalize both forms of human capital to be zero in the first year, and assume
that the human capital functions are weakly increasing. If a worker switches occupation, he
looses his human capital and ι = 0. The output of a worker with t years of general labor market
27Again superscripts indicate the period.
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experience and ι years of occupational experience in occupation k is in analogy to (2)
Xk = ai +H(t) + hk(ι) + εi. (12)
Wages are still determined by (3) given the profit Πk that firms want to obtain. The main
difference to the previous sections is that workers solve a dynamic programming problem when
deciding on the optimal occupation decision. Since human capital is a deterministic function, a
worker who observes his output can back out X˜i = ai+εi, and therefore learning is not affected
by human capital accumulation and the distribution of mean abilities F remains unchanged.
We again consider a stationary equilibrium where firms’ equilibrium profits Πk remain constant
over time. We define the precise notion of an equilibrium for this setup in Appendix A1.2.
Consider first the implication of general human capital (H(t) strictly increasing) for occu-
pational switching, abstracting from switching costs (hk(ι) = 0, κ = 0). Compared to a world
without human capital the distribution of worker productivity now shifts by H(t) for workers
with t years of experience, since the relevant measure of a worker’s ability in producing output
is ai+H(t). Even though new workers have the same relevant ability in either case, with general
human capital older workers become more productive and induce tougher competition for jobs
in productive occupations. Therefore, young workers start lower and in expectation move up
to better occupations over the lifetime. Human capital induces a drift towards more productive
occupations. This leads naturally to somewhat higher aggregate probability of switching to
higher than to lower occupations, as is visible in Figure 3.28
Even in the presence of switching costs (hk(ι) increasing, κ > 0) it is straightforward to
show that our insights on U-shapes in Propositions 6 and 7 carry over to this setting. For any
interior occupation k ∈ {1, ..., K − 1} there is an upper and lower bound on the prior mean A
among the agents that choose these occupations. Given that the expected wage per period is
Pk(A+H(t) + hk(ι))− Πk
workers with very low priors will not have enough periods of employment left to recover the
losses if they don’t choose home production. For agents with very high priors it clearly domi-
nates to choose the highest occupation. Therefore the priors of workers who choose intermediate
occupations are bounded. After very high wage observations any worker that chose an inter-
mediate occupation will update his prior above the upper bound and choose occupation K, so
28Hall and Kasten (1976) and a number of later papers (e.g., Miller (1984), Sichernam and Galor (1990)) have
also found that there is a systematic tendency for workers to move up to higher paying occupations with age.
Wilk and Sackett (1996) have noted the tendency of workers to move to occupations requiring higher cognitive
skills with age.
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that for very high occupations the probability to switch upward is one. Similarly, for very low
wage observations the probability to switch downward is one. For some intermediate wages
some agents do not change occupations, introducing an interior minimum.
5 Connection to existing models
5.1 Basic Search Models
As outlined in the Introduction, work on occupation-specific mobility is based on the assumption
that workers sort themselves according to the fit of the worker to the occupation. The standard
assumption is that all occupations are essentially the same, only that a worker might fit better
to some occupation than to another. This is usually modeled as a shock which the worker learns
over time (McCall (1990), Neal (1999)). In such models low wages are an indication of a bad
match, and low wage workers are the ones who leave in order to find a better match. In contrast
to such “horizontal” heterogeneity of occupations we pursue the idea of “vertical” heterogeneity
in which some occupations are more productive than others. Also workers are heterogeneous,
and there is complementarity between workers and occupations. In such a world a bad fit can
be characterized by underqualification or overqualification of a worker for a particular job. This
means that not only low wage workers leave an occupation, but also very qualified workers with
high wages.
5.2 Roy model
The idea that occupations might be vertically ordered goes back at least to Roy (1951). In the
basic version of the Roy model according to the formalization in Heckman and Honore (1990)
there are two occupations 1 and 2. Each worker is endowed with a two-dimensional skill set
(s1, s2) that describes his skill in each occupation. A worker observes his skills perfectly but
they are unobserved by the econometrician. The skill-endowment in the population is governed
by some two-dimensional type distribution. The output in occupation i can be sold for price
Pi to which we refer as the occupation’s productivity. The wage of a worker with skills (s1, s2)
is P1s1 in occupation 1 and P2s2 in occupation 2. Each worker chooses the occupation where
he earns the highest wage.
Figure 10 illustrates the implications of the Roy model. The dotted curve illustrates the
skill distribution. In general this can be some arbitrary cloud. The specific version drawn is
one of absolute advantage in which a person with a high skill in one occupation also has a high
skill in the other occupation. The solid curve is the indifference curve between the two sectors:
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All workers whose type lies below that line prefer occupation 1 while all workers whose types
lie above prefer occupation 2. Since wages are linear in skills, the line goes through the origin.
The distinguishing feature is that there are enough jobs in each occupation, and each worker
who wants to work in an occupation can do so and earn the prevailing wages. Occupational
switching arises only if prices change and the solid curve shifts, i.e. the model focuses on gross
mobility.
s1
s2
skill distribution in society
indifference curve:P1s1 = P2s2
Figure 10: Illustration of the Roy model. si and Pi: skill level and price of output in occupation
i ∈ {1, 2}.
In our model workers are characterized by their ability a that is common across all sectors.
Of main concern is the learning about this ability. Yet with only two sectors and known abilities
our model can be compared to the Roy model. The main difference to the Roy model is that the
skill distribution is (a, a) and thus goes through the origin, while the indifference curve does no
longer go through the origin since the profits that entrepreneurs earn in each of the occupations
introduces an intercept. These profits are due to the scarcity of the production opportunities,
which introduces competition among workers for jobs and sets our approach apart from the
Roy model. We illustrate the features of our model in Figure 11.
For given prices P1 and P2 the models are similar since that Figures (10) and (11) are
rotations of one another. In this sense one can interpret our model as an extension of the Roy
model to multiple occupations and learning about one’s type which induces net mobility even
when productivities are not changing. When prices P1 and P2 are changing, our model still
resembles the Roy model when there are fixed costs of entry of entrepreneurs into occupations
because each worker can simply ”rent” at job at the entry cost.
When the number of entrepreneurs is fixed due to a limited stock of knowledgeable en-
trepreneurs (or if the production costs of the marginal entrepreneur is increasing in the mass of
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s1
s2
skill distribution in society
indifference curve:P1s1 −Π1 = P2s2 −Π2
Figure 11: Illustration of our model. si = a: skill level in occupation i ∈ {1, 2}. Pi and Πi:
Price of output and profit in occupation i ∈ {1, 2}.
entrants) then our model differs with respect to the standard Roy model when prices change.
For example if price P1 goes up, in the Roy model the black indifference curve becomes flatter
and therefore more workers choose jobs in occupation 1 - i.e. the low productivity workers from
sector one change to sector two. In contrast, in our model in Figure 11 both the slope and
the intercept of the indifference curve change: Jobs in occupation 1 become more attractive,
but since their supply is limited their price will rise and the intercept between the dotted and
solid curve remains. Workers behavior will change substantially once P1 becomes so large that
the ranking between occupations change, i.e. when occupation 1 becomes more productive
than occupation 1. Then good workers sort themselves into the now better occupation 2 while
worse workers select themselves into occupation 1. Occupations that move up in the productive
hierarchy increase their high-skilled workforce but reduce their low-skilled workforce, while in
the Roy model all workers stay in an occupation that becomes more productive.
The difference in predictions is driven by differing assumptions about the scarcity of pro-
duction factors. In the Roy model, there is abundance of production opportunities in each
occupation. This turns the economy into an individual worker’s decision problem that is in-
dependent of the other workers. If an occupation becomes more productive while the others
stay unchanged, than each worker will view the more productive occupation as more attractive
than before. No worker will quit this occupation, and some will enter because it now dominates
their previous occupation. In contrast, in our model scarcity production factors implies that
the opportunity cost of employing some type of worker is endogenous and depends on which
other worker types are available in the economy. When productivity of an occupation increases
then it is not only the productivity of its existing workforce that increases, but also the pro-
ductivity of alternative workers that are not currently employed there. Exactly at the point
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when one occupation exceeds another in terms of productivity, the opportunity cost of forgoing
alternative workers exceeds the increase in productivity of the existing workforce because of the
complementarities between workers and firms. While human capital and match-specific factors
will prevent an extreme exchange of the workforce between the occupations in reality, the effi-
ciency effect of better sorting is still likely to lead to shedding of bad workers and expansion of
good workers in particularly fast-growing occupations.
5.3 Learning about Ability
In our model agent i sorts himself into the occupation that has the highest expected wage given
his past output realizations, i.e.,sorting is based on: E[Pk(ai + εit) − Πk|X0, X1, ..., Xt−1] =
PkAit − Πk. Now assume alternatively that wages are raised to an exponential:
E[e{Pk(ai+εit)−Πk}|X0, X1, ..., Xt−1]. This specification resembles the setup in Gibbons, Katz,
Lemieux, and Parent (2005), who additionally have a term in the exponent that captures
observable characteristics. Exponentiation has two main effects. First, the costs Πk are now a
fraction and are thus harder to interpret. Second, the error terms on no longer zero on average.
Rather, positive errors are more important than negative ones. Since the same key features
are at work as in our model, similar results can be derived for the switching decisions. The
expectation can be rewritten as e{PkAit+(1/2)P
2
kφ
−2
t −Πk}. Since workers preferences are invariant
to monotone transformations, we can take the logarithm of this expression, and a worker now
sorts himself into the occupation with the highest
PkAit + (1/2)P
2
kφ
−2
t − Πk.
In this specification, mean ability alone is no longer a sufficient statistic to determine current
period decisions. Rather, of two agents with similar mean ability A, the one with the higher
variance will sort himself into the higher occupation. Since φt goes up with general labor market
experience, the middle term deterministically decreases for older workers, and it decreases more
in high occupations than in low ones. Therefore, this model induces a drift to lower occupations
as workers age, but otherwise the decisions are similar to our slightly simpler setting.
5.4 Island Economies
The scarcity of production factors in our approach is similar to the setup in Lucas and Prescott
(1974). In their language each occupation is called an island. The prices on each island
are determined competitively given the scarcity of the production factors. This leads to an
efficient allocation of resources in our model as well as in theirs. In contrast to their model we
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have heterogeneous workers and a supermodular production function, which leads to sorting
of specific workers to specific islands. The learning in our environment leads to the specific
correlations of wages and switching behavior that seems consistent with the data that we
document.
5.5 Career Progressions
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997), Sichernam and Galor (1990) suggest that some occupations form
rungs of a career ladder. Workers spend time on the lower rungs accumulating skills that allow
them to perform effectively at higher rungs. Our setup and these theories share the idea that
occupations maybe vertically ranked. However, while their models describe only the upward
mobility or theory generates mobility in both directions.
6 Conclusion
Using administrative panel data on 100% of Danish population we document a new set of facts
characterizing the patterns of occupational mobility. We find that a worker’s probability of
switching occupation is U-shaped in her position in the wage distribution in her occupation.
It is the workers with the highest or lowest wages in their occupations who have the highest
probability of leaving the occupation. Workers with higher (lower) relative wage within their
occupation tend to switch to occupations with higher (lower) average wages. Higher (lower) paid
workers within their occupation tend to leave it when relative productivity of that occupation
declines (rises).
These facts are not implied by existing theories of occupational mobility that mostly treat
occupations as horizontally differentiated sets of tasks. We suggest that it might be productive
to think of occupations as forming vertical hierarchies. Workers who are unsure of their abilities
learn about them by observing their output realizations. Employment opportunities in each
occupation are scarce, inducing competition among workers for them. Complementarities in the
production function between worker’s ability and productivity of an occupation induce sorting
of workers into occupations according to their expected ability. We present an equilibrium
model of occupational choice with these features and show analytically that it is consistent
with patterns of mobility described above.
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APPENDICES
A1 Omitted Proofs and Derivations
A1.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider an agent at the beginning of his t’th year in the labor market who has prior A about
his mean ability and who chose occupation k this period. After observing wage w he can infer
by (3) his output X(w) = (w + Πk)/Pk in the current period. Given that the worker chose
occupation k, his prior is in [Bk, Bk+1). His posterior is according to (5) A
′ = αA+(1−α)X(w),
where the weight α = φt/φt+1 depends on his labor market experience t. He will switch only
if his posterior either exceeds Bk+1 or is below Bk. Therefore, for any X (w) ∈ [Bk, Bk+1) or
respectively for wages w ∈ [PkBk − Πk, PkBk+1 − Πk) the switching probability for workers
is zero, and therefore the minimum of Sk(t, w) is in the interior of the domain. For wages
above PkBk+1 −Πk workers will switch upward if αA+ (1− α)X(w) > Bk+1. Even the worker
with the lowest belief A = Bk will switch if αBk + (1 − α)X(w) > Bk+1 or equivalently if
w > Pk(Bk+1−αBk)/(1−α)−Πk. Therefore, toward the upper end of the domain the switching
probability becomes one and therefore we have a local (and global) maximum. Similarly, for
all low wages below w < Pk(Bk − αBk+1)/(1 − α) − Πk the switching probability is also one,
only that in this case workers switch to lower occupations.
A1.2 Equilibrium definition with human capital and switching costs
The output-contingent wages of workers are still given by (3), where output is now determined
by (12). The expected wage for a worker in occupation k with prior mean A and experience ι
in this occupation is therefore in analogy to (4)
w¯k(A, t, ι) = Pk[A+H(t) + hk(ι)]− Πk.
For any given profit vector Π = (Π0, ...,ΠK) workers can forecast their expected wages in all
occupations for given prior and given experience. A worker can then evaluate his optimal choice
of occupation by simple backward induction. A worker’s state vector at the beginning of each
period is (t, k, ι, A) : his year in the labor market t, the occupation k he was last employed in,
the consecutive years of experience in this occupation ι and his belief about his mean ability
A. Newborns start with home production as their previous occupation. In the last year of his
life the worker optimizes
V (T, k, ι, A) = max
{
w¯k(A, T, ι),max
m 6=k
{w¯m(A, T, 0)− κm}
}
,
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i.e. he chooses whether to stay in his previous occupation or to switch to a new occupation
with zero experience and pay the switching costs. This gives a decision rule d(T, k, ι, A|Π) ∈
{0, ..., K} regarding the occupation that the worker chooses given the profits that firms make.
Similarly, a worker with t < T years of experience maximizes his expected payoff including the
continuation value
V (t, k, ι, A) = max
{
w¯k(A, t, ι) + βEA′V (t+ 1, k, ι+ 1, A
′),
maxm6=k{w¯m(A, t, 0)− κm + βEA′V (t+ 1,m, 1, A′)}
}
,
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor and A′ is the update about the worker’s mean ability.
The solution to this problem gives again a decision rule d(t, k, ι, A|Π) ∈ {0, ..., K}. It is straight-
forward to show that for given profit vector Π these decision rules are unique for almost all
ability levels A. Given the distribution F t(A) of priors of each cohort and these decision rules,
one can derive for given Π the steady-state number of agents that choose occupation k, call it
vk(Π). Similar to Equilibrium Definition 1 we can now define:
Definition 12 An equilibrium is a vector of profits (Π0, ...ΠK) such that Π0 and vk(Π) = γk
for all k > 0.
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A2 Appendix Figures
(a) residual distribution from wage regression not including
firm and industry tenure
(b) residual distribution from wage regression not includ-
ing occupational spell number
Figure A-1: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in residual distributions from different wage regressions.
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Figure A-2: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in the wage distribution within occupation and year for half and double bandwidth.
Figure A-3: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in the wage residuals for half and double bandwidth.
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Figure A-4: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in the wage within occupation, year, and years after graduation for half and double bandwidth.
Figure A-5: Non-parametric plot of probability of switching occupation by worker’s percentile
in the wage within occupation, year, and 1, 2, 4, and 6 years after graduation for half and
double bandwidth.
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-exploiting the link between education and occupation∗
Fane Groes
CAM & University of Copenhagen
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of graduation time on occupational choice for a sample
of young men who all graduate from an apprenticeship in wall painting. The graduates
during low unemployment initially have high probability of working as a painter, low
unemployment probability, and higher incomes than painters if they work in a different
occupation than painting. The young men who graduate during high unemployment
initially have low probability of working as painters, high unemployment, and if they
work in a different occupation than painting, they have lower incomes than their painting
occupation counterparts. Exploiting the link between education and occupation we use a
dynamic discrete choice model to model the occupational choice of young men trained as
painters. The model has two occupations where one of them is the painting occupation and
it has endogenous human capital accumulation in both occupations. Job offer probabilities
for the two occupations depend on aggregate unemployment. Using the model we find
that over the workers’ 40 years in the labor market, the group who graduated during
low unemployment has an 81 % average participation rate in painting and the group
who graduated during high unemployment has an average participation rate of 70 % over
their 40 years in the labor market. By increasing the job offer probability in the painting
occupation in the first year after graduation to 100 % the participation percentages over
the workers’ 40 year work life change to 78 % for the high unemployment graduation
group and to 84 % for the group who graduated during low unemployment.
Chapter 4 of PhD thesis
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1 Introduction
The occupation a workers choose is highly related to the education the workers have. In this
paper we use 11 cohorts of males graduating with a wall-painting apprenticeship to analyze how
occupational choice relates to education. On average close to 70 % of this group of educated
painters are working as painters, 10 % work in other occupations and 20 % are not working.
The percent of educated painters working as painters vary with their time after graduation and
it varies with with the business cycle. For people graduating with an apprenticeship in the
expansion in 1984-1986 there were 90 % working as painters one year after graduation and for
people graduating with a painting apprenticeship in the recession from 1987-1993 there were on
average 63 % of the them who worked as painters the first year after graduation. Ten years after
graduation there are on average 70 % from both the graduation groups who work as painters.
The research question of this paper is to analyze how workers’ occupational choices are
related to their education and how these occupational choices are affected by the aggregate
unemployment rate in their field of training and by the aggregate unemployment rate in the
overall economy. Using a discrete dynamic choice model, which takes account of most workers
preferring to work in their field of education, we want to analyze if there are any long term
consequences of graduating in a recession or an expansion in terms of occupational choices in
a given year after graduation and over the workers’ lifecycles.
One strand of literature on occupational mobility models is e.g. McCall (1990) and Neal
(1999) where occupations are perceived as identical (e.g., not different with respect to skill
requirements), but workers find out the quality of their specific match to an occupation over
time. This paper extends the literature on occupational mobility from McCall (1990) and
Neal (1999) by allowing occupations to be different and letting workers direct their search
to the occupation in which they have trained for. Furthermore, this paper contributes to
the literature on occupational mobility by analyzing who switches between which occupations
when. This is related to the second strand of literature on occupational mobility models which
explains how occupational mobility is related to fluctuating demands for services of different
occupations. The Roy (1951) model (and its extensions in, e.g., Moscarini (2001)) predict that
it is the low productivity workers who leave the occupation in response to a negative change in
demand conditions. The models in Kambourov and Manovskii (2005, 2009a) generically have a
similar prediction. They present a version of the island economy model of Lucas and Prescott
(1974) where islands are interpreted as occupations and workers accumulate occupation-specific
human capital. Human capital is destroyed upon switching occupations which implies that, if
workers with different levels of human capital are perfectly substitutable in the occupational
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production function, it is the low human capital, and hence, low wage, workers that switch first
if occupational demand declines. If occupational demand rises, no one leaves the occupation.
Our model has two occupations, one is the occupation the workers trained for and one
is the alternative occupation, which in our case is an aggregation of all other occupations.
Workers receive job offers from each occupation with some probability each period and when
demand declines it is the workers with the least experience who will be affected more in terms
of job offer probabilities. However, experience in the occupation that the worker trained for
has a higher payoff in the other occupation than experience from the other occupation has in
the occupation for which the trained was trained. For this reason, there is a general drift of
workers from the occupation they trained for to the other occupation when experience increases
in the training-specific occupation. When demand increases all workers will have higher job
offer probabilities in both occupations. Furthermore, since we only have two occupations it is
possible to keep track of experience in both occupations, such that workers who switch back
to an occupation they have worked in before can use their human capital accumulate in the
occupation from before they switched out of it.
We show that most workers choose to work in the occupation they trained for and workers
choice of occupation fluctuates with the aggregate unemployment rate. Workers who graduate
when unemployment rate is high are less likely to work in an occupation related to their field of
education but the majority of workers return to the occupations they trained for when unem-
ployment rate falls. None of the existing theories on occupational mobility have a link between
education and occupation. Some models on occupational mobility (e.g. Groes, Kircher, and
Manovskii (2009)) have that workers have one occupation in which their wages on average al-
ways will be highest however, only by observing the workers choices will this specific occupation
be revealed. It is therefore not possible to determine whether workers are in their preferred
occupation right after graduation since we need many consecutive observations in the same
occupation to infer that this is the optimal occupation for the worker. One advantage of our
theory is that we know when the worker is not in the occupation he is trained for and we
can therefore do counterfactual experiments on how workers who graduate during a recession
will react if e.g. the government helps them to a job in their preferred occupation after they
graduate.
We choose to model the occupational choices of painters because it is clear what occupation
they trained for. Having a clear link between education and occupation allows us to differentiate
further than the choice of blue collar or white collar from e.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997). In the
case of painters this is important because 85 % of the educated painters who work in another
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occupation than painting work in a blue collar occupation. Furthermore, our setup allows for
occupational choices that are directed to a specific occupation, which differs from Neal (1999),
Pavan (2007), and McCall (1990) where initial choice of occupation is random.
The model presented in this paper builds on Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Eckstein and
Wolpin (1999). The setup is a finite-horizon dynamic discrete choice model of occupational
choice where one of the occupations is the one the workers trained for. In each period individuals
choose from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives over a finite horizon in order to maximize
discounted expected utility. Initially all individuals in the model are homogenous in the sense
that they are all in their first year after graduation from a painting apprenticeship. However, the
painting apprentices graduate in different years with different aggregate unemployment rates
in painting and different aggregate unemployment rates from the overall population, which
influences the job offer probabilities, both to receive a job offer as a painter and to receive a
job offer in another occupation than painting.
For Denmark, Holm, Groes, and Olsen (2001) has analyzed the effect on graduation year on
further unemployment rates and employment in industries related to the education. They use
a reduced form logit estimation with spline functions for age to analyze a sample of engineers,
school teachers, and unskilled workers. They find that workers who graduate in a recession
converges to the average worker in terms of unemployment rates by their third year after
graduation. Furthermore they find that workers who graduate in a recession initially have
lower participation in an industry related to their occupation but the workers return to the
given industry when the unemployment rate changes. The return to the industry related to
their education happens fast, such that by 2 years after graduation there are no significant
differences in overall- and specific industry related employment probabilities of people who
graduate during a recession or an expansion.
In this paper we find that workers also do return to the occupation they trained for however,
people who graduate in a recession never catch up with people who graduate in an expansion
in terms of participation rates in the painting occupation. The advantage of our paper is that
we model the workers choices and we will therefore be able to perform counterfactual analyses
that can give suggestions to how government sponsored programs can help people who graduate
during a recession.
The main results from our model are that our model is able to fit most of the patterns
in occupational mobility and transition rates for people graduating with an apprenticeship in
painting. Using the model to perform a counterfactual experiment we find that increasing the
job offer probability in the painting occupation to 100 % for all workers in the first year after
218
they graduate increases the average employment rate in the painting occupation more for the
group who graduated during high unemployment than for the group who graduated during low
unemployment. The results from the model show that the group who graduated during high
unemployment has on average 70 % participation in the painting occupation in all 40 years
they are in the labor market and for the group who graduated during low unemployment this
participation rate is 81 %. By increasing the job offer probability in the painting occupation
in the first year after graduation to 100 % the participation percentages over the workers’ 40
year work life change to 78 % for the high unemployment graduation group and to 84 % for
the group who graduated during low unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the sample of
workers graduating with a painters apprenticeship we use in this paper and in 3 we describe the
occupational mobility patterns and wages over their life cycle and business cycle. In Section 4 we
present the model and in section 5 we show the results from the model using different parameter
choice. In section 6 we present our counterfactual analysis with the preferred parameters from
the model and in section 7 we conclude.
2 Data
We use the administrative Danish register data covering 100% of the population in the years
1980 to 2002. The first part of the data is from the Integrated Database for Labor Market Re-
search (IDA), which contains annual information on socioeconomic variables (e.g., age, gender,
education, etc.) and characteristics of employment (e.g., wage worker, self employed, unem-
ployed, out of the labor force, occupations, industries, etc.) of the population. Information
on wages and income is extracted from the Income Registers and consists of either the hourly
wage in the job held in the last week in November of each year or the after tax income of the
year. Wage and occupational information is not available for workers who are not employed in
the last week of November. The wages and income are deflated to 1980 Danish Kroner using
Statistics Denmark’s consumer price index.
We use the Danish rather than the U.S. data for two reasons. First, the sample size is
much larger. We select males who all graduated from the same education. It is possible to
be this restrictive with the Danish data and at the same time end up with a sufficiently large
sample size. Second, the administrative data minimizes the amount of measurement error
in occupational coding that plagues the available US data (see Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009b)).
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2.0.1 Sample selection
We select all males who at the ages between 17 and 23 who graduated from a wall-painting
apprenticeship in the period 1983 to 1993. While the Danish register data dates back to 1980 we
choose the first year of graduation of our sample to be 1983. During the period 1980-1993 the
painting apprenticeships lasted 3 years in Denmark, and we choose 1983 as the first graduation
year because then we can observe graduates from this period both when they started and when
they graduated from their apprenticeship. We let 1993 be the last year an individual can
graduate from their apprenticeship because there was a law change in the painting education in
1990. People entering a painting degree after 1990 would be both in school half time and work
as an apprentice half time, which is different from our chosen sample where all training occurs
at the chosen firm of the apprenticeship. We restrict the sample to include people between the
ages of 17 and 23 at the time of their graduation in order to minimize experience before the
apprenticeship and this way to get as homogenous a sample as possible. We only select male
workers in order to minimize the impact of the fertility decision on labor market transitions
and we delete all people’s entire history if we observe them returning back to school. We select
graduation years in the early part of the data period in order to be able to follow the individuals
for as long time as possible in the labor market.
There are four reasons why we chose to analyze painters rather than people from another
education/occupation. First, it is clear what occupation an apprenticeship as a painter trains
people for and it is clear what working as a painter entails. Second, there are relatively large
cohorts of painters graduating such that restricting the sample to only one type of education
still leaves a sizable sample. Third, we would like a sample who are likely to be influenced by
business cycles, which also means choosing a sample of workers who work mostly in the private
sector. Forth, the Danish data experiences a break in the occupational classification in 1995
and the painting occupation is one of the few occupations, which have their own occupational
category before and after 1995.
There are 2,522 people graduating during the period 1983-1993 where 1,830 of these were
males. Of these 1,830 there are 1,644 who do not return to school during the period we observe
them. We use occupational codes to classify the majority of workers in painting or in some other
occupation. Occupations included as a painter-occupation are: painting, leadership of compa-
nies with more or less than 10 employees, leadership in craftsmanship companies, leadership in
detail companies, and leadership of companies in the building sector. After classifying workers
with occupational codes there is 29 % of people who are listed as workers during the year but
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who do not have an occupational code. We drop one person who has missing occupational
information all years he is in the sample. We further classify people with missing occupational
codes as painter if they are registered as full time workers in an industry related to painting,
classified as painting businesses. This reduces the number of missing occupations to 18 %. We
proceed to drop people’s entire history in the sample if they have more than 2 years of missing
observations in the sample, which is seven percent of all observations and reduces the sample
to 1,523 people. For people with one year of a missing occupational code we impute their occu-
pational category if possible. If a worker has the same occupation before and after the missing
observation and if he works in the same industry during all three observations, we classify him
with the occupation he had before and after the missing occupation. Furthermore, if a workers
has the same industry in any of the years around his missing observation as he has in the missing
year, we attach the occupation from the matching industry year. Finally we drop all people who
after these procedures still have a missing occupational observation. This leaves a sample of
20,302 observations, which is 1,427 people graduating with an apprenticeship from 1983 to 1993.
Table A-1 in the appendix shows what employment the painters have after graduation. In
table A-1 some people are registered both as working in an occupation and being not employed.
There are seven different employment states, which are painting employee, self employed painter,
blue collar work in construction, other blue collar work, white collar work, and not working.
For our further analysis we will simplify these labor markets into three categories. The first
category is painting, which includes employed and self employed painters, the second is working
in another occupation than painting, which consist of both types of blue collar and white collar
workers, and the last category is not working. We classify an individual as not working if he
is unemployed more than 20 % in a given year, otherwise we classify him as working in either
painting or another occupation.
We use disposable income as our income measure following le Maire and Schjerning (2007).
The gross income is calculated from wage income, capital income, labor market contributions
(since 1994), taxable and non-taxable benefits. To obtain disposable income we subtract tax
payments. It is not possible to use hourly wages as income measure since the self employed do
not receive wages but we will use the notation of wages and income interchangeably.
3 Pattern of Painters
In this section we present a set of descriptive statistics from the data, which motivates the
focus of our model. We want to analyze the occupational patterns of people graduating with
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a painting apprenticeship. Figure A-1 in the appendix shows the percentage of our sample
working in painting, working in another occupation than painting and not working in the years
after they graduate from their apprenticeship. It is clear from figure A-1 that for all years
after graduation, the majority of people with a painting apprenticeship work as painters. The
unemployment rate is highest two years after graduation and the probability of working in
another occupation than painting increases with years after graduation.
(a) Percentages of people two years after
graduation in 3 states.
(b) Yearly disposable income of people two
years after graduation in 2 states.
Figure 1: Percentages in painting, other occupations, and not working and disposable income in
1890 Danish Kroner in painting and other occupations of people with a painting apprenticeship
two years after graduation.
Figure A-1 is the average for all 11 cohorts graduating from 1983 to 1993. Throughout
the period 1983 to 1993 both the overall average unemployment rate and the unemployment
rate for all people, in the population, trained as painters has changed. Figure 1(a) shows the
employment states of people two years after graduation in the period 1985 to 1995 and what
the unemployment rate was for everyone in the population trained as painters during the same
period. Figure 1(a) shows there are up to 20 percentage points difference in the probability of
working as a painter for people who graduated when unemployment rate was low, in the middle
of the 1980’s, as opposed to people graduating when unemployment rate is high, in the beginning
of the 1990’s. At the same time, the percentages of people, two years after graduation, working
in another occupation than painting or not working are higher when the unemployment rate is
high. Furthermore, the average income of people working in another occupation than painting
is lower when unemployment rate is high than the the average income of people working in
another occupation than painting when unemployment rate is low. Figure 1(b) shows this for
the same people two years after graduation as in figure 1(a). Figure 1(b) also shows that the
average income of people, two years after graduation, working in painting does not vary much
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with the unemployment rate. Motivated by figure 1(a) and 1(b) we divide the sample into two
groups. The first group are those who graduated during the low unemployment from 1983 to
1986 and the second group are those who graduated during the high unemployment from 1987
to 1993. It is the descriptive statistics of these two groups which will be the focus of our model.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of people working as painters by years after graduation for
the two groups. As figure 1(a) showed the percentage of the sample working as painters is
smaller for the group who graduated during the recession for the initial years after graduation.
Figure A-2 in the appendix shows that these differences are significant up to 5 years after
graduation but after this there are no significant differences in the percentages who work as
painters from the two groups.
Figure 2: Percentages of people with a painting apprenticeship working in another occupation
than painting for 1983-1986 graduates and 1987-1993 graduates by years after graduation.
Figure 3(a) shows the percentage of the sample working in another occupation than paint-
ing by years after graduation for the two groups. The graduates from 1987 to 1993 have a
higher percentage working in other occupations than painting, relative to the group who grad-
uated from 1983 to 1986, for all years after graduation. However, figure A-3 shows that with
the number of observations in the sample the difference in the percentages working in other
occupations than painting between the two groups are only significant for the first two years.
The model presented in section 4 includes differences in employment probabilities in the
two occupations shown above, which depend on the year of graduation. In the model, the
arrival rate of job offers in the two occupations also determine part of the unemployment for
the two groups. Figure 3(b) shows that the unemployment rate of the two groups have different
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(a) Percentages of two graduation groups
working in other occupations than painting.
(b) Percentages of two graduation groups not
working.
Figure 3: Percentage of people with a painting apprenticeship working in other occupations
than painting or not working for 1983-1986 graduates and 1987-1993 graduates by years after
graduation.
patterns over their first 15 years after graduation and figure A-4 in the appendix shows that
these differences are significantly different for most of the years. The main aim of our model
is to replicate the percentages in each of the three states for the two groups graduating when
either the unemployment rate was low from 1983 to 1986 or when the unemployment rate was
high from 1987 to 1993. Table A-2 in the appendix show the same percentages as figures 2,
3(a), and 3(b) as well as the number of people from the sample in each of the three states.
A second feature of the data we would like the model to replicate is the average income
of the sample in the two occupations by the two different graduation groups. Figure 4(a)
shows that the average disposable income in 1980 Danish Kroner for the sample working as
painters does not differ much by the year of graduation and figure A-2 in the appendix shows
that income of graduates from 1983-1986 are not significantly different from graduates from
1987-1993. Both groups have a large income increase between the first and second year after
graduation, which is likely to be related to the transition from working as an apprentice to
being employed as a (educated) painter. From figure 2 we can further see that the percentage
of the sample working as painters drops after the first year for both graduation groups, which
is also likely to be related to the transition from being an apprentice to being an employed
painter. In the model we model the first year of graduation separately to capture this fact.
Figure 4(b) shows that the average income of the 1987-1993 graduation groups working in other
occupations than painting is lower than the 1983-1986 graduation group up to nine years after
graduation and figure A-6 in the appendix shows that these differences are significant for the
first 3 years after graduation and it is these differences in average income between the two
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graduation groups that we also want our model to capture.
(a) Income of two graduation groups working
in painting.
(b) Income of two graduation groups working
other occupations than in painting.
Figure 4: Yearly disposable income in 1980 Danish Kroner of two graduation groups, 1983-
1986 and 1987-1993. By years after graduation for painters and the sample working in other
occupations than painting.
The last descriptive statistics of the sample of graduates, from a painting apprenticeship,
are the transition probabilities between the three states. Table A-3 and A-4 in the appendix
show the transition probabilities for the two different graduation groups their first eight years in
the sample. We choose to only show the first eight years because this is the longest a graduate
from 1993 can be in the sample. Table A-3 and A-4 show that there are higher persistence in
each state for the graduates from 1983 to 1986 relative to the graduates from 1987 to 1993.
The largest difference in the persistence is in other occupations than painting where conditional
on working in another occupation than painting the period before, the graduates from 1983 to
1986 has 72.8 % probability of working in another occupation than painting in a given period
and for the 1987-1993 graduates this percentage is only 57.8 %. Table 1 and 2 below shows
that the transition rates have larger differences when we look at the transitions between two
and three years after graduation.
For the graduates from 1983 to 1986 the persistence in other occupations than painting is
the same for 2 to 3 years after graduation as it is the first eight years in the sample but for
the graduates from 1987 to 1993 the persistence in other occupations, between 2 and 3 years
after graduation, is significantly lower at 17.8 %. Furthermore, the percentage of the sample
graduating from 1987 to 1993 who chooses painting after working in another occupation than
painting two years after graduation is 46.6 %. From the transition probabilities in table A-3,
A-4, 1, and 2 and the percentage of the sample in each state from figure 2, 3(a), and 3(b)
we find that people with a painting apprenticeship graduating during high unemployment are
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Table 1: Transition matrix between 2 to 3 years after graduation for graduates from 1983 to
1986.
Status in t
Status in t− 1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Number 399 7 60
Row % 85.6 1.5 12.9
Other Occ.
Number 6 21 2
Row % 20.7 72.4 6.9
Unempl.
Number 53 5 56
Row % 46.5 4.4 49.1
more likely to choose to work in another occupation than painting than those who graduate
during low unemployment but the high unemployment graduates are also more likely to switch
from the other occupation to working as a painter. In the model we would like to capture this
fact that high unemployment graduates initially choose another occupation than painting but
switches into painting after a while. In the model different arrival rates of job offers dependent
of the aggregate unemployment rate of all painters in the population and the overall aggregate
unemployment rate of all occupations in the population. Graduates who do not receive a job
offer as a painter after graduation can be employed in another occupation than painting (if they
receive a job offer in that occupation) and once they receive a job offer as a painter they can
switch into painting. Lastly, table A-5 in the appendix shows the persistence probabilities in the
three states for the two different graduation groups by years after graduation. The persistence
of working as a painter is close to the same for the two groups 8 years after graduation and
the difference between the groups varies between 1 to 6 percentage points from 4 to 7 years
after graduation. The patterns are similar for the persistence of working in other occupations
than painting and not working. The longer time after graduation the closer the two graduation
cohorts get to each other in terms of persistence.
4 Model
In this section we present a finite-horizon dynamic discrete choice model of occupational choice
where one of the occupations is the one the workers trained for. This model follows the dynamic
programming approach to labor supply of e.g. Wolpin (1992), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eck-
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Table 2: Transition matrix between 2 to 3 years after graduation for graduates from 1987 to
1993.
Status in t
Status in t− 1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Number 297 9 84
Row % 76.2 2.3 21.5
Other Occ.
Number 47 18 36
Row % 46.5 17.8 35.6
Unempl.
Number 101 21 201
Row % 31.3 6.5 62.2
stein and Wolpin (1999), and Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2008). In each period individuals
choose from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives over a finite horizon in order to maximize
discounted expected utility. Initially all individuals in the model are homogenous in the sense
that they are all in their first year after graduation from a painting apprenticeship. However, the
painting apprentices graduate in different years with different aggregate unemployment rates
in painting and different aggregate unemployment rates for over all in the population, which
influences the job offer probabilities, both to receive a job offer as a painter and to receive a job
offer in another occupation than painting. So far, the model is not estimated but we present
parameters for the model, which match most of the data moments described in section 3. See
section 5 for a discussion of the chosen parameters.
Each individual in the sample graduates from their painting apprenticeship between the age
of 17 and 23 and starts in the labor market at 1 year after graduation (a = 1), and retires after
40 years (a = A = 40). The individuals graduate in 11 different years, from 1983 to 1993, where
each year, t, has an associated aggregate unemployment rate of all painters from population
and an associated aggregate unemployment rate for all occupations in the populations. The
aggregate unemployment rates are known with perfect foresight by the individuals. From the
first year of the model (1984) to 2002 we use actual aggregated unemployment rates from the
population. After 2002 we use the average unemployment rate during the previous period,
which is 7.5 % for the painting occupation and % 6.5 for the overall population. Each period
after graduation the individual can choose between working as a painter (d1a,t = 1), working
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in another occupation than painting (d2a,t = 1) or not working (d
3
a,t = 1). The three choices
are mutually exclusive such that
∑3
j=1 d
j
a,t = 1 for every year after graduation, a, and every
calendar year, t, 1. The periodic utility is,
Ua,t = Ca,t (1)
where Ca,t is consumption of a man educated from a painting apprenticeship a years after
graduation in the calendar t. The budget constraint is given by,
Ca,t = w
1
a,td
1
a,t + w
2
a,td
2
a,t + ba,td
3
a,t (2)
where w1a,t is the wage in the painting occupation, w
2
a,t is the wage in the occupations, which
is not painting, and ba,t is the benefits received if unemployed. The wages (disposable income)
are stochastically offered in each period and follows a log linear function of the
√
Kjt,a with cross
experience terms,
√
K−jt,a , where
√
Kjt,a is the occupation-specific experience in occupation j,
j = 1, 2 and
√
K−jt,a is the experience from the other occupation. We choose the square root
of experience in order to let disposable in be an increasing and concave function of experience.
The wage function for painters is,
ln(w1a,t) = γ
1
0 + γ
1
1 ∗
√
K1t,a−1 + γ
1
2 ∗
√
K2t,a−1 + ξ
1
a,t (3)
and the wage offer function for working in another occupation than painting is,
ln(w2a,t) = γ
2
0 + γ
2
1 ∗
√
K1t,a−1 + γ
2
2 ∗
√
K2t,a−1 + ξ
2
a,t (4)
The accumulation of human capital in the painting occupation, j = 1, is determined by the
following equation:
K1t,a = K
1
t,a−1 + d
1
a,t (5)
and the accumulation of human capital in the other occupation, j = 2, is determined by
the following equation:
K2t,a = K
2
t,a−1 + d
2
a,t (6)
The shocks to income, ξja,t for j = 1, 2, are joint normally distributed N(0,Ω) and serially
uncorrelated, such that E(ξja,tξ
j
a−1,t) = 0. We first show results from the model where the
1For notational simplicity we omit the individual index in this section
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correlation parameters and standard deviation of the income shocks are zero and show that in
order to match the income in the other occupation than painting of both the graduate groups
we need some stochastic element in the offered wages. The benefit during non-employment are
given by a linear function of years after graduation, for all t:
ba,t = α0 + α1 ∗ a (7)
The level and linear coefficient of the function of benefits are chosen to match the painters’
average received benefit level by years after graduation from the data.2.
Each period after graduation the workers get offered a job in each occupation with proba-
bility Qja,t, which follows a logistic form:
Qja,t =
Zja,t
1 + Zja,t
, (j = 1, 2) (8)
where the specification of Zja,t depends on the aggregate unemployment rate in the period,
t, and what the worker was doing during the previous period, a− 1, such that for the painting
occupation in all periods after the first year after graduation, a > 1, Z1a,t is given by:
Z1a,t = λ
1
0 + λ
1
1 ∗K1t,a−1 + λ12 ∗ d1a−1,t + λ13RPt + λ14(RPt −RAt ) (9)
and in the first period after graduation, a = 1, the Z11,t component of the job offer probability
for the painting occupation is given by:
Z11,t = δ
1
0 + δ1R
P
t + δ2(R
P
t −RAt ) (10)
For all period after graduation, a > 0, the Z2a,t component of the job offer probability in
the other occupation than painting is given by:
Z2a,t = λ
2
0 + λ
2
1 ∗K2t,a−1 + λ22 ∗ d2a−1,t + λ23RPt + λ24(RPt −RAt ) (11)
2An extension of this function is a more thorough breakdown of the benefit laws over the period. This is
the plan for a future extension of the model. We do not allow for any stochastic elements in the benefit level
nor do we allow the benefit level to depend on past income or experience. If this was the case, individuals
would need to take the expectation over their benefit levels when making their optimal choices. In the current
version this is not the case since people know their benefit levels with perfect foresight because the benefit
levels only vary with years after graduation. Another possible extension is to include insurance status as a
state variable. Workers who are insured have the possibility to receive unemployment benefits, which are higher
than the welfare benefits that workers without insurance have the possibility to receive. It is also possible to
include other types of benefits such as early retirement benefits, sickness benefits, and invalid benefits to get an
indicator of whether the individuals are out of the labor market.
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In the specification of Zja,t in equation 9 to 11, K
j
t,a−1 is past experience in the occupation,
dja−1,t is an indicator whether or not the person worked in the occupation during the previous
period, RPt is the aggregate unemployment rate for people educated as painters in the popu-
lation in calendar year t, and RPt − RAt is the difference in the aggregate unemployment rate
of painters and the overall aggregate unemployment rate in calendar year t. Each period after
graduation the individuals draw two shocks θja ∼ U [0, 1] for j = 1, 2 and if θja ≤ Qja,t the workers
receives a job offer in the occupation. In the model θ and ξ are independent.
The setup of the model described above gives a state Sa,t = {a,Kjt,a−1, dja−1,t, RPt , RAt , ξja,t, θja,t}
for j = 1, 2. The individuals maximize the expected present value of utility over their lifetime:
Va,t(Sa,t) = max
da,t
E[
A∑
a=1
βa−1
3∑
j=1
U ja,td
j
a,t|Sa,t] (12)
The maximization problem in 12 is achieved by an optimal sequence of choices of the control
variable dja,t given realization of the shocks and utility in the period. The optimization problem
in 12 can be written as a set of alternative specific value functions, each obeying the Bellman
(1957) equation:
Va,t(Sa,t) = max
j∈{1,2,3}
{V 1a,t(Sa,t), V 2a,t(Sa,t), V 3a,t(Sa,t)} (13)
where the alternative specific value functions, for a ∈ [1, A− 1], are given by:
V ja,t(Sa,t) = U
j
a,t + βEmax{Va+1,t+1(Sa+1,t+1|Sa,t, a, dja,t = 1)} (14)
and the value function the last period before retirement, at a = A or a = 40 is:
V ja,t(Sa,t) = U
j
a,t (15)
In equation 14, E is the expectation operator taken over the joint distribution of ξa and the
probability of a job offer, which depends on Zja,t(K
j
t,a−1, d
j
a−1,t, R
P
t , R
A
t ). The decision process for
the sample of individuals just finishing their painting apprenticeship is to decide in each period
whether to work as a painter, work in another occupation than painting, or not work in order
to maximize their lifetime utility. They do so, taking into account their endogenous human
capital accumulation in the two occupations and the changes in the job offer probabilities their
choices create. Each period after graduation individuals are offered a job in either, both, or
none of the two occupations, and dependent on the job offer, they decide if they want to work,
and if so in what occupation. We solve the model by backwards recursion.
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5 Results and Parameter Choices
The parameters of the model presented above in section 4 are so far taken partly from reduced
form regression and partly by testing the model to match the data as close as possible. It is the
plan for future research to estimate the parameters of the model. There are 25 parameters we
need to decide on and in order to structure the choice of parameters the model is first presented
without stochastic wages. This leaves 22 parameters, where we set the discount parameter,
β = 0.95. The rest of the parameters are:
5.1 Parameter Choices
From the wage function: γj0, γ
j
1, γ
j
2 for j = {1, 2}
From the job offer probabilities when a > 1 for and a > 0 for the other occupation: λj0, λ
j
1, λ
j
2, λ
j
3, λ
j
4
for j = {1, 2} and when a = 1, the job offer probability parameters for painters are: δ0, δ1, δ2
From the benefit function: α0, α1
The first two parameters are from the benefit function estimated from the data, where
α0 = 54, 800 and α1 = 560
3. In choosing the parameters for the wage function and the
function for job offer probabilities we run reduced form estimations to guide our choices. The
results of the two OLS wage regressions from equation 3 and 4 and the three logit regressions
for the job probabilities from equation 9, 10, and 11 are shown in the appendix table A-6 to
A-7. From the OLS regression of disposable income in table A-6 the coefficient of painting
experience is 0.1073 conditional on working as a painter, such that five years of experience as
a painter gives an extra income of 24 % if working as a painter. Five years of experience as a
painter gives 21 % higher wages if working in another occupation than painting. Experience in
another occupation than painting gives an extra 22 % disposable income if working in another
occupation than painting whereas five years of other experience than painting only gives 6 %
higher income in the painting occupation. These results from the OLS regressions suggest that
painting experience can be transferred to other occupations whereas experience in another oc-
cupation than painting is less valued for working as a painter. We will use these coefficients in
our benchmark analysis, which we name the reduced form benchmark.
Table A-7 shows the coefficient of 5 logit estimation for the probability of working as a
painter and the probability working in another occupation than painting as function of ex-
3The α0 and α1 parameters are estimated from a linear OLS with deflated disposable income as the dependent
variable and a constant term and years after graduation as regressors.
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perience, past participation, the unemployment rate for painters in the population and the
difference in unemployment rates of painter from the population minus the aggregate unem-
ployment rate of the population. Column 1 and 2 in table A-7 show probability of working as a
painter from 2 to 13 years after graduation and the probability of working in another occupation
than painting 1 to 13 years after graduation as function of the unemployment rate of painters
and the difference of the painter and the aggregate unemployment rate. Only including the
unemployment rates in the probability of working a 1 percentage point increase in the aggregate
painters unemployment rate decreases the probability of working as a painter by 2.6 % and a
one percentage point higher unemployment rate in painting over the aggregate unemployment
rate (ie. when unemployment of painters is 0.13 and aggregate unemployment is 0.12) decreases
the probability of working as a painter by 0.2 %. The probability of working in another occu-
pation than painting also decreases with the unemployment rate of painters but increases with
the difference in the unemployment rates. When the unemployment rate of painters increases
by 1 percentage point the probability of working in another occupation than painting decreases
by 0.9 % and when the unemployment rate of painters is 1 percentage point higher than the
unemployment rate of the overall population the probability of working in another occupation
than painting increases by 2 %. Figure A-7 in the appendix shows the two unemployment rates
over the period 1984 to 2002. From figure A-7 it is clear that the two unemployment rates
follow the same cycle and the unemployment rate of painters is more volatile than the overall
unemployment rate. Column 3 in table A-7 shows the correlation of the unemployment rates
and the probability of working in painting the first year after graduation. The coefficients of
unemployment for working in painting the first year after graduation follow the patterns from 2
to 13 years after graduation and we will use the coefficients from column 3 for the reduced form
benchmark in our model. Column 4 and 5 from table A-7 include the parameter values we will
use for the benchmark values in the probability of receiving a job offer in painting after the first
year after graduation and in the probability of receiving a job offer in another occupation than
painting for all years after graduation. The logit regressions in column 4 and 5 also includes
experience and past period’s participation in the given occupation, which are both positively
related to the probability of receiving work in the occupation.
Besides using the coefficients from the reduced form estimations we also pick parameters to
match the data as close as possible. We choose new parameters for the two wage functions and
the two job offer functions. The chosen parameters are given from the four following equations:
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ln(w1a,t) = 10.96 + 0.115 ∗
√
K1t,a−1 + 0.0364 ∗
√
K2t,a−1 + ξ
1
a,t (16)
ln(w2a,t) = 10.92 + 0.091 ∗
√
K1t,a−1 + 0.095 ∗
√
K2t,a−1 + ξ
2
a,t (17)
Z1a,t = −2.27 + 0.16 ∗K1t,a−1 + 2.2 ∗ d1a−1,t + 16.0 ∗RPt − 65.0(RPt −RAt ) (18)
Z2a,t = −2.0 + 0.60 ∗K2t,a−1 + 2.0 ∗ d2a−1,t + 0.0 ∗RPt + 0.0(RPt −RAt ) (19)
5.2 Results
In this section we present results from the model using different parameter choices. We show
results without income shocks from the reduced form parameters and the chosen parameters
from equation 16 to 19. Next we show the results from the chosen parameters when we also
include stochastic incomes. We first show evidence on the participation rates in the painting
occupation and the other occupation, next we show the results on income, and last we show evi-
dence on the transition probabilities. Finally we show how sensitive the simulated participation
rates are to different choices of parameter values.
We simulate 40 years of data for 10,000 individuals for each of the 11 years of graduation.
Individuals have the same uniform draws of θja and the same income shocks, ξ
j
a, for j = 1, 2
for the different years of graduation, but the 10,000 individuals have different shocks across
individuals and across years after graduation.
Figure A-8 in the appendix shows the simulated data by using parameters from the reduced
form estimations. In the first year after graduation the percentages working in painting match
the data because the parameters are estimated separately for year 1. Figure 8(a) and figure
9(b) show the painters’ job offer probabilities and their acceptance percentages each year after
graduation. It is clear from the figures that the workers always initially choose to work as a
painter if they receive a job offer and around 8 years after graduation some people start to
reject their painting job offers. Using the reduced form parameters does no match the data well
for the painters and in figure 9(c) and 9(d) it is clear that they do not match the participation
rate in the other occupation either. For the other occupation the job offer probabilities from
the reduced form estimates are always lower than the data.
The results from the chosen parameters are shown in figure A-9. The simulated data does
not match the real data perfectly however, the model does capture most of the patterns from
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the data. In figure 9(a) the simulated data has the lowest participation rates in painting 6
years after graduation and the data has the lowest participation rate 7 years after graduation
and the simulated data has too high participation rates in the later period after graduation.
For graduates from the period 1987-1993 working as painters, figure 9(b) shows that the the
simulated data also captures most of the patterns from the data but has too high participation
rates in painting in year 2 after graduation and too low participation rates in the later years
after graduation. The major exception from matching the patterns from the data is the first two
years after graduation for the 1987-1993 graduation group who works in the other occupation.
Figure 9(d) shows that the 1987-1993 graduation group has a high percentage of people from
the data working in the other sector for the first two years after graduation and the model
does not match this. In the sensitivity analysis of the parameter choices we show, in section
5.3, that this initial decline is not something the model is able to capture. We will discuss a
possible reason why the model is unable to match the early years for people working in the
other occupation than painting in section 5.4. From figure 9(c) and 9(d) it is furthermore
worth noticing that the job offer probabilities in the other occupation are much higher that the
participation rates while for the people who works as painters this difference is much smaller.
Figure A-9 shows the results using the chosen parameters and figure A-10 shows the same
parameter choices but also including a joint normally distributed shock for the incomes in
painting and the other occupation. The standard deviation of the two shocks are 0.15 and
their correlation is 0.2. The overall result, when including the stochastic incomes, is that the
percentages of the simulated people who work as painters decrease while the percentages of
people who work in the other occupations increase. Furthermore, it is no longer all the people
who have been offered a job as a painter who works as a painter. The reason for these patterns
can be found in figure A-11, which shows the incomes in the two occupations with and without
shocks.
The top two graphs in figure A-11 are the incomes for painters. These graphs show that
the simulated data from the reduced form estimates slightly underestimate income profile for
people who work as painters and the chosen parameters creates a steeper income profile, which
matches the data after around 6 years after graduation for the 1983-1986 graduation group
in figure 11(a) and almost always lies below the data for the 1987-1993 graduation group in
figure 11(b). Including the stochastic income in the model increases the average income levels
for painters all years after graduation and matches the data closer for both graduation groups.
The incomes of individuals who work in the other occupation than painting are given in figure
11(c) for the 1983-1986 graduation group and in figure 11(d) for the later 1987-1993 graduation
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group. The simulated data from the reduced form estimates and the chosen parameters have a
hard time matching the income profiles for individuals who work in the other occupation than
painting. For the early graduation group from 1983-1986, the simulated average income data
is initially below the actual average income of people who work in the other occupation and for
the later graduation group the simulated average income is initially above the actual average
income. Including stochastic income in the model increases the income for individuals working
in the other occupation more than the painters’ income for both graduation groups for all years
after graduation. This is because the difference between the percent of people who are offered a
job in the other occupation and the percentage of people participating in the other occupation
decreases when stochastic income is introduced. At the same time not all individuals who are
offered a job as a painter works as painters with stochastic incomes. For the workers who are
offered a job in both occupations, the ones with a high shock to income in the other occupation
and a low income shock in painting choose to work in the other occupation than painting. When
there are no stochastic incomes these individuals would work as painters. The reason why the
model is unable to match the income profile for individuals working in the other occupation
than painting is most likely the same reason why the the model cannot match the first few
years after graduation for the 1987-1993 graduation group. We will discuss possible extensions
to the model to match this part of the data better in section 5.4.
The last part of moments from the model are the transition rates. The parameters in the
model have not been chosen to match the transition rates and especially the transition rates
in the early periods after graduation need improvement. Table A-8 and table A-9 show the
transition rates between 2 and 3 years after graduation when data are simulated using the
reduced form estimates. The two tables show that too few people switch into painting and too
many people stay in unemployment and switch into unemployment. The transition rates for
the first 8 years after graduation are presented in tables A-10 and A-11. These transition rates
look closer to the transition rates from the actual data but there are again too many individuals
switching into unemployment and staying unemployed. Table A-12 show the persistence in each
state still using the reduced form estimates as parameters in the model. As was the case for
the transition matrices the persistence in unemployment is again too high and the persistence
in the other occupation than painting is too low.
The transition rates from the model look closer to the data when we use our chosen param-
eters. Table A-13 to A-16 show transition rates from 2-3 years after graduation and 2-8 years
after graduation when we use our chosen parameters in the model. The transition rates are all
closer to the real data than when we used the reduces form parameters but between year 2 and
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3 after graduation the model again has hard time matching the transition rates for individuals
who are working in the other occupation 2 years after graduation. This is the problem from
earlier that arises again that the model cannot replicate participation in the other occupation
in the first 3 years after graduation. For the first 8 years after graduation the persistence in
unemployment for the 1983-1986 graduation group is a little too low and the persistence of
working in the other occupation than painting is a little too high for the 1987-1993 graduation
group. In table A-17 we show the persistence over time in the three states using our cho-
sen parameters in the model. The persistence in painting and unemployment are close to the
data, but the persistence in the other occupation than painting is too low for both graduation
groups. Tables A-18 to A-22 show the same five transition tables when we include stochastic
income in the model. The transition rates from the model with stochastic income do worse
in terms of matching the transition rates from the data compared to not including stochastic
incomes. Especially, the persistence in each of the three states becomes worse. The persistence
in painting and the other occupation is too low and the persistence in unemployment is too high.
Above we show how the model matches moments in the data using different sets of param-
eters. The set of parameters, which match the data best are the chosen parameters without
stochastic income. We will use the chosen parameters in our sensitivity analysis in section 5.3
below as well as in the the counterfactual experiment in section 6.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Parameter Choices
In this section we show how the participation rates in painting and the other occupation changes,
when we change the values of the chosen parameters without stochastic income. We show the
results for changing the parameters from the two job offer functions. All figures from this section
are presented in the appendix. Figures A-12 and A-13 show what happens when we change
λ11 and λ
2
1, which are the coefficients on experience in the job offer function. Increasing the
coefficient on painting experience in job offer function for painting, λ11, increases the percentage
of people working in painting and decreases the percentage of people working in the other
occupation. The changes in percentage participation in each occupation is highest for the later
years after graduation when experience is higher. Figure A-13 shows similar qualitative results
when we change λ21, which is the coefficient on experience in the other occupation in the job offer
function for the other occupation. The difference is that the participation in both occupations
is not as sensitive to changes in λ21 as they are to changes in λ
1
1.
Figures A-14 and A-15 show the response to changes in λ12 and λ
2
2, which are the coefficients
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on past participation in each occupation. Increasing the coefficient on past participation in the
job offer function for painters increases the percentages of people working as painters and
decreases the percentages of people who work in the other occupation as presented in figure
A-14. The response in participation from changing the coefficient on past participation in the
other occupation is again less sensitive than changing the coefficient in the job offer function
for the painting occupation, as can be seen from figure A-15.
Next we show how sensitive the simulated data from the model is to changes in the un-
employment rates. Figures A-16 and A-17 show the results from changing the parameters,
λ13 and λ
2
3 on the unemployment rate for painters in the two job offer functions. An increase
in the parameter λ13 increases the job offer probability for painters overall and especially when
unemployment rate is high. From figure A-16 we see that increasing λ13 increases the percentage
working as painters and decreases the percentage working in the other occupation. Figure A-17
shows that increasing the coefficient on the painting unemployment rate, λ23, in the job offer
function for the other occupation has very little effect on the participation rates in painting but
increases the probability of working in the other occupation in all years after graduation.
Finally, we show in figures A-18 and A-19 the model’s response to changing the parameter
on the difference in aggregate unemployment rates, (RPt − RAt ). An increase λ14 in figure A-18
raises the participation in painting for almost all years after graduation with the exception of
the first 4 years after graduation from the 1983-1986 graduation group who graduated when the
aggregate painting unemployment rate was lower than the overall unemployment rate. Figure
A-19 shows that the same size increase in λ24 has very little effect on the participation rate
in painting but increases the participation in the other occupation for almost all years after
graduation.
By changing the parameters of the model we are able to capture different parts of the
moments in data. As noted earlier, the major obstacle in terms of matching moments from the
data is the early years in the other occupation. The model makes both the graduation groups
have low participation in the other occupation early on and increase in participation over the
lifecycle. We will discuss possible solutions to this problem in the next section.
5.4 Possible Extensions of the Model
In this section we discuss two possible extensions of the model, which both can increase the
participation rate in the other occupation in the years right after graduation. The first extension
is alterations of the two wage functions. Currently, the experience in painting has high payoffs
in the other occupation, but experience in the other occupation has little payoff in the painting
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occupation. The parameters on experience together with the concavity of the wage functions
induces people to work early in the painting occupation and transfer their experience from
painting into the other occupation later on. This increases the participation in the other
occupation over time but causes the participation in the other occupation to be low right after
graduation. A possible alteration of the wage functions is to let the experience parameters enter
in the following way:
ln(wja) = γ
j
0 + γ
j
1 ∗
√
Kja−1 + φj ∗K−ja−1 (20)
where φj ∈ [0, 1] and can be interpreted as how much a unit of experience from the other
occupation is worth relative to a unit of experience from the chosen occupation.
The second extension of the model is to include serving in military as a forth choice in
the first two or three years after graduation. As seen from table A-1, there are 8 % of the
sample who works in the military the first year after graduation. The choice to work in the
military should be modeled to depend on the unemployment rate for painters because 80 % of
the people who work in the occupation for the 1987-1993 graduation group are in the military
and it is therefore mostly these people who represents the initially high participation in the
other occupation for the given group. Including the military as a choice in the first 2 years after
graduation would likely also improve the transition rates for the 1987-1993 graduation group.
This group has low persistence in the other occupation and high transitions from the other
occupation into the painting occupation, both features which could be captured by a choice to
serve temporarily in the military.
6 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section we investigate how our sample of painting apprentices behave if we change the
job offer probability in the first year after graduation to be 100 % for the painting occupation.
We use our chosen parameters without stochastic income for this counterfactual experiment.
The average participation rates from the model for the two graduation groups in the three
states, painting, other occupation, and unemployment are given in table 3.
Table 3 shows that the early graduation group who graduated during low unemployment
have higher participation rates in painting in the first 10 years after graduation and in all 40
years of working than the later graduation group who graduated during high unemployment.
The early graduation group also has lower participation in the other occupation than painting
and they have lower unemployment rates. Using our chosen parameters the results from the
model show that there are long term consequences of graduating when unemployment is high in
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Table 3: Average participation rates for first 10 years after graduation and all 40 years from
the model using chosen parameters.
First 10 years All 40 years
Grad. Grad. Grad. Grad.
status 83-86 87-93 83-86 87-93
paint 0.72 0.62 0.81 0.70
other 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.18
unempl 0.21 0.27 0.08 0.12
terms of participation rates in the occupation for which the workers trained. The counterfactual
experiment gives both graduation groups the same probability of receiving a job offer in the
painting occupation the first year after graduation, namely 100 % probability of a job offer.
The results on the average participation rates from the experiment can be seen in table 4.
Increasing the job offer probability in the painting occupation to 100 % in the first year after
graduation increases the participation rates for both graduation groups but it increases the
painting participation rates more for the later graduation group who graduated during high
unemployment.
Table 4: Counterfactual average participation rates for first 10 years after graduation and all
40 years from the model using chosen parameters with 100 % job offer probability in painting
first year after graduation.
First 10 years All 40 years
Grad. Grad. Grad. Grad.
status 83-86 87-93 83-86 87-93
paint 0.75 0.73 0.84 0.78
other 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.13
unempl 0.19 0.20 0.07 0.09
By comparing table 3 and table 4 we can see that the average participation rate in the
painting occupation over the first ten years after graduation increases by 3 percentage point
for the early graduation group while the participation rate increases by 11 percentage points
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for the later graduation group. The average participation rates in painting also increases more
for the later graduation group for all 40 years they are in the model when setting the job offer
probability to 100 % in painting in the first year after graduation.
In figures A-20 and A-21 we show the result on participation rates in the two occupations
for the two graduation groups from the counterfactual experiment. Figure 20(a) shows that the
1983-1986 graduation group only has a small increase in painting participation the first year
after graduation from the counterfactual experiment. This is because their participation rate
in painting already is very high in the first year after graduation and as a result of this, the
experiment does not change the participation rates much over the first 20 years after graduation.
The opposite is true for the 1987-1993 graduation group. This group initially had an average
participation rate in painting the first year after graduation which was 65 %. By increasing
the job offer probability to 100 % in the painting occupation in the first year after graduation,
this group finds an average participation rate in painting, which is around 7 percentage points
higher than the participation rate was before the experiment. The participation rates in the
other occupation than painting are shown in figure A-21. The participation rate in the other
occupation than painting is the opposite of what happens for the participation in the painting;
the 1983-1986 graduation group has a small reaction to the experiments whereas the 1987-1993
graduation group decreases their participation in the other occupation than painting by around
5 percentage points.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we use 11 cohorts of males graduating with a wall-painting apprenticeship to
analyze how occupational choice relates to education. We use a model which builds on the
dynamic discrete choice models in Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999)
but we allow workers’ occupational choice to be directed to the occupation that they trained for.
We use the model to analyze how workers’ occupational choices are related to their education
and how these occupational choices are affected by the aggregate unemployment rate in their
field of training and by the aggregate unemployment rate in the overall economy.
We show how the participation rate is in the painting occupation, in other occupations than
painting, and the unemployment rate for two different graduation groups, one that graduated
during low unemployment and one that graduated during high unemployment. For people grad-
uating with an apprenticeship during the expansion from 1984-1986 there were 90 % working
as painters one year after graduation and for people graduating with a painting apprenticeship
during the recession from 1987-1993 there were on average 63 % of the them who worked as
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painters the first year after graduation. Ten years after graduation there are on average 70 %
from both of the graduation groups who work as painters.
We use the model to match these participation rates as well as participation rates in another
occupation than painting and in unemployment. Using the parameters from the the best fit
of the data we predict that over the workers’ 40 years in the labor market, the group who
graduated during low unemployment has 81 % average participation rate in painting and the
group who graduated during high unemployment has an average participation rate of 70 % over
their 40 years in the labor market. With the chosen parameters for the model we perform a
counterfactual experiment, which allows for the job offer probability in the painting occupation
to be 100 % in the first year after graduation for both graduation groups. By increasing
the job offer probability in the painting occupation in the first year after graduation to 100
%, the participation percentages over the workers’ 40 year work life change to 78 % for the
high unemployment graduation group and to 84 % for the group who graduated during low
unemployment.
The model is still preliminary and it has a hard time matching the participation rate in
the other occupation than painting in the first few years after graduation. We discuss possible
extension of the model where one of them is to include the choice to temporarily enter the
military in the first or second year after graduation.
Most of our results are presented without stochastic incomes in the two occupations and
matching the data when including stochastic incomes in the model is also future research.
Including the stochastic incomes decreases the persistence in each state. At the moment the
only source of state dependence in the model is the indicator of past participation in the job
offer probability. It could be interesting to include unobserved individual specific heterogeneity
in the model such that the wage shocks and the job offer draws become serially correlated. This
can allow for more state dependence and is also a plan for a future development of the model.
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APPENDICES
A1 Percent in Occupation Before Aggregation
Table A-1: Percent of graduates with painting apprenticeship in different employment categories
by year after graduation
years after paint paint construction other white military non-
graduation empl. self empl. blue collar blue collar collar employment
1 0.771 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.006 0.083 0.124
2 0.718 0.020 0.008 0.025 0.010 0.062 0.166
3 0.741 0.033 0.015 0.037 0.013 0.018 0.162
4 0.749 0.042 0.018 0.048 0.015 0.008 0.140
5 0.729 0.048 0.020 0.048 0.016 0.008 0.145
6 0.685 0.069 0.022 0.067 0.018 0.005 0.153
7 0.682 0.087 0.022 0.080 0.015 0.006 0.132
8 0.674 0.104 0.016 0.087 0.020 0.004 0.121
9 0.647 0.111 0.019 0.082 0.024 0.004 0.131
10 0.673 0.120 0.017 0.075 0.021 0.005 0.104
11 0.647 0.137 0.014 0.084 0.021 0.004 0.108
12 0.634 0.158 0.016 0.088 0.014 0.003 0.099
13 0.616 0.171 0.017 0.091 0.024 0.002 0.096
14 0.619 0.172 0.018 0.099 0.025 0.001 0.080
15 0.605 0.172 0.016 0.093 0.025 0.001 0.101
16 0.601 0.201 0.014 0.085 0.024 0.003 0.083
17 0.553 0.226 0.018 0.080 0.035 0.000 0.101
18 0.563 0.208 0.016 0.082 0.041 0.000 0.106
19 0.585 0.202 0.011 0.117 0.032 0.000 0.085
20 0.333 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.679 0.096 0.016 0.066 0.018 0.015 0.125
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Figure A-1: Percentages people with a painting apprenticeship working as painters, working in
another occupation than painting, and not working.
Figure A-2: Percentages people with a painting apprenticeship working as painters for 1983-
1986 graduates and 1987-1993 graduates by years after graduation. 95 % confidence intervals
included.
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Figure A-3: Percentages people with a painting apprenticeship in another occupation than
painting for 1983-1986 graduates and 1987-1993 graduates by years after graduation. 95 %
confidence intervals included.
Figure A-4: Percentages people with a painting apprenticeship not working for 1983-1986 grad-
uates and 1987-1993 graduates by years after graduation. 95 % confidence intervals included.
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Table A-2: Percent of graduates with painting apprenticeship in different employment categories
by year after graduation
Graduated Graduated
1983-1986 1983-1986
Years after grad. Paint Other occ. Unempl. Paint Other occ Unempl.
1 552 15 42 521 125 171
90.6 2.5 6.9 63.8 15.3 20.9
2 466 29 114 392 101 324
76.5 4.8 18.7 48.0 12.4 39.7
3 458 33 118 445 48 321
75.2 5.4 19.4 54.7 5.9 39.4
4 437 37 134 481 69 263
71.9 6.1 22.0 59.2 8.5 32.3
5 411 40 156 503 71 238
67.7 6.6 25.7 61.9 8.7 29.3
6 384 42 177 502 83 226
63.7 7.0 29.4 61.9 10.2 27.9
7 370 44 188 545 92 170
61.5 7.3 31.2 67.5 11.4 21.1
8 375 43 181 562 105 139
62.6 7.2 30.2 69.7 13.0 17.2
9 392 50 156 548 101 155
65.6 8.4 26.1 68.2 12.6 19.3
10 414 49 133 506 87 121
69.5 8.2 22.3 70.9 12.2 16.9
11 433 51 111 471 87 109
72.8 8.6 18.7 70.6 13.0 16.3
12 438 52 105 367 68 75
73.6 8.7 17.6 72.0 13.3 14.7
13 444 61 85 277 58 55
75.3 10.3 14.4 71.0 14.9 14.1
14 447 68 74 157 44 42
75.9 11.5 12.6 64.6 18.1 17.3
15 451 66 71 104 24 32
76.7 11.2 12.1 65.0 15.0 20.0
16 435 70 79
74.5 12.0 13.5
17 293 52 50
74.2 13.2 12.7
18 175 33 34
72.3 13.6 14.0
19 65 13 13
71.4 14.3 14.3
247
Figure A-5: Yearly disposable income in 1980 Danish Kroner of two graduations groups, 1983-
1986 and 1987-1993. By years after graduation for the sample working as painters.
Figure A-6: Yearly disposable income in 1980 Danish Kroner of two graduations groups, 1983-
1986 and 1987-1993. By years after graduation for the sample working in other occupations
than painting.
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Table A-3: Transition matrix up to 8 years after graduation for graduates from 1983 to 1986.
Status in t
Status in t− 1 Paint Other Occ. Unemp.
Paint
Number 2,583 55 434
Row % 84.1 1.8 14.1
Other Occ.
Number 37 174 28
Row % 15.5 72.8 11.7
Unempl.
Number 281 39 606
Row % 30.4 4.2 65.4
Table A-4: Transition matrix up to 8 years after graduation for graduates from 1987 to 1993.
Status in t
Status in t− 1 Paint Other Occ. Unemp.
Paint
Number 2,737 123 523
Row % 80.9 3.6 15.5
Other Occ.
Number 141 340 107
Row % 24.0 57.8 18.2
Unempl.
Number 552 106 1,051
Row % 32.3 6.2 61.5
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Table A-5: Persistence in each state for the two graduation groups. Percent in the in the state
in year t conditional on being in the state in year t-1.
Graduated Graduated
1983-1986 1983-1986
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
in paint in other occ. in unempl. in paint in other occ. in unempl.
Years if paint if other occ. if unempl. if paint if other occ. if unempl.
after previous previous previous previous previous previous
graduation period period period period period period
1 . . . . . .
2 0.82 0.80 0.67 0.61 0.40 0.75
3 0.86 0.72 0.49 0.76 0.18 0.62
4 0.87 0.70 0.64 0.83 0.67 0.61
5 0.84 0.78 0.66 0.83 0.78 0.61
6 0.81 0.75 0.69 0.84 0.75 0.62
7 0.82 0.69 0.68 0.89 0.77 0.56
8 0.86 0.70 0.69 0.89 0.76 0.55
9 0.86 0.74 0.61 0.87 0.71 0.62
10 0.91 0.70 0.66 0.92 0.76 0.60
11 0.89 0.67 0.55 0.90 0.85 0.61
12 0.90 0.76 0.61 0.93 0.83 0.61
13 0.89 0.83 0.49 0.93 0.89 0.71
14 0.92 0.85 0.55 0.89 0.93 0.63
15 0.92 0.78 0.57 0.87 0.79 0.67
16 0.91 0.77 0.68 . . .
17 0.90 0.80 0.56 . . .
18 0.91 0.88 0.65 . . .
19 0.91 0.63 0.75 . . .
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Table A-6: Wage regression for painters and other occupation
Wage regression Wage regression
for painters for other occupation
(1) (2)
paint exp. 0.1073*** 0.0919***
(29.19) (14.60)
other occ. exp. 0.0264*** 0.0978***
(2.756) (15.07)
Constant 10.9490*** 10.9178***
(1321) (832.0)
Observations 11667 1640
R-squared 0.068 0.190
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
t statistics in parentheses
Figure A-7: Yearly unemployment rates of (educated) painters from the population and the
overall population.
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Table A-7: Logit regressions for participation in painters and other occupation
Painting Other occ. Painters Painting Other occ.
2 to 13 years 1 to 13 years first year 2 to 13 years 1 to 13 years
after grad. after grad. after grad. after grad. after grad.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
paint exp. 0.2683***
0.0541***
(30.28)
past partic.
in paint 2.2355***
0.4765***
(50.54)
other exp. 0.5495***
0.0265***
(23.19)
past partic.
in other 2.6991***
0.3474***
(31.57)
unempl. painters -11.5306*** -10.9517*** -19.8763** 7.6705*** 6.3442**
-2.5738** * -0.9111*** -3.4188** 1.5453*** 0.3055**
(-9.563) (-5.732) (-2.266) (4.770) (2.531)
unempl diff. -1.0966 24.5204*** -8.9883 -28.6543*** -4.6380
-0.2448 2.0399*** -1.5460 -5.7729*** -0.2234
(-0.462) (6.474) (-0.604) (-9.267) (-0.953)
Constant 1.6286*** -1.4146*** 2.7265*** -2.2726*** -3.8890***
(16.43) (-9.244) (3.576) (-15.59) (-18.43)
Observations 14996 16422 1426 14996 16422
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Italic numbers are marginal coefficient calculated at the mean
z statistics in parentheses
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A2 Appendix Results from Different Parameter Choices
(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-8: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data with
parameters from reduced form estimations.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-9: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data with
parameters chosen to ”fit” data.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-10: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data with
parameters chosen to ”fit” data without income shock. Figures are simulated data with income
shocks in the model.
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(a) Disposable income of people from graduation
years 1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Disposable income of people from graduation
years 1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Disposable income of people from graduation
years 1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Disposable income of people from graduation
years 1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-11: Disposable income in 1980 Danish Kroner in painting and other occupations from
data and simulated data with parameters chosen to ”fit” data without income shock. Figures
are simulated data from reduced form parameters and chosen parameters with and without
income shocks in the model.
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Table A-8: Transition matrix between 2 to 3 years after graduation for graduates from 1983 to 1986. Data
simulated from reduced form estimates.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,76 0,01 0,23
Other Occ.
Row % 0,14 0,42 0,44
Unempl.
Row % 0,19 0,03 0,78
Table A-9: Transition matrix between 2 to 3 years after graduation for graduates from 1987 to 1993. Data
simulated from reduced form estimates.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,75 0,01 0,24
Other Occ.
Row % 0,15 0,44 0,40
Unempl.
Row % 0,18 0,03 0,79
Table A-10: Transition matrix from 2 to 8 years after graduation for graduates from 1983 to 1986. Data
simulated from reduced form estimates.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unemp.
Paint
Row % 0,80 0,01 0,19
Other Occ.
Row % 0,15 0,52 0,33
Unempl.
Row % 0,24 0,03 0,74
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Table A-11: Transition matrix from 2 to 8 years after graduation for graduates from 1987 to 1993. Data
simulated from reduced form estimates.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,79 0,01 0,21
Other Occ.
Row % 0,14 0,50 0,36
Unempl.
Row % 0,20 0,02 0,78
Table A-12: Persistence in each state for the two graduation groups. Percent in the in the state in year t
conditional on being in the state in year t-1. Simulated data from reduced form estimates.
Graduated Graduated
1983-1986 1983-1986
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
in paint in other occ. in unempl. in paint in other occ. in unempl.
if paint if other occ. if unempl. if paint if other occ. if unempl.
Years previous previous previous previous previous previous
after graduation period period period period period period
1 . . . . . .
2 0,72 0,32 0,80 0,69 0,37 0,81
3 0,76 0,42 0,78 0,75 0,44 0,79
4 0,79 0,44 0,77 0,78 0,47 0,79
5 0,81 0,52 0,75 0,80 0,54 0,77
6 0,83 0,50 0,73 0,82 0,51 0,76
7 0,86 0,56 0,70 0,83 0,55 0,76
8 0,88 0,59 0,69 0,85 0,58 0,75
9 0,89 0,61 0,66 0,87 0,63 0,74
10 0,91 0,66 0,66 0,88 0,67 0,76
11 0,92 0,73 0,67 0,89 0,70 0,75
12 0,93 0,74 0,64 0,91 0,76 0,74
13 0,94 0,81 0,65 0,92 0,78 0,75
14 0,94 0,83 0,66 0,93 0,81 0,75
15 0,95 0,82 0,65 0,94 0,82 0,76
Table A-13: Transition matrix between 2 to 3 years after graduation for graduates from 1983 to 1986. Data
simulated from chosen parameters.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unemp.
Paint
Row % 0,85 0,02 0,13
Other Occ.
Row % 0,30 0,47 0,23
Unempl.
Row % 0,34 0,07 0,58
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Table A-14: Transition matrix between 2 to 3 years after graduation for graduates from 1987 to 1993. Data
simulated from chosen parameters.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,79 0,03 0,18
Other Occ.
Row % 0,25 0,52 0,22
Unempl.
Row % 0,30 0,08 0,61
Table A-15: Transition matrix from 2 to 8 years after graduation for graduates from 1983 to 1986. Data
simulated from chosen parameters.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,84 0,02 0,14
Other Occ.
Row % 0,21 0,62 0,17
Unempl.
Row % 0,33 0,09 0,59
Table A-16: Transition matrix from 2 to 8 years after graduation for graduates from 1987 to 1993. Data
simulated from chosen parameters.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,82 0,03 0,16
Other Occ.
Row % 0,18 0,67 0,15
Unempl.
Row % 0,32 0,08 0,59
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Table A-17: Persistence in each state for the two graduation groups. Percent in the in the state in year t
conditional on being in the state in year t-1. Simulated data from chosen parameters.
Graduated Graduated
1983-1986 1983-1986
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
in paint in other occ. in unempl. in paint in other occ. in unempl.
if paint if other occ. if unempl. if paint if other occ. if unempl.
Years previous previous previous previous previous previous
after graduation period period period period period period
1 . . . . . .
2 0,88 0,35 0,51 0,74 0,48 0,66
3 0,85 0,47 0,58 0,79 0,52 0,61
4 0,84 0,55 0,61 0,80 0,58 0,60
5 0,81 0,61 0,66 0,84 0,63 0,58
6 0,79 0,65 0,64 0,85 0,71 0,54
7 0,84 0,65 0,55 0,85 0,78 0,57
8 0,86 0,68 0,53 0,86 0,80 0,57
9 0,89 0,72 0,48 0,87 0,83 0,55
10 0,92 0,74 0,39 0,86 0,84 0,60
11 0,91 0,84 0,43 0,87 0,86 0,58
12 0,92 0,83 0,41 0,88 0,86 0,58
13 0,93 0,87 0,41 0,89 0,88 0,58
14 0,93 0,89 0,43 0,88 0,89 0,56
15 0,94 0,89 0,43 0,90 0,90 0,57
Table A-18: Transition matrix between 2 to 3 years after graduation for graduates from 1983 to 1986. Data
simulated from chosen parameters and including stochastic income in the model.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unemp.
Paint
Row % 0,81 0,05 0,14
Other Occ.
Row % 0,23 0,53 0,23
Unempl.
Row % 0,31 0,08 0,61
Table A-19: Transition matrix between 2 to 3 years after graduation for graduates from 1987 to 1993. Data
simulated from chosen parameters and including stochastic income in the model.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,74 0,06 0,20
Other Occ.
Row % 0,18 0,56 0,26
Unempl.
Row % 0,26 0,07 0,67
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Table A-20: Transition matrix from 2 to 8 years after graduation for graduates from 1983 to 1986. Data
simulated from chosen parameters and including stochastic income in the model.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,79 0,06 0,15
Other Occ.
Row % 0,20 0,62 0,18
Unempl.
Row % 0,29 0,10 0,61
Table A-21: Transition matrix from 2 to 8 years after graduation for graduates from 1987 to 1993. Data
simulated from chosen parameters and including stochastic income in the model.
Status in t
Status in t-1 Paint Other Occ. Unempl.
Paint
Row % 0,77 0,06 0,17
Other Occ.
Row % 0,19 0,62 0,19
Unempl.
Row % 0,27 0,09 0,64
Table A-22: Persistence in each state for the two graduation groups. Percent in the in the state in year t
conditional on being in the state in year t-1. Simulated data from chosen parameters and including stochastic
income in the model.
Graduated Graduated
1983-1986 1983-1986
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
in paint in other occ. in unempl. in paint in other occ. in unempl.
if paint if other occ. if unempl. if paint if other occ. if unempl.
Years previous previous previous previous previous previous
after graduation period period period period period period
1 . . . . . .
2 0,82 0,47 0,59 0,68 0,52 0,73
3 0,81 0,53 0,61 0,74 0,56 0,67
4 0,80 0,58 0,63 0,76 0,58 0,65
5 0,76 0,63 0,67 0,79 0,60 0,61
6 0,75 0,65 0,66 0,80 0,61 0,59
7 0,79 0,66 0,57 0,80 0,67 0,61
8 0,81 0,66 0,54 0,80 0,69 0,60
9 0,83 0,67 0,50 0,81 0,71 0,59
10 0,86 0,66 0,40 0,80 0,74 0,61
11 0,84 0,70 0,45 0,80 0,75 0,59
12 0,84 0,71 0,43 0,80 0,76 0,59
13 0,85 0,72 0,43 0,81 0,78 0,60
14 0,85 0,75 0,44 0,81 0,79 0,58
15 0,85 0,74 0,45 0,82 0,79 0,59
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-12: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data
varying λ11.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-13: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data
varying λ21.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-14: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data
varying λ12.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-15: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data
varying λ22.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-16: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data
varying λ13.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-17: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data
varying λ23.
267
(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-18: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data
varying λ14.
268
(a) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working as painters.
(c) Percentages of people from graduation years
1983-1986 working in other occupations.
(d) Percentages of people from graduation years
1987-1993 working in other occupations.
Figure A-19: Percentages in painting and other occupations from data and simulated data
varying λ24.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years 1983-1986
working as painters.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years 1987-1993
working as painters.
Figure A-20: Percentages in painting from data and simulated data with the chosen parameters.
Counterfactual experiment of increasing job offer probability in painting to be 100 % in the
first year after graduation.
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(a) Percentages of people from graduation years 1983-1986
working in other occupations.
(b) Percentages of people from graduation years 1987-1993
working in other occupations.
Figure A-21: Percentages in other occupation from data and simulated data with the chosen
parameters. Counterfactual experiment of increasing job offer probability in painting to be 100
% in the first year after graduation.
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